Camelot Delegate Communication Thread

[Camelot]

October 2025 voting

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Snapshot votings

Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies

Vote: Abstain

@Camelot

Camelot is voting Abstain for this proposal.

We agree the treasury should be put to work: assets sitting idle are a missed opportunity for the DAO. That said, an approach that is exclusively yield-oriented is, in our view, myopic.
We were one of the few recipients of the last treasury allocation, which testifies to Camelot’s key role in the ecosystem. We were the only Arbitrum exclusive protocol to receive funds. While the other choices make sense on paper, they don’t necessarily favor the specific development of the chain or the teams that have been investing more heavily, in the past or currently, in our ecosystem with a particular focus on Arbitrum.

We also see a lot of confusion in how ATMC has evolved. In the first round the process was open (protocols could submit proposals, though few were selected). The process was fairly long with an open approach to proposals in terms of submission, but not in terms of discussion; the risk parameters the commission was looking for to decide on an allocation were not clear enough, and the end result was that we only had allocations in Lido-staked ETH, AAVE, Fluid, and Camelot, with our protocol being effectively 100% focused on Arbitrum. Note that this doesn’t mean that allocations can’t go to multi-chain ones, because we do understand how, for example, AAVE is the leading lending market on our chain, to name just one of the chosen protocols. But the end result of the previous round was quite underwhelming compared to the initial set of expectations.

We were hoping to have more clarity beforehand for this round. This doesn’t necessarily mean having a granular list at this moment, before the voting, but instead understanding what the outcome will be and what we can reasonably expect for our chains and protocols.

We think the goal of the DAO with its treasury should be to produce yield and foster growth. It doesn’t necessarily have to happen in this round, but setting a clear path ahead is necessary to avoid what seems like a partial plan, with some key decisions potentially taken at the last minute.

[Constitutional] AIP: DVP Quorum

Vote: For

@Camelot

Camelot is aligned with the Foundation’s and DAO’s will to solve the quorum problem. The fix is in principle right: quorum should follow delegated voting power, not float with voteable supply.
A 40% / 50% DVP rule seems reasonable on paper. But we don’t agree to what the current formula would bring to us. With 320M delegated, 50% would put the constitutional bar around 160M, which feels like too low for the security standards we have compared to the 210M we have which seems more reasonable.

There’s a simpler way to reconcile these 2 values: yes, adopt the DVP rule, but pair it with a delegation ramp so we land near today’s hardness and not below it. Concretely: we think the DAO, AF and OCL should push for further delegation up to the point the DVP is around 400-420M. This can happen either through a delegation to top 10-20 delegates, or through other metrics such as ones that favour AAEs or excellent delegates in the ecosystem such as protocols and employees, which have stronger alignment with the chain. We know that there have been effort in the past to do so, and this created several millions more in delegations, but we think we should do more in this sense, either from the treasury of the DAO or from wallet from other entities.

AGV Council Compensation Calibration: Benchmark for Future Council Terms

Vote: For
We do think the compensation raise is not material compared to the theoretical role of the AGV council: supervise a 200M Arbitrum fund for a very difficult vertical, gaming. We do understand the compensation end number is the result of both research of similar roles and also internal DAO benchmark like the OpCo OAT; there could be a merit in discussing if that number toward we are all gravitating, around 8,000 in council position, is right or wrong. While it could be a bit inflated, we are more focused on having the right people in these position to foster growth of DAO initiatives. For these reasons, we are voting in favour.

[Temperature Check] Should we try a Delegate Incentive Program like the Arbitrum Triple Dip?

Vote: Against
We are against this proposal. The program seems like it was designed to tap into mostly into a specific set of delegates, the ones that are active in the forum, allocating to them 60% of monthly rewards. This mechanism will push likely for “discussions for the sake of discussing” more than meaningful contributions, and won’t help too much tackling the hard problems we have in the DAO, but just the perception of tackling them. Finally, we don’t understand why this proposal did frontrun on snapshot the one from the Foundation: is not that the latter is necessarily better than the former, but they are competing proposals on the same topic and running both at the same time voting wise could have been a bit more beneficial.

The DAO Incentive Program (DIP 2.0)

Vote: Against
We are not supporting the new DIP proposed by the Foundation. While we do see the effort of improving several things that have been perceived as a problem in the last year, we think it introduces too much complexity in the operations, especially through the peer review assembly, without any predictability on voting.
The program should be aimed to sustain delegates in allocating time for voting, which is a fundamental and necessary duty of our ecosystem. Arbitrum DAO governance wise is hard, with several proposals, calls and initiatives, sometimes very different between each other. While the activity has seen a slow down and simplification through the AAEs, there is still a merit in considering governance in Arbitrum still a very important and heavy task.
The DIP has so far allowed big delegates, and especially protocols, to allocate an FTE (partially or totally) to this duties; this new iteration, with no proper example of payouts, budget in ARB and not in stables and a mix of contributor and delegate program will likely neither solve delegates’ needs nor contributors’ needs. We are honestly puzzled by the choices made so far in designing the proposed program, because it feels like is very distant from the overarching goals it had in the beginning.
We would like to see something closer to previous iteration, with a centralised program manager able to evaluate ad-hoc cases and issues, with more predictability for payout, and a separation between contributors and delegates program.

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Tally votings

Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies

We unfortunately didn’t vote due to technical issues, but our stance from the Snapshot vote hasn’t changed.