Bobby from Across. The proposals overall aim of enabling chain abstraction is a sound goal, and as outlined in the post, multiple teams are already working on this in various ways.
Regarding the phases, I believe that Phases 1 and 2 will have the most significant impact. I think it would be most beneficial for these three parties (DAO, OCL, and Foundation) to work together in researching each solution - including intent-based bridging, messaging layer development, - to thoroughly understand the advantages and disadvantages of each approach.
Non-technical solutions
I’d like to highlight some key non-technical differences between Optimism and Arbitrum’s approaches to builder engagement and ecosystem connectivity. Optimism has successfully created a more cohesive and welcoming environment through several strategic initiatives.
Superbridgg or bridgg show you most OP Stack chains and let you bridge between them directly via Across,CCTP or canonical routes. This visibility makes OP chains more attractive to builders, as their projects gain immediate recognition within the ecosystem.
From the volume flowing through these to Across we can confirm a fair amount transaction volume flowing through these frontend interfaces. Currently, Arbitrum lacks a comparable solution. I strongly recommend playing with the Superbridgg UI.
Additionally, Optimism’s Retroactive Public Goods Funding (RPGF) program provides tangible benefits to OP chains. Their current “mission” grant program for op chains offers flexible funding opportunities. While neither of these initiatives directly addresses technical interoperability, they make the Optimism ecosystem significantly more attractive to builders from a business and community perspective.
The Arbitrum DAO should consider developing similar ecosystem-building initiatives to enhance its appeal to developers and projects.
Bridge Design Research
The growing popularity of intent-based bridges is largely due to their ability to provide fast transaction fills, improving overall user experience. However, it’s crucial for the DAO and broader ecosystem to understand that not all intent-based bridges are designed equally. These systems can vary significantly in their implementation and risk profiles. I believe it would be valuable for us to develop a deeper understanding of these various design choices and their implications.
Key differences exist in several areas (as examples)
- Relayer network; Decentralized or centralized (running just 1-3 relayers in-house.)
- Others take different approaches to finality risk
- Variations in their settlement contracts - assuming they even implement a settlement system at all. These settlement contracts, which determine how relayers are compensated for their services, are particularly important as they directly impact the bridge’s security and sustainability
The messaging layer situation deserves similar detailed analysis. Uniswap conducted a comparable study a couple of years ago. These types of analytical reports enable orbit chains to make more informed decisions about their infrastructure choices.
Both of these reports are impactful for the arb ecosystem and should be conducted with OCL and Foundation IMO.
Clearing Layer
This section is to provide some context on the ‘clearing’/rebalancing layer.
Per the Chain Abstraction Stack Table in the proposal; “Ensure Solvers are refunded on their preferred chains and prevent liquidity from being stuck”
Relayers are economically incentivized actors and are here to do a service to get paid. They will rebalance their funds in whatever way they feel fit;
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CEX
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using the canonical solution (which is a lot faster now thanks to fast withdrawals and eventually Chain Mesh)
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Decentralized solution like Everclear
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PS: Across LP pool (Specific to Across Relayers and if they want to get paid on another chain that isn’t the source chain)
The various clearing solutions each come with their own set of trade-offs, whether in terms of cost, centralization, or speed. However, I don’t understand why the DAO needs to make specific recommendations regarding clearing layers, as this primarily concerns solvers/relayers rather than Orbit chains or the Arbitrum DAO itself. Also the only protocol clearing layer is everclear, afaik.
Solvers are fundamentally chain-agnostic actors driven by economic incentives, and they’re already well-versed in the available rebalancing solutions. Given this context, I’m uncertain about the actual impact of a clearing-focused RFP. Since we consider solvers to operate in an open market, it would be logical to treat the clearing layer similarly - as an open market solution.
What would be more beneficial is focusing on attracting more solvers to the Arbitrum ecosystem, particularly as ERC-7683 continues to develop.