Hi @paulsengh, we appreciate you sharing this analysis with the DAO and believe it represents a meaningful discussion surrounding the goals of incentives and the behaviors they attract.
Upon reviewing the data you’ve provided, we’d like to offer some insights into Boost Protocol’s (previously known as RabbitHole) impact during STIP.
Context on Boost
For wider context, Boost is a protocol to deploy token incentive offers to do onchain actions. While the protocol is permissionless and can be used by anyone for different strategies, Boost Studios uses the protocol as a grant recipient to maximize Arbitrum DAO sequencer fees for the cheapest possible cost.
For users, a boost is made up of two transactions: the target action that is being incentivized, and the reward claim itself. In both transactions, network & sequencer fees are being generated for the Arbitrum DAO, in addition to growing third-party protocols on Arbitrum. One of the main benefits of Boost is that all of the data is onchain, and can be verified by any third-party. In fact, you can see all the data here about our STIP grant in our STIP Dune dashboard.
Context on Boost’s STIP grant
Our primary objective with our STIP grant has been to maximize sequencer revenue at the cheapest possible cost. In doing so, we’ve been able to minimize the net cost to the network (STIP spend) and maximize the transaction fees it’s produced to the extent we’re net profitable in our incentive spending. As of this writing, we’ve generated over $1.16M in network revenue, with only $1.08M in rewards distributed.
(Source: Dune)
Boost is a flexible targeting tool for different strategies
In light of OpenBlock Labs’ detailed Sybil analysis, we’d like to take this opportunity to clarify Boost Protocol’s stance on Sybil behavior. While we have developed infrastructure to mitigate Sybil activities on the protocol with allowlisting, we’ve developed a strategy for this grant to maximize Arbitrum DAO’s sequencer fees at the cheapest possible cost.
Our 3+ years of experience working with sybil solutions has taught us that tracking and blocking sybil is a cat and mouse game. As a result, we’ve designed incentives that naturally discourage malicious behavior by aligning rewards with genuine network usage. To achieve this, we reward Boost incentives at or near the completion cost, effectively rebating the cost of the users’ transactions with network ownership (ARB). In most cases, Boost completions are near break-even (References: Spend/network fees by Boost deployed, all Boost completions & associated fees, daily Arbitrum network profit). Theoretically, most ‘attackers’ would be better suited to swap ETH for ARB on any exchange than to ‘attack’ Boost protocol. However, as there are indications of ‘attacks’ on Boost, our dilemma becomes whether it’s beneficial for us to halt this behavior, as completions under break-even is profit to the DAO.
As previously mentioned, Boost protocol has developed the infrastructure to enable anybody to deploy boosts that exclude sybil behavior; we’ve been reluctant to apply these measures for a few reasons.
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The notion of sybil as a potential ‘Attack’ at the network level is debatable.
Although sybil behavior can affect outcomes in scenarios that assume each human is a unique actor, such as for identity protocols, user-centric airdrops, or quadratic funding on Gitcoin, we don’t see it as inherently malicious in the context of driving network activity. -
We believe incentives at the network level should prioritize maximizing sequencer revenue for the cheapest possible cost.
Our experience shows that a strategy focused on profitable incentive distribution maximizes value returned directly to the DAO, which could theoretically make incentives sustainable. Applying Open Block’s sybil methodology has revealed that only 3/22 participants engaging in what might be considered ‘sybil attacks’ have actually profited from such activities (with a combined profit under $2K). This brings into question whether the network fees generated by automated transactions are inherently less valuable than those from other sources.
Should the DAO prioritize sybil or profit?
If there’s a widespread desire within the DAO to curb sybil activities, we’re open to exploring allowlisted approaches at the expense of higher costs and less profitability for the DAO. We believe it’s crucial for DAO members to engage in an open dialogue surrounding incentive priorities—whether maximizing revenue and transactions is a viable objective or whether all grantees should maximally prioritize discouraging ‘sybil attacks’ on principle.