These structural changes are creating some accountability gaps while giving OpCo way more authority. I get that operational flexibility is needed, but not by throwing basic governance safeguards out the window.
Letting OAT members keep their service provider relationships while they’re approving discretionary spending? That’s a direct financial conflict waiting to happen. An OAT member could literally approve contracts that benefit their own company, and we’re supposed to trust that “recusal” will handle it. Come on. You don’t have to assume bad faith to see the incentive problems.
“Excess capital that is available can be used on a discretionary basis” - this is exactly the kind of language that lets spending spiral out of control.
And what counts as “benefiting the ArbitrumDAO”? Pretty much anything if you’re creative enough with the justification.
Where’s the Accountability? That’s not how this should work. If you want more authority, you need more accountability, not less.
What Should Actually Happen Start small and earn the bigger authority. Give OpCo like $25K quarterly for discretionary stuff and let them prove they can use it well. If they’re crushing it and creating real value, then we can talk about expanding that authority. But earning expanded power through good performance, not getting it by removing oversight.
I want OpCo to succeed and I understand they need some flexibility to operate effectively. But these changes feel like they’re optimizing for OpCo’s convenience rather than what’s actually good for the DAO.