Camelot supports this proposal as we see value in having a smoother fee curve during periods of network congestion. We have observed what happens during turmoil periods, and we believe the proposed changes would benefit user experience by reducing the volatility in gas pricing, especially in DeFi protocols that do see increase of usage like DEXes and Perps.
However, we are somewhat dubious about increasing the base fee. While there is certainly merit in both increasing base revenue for the DAO and eliminating spam transactions, we wonder how this would affect arbitrageurs and market makers. We are particularly interested in understanding if there are any projections on how this increase might change activity that is key for specific DeFi protocols, namely DEXs and perpetual protocols.
We are overall supportive of the direction, but before moving to Tally we would like the question above answered. We acknowledge there is a scenario in which market maker data is simply not public, not even for Offchain Labs, and so conducting projections might be complex. If such data constraints exist, we would appreciate transparency around that limitation and any alternative analysis that could be provided to assess the potential impact on arbitrage and market-making activities.