Thank you for your feedback. We will consider your suggested idea for future proposals. As stated in this proposal, this idea is just a short-term solution, while we examine other long-term solutions.
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Thank you for the comment. We are currently researching some ways to design a flexible quorum based on voter participation. Your suggestion is indeed helpful, and will help us in shaping future governance.
We also believe that flexible quorum is likely more apt as a long-term solution than short-term manual adjustment.
Regarding your last question, flexible quorum is technically feasible. We are still evaluating the best way to balance implementation complexity, security and long-term effectiveness.
We believe that 4.5% will only remain appropriate for the next several months. As outlined in the original proposal, this is not meant to be a permanent solution. Flexible quorum may be a more appropriate long-term solution. Metrics included in Entropyâs dashboards, such as âDelegated Voting Powerâ, âVotable Tokensâ, as well as in the ARDCâs research, such as âCurrent & Projected Constitutional AIP Quorumâ, âParticipation (%) of Votable Supplyâ, would help guide future adjustments. Such adjustments will be explored as we continue to review the metrics and data.
We also agree that the DAO should explore new mechanisms to attract more voters and increase participation from token holders.
Thank you for your support on this proposal. At the present, the costs of limiting vote buying or lobbying outweigh the benefits of doing so. Thus we think higher priority should be put on reducing quorum for the time being so that technical upgrades can continue uninterrupted.
Constitutional proposals typically apply to software upgrades. Any potential attacks on the treasury would be via non-constitutional proposals. As mentioned in the proposal, the quorum for non-constitutional proposals will remain the same, so itâs a non-issue for this proposal.
While I can understand the need to reduce quorum to facilitates operations and technical upgrades, would it be possible start establishing a criteria for either increasing the quorum again in the future? Or even then, what could justify lowering it again in the future?
Besides that, does the proposal account for the role that abstain votes play in these scenarios? I believe this issue was raised by @cupojoseph here and though their idea was initially prompted by a non-constitutional proposal passing, these are two topics that are tightly connected nonetheless.
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I agree that the use of treasury delegations is a valuable tool. Further, as example, the current Event Horizon community pool has served to add 7M in active votable supply with 100% uptime. This pool is fully accessible to all Arbitrum delegates and community members. But, treasury delegations are only one avenue of votable supply expansion.
Iâd like to open discussions around increasing VS through:
A. Investor Holdings: many of the early investors have been sidelined from voting participation. Often, this is due to workload requirements and legal limitations. To the former, myself and the Event Horizon team would gladly set up bespoke agents to ease the workload required and make voter participation seamless for any early Arbitrum investors. We would gladly work with @Arbitrum @offchainlabs to make governance easy for and mobilize Arbitrum investors.
B. Retail Engagement (individuals and organizations): Tremendous sums of ARB tokens are held on exchange and in wallets with no engagement in actual DAO governance. At Event Horizon, we have been experimenting with the use of grant-funded incentives to encourage the delegation of retail-held tokens. To date, and until staking goes live, this is a completely untapped source of votable supply. Benefitting our capital efficiency, at present (and again until staking), DAO tokens offer 0% APR. As such, with just $1,500 in emitted rewards, Event Horizon has garnered >$1.5M in votable supply. And, again, unlike vote buying, this voting power goes immediately back to the community members who leverage the public good community voting pool. I would be interested in exploring an expansion of this emissions model to work toward a more durable solution than simply perpetually lowering quorum requirements.
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The following reflects the views of L2BEATâs governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and itâs based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We have recently seen a similar discussion in different DAOs and have debated the ârightâ course of action with multiple stakeholders in different settings.
While weâre big proponents of the fact that a quorum that is difficult to meet is a feature and not a bug, we also understand that we shouldnât let that hinder activity and lead good initiatives that have broad support to fail simply because quorum is hard to meet.
The proposed quorum reduction is the most straightforward and easiest to implement solution, although it comes with risks. However, any of the alternatives, including delegating tokens from the treasury to existing delegates, come with a bigger overhead without fully mitigating the risk of artificially making quorum easier to meet.
Ideally, we would want to activate a larger votable supply to participate in governance. Given that is no simple feat and that, as Entropy also pointed out, the rate at which the quorum increases would probably render any other reasonable interim measure obsolete within a few months at best, we support the idea of reducing the constitutional quorum.
The proposed 0.5% reduction seems reasonable. Itâs big enough to help make quorum easier to achieve, but small enough not to dramatically increase the risk of a governance attack.
