Just as a reference, the two delegates mentioned above have a combined total of 25,000,000 ARB voting power. In my opinion, being active and responding to these types of discussions is a core expectation for all delegates.
Failing to respond to this post would send a clear message about your intentions.
I fully agree with the proposal.
We need a framework, but it wonât come fast (and we should talk about the reasons for that, but not here and now). Arbitrum Dao canât afford to wait and do nothing while work on a framework drags on for months. We need to act now because our competition is using its firepower (incentives) to capture the market.
Developers and users are scarce resources. Capital is mercenary and chain agnostic. ArbitrumDao wasted five months, and as a consequence teams, users, and capital started moving elsewhere. If we want Arbitrum to remain a defi hub we must move more quickly and try to always be in front of others. The best way to do that is to support Arbitrum native projects, innovative builders, and the development of crucial infrastructure. Grants should be a tool for that. Some money will be wasted, deadlines will be broken⊠But in general, the effects will be better than if we do nothing.
We all sometimes joke that Arb is a valueless governance token. With the current state of ArbitrumDao - it really is. Itâs time to change things here.
I see the refusal of the Camelot proposal as a major governance failure. This should have been an obvious âyesâ. If necessary reduce the grant. But a âNoâ is the absolute worst outcome.
There was a first alert after the airdrop, when the DAO showed defiance against the very team that created Arbitrum : Community wants Arbitrum Foundation to return 700M ARB to DAO Treasury
This was a big red flag for me.
As an ardent Arbitrum believer, I now have doubt on the capacity of the DAO to implement agile, bold and flexible policies to grow Abritrum. Seeing protocols like Plutus, that I love so much, oppose the Camelot grant was a major disappointment. I see a deadly danger which is bureaucracy and petty politics. Itâs like the governance is frozen by itâs own success and fears mistakes. Itâs like Abritrumâs success made us win the lottery, but we are incapable of spending anything for fear of spoiling it all.
And it is a concern for the whole ARB ecosystem : DAO ARB airdrop mostly sitting idle: Report - Blockworks
We need to embrace the risk and understand that action is required, even if it means mistakes.
Arbitrum should be run like a startup, not like a multinational company that waits for âframeworksâ before acting.
Arbitrum airdrop was in march, 5 months ago, and nothing is happening. This seems unacceptable to me.
Make no mistake, adoption is lighntning fast in crypto. Just one killer app can drain massive amount of users. Bureaucracy and inner politics is a potentially deadly danger. It killed many companies in the past.
That being said, I understand that Iâm not an expert. Just sharing my impressions as a user.
A very insightful perspective and particularly relevant with the recent successes of BASE and the potential inherent with MANTLE. Without a doubt, plenty of speculators will move over there to chase some potential airdrops and see what they can score with some new protocols.
With that said, ARB has become a powerhouse and is now home to some of the best protocols in all of defi. Sure defi market action sucks at the moment, but anyone who is anyone is coming over to ARB. ARB is home to protocols like GMX, Dopex, Jones, Camelot, Ramses and is drawing in the big players like Pendle, Balancer and others. I think the point is that the DAO does not need to take urgent action to address the latest moves in the crypto space. In other words, we are safe for the moment in that we have many of the best builders in defi and should acknowledge that!
BUT, resting on our laurels will also lead to atrophy and a slow death. So what might a balanced approach be? The approach proposed above to use the DAO governance process to approve grants in the interim makes sense, especially if it is in a provisional framework that allows things to get moving without over committing the foundationâs native assets. So maybe a short list of protocols with innovative ideas who receive generous grants and then show their results and how the grants have benefited Arbitrum more broadly would work.
I do not claim to know how best protocols could demonstrate this value to the ecosystem, but a simple proposal to set some limits and a defined grant amount would generate interest, and hopefully align participants to our long term future.
I resonate with this post, my two cents is that projects should just post clear and concise proposals that bring utility to the arb token and is EV+ for the whole rollup. Not just asking for money for the sake of it.
This will show that arbitrum native projects are serious about growing the ecosystem and not just pumping their bags. Setting realistic kpis within the proposals would allow for the big delegates to vote-in.
