This 2 for one special is a no brainer… but we need to get to quorum, it’s going to be a tough one so make sure you vote! Wee need every ARB we can get!
I’m voting FOR this proposal
Timeboost
I love Timeboost, very innovative. It is a pretty epic contribution to the blockchain space and i’m honored to be able to vote to execute on it. It seems like the network is ready for it, kudos for taking our time here.
Nova Fee Sweep
Not much to add on this on, let’s move the 1,885 ETH to where it belongs. Clean, efficient, and good. Let’s ship it.
Bundling Timeboost and the Nova Fee Sweep makes a lot of sense. Timeboost feels like a smart step forward in dealing with MEV while still protecting users and keeping things stable. We’re also aligned with sending the auction proceeds back to the DAO—it’s a sustainable approach.
On the Nova Fee Sweep side, moving those historical fees to the Treasury is long overdue and helps clean things up.
We voted FOR
Mainly for resource optimization, but in addition, this proposal combines two key actions to improve Arbitrum:
Timeboost reduces harmful MEV.
as it eliminates latency/spam races from “MEV seekers” through fair auctions for an express lane.
Generates revenue for the DAO (in ETH), with 3% earmarked for development.
The DAO controls parameters (pricing, currency) and can disable it if necessary.
In addition the Nova Fee Sweep recovers 1,885 ETH for the Treasury.
Transfers historical funds stuck in an obsolete contract to the Treasury from the DAO using secure, audited infrastructure.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
We have reached consensus on the “AIP: Timeboost + Nova Fee Sweep” proposal, supporting its implementation within the Arbitrum ecosystem.
Key Points of Support:
Timeboost: We believe Timeboost offers a fair method to handle MEV while generating revenue for the DAO. Its auction-based system can enhance network efficiency and provide a competitive advantage for Arbitrum.
Nova Fee Sweep: We support the transfer of historical fees to the DAO Treasury, ensuring efficient fund utilization and aligning with the modernized fee collection infrastructure.
Future Directions:
Base Fee Strategy: We advocate for exploring a Base Fee Reduction Strategy to stimulate network activity and growth. By leveraging Timeboost revenue, Arbitrum can offset potential losses during gas price spikes and make the network more attractive for everyday users, builders, and institutional holders.
Monitoring and Adjustments: We recommend monitoring the impact of Timeboost on regular users upon its launch and establishing mechanisms for ongoing monitoring and adjustments based on observed outcomes.
Economic Growth Strategies:
We are considering multiple strategies for economic growth, including:
Base Fee Reduction: Lowering fees to attract more users and increase network activity.
DAO-Owned Liquidity: Exploring the potential benefits of deploying DAO-owned liquidity to enhance market depth and stability.
Grants/Investments: Evaluating opportunities for grants or investments that support ecosystem development and innovation.
Request for ARDC Research:
We propose that the ARDC conduct research on the following topics to better understand the implications of Timeboost and similar mechanisms:
Impact of Transaction Fees: Investigate how transaction fees affect different user groups, including retail users, whales, and institutional investors. This research should explore how fee structures influence user behavior and network adoption.
Priority Mechanisms Landscape: Conduct a comprehensive analysis of priority transaction mechanisms across various blockchain ecosystems. This study should evaluate the effectiveness of different models in capturing MEV, enhancing user experience, and promoting network growth.
Monitoring Tools and Methodologies: Develop tools or methodologies for monitoring network congestion, transaction fees, and user behavior post-Timeboost implementation. This could include utilizing blockchain explorers, custom fee estimation models, and regular user feedback sessions.
We look forward to engaging with the community and exploring ways to optimize Timeboost’s benefits for the Arbitrum ecosystem.
Onchain voting for this proposal is ending within 24 hours:
[Vote on Tally: [CONSTITUTIONAL] - Adopt Timeboost + Nova Fee Sweep](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/eip155:42161:0xf07DeD9dC292157749B6Fd268E37DF6EA38395B9/proposal/2544994695910523959)
* * *
I am a bot. Questions? Contact support@tally.xyz
We’re aware that this is coming too late for this vote and we don’t consider it something that needed to be a blocker for this proposal anyway, but we’d like to keep this topic from getting lost to time in delegate chats.
In this proposal that passed Tally, there’s text that reads:
3% of auction proceeds to be set aside for the Arbitrum Developer Guild, which helps fund core Arbitrum development
In return, the new Orbit chain is expected to share 10% of their chain’s profit back to the wider Arbitrum ecosystem. This includes 8% for the ArbitrumDAO and 2% for a new Arbitrum Developer Guild.