Below is a v1 pre-vote feedback report from the Event Horizon community and agents:
Summary of the Rationales:
- 178 of 191 Voters Support this proposal as is. Nearly all voters emphasize that the current 5% quorum is hard to meet in light of stagnant voter turnout and increasing token supply and that 0.5% is a safe and immediate remedy. A few voices express caution, warning that any reductionâeven if smallâmight undermine the perceived legitimacy or security of the governance process if not paired with longerâterm reforms.
Most Compelling Arguments AGAINST:
- Security & Legitimacy Concerns: One notable perspective cautions that even a modest reduction might undermine the systemâs credibility.
- Considerations of Precedent There is a worry that if quorum reduction is the preferred mode of addressing issues of votable supply, it may become a tempting and easy future solution rather than harder efforts to address the root issue.
Potential Improvements to Mitigate Weaknesses
For ProponentsâŚ
- Metrics and Monitoring: Clearly outline metrics and monitoring tools to ensure that the reduced quorum does not become a backdoor for low-signature proposals.
- Periodic Reviews: Commit to a periodic review of voter participation and propose a framework for a dynamic or âflexible quorumâ in the future if conditions change further.
For SkepticsâŚ
- Sunset Date: Pair the quorum reduction with a temporary-nature / sunset clause or a followâup review to ensure that if the lower threshold adversely affects governance, adjustments can be quickly reversed.
- Couple with Search for Alternative Approaches: Commit effort to explore supplementary measures for longâterm reform that may involve flexible, contextâdependent quorum settings rather than a fixed percentage.
- Increased Requirements for Future Quorum Reductions: to assure quorum reductions donât become a solution of convenience, guardrails and requirements around further and future reductions could be added.
Condensed Representation of Inter-Agent Discourse
â Alice (Proponent):
âWhile Constitutional AIPs have passed, in almost every case, doing so has required high-effort coordinationâeither from the Foundation, the MSS, or a small cluster of high-capacity delegates like L2BEAT, Blockworks, and others. These stakeholders have done remarkable work to uphold quorum, but the reality is that the threshold is increasingly mismatched with organic participation levels. The Security Council renewal votes and several STIP proposals, despite strong ecosystem support and broad alignment across power centers, came dangerously close to failure due to this static quorum.
This proposal doesnât introduce any technical or procedural overhaulâit simply adjusts the quorum for Constitutional AIPs specifically from 5% to 4.5%, reflecting the turnout patterns weâve seen even on broadly supported initiatives. Itâs deliberately conservative in scale, and explicitly scoped: it doesnât touch other proposal types. The aim is to prevent a situation where only hyper-coordinated, heavily whipped efforts can pass proposals, even when thereâs clear support across diverse delegate groups.â
â Bob (Opponent):
"I want to challenge a deeper assumption: that friction in reaching quorum is inherently bad. Iâd argue that itâs deliberate. Governanceâespecially Constitutional governanceâshould be hard. The need to coordinate across diverse stakeholders isnât just a hurdle; itâs a proof of legitimacy.
If we begin shifting the quorum downward based on participation trends, we risk making quorum feel negotiable. The danger is precedent. If turnout stagnates or the supply grows again, do we revisit this in six months? To me, this isnât about rejecting this proposal outrightâbut about building in strong guardrails: a sunset clause, a formal re-ratification, and a broader commitment to solving the underlying problem, not just patching it.â
â Alice (Proponent):
I would support adding a formal sunset mechanismâsay, a two-quarter trial period. We could even codify that further quorum reductions require an entirely separate governance process to avoid normalization. This way, we protect against the slippery slope while addressing the governance bottleneck weâve clearly observed. With regards to future improvement, static percentage thresholds were a rational first step, but they donât adapt well to evolving conditions. We should be exploring flexible quorum modelsâones that adjust dynamically based on voter participation, proposal type, or on-chain signal strength. Optimism and Gitcoin have both experimented here, and Arbitrum should lead on this front too.â
Strength of Conviction â Before and After Discourse
â Before Discourse:
- Proponents: Approximately 85/100 conviction, based on strong data and a focus on efficiency.
- Opponents: Approximately 60/100 conviction, concerned with the validity of decreasing safeguards and absence of durable future solution.
â After Discourse (with proposed improvements integrated):
- Proponents: Increase to about 90/100 due to the reassurance provided by review mechanisms and commitment to future evolution.
- Opponents: Increase to about 80/100 as the modifications address many of the concerns around precedent and legitimacy while still allowing necessary future flexibility.
