The proposal pinpoints a real bottleneck. Delegates have watched promising ideas wither while each step—draft, OAT review, Snapshot, on-chain execution—grinds forward, so letting OpCo co-design solutions with service providers before a formal DAO vote could shrink timelines, surface realistic budgets sooner, and keep momentum alive. We share that goal, and we agree that some discretionary spend is essential to avoid bureaucratic gridlock.
Where we part ways is on scope and safeguards. The charter already lets OpCo draw up to $500k a month with no vote, climbing to an OAT or DAO check above that. After covering the exemplary $5.2 M annual budgeting, about $436k per month, roughly $64k in “excess” cash would still be available every month. Under the amendment, that surplus could finance external work without pre-defined limits or public sign-off, effectively repurposing the treasury while the community learns only in hindsight.
Agility does not require a blank cheque. A practical compromise would:
create a “discovery pool” capped at, say, $10k per engagement and $30k per quarter;
require unanimous OAT sign-off for each draw and publish the contract summary in the next monthly report;
These guardrails keep the spirit of fast, iterative vendor collaboration while ensuring that material sums still pass through the DAO’s accountability mechanisms. Until such parameters are built into the text, we would vote against and invite the authors to return with a tighter, budget-bounded revision.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
We would be voting in favour of the proposal as it provides the necessary flexibility and clarity to ensure the OpCo can fulfil its mandate effectively. By allowing the OpCo to engage with service providers, allocate discretionary funds for proactive initiatives, and offer flexible compensation structures, these changes will empower the entity to attract top talent. After discussion with Pedro it’s clear this model is similar to a fire-starter grant by Plurality; if the OpCo believes an initiative adds value to the DAO, it can fund the contributor or service provider for their time and effort.
The revisions to governance structures, conflict of interest policies, and the mandate itself reinforce both transparency and accountability, while also enabling broader participation from aligned contributors. This is especially important for hiring high-quality talent for the OpCo. During the OAT elections, many DAO contributors expressed interest in applying but were restricted due to the requirement to relinquish existing roles. With this new framework, OpCo will be better positioned to recruit top talent without unnecessary trade-offs. Combined with the capabilities of the current committee members, these updates will empower the OpCo to become a more effective and proactive partner in advancing the long-term interests of the ArbitrumDAO.
I’m voting in favor. These seem like pragmatic changes that will improve Opco’s operational capability and help avoid unnecessary slowdowns along the way, so I believe it is better to support this proposal now rather than face delays later. That said, I also think that every time there is a move towards more centralization, community oversight and transparency from the operators should increase. I’ll keep following developments closely and expect Opco to uphold the highest standards of transparency moving forward
The DAO will benefit from the capacity of OpCo to move quickly and execute.
As a DAO, we already voted for the OpCo budget, and those limitations are absurd. I’m in favor of letting OpCo do their thing and what comes from it, we will be watching, and holding the people running it accountable. Often every micro-decision becomes a governance theater performance. We’re burning contributor energy on process instead of progress.
The DAO needs an execution arm that can actually execute, without the need of asking permission. These changes create the operational flexibility OpCo was supposed to have from the start.
If anything, I’d like to see this evolve into a more general pattern: DAO sets strategy, execution entities carry it out.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We are voting FOR the proposal.
While we understand the concerns raised by other delegates regarding the change to the OpCo’s original mandate, we do not share them. We’ve seen several initiatives in the past fall short and require additional clarification (e.g., the role of the DAO Advocate in the original ARDC, or the responsibilities of chairs in the MSS); therefore, we shouldn’t let the original proposal restrict us from proposing changes.
Furthermore, we believe that, at this stage, the OAT should have the flexibility to maximize the chances of OpCo’s success. However, we ask that the OAT and OpCo personnel ensure frequent and proper reporting back to the DAO so that we can keep track of what’s happening, raise concerns or issues in a timely manner, and correct course if needed.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation decided to vote FOR *(Update the OpCo Foundation’s Operational Capabilityon this proposal at theSnapshot Vote.*
Rationale
In this case, we want to give comments on the changes:
Ecosystem Support or Financial Management only: makes sense, this clause is hindering the OpCo’s ability to perform on other non-related verticals because it is a formally created entity that must fulfill its foundational purpose. Although Ecosystem Support or Financial Management are broad concepts, if we want to ensure optimal operational capability for the OpCo, this change is a must.
Compensation for OpCo Employees: We support this approach. In traditional finance, salary structures similar to what the OAT has proposed are standard practice.
That said, SEED believes that token vesting schedules may be an even more effective and aligned mechanism than the initially proposed bonuses, especially for an organization of this nature. Vesting helps reinforce long-term commitment and accountability.
Inability to Interact with Service Providers and Restrictive Treasury Spend: This provides the OpCo with the capability to manage budgetary surplus for hiring service providers or providing grants, converting the OpCo into a more proactive organization, and allowing them to make some minor decisions without the need for a governance vote.
For the remaining changes, we think these are no-brainer decisions.
While caution is needed when expanding mandates, I am supportive in this case. I have voted FOR. Unblocking budget channels without asking for new money is a pragmatic step, but it requires strong transparency. I was supportive of OpCo from the start and think (optimistically) that the involved parties are operating in Arb’s best interest. I acknowledge that this proposal is giving even more latitude, but with the level of scrutiny there is on this DAO I am comfortable signaling approval in this case.
I don’t support this, and I disagree. I have voted in favour anyway, but wanted to express here.
Voting FOR “Updating the OpCo Foundation’s Operational Capability”
Decision Summary
After a close read of the forum thread and the linked docs, I’m casting a FOR vote. These amendments give OpCo just enough freedom to move at the speed our ecosystem now demands, while still anchoring key guardrails the DAO painstakingly put in place last year.
Why I’m Voting FOR
Faster, Smarter Execution
By clarifying that the existing monthly spend caps also cover exploratory pilots, OpCo can commission research or run small-scale tests before a full DAO vote is warranted. This closes the “analysis-paralysis” gap we’ve seen on several promising ideas.
Competitive Talent Packages
Re-labeling the 4 M ARB comp pool into a unified base + vesting + performance bonus structure lets OpCo craft offers that top operators in web3 actually say “yes” to—without asking the DAO for piecemeal approvals.
Oversight Intact, Transparency Enhanced
The OAT veto and DAO claw-back remain untouched. I do, however, echo calls from other delegates for a public quarterly contract registry (counterparty, deliverable, spend band) so everyone can track where funds flow.
Remaining Considerations (Ideally Pre-Tally)
Twelve-Month Review Clause
Please add a formal 12-month review in the Snapshot description: after a year of data, delegates can renew, revise, or sunset these flexibilities.
Confirm Review Mechanics
Clarify now how that review will be triggered (automatic Snapshot? OAT proposal?) so we’re not scrambling later.
With these two final tweaks, I’m confident the proposal balances agility with accountability—and positions OpCo to deliver outsized value for ArbitrumDAO.