Hey @cattin ! Relaying the detailed feedback that we had in OpenBlock’s analysis here since it seems like a few people missed it:
Boost is a flexible targeting tool for different strategies
In light of OpenBlock Labs’ detailed Sybil analysis, we’d like to take this opportunity to clarify Boost Protocol’s stance on Sybil behavior. While we have developed infrastructure to mitigate Sybil activities on the protocol with allowlisting, we’ve developed a strategy for this grant to maximize Arbitrum DAO’s sequencer fees at the cheapest possible cost.
Our 3+ years of experience working with sybil solutions has taught us that tracking and blocking sybil is a cat and mouse game. As a result, we’ve designed incentives that naturally discourage malicious behavior by aligning rewards with genuine network usage. To achieve this, we reward Boost incentives at or near the completion cost, effectively rebating the cost of the users’ transactions with network ownership (ARB). In most cases, Boost completions are near break-even (References: Spend/network fees by Boost deployed , all Boost completions & associated fees , daily Arbitrum network profit ). Theoretically, most ‘attackers’ would be better suited to swap ETH for ARB on any exchange than to ‘attack’ Boost protocol. However, as there are indications of ‘attacks’ on Boost, our dilemma becomes whether it’s beneficial for us to halt this behavior, as completions under break-even is profit to the DAO.
As previously mentioned, Boost protocol has developed the infrastructure to enable anybody to deploy boosts that exclude sybil behavior ; we’ve been reluctant to apply these measures for a few reasons.
The notion of sybil as a potential ‘Attack’ at the network level is debatable.each human is a unique actor , such as for identity protocols, user-centric airdrops, or quadratic funding on Gitcoin, we don’t see it as inherently malicious in the context of driving network activity.
We believe incentives at the network level should prioritize maximizing sequencer revenue for the cheapest possible cost.only 3/22 participants engaging in what might be considered ‘sybil attacks’ have actually profited from such activities (with a combined profit under $2K). This brings into question whether the network fees generated by automated transactions are inherently less valuable than those from other sources.
Should the DAO prioritize sybil or profit?
If there’s a widespread desire within the DAO to curb sybil activities, we’re open to exploring allowlisted approaches at the expense of higher costs and less profitability for the DAO. We believe it’s crucial for DAO members to engage in an open dialogue surrounding incentive priorities—whether maximizing revenue and transactions is a viable objective or whether all grantees should maximally prioritize discouraging ‘sybil attacks’ on principle.
Definitely recommend reading through the whole post, but the point is that you can use Boost to target quantity or quality users and is much different than other protocols. Therefore, our proposal is directly targeting valuable user segments (ie. Farcaster) therefore is a better “sybil” filter. Open to discussing this more with the community if there is other feedback!