Conclusion
A compromise grounded in a temporary quorum reductionâpaired with formal review timelines, transparent turnout metrics, limitations on future reductions absent a new governance process, and a shared commitment to explore adaptive quorum modelsâprovides a pragmatic near-term solution. It addresses current coordination constraints while preserving the legitimacy and resilience of Arbitrumâs Constitutional governance framework.
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Reducing Constitutional Quorum Threshold form 5% to 4.5% (~25m ARB)
POSITION: This past year saw voter turnout fall from ~8% to 4-5% ââ a clear threat to effective DAO functionality. Arbitrumâs proposal addresses this issue by lowering the quorum threshold for constitutional reforms, thereby increasing the chances of completing more votes. Michigan Blockchain supports this proposal for 2 reasons:
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Lowering the quorum threshold neither dilutes nor inflates existing voting power, doing nothing to shift the concentration of power. The DAOâs core functionality remains the same, there is merely a lower barrier to entry for proposals to be voted on.
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This proposal is free of cost, incurring only standard gas fees.
CONCERNS: Michigan Blockchain is sympathetic to security concerns arising from a lowered constitutional quorum threshold. However, as @Tane points out, acquiring the ARB necessary for a hostile takeover (given a 4.5% threshold) would inflate the price of ARB, making an attack significantly more expensive. Secondly, the Arbitrum DAO Security Council retains the power to take emergency action against malicious activity, further enhancing prootcal security irrespective of quorum threshold. For these reasons, Michigan Blockchain does not foresee significant security risks arising from this proposal.
ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL: @cupojoseph suggested allocating 22 million ARB to top contributors to increase their voting power and help meet quorum. Despite this proposalâs upfront cost, Michigan Blockchain views it as a better alternative as it temporarily fixes the DAO participation problem and justly rewards top contributors.
We are wary of the centralization risk posed by this proposal; however, top contributors to the DAO have no history of malicious activity ââ increasing their voting power does not pose centralization risk. If anything it is an added incentive to contribute to the DAO, with the understanding that top contributors can be rewarded through previously established incentive programs, as well as spontaneous increases to their voting power, such as this proposal.
While Arbitrum values the opinion of every DAO participant, top contributors (many of whom devote significant time toward governance) are likely to be better informed than less active participants. Increasing their delegation accelerates the best ideas. While this proposal comes at a 22m Arb cost, it is a reasonable price to pay for vastly improving DAO functionality.
CONCLUSION: Michigan Blockchain believes both proposals are better than inaction. Nevertheless, @cupojosephâs alternative proposal is superior to the original for the following reason:
The original proposal accommodates bad behavior. People are participating less (bad) and lowering the quorum threshold (accommodating) allows for governance to remain strong despite decreased participation. This accommodates bad behavior while doing nothing to reward good behavior.
Alternatively, increasing delegation to top contributors addresses the issue by incentivizing/rewarding strong participation. Rather than lowering standards to meet turnout, it raises participation to meet standards.
Jack Verrill; TG @JackVerrill
I agree with this proposal.
Urgently needed! Then we also need more long term solutions
Below are the opinions of the UADP:
Quorum isnât meant to be an easy threshold to reach. Itâs purposefully designed to induce a degree of friction in the voting processâbut the friction shouldnât impede governance functionality.
The drastic quorum margin reduction stats presented by the ARDC surprised us. This increasingly narrower buffer means proposals are more vulnerable to failure due to even small drop-offs in voter turnout, hence the rationale for reducing the quorum threshold makes sense here.
As mentioned by a handful of other folks, this quorum alteration is more or less a bandaid solution in reaction to a deeper problem: general voter participation. Regardless of programs like the DIP, for example, it seems that the overall active voting power remains stagnant. The exceeding reliance on a small number of large delegates to pass a vote is also worrying. A sale occurring from a large delegator could cause serious issues.
A last resort scenario would be a large treasury delegation initiative. This adds a predictable degree of stability towards meeting quorum. Compound conducted this last year after the governance attack. Conversations should be had with larger token holders as well if they donât actively delegate. Staking-based fees of course makes the case a lot more compelling, especially if an entity is worried about the potential legal recourse associated with governance participation.
The clear risk with a one-time reduction is that it makes the DAO more comfortable with continually lowering the quorum threshold based on increasing votable supply. Simultaneous efforts have to be in place to counteract increasing supply with increased ARB involved in voting. Dynamic quorum thresholds based on trailing or projected voting metrics, or even ARB supply metrics, feels flimsy. As a delegate, we feel more comfortable with a hard-set quorum that is predetermined and unalterable unless decided on by an onchain vote. Thatâs why itâs with a degree of reluctancy that we are in favor of reducing the quorum in this case.
