Axia Network — Delegate Communications Thread

Voting Rationale & Governance Calls Delegate Statements
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Axia Network is a delegate across DAOs in the EVM ecosystem. Axia is committed to growing alongside the ecosystem and contributing responsibly to each protocol’s long-term success.

Axia’s values emphasize supporting protocols through sustainable long-term growth, education, and strong oversight, while preserving decentralization by creating and sustaining pathways for community participation and meaningful checks and balances that ensure accountability and transparency across governance stakeholders.

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Rewarding Active Delegates (RAD) Program - Application Thread
Rewarding Active Delegates (RAD) Program - Application Thread
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[Constitutional] DVP Quorum for ArbitrumDAO: Implementation & Parameters

Vote: For

Rationale: Voted FOR adopting a DVP-based quorum model with the proposed parameters. The current system which bases quorum on total votable supply is structurally misaligned with actual governance participation. A DVP-based model more accurately reflects the tokens actively engaged in governance.

Significant research and benchmarking by the Arbitrum Foundation informed this proposal, which is appreciated. Looking forward to the DVP model implemented in practice.

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[Constitutional] DVP Quorum & Proposal Cancellation

Vote: For

Rationale: Voted FOR adopting a DVP-based quorum model with the proposed parameters, along with onchain proposal cancellation. As confirmed during the March 3rd Open Discussion of Proposals call, no technical changes were made since the Snapshot vote. One addition was made: onchain proposal cancellation — allowing proposers to withdraw proposals containing errors, outdated parameters, or requiring revision based on delegate feedback received after submission.

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Automate the Consolidation of Idle Funds into the Treasury Management Portfolio

Vote: For

Rationale: Voted FOR this proposal to establish an operating directive that would automate movements of any surplus and idle funds from DAO initiatives to the ATMC so they can start to generate yield for the DAO. Establishing this directive to routinely consolidate surplus and idle funds into the ATMC balance is more efficient and productive than going through a full governance process for the idle funds to be withdrawn.

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Security Council Nominee Selection

Vote: Blockful, Tino, Cyfrin

Rationale: I split my votes across Blockful, Cyfrin, and Tino to prioritize diversity of background, independence, and technical expertise on the Security Council.

Blockful brings deep DAO tooling and governance experience. Cyfrin has one of the strongest audit reputations in the space. Tino represents an important independent voice. Together, these three offer a mix of technical depth, governance literacy, and independence that I believe serves Arbitrum’s long-term security.

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Updating the Code of Conduct & DAO Procedures to Become Living Documents

Vote: For

Rationale: Voted FOR transitioning the Code of Conduct and DAO Procedures to a living document. Two trial periods validated the framework, and permanent adoption with an optimistic amendment process is the logical next step. Keeping the CoC outside the Constitution avoids unnecessary amendment burden for what is effectively operational policy. The shift to optional shielded voting is supported by the data gathered across both trial periods, which showed increased last-minute voting concentration under shielded conditions.

[Constitutional] AIP: ArbOS 60 Elara

Vote: For

Rationale: Voted FOR the ArbOS 60 Elara upgrade. Dynamic Pricing is a meaningful step forward — aligning gas costs with actual node resource consumption improves both fairness and capacity without requiring hardware changes. The Stylus contract size increase to 96 KB directly addresses the developer experience friction that has been consistently raised by builders. Granting Offchain Labs a 2-year window to adjust gas targets and the minimum base fee within defined bounds is reasonable given the need to iterate quickly as Dynamic Pricing rolls out, and the DAO retains the ability to revoke that delegation at any time.

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Improvements to the Arbitrum Audit Program

Vote: For

Rationale: Voted For this proposal because strengthening the audit program is a practical way to improve security standards across the Arbitrum ecosystem. Security and audit quality are core public goods, and governance should continue refining the structures that help builders deploy more safely and effectively.

Transfer 6,000 ETH and Idle Stablecoins from the Treasury to the Treasury Management Portfolio

Vote: For

Rationale: Voted For this proposal because treasury stewardship is a core governance responsibility. Moving idle treasury assets into a more active treasury management framework is a sensible step toward improving capital efficiency, resilience, and long-term ecosystem sustainability.

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Security Council — Member Election

I split my votes across Blockful, Cyfrin, and Tino to prioritize diversity of background, independence, and technical expertise on the Security Council.

Blockful brings deep DAO tooling and governance experience. Cyfrin has one of the strongest audit reputations in the space. Tino represents an important independent voice. Together, these three offer a mix of technical depth, governance literacy, and independence that I believe serves Arbitrum’s long-term security.

This reasoning has not changed since the nominee selection.

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Appreciate the clear rationale, Axia. DVP-based quorum is the right direction governance should reflect active participation, not just total supply. The onchain proposal cancellation is a smart addition too. Keep the consistency going… @Axia

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Transfer 6,000 ETH and Idle Stablecoins from the Treasury to the Treasury Management Portfolio

Vote: FOR

Rationale: Voted FOR this proposal. Leaving idle ETH and stablecoins unallocated carries a real opportunity cost, and moving them into the Treasury Management Portfolio is a sensible step toward better capital efficiency, yield generation, and treasury diversification within an established framework.

