AIP-1: Arbitrum Improvement Proposal Framework

Proposals Finalized AIPs
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Hello all,

First, as an Abritrum holder, I can’t vote in this proposal. Why is that? and what else should do in order to be able to Vote,

Second, this seems like a rushed proposal that needs further clarification. If the DAO controls the 4.2B tokens, why 750m are in a different wallet already prior to the Vote finishing? And as @smyyguy points out, there is already a movement of the 50m from the 750m ARB tokens to different wallets. The details of this have not been discussed with the DAO prior to happening.

Third, how many people are in the same situation that like me, can’t vote for this proposal?.

Overall I think this proposal needs more consideration and thought. Too many things in one proposal that need further clarification and transparency. Not a good look for the Foundation in my opinion.

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Hi this is purplepill from @BlockworksResearch

Following on from @smyyguy 's latest comment, we can see that 0xc2 has distributed 50.5M ARB to 3 “child wallets.” Notably, one of the transfers was of 40M ARB tokens to 0xcc as outlined in this transaction Arbitrum Transaction Hash (Txhash) Details | Arbiscan.

It looks like this address is highly possible to be Wintermute Trading. Further investigation on arbiscan shows that this address 0xcc has sent small amounts of ARB tokens to CEXs such as Gate, Bybit, and Kucoin and on Arkham shows that it has sent ARB to Wintermute deposit addresses on Binance, OKX, Kucoin, and Gate. We can speculate that these tokens were given to Wintermute to marketmake ARB on various exchanges. This is further corroborated by this tweet stating that the recipient is Wintermute Trading. https://twitter.com/lookonchain/status/1638844521235750912

The vote to fund the Administrative Budget Wallet as part of AIP-1 has not passed, yet it seems like the Arbitrum Foundation has already utilized a portion of the 750M that as stated “will be transferred to the Administrative Budget Wallet” with 40M tokens seemingly going to Wintermute already. Would these 40M ARB tokens count as being accounted for? And if AIP-1 does not pass, and none of the clauses including the steps to implement are ratified, does that mean all of the actions regarding the 750M ARB tokens will be reversed?

We would like further clarity on what occurred, as in its current state, it seems like the Arbitrum Foundation has chosen to pre-emptively utilize the Arbitrum Budget Wallet without the AIP-1 vote being passed. It would appear as if 40M ARB tokens have been taken from the DAO treasury and given to Wintermute to market-make without any approval from ArbitrumDAO.

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People voting yes for this :skull:. This is why the crypto space is seen as a joke. Oh well. I’ll get my popcorn ready.

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1 billion dollars for grands and salary lol.
Are u kidding us?
Everyone Please Vote Against !!!
Security council is ok, but other part should be clarify and discuss later

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So the team has apparently already funded themselves with 750m ARB, before this vote, and those have been sent to Binance?

Wow. This whole thing looks like a big scam.

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There was ample feedback that the grant program as laid out here was not sufficient, yet the proposal still went to snapshot as is. …

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We will be voting “Against” this proposal for the following reasons:

  1. There are significant issues raised by various members of the DAO, some of which have come to light only after the submission of this proposal for temperature check, and many of these issues have not yet been addressed in a conclusive manner. Considering the nature of some of the issues pointed out by other members of the DAO pertaining to transparency, it is pertinent that these issues are addressed in entirety, before a governance proposal is put up for either temperature check or formal voting. The fact that issues on transparency are coming to light even as the voting is underway runs counter-intuitive to the established standards of good governance.

  2. There is far too much ambiguity on the terms of the various proposals put forth in this proposal. Some of the proposals have an alternate path to viability, as pointed out by other members of the DAO, not limited to setting up specific delegate councils for deciding grants instead of adopting a black-box approach citing voter fatigue. Implementing these decisions in a hurry without exploring the alternatives could result in irreparable damages to the Arbitrum DAO. The sensible approach here would be to discuss the alternate solutions proposed, and come to a decision based on the merits and demerits of such solutions, instead of rushing to pass this proposal in a hurried manner.

  3. The AIP is categorized as “Constitutional” whereas some of the provisions sought in the AIP relate to requests for funding, which as per the The Constitution of the Arbitrum DAO would fall under “Non-Constitutional” category. This adds to the ambiguity and lack of due process in the AIP.

