The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We have recently seen a similar discussion in different DAOs and have debated the ‘right’ course of action with multiple stakeholders in different settings.
While we’re big proponents of the fact that a quorum that is difficult to meet is a feature and not a bug, we also understand that we shouldn’t let that hinder activity and lead good initiatives that have broad support to fail simply because quorum is hard to meet.
The proposed quorum reduction is the most straightforward and easiest to implement solution, although it comes with risks. However, any of the alternatives, including delegating tokens from the treasury to existing delegates, come with a bigger overhead without fully mitigating the risk of artificially making quorum easier to meet.
Ideally, we would want to activate a larger votable supply to participate in governance. Given that is no simple feat and that, as Entropy also pointed out, the rate at which the quorum increases would probably render any other reasonable interim measure obsolete within a few months at best, we support the idea of reducing the constitutional quorum.
The proposed 0.5% reduction seems reasonable. It’s big enough to help make quorum easier to achieve, but small enough not to dramatically increase the risk of a governance attack.