Anyways, best of luck to all projects and looking forward the next steps on how projects keep building great products within the arb ecosystem.
-0xCasio
Hey everyone,
I hope this message finds you well. I wanted to take a moment to share my thoughts on this post. Reading through the post, I found myself in complete agreement with Coinflipâs perspective and the proposed pragmatic approach.
First and foremost, I want to commend Coinflip for articulating the complex challenges weâve been facing and the need for a practical solution. Managing a DAO is an intricate task, and itâs becoming increasingly clear that weâre navigating uncharted waters.
Coinflipâs proposal to let the DAO itself act as the framework, at least until a formal one is established, resonates with me. The notion of utilizing the existing multi-stage process involving Proposal, Snapshot, and Tally voting as the basis for decision-making is not only efficient but aligns with the inherent spirit of decentralization and community-driven governance.
In light of the rapidly evolving landscape, itâs essential that we find a balance between thorough decision-making and timely action. Other chains and their respective DAOs are making swift progress, and the risk of being left behind is real.
Furthermore, the proposalâs emphasis on cooperation with the Arbitrum Foundation is a crucial step. Their insights and guidance in aligning proposals with the Arbitrum Constitution, administrative guidelines, and the Foundationâs activities can help us maintain cohesion and alignment.
Iâm genuinely amazed by the overwhelming support and engagement this post has garnered. Itâs a testament to the fact that many of us share the same sentiments and recognize the need for a solution that enables us to move forward efficiently and effectively. Personally, I find it reassuring to know that Iâm not alone in grappling with the time constraints that come with managing a DAO while juggling other responsibilities.
We are indeed Arbitrum, and the time to act is now.
Looking forward to seeing this proposal gain traction and contribute to the continued success of our community.
This is why I delegated my ARB to @coinflip. Reading this maybe it would be good if even more would do so to advance the cause of Arbitrum. Consider.
100% on board with this take! Actions need to be taken now. A dedicated committee to evaluate the proposals is crucial to the proper allocation of the grants etc. Execution is the key. Looking forward to see how this moves.
Thereâs a very important balance between remaining stagnant and rubber-stamping any disbursement of funds that comes the DAOâs way. As delegates, we have to remain critic, fair, and work towards a clear and well-communicated vision. I advocate for the decentralization of finance, and to express to the best of my abilities what my community and the people who entrusted me with voting power communicate they align with.
Whatâs happening here is truly a reflection of the potential decentralized future we all envision. If proposals were to pass without question, if all power was concentrated in a single entity, if a collection of organizations or protocols were to determine the turnout and future of the chain⊠then it truly would be a valueless governance token, which is not the case here.
This view from @karelvuong is precise. Every delegate has a different risk tolerance on the size and context of âbetsâ and âmistakesâ that would like to see the DAO make or not make. Personally, I tend to align with a more conservative approach when reviewing ideas and proposals. This does not have to be something negative for the DAO, since itâs healthy to have multiple opinions, points of view, -and importantly- risk tolerances between delegates participating in a DAO. Moreover, the approaches can, and will, change. As will the context, proposals, and different other factors that impact a specific decision from a specific delegate for a specific proposal on a specific point of the DAO lifetime.
Thereâs also the fact of actually measuring impact and analyzing what it means to have an impact. Arbitrum is the leading chain by TVL, it has 56% of the Market Share, while Optimism has 27%, according to L2 Beat. Hereâs DefiLlamaâs graph of its evolution:
In terms of transactions, you can see thereâs clearly an uptick in Optimismâs transactions in the last few weeks in relation to Arbitrum, as well as other L2s that have been appearing (and will probably continue to do so, even more with chains like Fantom and Celo touting to transition from L1 to L2).
There is a sense of ultimate urgency thatâs being communicated by some entities and that I disagree with. Other L2s are aggressively operating to obtain market share, this can clearly be seen, however, it should not be the reason why we lose criticality. Itâs also not a reason to remain halted, this is why I welcome this discussion.