    The Constitution of the Arbitrum DAO specifically caries the following provision:

    Recommended guideline: DAO members should vote against any AIP that is incorrectly labeled.

    While the Constitution carves out a provision for AIP-1, nevertheless having a funding proposal (“Non-Constitutional” in nature) within a “Constitutional” proposal still runs contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and creates more ambiguity.

    In our view, the Arbitrum DAO can be better served by passing the funding provisions sought in AIP-1 through a separate proposal, where the merits of such funding proposal can be discussed as a standalone topic. This seems to be the intention of the Constitution in creating a distinction between “Constitutional AIPs” vs “Non-Constitutional AIPs”

For the foregoing reasons, in our view it would not be in the interest of the DAO to vote FOR this proposal as long as these issues and ambiguities remain unresolved.

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Also as @enzo7 wrote, absolutely unnecessary and harmful combine several important proposals into one.

This is a bad practice, which is usually used in corrupt structures, for people to vote for one decision they need, and in parallel take another, which is most often harmful for them, but less harmful than the benefits of the first.
So corrupt management gets things that it wouldn’t get if it separate these proposals.

Agreed completely, combining several proposals into one is a really bad practice. It reminds me of how US Congress passes laws, with 1500 pages of laws crammed into one bill that no one has the time to read. Its then left to unelected agencies to sift through it and come up with rules to fit their own agenda

Im not sure if its intentional or just a poorly drafted proposal but lets please not try to emulate the US government here

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Hi all, glad to see this proposal kicking off the process of formally establishing the Arbitrum DAO. While I’m aligned with many of the items with this proposal, and support the creation and funding of the Arbitrum Foundation, I echo some of the same concerns that have been laid out in this thread.

Proposal Structure

The structure of this proposal reminds me of omnibus bills within the US where many different potentially non-contentious and contentious items are packaged together under a single vote. I don’t believe this is a process or precedent we want to establish. I’m aligned with @cp287 that it would be better to vote on the sub-items within this proposal separately so the opposition to one contentious sub-item doesn’t impact the passage of other non-contentious sub-items.

I understand that in order for the DAO to take effective control over the Arbitrum network, some variation of all of the sub-items within this proposal are required to pass first, but I’m not clear on why this would necessitate a single proposal to vote on everything wholesale. My suggestion would be to split the five specifications within AIP-1 into their own proposals, before handing off control to the DAO, unless there’s a clear reason why this cannot be done.

Administrative Budget Wallet

In my opinion, the creation and funding of the Arbitrum Foundation is a logical route for the Arbitrum DAO to take, supporting the development of the Arbitrum ecosystem, allowing the creation of an effective grants program without voter apathy blockers, and the ability to efficiently execute on the desires of the DAO, all while providing the DAO oversight over who makes up the Foundation and by which rules it operates. It appears to address some key legal hurdles as well with DAO operations.

That said, there seems to be a general consensus that there’s too little insight into how 750M ARB was determined or the plans in regards to asset management and anticipated usage over time. While there is sufficient background on the entities proposed for the Security Council, there is no background provided on the proposed initial Foundation directors. Given the amount of capital involved with funding the Foundation, it would be beneficial to have a greater level of clarity here.

Retroactive Voting

As noted by @BlockworksResearch, the 750M ARB has already been split into its own multi-sig wallet (confirmed to be the Administrative Budget Wallet) with 50.5M ARB having been sent into child-wallets, including ARB being sent CEXs. It’s not clear why the language in the original proposal is future-facing, when the Administrative Budget Wallet has already been funded with the proposed amount. It’s also not clear why a portion of the tokens proposed to be sent to Administrative Budget Wallet is already being actively used. Is the ARB that was sent to CEXs being used for market making purposes or Foundation diversification?

This seems a bit murky, because the proposal that establishes the DAO’s governance authority over the Foundation (AIP-1), hasn’t yet been approved. Is the intent for the DAO to retroactively approve the actions that have already taken place?

If AIP-1 or a sub-proposal focused on Administrative Budget Wallet doesn’t pass, what happens to the ARB in the Administrative Budget Wallet multi-sig? How will the ARB usage from the child-wallets be reconciled with such a vote result? These type of situations are why I’m generally opposed to retroactive votes.