When asked about the Arbitrum Developer Guild then, we were told that there wasn’t much to share but the format was being worked on.
When @JoJo asked about this again recently and suggested an update in a GRC call, we were again given very little information.
At the same time, we can see that the [Orbit] Developer Guild is indeed collecting (a negligible amount) of money, and presumably will have more income when auctions begin.
Like we mentioned at this beginning of this post and in our rationale for voting on the Expansion Program, we don’t believe that this is something big enough to vote against either of these proposals for, but we do find it odd that we’re creating official fee structures that are already and will continue to fund this organization we don’t know much about. We also don’t believe this is particularly urgent or should be the first priority of the DAO as the income is still so small, but we’d like to see more on this before we get too far out into the future and the amount of money being diverted into the Guild does become significant.
My stance has not changed, I voted FOR on Snapshot (with collect bids in ETH option) and voted FOR on Tally. Timeboost addresses MEV-related challenges without impacting users and creates another revenue stream for the DAO. The Blockworks estimated, “…additional $19m to $95m increase in annual DAO revenue…” is too compelling to ignore. Lower infrastructure burden in current market conditions is also a plus. After reviewing concerns raised by other delegates, I concluded that the benefits of Timeboost outweigh the drawbacks.
Hey - these are great points and we welcome and acknowledge your feedback. In general, we want to point out that all known approaches to addressing the negative externalities of MEV and MEV-associated spam, including doing nothing, come with trade-offs. That is to say: even Timeboost comes with risks that the community would benefit from addressing and mitigating as you are attempting to do now. Here are our responses:
Re: Tail risks and lack of success/failure scenarios: If Timeboost creates the opportunity for searchers to capture a significant portion of MEV on Arbitrum One through its express lane mechanism while maintaining a balanced impact on both user experience and the broader ecosystem — with particular attention to how Timeboost affects non-participating users — as measured by key metrics such as TVL, DEX volumes, and user activity, then we would consider Timeboost’s design and launch a success. We agree ultimately, as you pointed out, that the ArbitrumDAO should work to define what success and failure looks like, perhaps with the input of the ARDC, to come to their own decision.
Re: Potential impact on protocols: similar to the above, the ArbitrumDAO should decide on a plan for how best to spend any potential Timeboost revenue that gets accrued to the ArbitrumDAO treasury.
Re: Metrics to monitor: we agree and would welcome contributions and help from any member of the ArbitrumDAO who may be able to collect and publish critical metrics about MEV activity and trends for Arbitrum One and Nova - like those that you suggested (arbitrage frequency, trading pair “staleness”, PnL of Timeboost users, etc). In fact, many of these metrics can be found in Entropy’s Timeboost dashboard, here. We believe these metrics will be very valuable in helping the ecosystem understand the impacts of Timeboost, the goals of Timeboost, and ultimately how to use Timeboost to achieve said goals. To start, Offchain Labs intends to monitor for and publish metrics about:
Key KPIs for DeFi protocols on Arbitrum, over time (e.g. TVL, DEX volumes, LP Returns etc)
User activity/behavior before and after Timeboost, over time
Number of bids per round, segmented by participant, and their standard deviation from the mean and pre-defined reserve price
Average value of bids per round, over time
Historical bid data, alongside their value and segmented by participant, over time
Duration of time a given address was in control of the express lane, as a proxy measure of monopolistic behavior (to be used in conjunction with bid values)
The number of express lane transactions, over time
We look forward to working with the ArbitrumDAO on making positive, net-beneficial contributions to Arbitrum technology and Arbitrum One and Nova, including, but not limited to, discussions about the topics you’ve raised here - thank you again!
Hello! See below for our replies to your questions:
Revenue from Timeboost is entirely dependent on the amount that express-lane users are willing to pay for a time advantage. This sort of information is difficult to predict without real market data and conditions, which we can start to get an understanding of through dashboards like this from Entropy.
No - express lane transactions and regular non-express lane transactions both must adhere to the block gas limit and are subject to the same fluctuations in gas prices during periods of heightened activity. We believe that today and in the future, there will be a supermajority of transaction and users who do not need nor rely on the time-advantage offered by Timeboost. As such, we believe that the Timeboost’s time-advantage will likely be used primarily by those entities who want to send extremely time-sensitive transactions.
@Arbitrum@offchainlabs are these 3% currently being set aside yet? or no? @Entropy are the Timeboost fees shown here deducting these 3% already or not? from the chart description I assume not, but would love to get that clarified.