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Approve Release of Frozen ETH

I did not vote on the Snapshot because a Restraining Notice was still active on the Immobilized Assets. I chose to abstain out of caution. The U.S. District Court order dated May 8, 2026 (Case 1:25-mc-00527-MMG) now explicitly modifies the Restraining Notice to allow the on-chain vote and transfer to Aave LLC. It states that anyone voting or participating in this on-chain transaction shall not be in violation of the Restraining Notice. With this legal clarity, I plan to vote FOR the on-chain proposal.

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Constitutional] AIP: Amended Release of Frozen ETH Pursuant to Court Order

Voted FOR this proposal authorizing the transfer of the frozen ETH to a wallet controlled by Aave LLC and for Aave LLC to hold this frozen ETH while the court continues to deliberate. Pursuant to this court order which states:

the Restraining Notice issued to “Arbitrum DAO” is modified, so as to allow an on-chain vote to transfer the Immobilized Assets (as that term is used in the Motion) to a digital assets wallet controlled by Aave LLC.

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Continued Funding for the Arbitrum Foundation

I voted FOR on this proposal because the Arbitrum Foundation remains critical to the DAO across the four areas highlighted in the proposal: strategic grants and partnerships, technical advancement and infrastructure maintenance, marketing/community/education, and tokenholder relations/governance/DAO wrapper.

That said, as the DAO matures, we need to normalize a higher standard for recurring budget visibility. The goal should be constructive accountability: giving AAEs the resources they need while making it easier for delegates/tokenholders to understand what is being funded, what outcomes are expected, and how performance will be evaluated over time.

Constitutional AIP: Minimize Arbitrum Nova

I voted FOR because Nova played an important role in validating the AnyTrust / DAC model, but its current usage no longer justifies the ongoing cost. With low activity, around $20M TVL**, and roughly $1.52M/year in maintenance costs, moving Nova into a lighter maintenance state feels like the responsible path.

I also appreciate that this is minimization rather than an abrupt shutdown. The 90-day migration window and continued withdrawal paths should help reduce disruption for remaining users and projects.

Overall, I support refocusing resources toward higher-demand parts of the Arbitrum ecosystem, as long as the transition is handled carefully and remaining users are given clear migration support.

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Continued Funding for the Arbitrum Foundation

Voted FOR this proposal in the Snapshot phase and my reasoning has not changed for supporting it.

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Transition Arbitrum One ordering policy to Priority Gas Auctions (PGA)

Voted FOR the Constitutional AIP to transition Arbitrum One’s ordering policy to Priority Gas Auctions.

This proposal disables Timeboost’s express lane auction on Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova, enables collection of priority fees, activates PGA on Arbitrum One, and routes the resulting priority fee revenue 97% to the ArbitrumDAO Treasury and 3% to the Arbitrum Developer Guild.

Importantly, PGA is only being adopted for Arbitrum One. For Arbitrum Nova, the proposal only sunsets Timeboost and does not introduce PGA, which is consistent with the Nova Minimization AIP.

Timeboost was useful however it’s apparent now that a new mechanism is needed. PGA is a more open, permissionless, and familiar mechanism for priority ordering on Arbitrum One, which should reduce barriers for market participants while giving the DAO a clearer path to capture transaction-priority revenue.

My main expectation post-implementation is continued transparency around priority fee revenue, user costs, ordering dynamics, and any future parameter changes.

Overall, this feels like a practical evolution: sunset a more bespoke mechanism, move Arbitrum One to a more standard priority-fee market, and route most of the proceeds back to the DAO.

Extending DRIP’s Mandate

Voted FOR extending the end date of DRIP’s mandate from July 1, 2026 to July 1, 2027.

The key point for me is that this proposal does not request new funding. The DAO already approved the DRIP budget; this vote is about whether the remaining funds should be deployed with more time and discretion rather than rushed into a shortened or poorly timed Season 2.

Season 1 appears to have produced strong results, including a reported adjusted cost-effectiveness ratio of 51 overall and 76 on USD assets, plus meaningful growth in yield-bearing stablecoin supply on Arbitrum.

Extending the end date of the mandate seems like a prudent choice.

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[Constitutional] AIP: Automate Timeboost Proceeds Split

Voted FOR. This is a clean operational follow-through on the previously approved Timeboost proceeds split: 97% to the DAO Treasury, 3% to the Arbitrum Developer Guild. Automating the split reduces recurring governance overhead, avoids repeated onchain votes for a mechanical transfer, and gets funds to ADG more predictably.

AGV Wind-Down: Structured Transition & Return of Capital to the DAO Treasury

Voted FOR. This is a responsible wind-down that preserves value instead of letting an outdated mandate keep consuming DAO capital. Returning ~143.7M ARB to the treasury gives Arbitrum more flexibility to fund current priorities, while still supporting the existing AGV portfolio and maintaining follow-on reserves where appropriate.

[Constitutional] AIP Fast Feed

Voting FOR.

Fast Feed seems like a practical way for Arbitrum to monetize valuable sequencer data access while keeping it authenticated, paid, and routed back to the ecosystem. The design is important: it provides earlier visibility into already-ordered transaction flow, without changing ordering rights or introducing new frontrunning/sandwich mechanics.