Enabling each delegate to contribute in the way they see fit is core to a DAO. If delegates want to abstain, if delegates want to vote against, if delegates want to vote for, if delegates want not to vote - thatâs their decision. Each and every one of us can choose to delegate and re-delegate based on the impact we believe that delegate choice is able to create.
Unfortunately, this topic has not yet gathered much discussion, and it would be really positive to see some more Foundation involvement for better accountability. Some unanswered questions:
In Camelotâs proposal, JonesDAO utilized their 2.3M ARB (which they received on their ARB airdrop) to vote âForâ. Were Camelotâs proposal to pass, JonesDAO was going to have a pool with their own token be incentivized with ARB. Was it okay that they were able to vote with ARB that was airdropped to them by the initial DAO to ultimately be the beneficiaries of token incentives?
To give more context, the Synthetix Council was involved in a similar situation in the early stages of Optimism, and ultimately the Foundation created the Code of Conduct and the Collective Grant Policies. That explicitly addressed ambiguous situations like this one. It would really be impactful to see better delegate and protocol engagement on topics like this one.
Abitrum has been the leader in many L2 metrics for quite the amount of time, but other L2s are aggressively competing with it.
When thinking of a âFrameworkâ, what first comes to mind is a Delegate Code of Conduct, stipulated Voting Times and structure, The Constitution per se, Conflicts of Interests, Grants Policies. Itâs a broader structure for the DAO to operate within. The Arbitrum Foundation set the initial Community Guidelines, How to submit a DAO Proposal, and Constitution. These, however, fall short in some specific areas that have undoubtedly come up in the past few weeks.
The approach of the Arbitrum Foundation so far has been to have limited involvement and let the DAO sort things out. This is what the DAO sorting things out looks like, for better and for worse, and it is though indeed making progress. However, and this is a personal opinion, it is undeniable that a degree of centralization (I know, explicitly against some of the views expressed above) could be helpful to enable and better allow the DAO to be self-governing in the long run.
With no accountability there is potential funds misusage. Here we find, again, the balance between the risk of not using funds so efficiently, and effectively delaying progress by not incentivizing builders. Itâs healthy that there are diverse risk tolerance factors amongst delegates to propel discussions like this very same one, escaping a situation where everything and everyone thinks the same and operates under the same views.
There are four Grants structures in the works:
Voting has passed in Tally. They will distribute 1M.
Voting has passed in Tally. They will distribute 2.8M ARB tokens. Initially voted against in Temperature Check, and, after discussions, feedback and amendments from the team, voted For in the final on-chain vote.
This comment is good feedback on the state and progress, reported by @DisruptionJoe.
New, ongoing Program. Thereâs not much information yet on dates and deadlines, but they will be impacting protocols, projects, and individuals in areas like Gaming, DeFi, NFT, and Social.
In forum discussion.
Regardless of the amount of ongoing initiatives, the potential impact they might have (excluding Arbitrumâs official one) is not at an immense scale, given the amount of funds put at the disposal of PL and QB. For context, Camelot was asking for 11M, and this greatly surpass what PL and QB is managing.
There were 125M of ARB tokens airdropped.
Source: Dune Analytics from Shogun and Castle Capital.
Overall, there is more than 70% ARB from the initial DAO airdrop still held in protocol multi signatures.
The Arbitrum DAO and token were launched and created 5 months ago. So were these airdrops to the Arbitrum DAOs. So far, there has been little utilization of these funds.
I respect and read all feedback, and I share thoughts whenever possible.
I relate this discussion to something @krst has said on Camelotâs discussion:
My initial reflex reaction to a proposal similar to another one from the past would have been to act inversely to the idea transmitted here on this comment. However, indeed circumstances and context do change, and if a grant is approved, it does not mean another one, similar, cannot be rejected. Consequently, if a proposal is voted against, it does not mean another one, similar, cannot be voted for. The idea of setting a precedent is a powerful idea, and it can have effects in both ways. After reading and after the interexchange of these different ideas, my opinion is that precedents are important, but they donât have to be forever binding.
Moving forward, I personally like the spirit and central idea of this thread (to take a pragmatic approach at the present time and with current given DAO conditions) and asses individual proposals under this optic, maintaining core values and a critical way of thinking.