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Itâs strange, but @Arbitrum didnât react to my proposal and criticism of their solution to the voting problem.
The thing is that this problem is not new and the solution to this problem has already been tested in other DAOs and I havenât seen a single argument why we should reinvent the wheel instead of using the experience of other DAOs.
In addition, this solution reduces security
The proposal that I proposed does not reduce security, and it is easier to implement - just delegate as many tokens as needed in an emergency
At the same time, if Arbitrumâs solution is temporary and will no longer work in several months, then in my case it is enough to add a certain number of tokens and delegate them to trusted delegates
I support lowering the constitutional quorum threshold as a necessary short-term fix. Without this adjustment, we risk slowing down governance and potentially blocking valuable proposals simply because they canât reach quorum. In the current environment, this change is much needed to keep the governance process functional.
However, itâs clear that a longer-term solution is also needed. Even with strong participation from the most active delegates - such as those in the DIP program, who together represent 61% of the 5% quorum as of March 2025 - a significant portion of voting power remains inactive. This is a common challenge for DAOs: most token holders simply donât participate in governance, and realistically, it is extremely difficult (if not impossible) to change this behavior.
In my view, redelegation is the only way to realistically address this problem. Since we canât expect passive holders to suddenly become active, the best path forward is to make it easy and rewarding for them to redelegate their tokens to engaged delegates. The ARB Staking proposal was designed to do exactly this, requiring holders to delegate in order to earn yield and I think that this is exactly the kind of approach we need. Unfortunately, there havenât been updates or concerning ARB Staking to date and, as things stand, I donât see any other solution being put into practice.
Beyond the quorum issue, I believe this problem highlights a broader challenge: declining participation is a symptom of waning interest in the DAO itself, which if left unaddressed, could threaten both its effectiveness and long-term viability.
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Thank you to the Arbitrum Foundation for raising this important and timely topic. As noted in recent ARDC reports, quorum risk has been flagged as a significant governance concern, and we appreciate the initiative to proactively address it.
However, while the proposal to reduce quorum thresholds seeks to improve operational efficiency, we believe it does so at the cost of increasing long-term governance risk. Reducing the quorum requirement may offer a short-term fix for participation challenges, but without addressing the underlying issues, it risks setting a precedent that could erode the integrity of DAO decision-making over time.
We would like to highlight that the current proposal lacks clear, data-driven justification for the chosen reduction targets, as well as a systematic framework for future adjustments. The assumption that quorum will need to be repeatedly lowered over time suggests a need for more robust structural responses rather than ongoing threshold erosion.
We would be inclined to support this proposal if it were presented as part of a broader strategy that included complementary initiatives to mitigate governance risk and increase sustainable participation. In our view, some of the most impactful mitigation strategies could include:
- Delegating Treasury-held ARB to trusted delegates, especially those participating in the Delegate Incentive Program. The program already includes a rigorous review of delegate performance, making it a natural mechanism to align capital and accountability.
- Activating Tallyâs stARB governance staking. StableLab has recently proposed the first governance staking rewards for Rari DAO, using stRARI staking to direct delegation power in Rari Chain (an Arbitrum Orbit L3). The Obol Collective has already implemented it and is discussing metrics to determine active delegates. This system helps convert passive token holders into active governance participants by tying delegation to staking yield, using the same infrastructure the governace staking in Arbitrum would use. It would also help reconnect the correlation between total ARB supply and the share actively participating in votes.
Ultimately, we agree that quorum management is a critical issue. But reducing thresholds without simultaneously building participation infrastructure introduces long-term risks to the DAOâs legitimacy and resilience. We encourage the Foundation and other governance stakeholders to consider bundling quorum reductions with these or other strategic initiatives aimed at improving turnout and representation in the long run.
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We recognize the immediate challenge this proposal aims to address. While we do not fully agree with the recommendation to lower the constitutional quorum threshold from 5% to 4.5%, we understand the rationale behind it and acknowledge the practical need for short-term adjustments.
Tane raises an important concern: reducing the quorum does carry tradeoffs. In particular, it marginally increases the risk of governance capture and could, over time, dilute the strength of constitutional safeguards if similar reductions continue. We share the view that any change to quorum thresholds should be made with caution.
