Areta Delegate Thread

[Areta]

Proposal: Revert the Delegate Incentive Program (DIP) to Version 1.5

Type: Off-chain
Vote: Keep the current version
Rationale: This proposal seeks to roll back changes introduced in the Delegate Incentive Program v1.6 and v1.7. We voted in support for the changes introduced by DIP v1.7 in line with the following rationale:

@Chris_Areta

Our rationale for voting in support and our general thoughts on the proposal are as follows:

Introduction of Tier X

• We support the introduction of Tier X and the incentivization of voting participation, particularly for larger delegates. This is a welcome development.
• Recent trends in the DAO highlight the importance of voting participation. Incentivizing holders of significant voting power to exercise it is a logical step. While other forms of governance participation are also valuable to encourage, without sufficient voting engagement (and quorum), much of the effort is ultimately wasted.

~40% Reduction

• We align with the option to maintain the 40% reduction pending the introduction of a new delegate incentive program, as opposed to the other proposed alternatives. Our reasoning is as follows:
  • Compensation should reflect delegate workload and the DAO’s evolving organizational structure. We’re aligned with reduced compensation, provided delegate responsibilities are also scaled back (which appears to be the ongoing trend).
  • In our view, the proposed ~40% reduction fairly accounts for the decreased delegate responsibilities under the program. Other options (e.g., pausing, or canceling the program) represent overly drastic steps that overlook the continued value delegates provide, particularly in ensuring quorum and DAO oversight.

We acknowledge that DIP v1.7 does not fully resolve every issue with the program design. Still, it introduces important changes that respond to current governance challenges and the evolving role of delegates:

• The compensation reduction in v1.7 reflects the lighter delegate workload.
• The DAO faces a quorum problem. Incentivizing voting activity from delegates with significant voting power is a more effective way to achieve quorum than spreading incentives across a wider group of delegates.
• Reverting to DIP v1.5 would not address the quorum issue, the reduced workload, or other concerns in the program’s design, including the issue of subjective assessments by program managers.
• The Arbitrum Foundation and SEEDGov are collaborating on a DIP 2.0 proposal, expected in the coming weeks, which will introduce major improvements to address current design challenges.
  • This gives delegates a clear opportunity to shape DIP v2.0, and we encourage all delegates to actively participate in the review and voting process to make sure concerns are addressed.

For these reasons, we will be voting to keep the current version of the DIP.

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Proposal: [CONSTITUTIONAL] AIP: Security Council Election Process Improvements

Type: Off-chain
Vote:

• Increase cohort duration
• Allow members to rotate keys
• Allow members to bypass Nominee

Rationale: This proposal seeks to improve the Security Council election process. Below is our rationale for supporting or abstaining from each proposed change:

• Increase Cohort Duration

  The Security Council nomination and election process requires considerable effort from both candidates and election coordinators. Extending cohort terms to 2 years would reduce election frequency and lower friction, which we support.

• Reduce Qualification Thresholds

  We prefer keeping the qualification threshold for advancing nominees to the Member Election phase at the current level. The 0.2% of votable ARB requirement remains attainable for candidates and is appropriate given the active votable supply.

• Progress Security Council Members

  Returning Security Council members seeking re-election should bypass the Nominee Election phase. Requiring them to repeat a process they have already passed is redundant.

• Security Council Key Rotation

  Allowing Security Council members to rotate their keys at any time during their term is an efficiency improvement that avoids the operational burden of initiating non-emergency actions for updates. We support this flexibility during a member’s term, but believe it should not apply once a candidate has formally registered for the election.

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