Really appreciate the detailed view and will answer to some other sections of your post later as well, but wanted to react to this part as Camelotâs representative, since it was mentioned multiple times in our proposal as well:
Overall, there is more than 70% ARB from the initial DAO airdrop still held in protocol multi signatures.
The Arbitrum DAO and token were launched and created 5 months ago. So were these airdrops to the Arbitrum DAOs. So far, there has been little utilization of these funds.
This airdrop has been distributed to all Arbitrum protocols proportionally to their contribution and their role in the ecosystem since its inception, and is their only guaranteed voting power to make sure their voice is properly heard as an important part of the DAO.
There wasnât any requirement or condition from the Foundation when this airdrop was made back in March, and some protocols decided to directly make use of it through incentives, extend their runway etcâŠ
But many of the protocols you mentioned (Camelot included), decided to keep this $ARB - or most of it - as a unique opportunity to actively take part to Arbitrum governance. I donât really understand the idea of suggesting to those protocols to give up on those voting rights before asking for a grant.
Only in crypto will you find a twitter influencer trying to lecture builders on what they should do - remarkable.
Since @olimpio has raised the topic of conflict of interests, I would like to make totally transparent that his own interests are in direct conflict with the DAO, and this may explain his positioning.
olimpioâs main occupation is being an airdrop farmer, as claimed by his own profiles.
olimpio is compensated rather well by ecosystems, apps, and chains to encourage his followers to âmake the most of potential airdrop opportunitiesâ. Not only is this a questionable practice in general, itâs a significantly conflict that should be brought to attention for one of the major Arbitrum delegates.
Being incentivised to drive activity towards other chains is a significant point to ponder⊠this must play role in his voting decisions?
I encourage everyone to read his latest tweets, about how Base is a prime airdrop opportunity and thanks to his strategy users earned up to 10k ARB airdrops.
Interesting.
This was a nice try @Youyou761.
Although I encourage and applaud discussion, your comment seems a rather personal attack dismissing every point Iâve tried to bring up for discussion.
Completely false, Iâve never been compensated.
I invite you to go to my public Twitter profile and have a look at the content I produce.
There is no financial motivation here, quite the contrary, as delegates are not being compensated for their work.
wonderful take, Karel
I think it is really questionable that an airdrop farmer has one of the largest voting powers in the entire DAO, this is a highly concerning conflict of interest. Combined with the fact that Olimpio has and will have governance power in other DAOs through the same airdrop strategy, this becomes even more questionable.
âBase airdrop strategy: using Arbitrum criteriaâ - I ask all Arbitrum builders, users, and stakeholders to read this wording and let me know how they genuinely feel. As an ecosystem supporter it makes me feel genuinely uncomfortable.
For airdrop hunters, Arbitrum is already âold newsâ, and I imagine most of these hunters have dumped and moved on to the next shiny chain that @olimpio is tweeting about.
I have not found any tweets about providing value to the ecosystem or contributing - the focus is entirely on extracting before moving on to the next ecosystem.
What should be hunting for now - Linea, Base, zkSync, Mantle, Starknet, zkEVM?
All zk , All L2, All L3 , event L1, bridges includes, and so on, even related, , All of them , past & future
In order to keep a relatively fluid exchange Iâll try to be as concise as possible and to focus on the aspects on which I have divergent views.
Your conclusion seems to resonate with coinflipâs take (?) but tbh Iâm a bit confused since most of the points you raised actually seem to indicate your opposition to it.
Donât have much to disagree with from a high level and theoretical perspective.
In practice, itâs a bit odd to highlight decentralization when the DAO is currently controlled by <10 people concentrating 135M of ARB voting power. For reference, proposals put on Tally gathered ~170M votes on average.
Focusing on a long-term vision and refining DAO decision processes and frameworks is key, Iâll just temper it by saying decentralization should be here to serve the chain, not the opposite.
Almost all of the messages that preceded your answer in this thread (op included) are from members of major protocols of the ecosystem: GMX, Radiant, Dopex, Umami, Jones, Camelot etc⊠They are the ones currently holding the majority of this TVL, and also in the best position to be aware of whatâs happening behind the scenes/under the tip of the iceberg.