At the same time, we align with Curiaâs perspective that the current issue reflects deeper structural shortcomings, namely, voter apathy and low delegate engagement. Lowering the quorum alone does not address the root cause. Whatâs needed is a longer-term solution that makes participation more dynamic and reflective of actual delegate activity. We believe this is where the DAOâs attention must shift next.
With that in mind, we will support this proposal as a temporary and pragmatic step but not as a permanent fix. It is a pressure valve, not a cure. We recommend further research into dynamic quorum mechanisms or alternative models such as Treasury Delegation that better align participation, and the security of Arbitrumâs governance.
We thought about this for a bit and are willing to support it. In a vacuum, we would be opposed to lowering quorum like this but the DAO is making a lot of big changes in favor of efficiency and we believe itâs better to rip this band-aid off now along with everything else instead of making this a problem that we will have to deal with while trying to keep things streamlined later. In response to one thing that was mentioned:
Weâd like to note that this scenario is addressed in the governance docs, and the Security Council could keep the chain running, but itâs obviously a worst case situation and if we can avoid it through social consensus, we should.
Scenario 8: The Arbitrum DAO experiences a season of voter apathy.
Will this prevent work from being done on the chains that the Arbitrum DAO owns?
No, voter apathy wonât prevent work from being done on the chains that the Arbitrum DAO owns. The Constitution allows for non-emergency actions to be taken, which donât require the approval of token holders. The Security Council has the power to perform emergency actions with a 9-of-12 approval, which can be used to address critical issues that cannot wait for voter approval. While voter participation is important for the proper functioning of the DAO, the Constitution has built-in mechanisms to ensure that work can continue to be done even in the event of low voter turnout.
Note that voter apathy could have an impact on the governance of the DAO, and certain decisions and actions might not be as representative of the communityâs collective will if voter turnout is low.
Non-emergency action
Routine actions taken by the Security Council, such as software upgrades and maintenance.
We also remain generally pessimistic about increases in governance participation and we anticipate there will be more ARB coming out of the treasury in the near future further increasing quorum so we think itâs best to get ahead of this now. Lastly, we want to mention that while this is meant to be a short-term change, weâve seen that technical upgrades to the DAOâs governance systems can take a while to get through the whole pipeline of deliberation, development, and implementation. If we know that a technical way to adjust quorum or increase governance participation isnât likely to come soon, we might want to define a way now to adjust quorum as needed instead of having this discussion repeatedly. For example allowing the AAEs to monitor delegate voting activity and make changes as they see fit. As mentioned by other delegates, the Security Council can also take Emergency Actions to mitigate any potential harm to the chain.
Iâm supportive of lowering the constitutional quorum by 0.5%. Itâs a pragmatic step to avoid governance deadlock, and we donât put ourselves in a scenario where critical votes consistently struggle to meet quorum.
While the reduction increases the risk of governance attacks, the 14-day voting period and Security Council backstop provide meaningful protection. A successful attack would require both (i) accumulating enough ARB and (ii) getting the Security Council to cooperate â similar to hostile takeovers in traditional finance, where gaining both stake and board alignment is extremely difficult, and arguably justified if successful.
Iâm against delegating ARB from the treasury to boost participation, as I donât see a viable way to do it effectively. Allocating delegations based on objective metrics (like governance participation) can be easily gamed, while subjective ones introduce conflicts of interest, as delegates may feel pressure to align with those allocating the stake. And either way, itâs a short-term fix just as much as lowering the quorum is.
A more sustainable solution would be proactive outreach to large ARB holders. Has the Foundation already engaged top holders to encourage delegation? Given the power-law distribution, Iâd expect a relatively small number of holders to control most of the votable supply â getting them to delegate seems like the most scalable long-term solution to make sure participation keeps up with threshold increases.
In the original post, we quoted 190M ARB as the figure considered for the purposes of April 2025. Assuming that this proposal goes through the entire lifecycle of an AIP and passes at the end of June, then it would realistically only take effect for proposals posted to Tally in July onwards. By July 2025, assuming the consistency in token unlocks, the new quorum threshold of 4.5% for constitutional proposals would translate to roughly ~210M. So we would end up in almost exactly the same place as where we started in April 2025 (215M). Thus this proposal is just a temporary solution until we find some other long-lasting solutions that will work.
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This proposal is designed to be a minimal and short-term adjustment that responds to the specific quorum friction weâve seen in recent constitutional proposals. As you rightly pointed out, itâs important to consider whether and how quorum thresholds could be revisited in the future, whether upward or downward, based on evolving DAO participation levels. Thus the next step would be to look into long-term solutions such as flexible quorum and improving voter participation.
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