Voting Threshold

As mentioned in this thread, the 5M ARB minimum threshold for the creation of an on-chain proposal seems far too high, with only four delegates currently meeting this threshold. I have seen with ENS and other DAOs, that as people liquidate their airdrops over time to other market participants, the top delegators see their delegation amounts decrease. The new acquirers of governance tokens often don’t delegate. A high minimum threshold can lead to various issues, including centralization of delegation power to a few actors, which doesn’t seem ideal.

For the above reasons, I have voted no against AIP-1, though I am open to changing my mind based on new information as it arises.

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Hello everyone

A heated start to kickoff the Arbitrum DAO. I will present some ideas here to try and further incentivize the debate.

750M ARB:

As pointed out by several team members, it appears that the 750M ARB tokens that the AIP-1 proposes to allocate to the Administrative Budget Wallet have already been moved, before the AIP-1 could have the chance to pass or fail.

The 750M ARB were sent to this wallet: $1.29 | Arbitrum (ARB) Token Tracker | Arbiscan

Any further clarification on these transactions (and their timing) would be appreciated.

Special Grants:

750M ARB tokens (975,000,000 USD) allocated to issue grants “without undergoing a full on-chain AIP process” seems excessive. I would favour a progressive approach, where the 3,500,000 USD in formation costs are reimbursed to service providers, and a reasonable amount is allocated for Special Grants to the Foundation.

I believe that additional information on what these grants could be and how transparency and accountability would be in place is important to be disclosed, if possible, beforehand, before the DAO can allocate ARB to fund them.

I also would like to stress the importance of a (funded) Arbitrum Foundation that is able to operate, to a certain degree, autonomously, for the advancement of the Ecosystem.

Unbundling AIP-1:

It is a good idea to separate AIP-1 into multiple, smaller AIPs. This will prevent progress from being delayed because of a disagreement with some parts but not the whole proposal.

Passing through the community’s desire:

Lastly, I want to say that my votes will always express the community’s desire. I have received multiple requests and comments regarding AIP-1, and all of them were not in favour, at least on this current form and circumstances.

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This entire week of market manipulation will be revisited in court discovery. Please don’t just outright delete this comment because that shows bad faith, in my opinion. This past week isn’t price discovery - it’s just showcasing collusion.

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Has anyone been able to get Lemma LTD to talk to them? Coindesk and Cointelegraph apparently reached out to them but haven’t heard anything back in 24 hours. I think we really need a Lemma LTD input.

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Hi @sluicejuice1, we have not received any communication from Coindesk or Cointelegraph. Just reached out on Twitter saying that we are happy to have a conversation.

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Hi - thank you for responding to me and for reaching out to the publications I mentioned, this is why I commented what I did, from the Coindesk article.

brave_QB1VYLDZKM
brave_QB1VYLDZKM938×388 43 KB

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The clear pressing issue which has been asked multiple times now and eloquently put above by @ChainLinkGod is: If AIP-1 doesn’t pass, what happens to the ARB in the Admin Budget multi-sig? How will the ARB usage from the child-wallets be reconciled?

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I think it would be much better if it was devided to several parts on different times so that we were able to consider which one is needed and which one not.
personally voted againt, and hope to see more clarification on devided parts.
Thank you.

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There’s a lot of market manipulation going on - that’s my take and a lack of information for investors.

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I have a few questions.

What made the team change their mind regarding the 750 Million allocation? If it were already planned, then it’d not have been counted under the DAO funds on the foundation docs website.

What happens to the spent funds out of the 750 Million ARB if the votes pass as is (52.9% against)?

The clear path forward seems like separating the setup / admin costs and grants funds. Also segregation of the proposals so that important decisions can reach consensus with less friction.

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LOL Do you still think so? :rofl:

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Love the discussion so far and here’s my take on the AIP.

AIP-1 is obviously a complete utter joke and a strategic ploy meant to elicit a polarizing response from the community, thereby prompting a heightened level of engagement and emotive discourse. Objective is so that genuine stakeholders in the arbitrum ecosystem will exercise their voting rights.

At the end of this DAO social experiment, all non-voting coins will get an undisclosed % of their allocation burnt. This novelty of AIP-1 is a 1000 IQ play and presents a fascinating case study on the intricacies of decentralized governance and the power dynamics at play within DAOs.

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