I can admit a difference in opinion, but itâs hard to not take all of those aligned voices in consideration.
Globally echoing your questions. Could also extend them to delegates involved with competing chains through their holdings (or for protocols deployed on multiple other chains).
I think transparency is a more judicious approach than exclusion so we can avoid turning proposals into an extended purity test for each participant.
If you forbid concerned parties when incentives (through/to protocols) are at stake, ie if they are recipients, competitors, partners etc⊠then youâre basically excluding builders from every decision process of this type.
Personally echoing that a certain degree of centralization makes sense, especially in the beginning, in order to get the DAO on the right track. But I think the Foundation made it quite clear multiple times that their approach was to be âSwitzerlandâ.
I would definitely support it if they were open to soften their stance though.
Like it was mentioned multiple times, none of these frameworks can be used for liquidity incentives programs, or even large-scale grants. You said it for PL and QB, and the Foundation also confirmed it for its own.
Not sure about 4. as there hasnât been any post for nearly 1 month.
Already answered in my previous message, putting it here for simplicity:
This airdrop has been distributed to all Arbitrum protocols proportionally to their contribution and their role in the ecosystem since its inception, and is their only guaranteed voting power to make sure their voice is properly heard as an important part of the DAO.
There wasnât any requirement or condition from the Foundation when this airdrop was made back in March, and some protocols decided to directly make use of it through incentives, extend their runway etcâŠ
But many of the protocols you mentioned (Camelot included), decided to keep this $ARB - or most of it - as a unique opportunity to actively take part to Arbitrum governance. I donât really understand the idea of suggesting to those protocols to give up on those voting rights before asking for a grant.
â
I think Iâll echo the general feeling of many protocols by saying the current DAO situation has been a serious concern.
This concern doesnât stem specifically from Camelotâs proposal not passing the temp check, but rather for the reasons why it didnât pass.
It has left most builders hanging in a situation where they genuinely donât know how to proceed / what to expect next.
The fact that our proposal was the only one submitted by a protocol in almost 6 months should also be an equally strong alert signal.
This is why Camelot are such legends. Even though I prefer RAMSES, without Camelot and their dedicated work and discussion, we wouldnât even be having this debate.
I just leave it here
suggests swapping ARB, an unproductive asset, for ETH, a productive one that can be directly used by Synapse to further benefit Arbitrum.
On the topic of conflicts of interest, I have already made my personal view clear on Olimpioâs âairdrop huntingâ approach.
It is highly toxic to any chain, and the fact that airdrop farmers can also be one of the largest delegates on multiple DAOs is incredibly questionable.
I would also like to raise an article I came across regarding @Griff.
I am requesting full transparency from the largest delegates. The DAO is frozen whilst any proposal can be decided by less than 10 of the top delegates. This needs to change, otherwise nothing else will.
I would like to also raise the fact that @ChainLinkGod - one of the largest delegates with 10m ARB, hasnât made a single forum post since April, and has not voted on some of the most recent proposals.
What is the reasoning for this? It is unacceptable.
This is highly concerning.
I am not a fan of delegation as a governance method given all the weak points this thread illustrates. But, that said, it is about the best solution we have at the moment and we do need to continue to refine the selection of delegates, highlighting their activity, and the holding accountable to standards of conduct (perceived conflicts of interest).
While I was working governance at Gitcoin I found that one of the best tools to quantifiably illustrate delegate performance was Karma. What I like about the tool is the creation of a delegate âscoreâ which is transparent calculation of voting and forum activity as well as a ranking where you can see those scores across whale delegates. We used this tool to celebrate dedicated delegates (who thus got greater delegation) and to nudge inactive whale delegates to some success.
Linking to the @coinflip suggestion -
I am not suggesting adding quantifiable performance metrics to delegates, but a regular appraisal or reporting of performance standings might be helpful. Yes, I know metrics can all be gamed and if you track behavior you can drive unintended behaviors - but until we find the ideal replacement for delegation, this is a mechanism we can consider.
