[Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction

[Chris_Areta]

We will be voting against this proposal. Sharing our rationale here:

@Chris_Areta

Rationale: We’d like to thank the AF for their work in raising this important issue and for proposing a path forward.

We will be voting AGAINST this proposal to reduce the constitutional quorum threshold from 5% to 4.5%. While we acknowledge the practical challenges of meeting current quorum requirements, we believe this proposal represents a band-aid solution, and the DAO should focus on implementing long-term solutions now.

We believe this proposal sets a precedent of reactive governance parameter adjustments that could potentially degrade governance quality down the line. If participation declines further, will we lower quorum again? Conversely, if participation increases, would the DAO raise the threshold again? We see this as unsustainable and a potential slippery slope.

@Arbitrum

The 0.5% reduction represents a minimal-risk, fast-to-implement interim solution, while other long-term solutions can be considered, such as flexible quorum, or franchiser contract.

Our view is that the DAO should be advancing longer-term options now rather than waiting. The proposal frames the quorum change as an interim solution, yet there are no ongoing efforts to suggest a path towards developing a complementary long-term solution. Lowering quorum to match declining participation treats the symptom, not the cause. Instead of accommodating the problem, we suggest the DAO focus on:

• Expanding voter education and engagement efforts;
• Designing incentives for active voting or delegation (for example, models combining staking rewards with voting-power decay, as seen SummerFi and MODE);
• Reviewing past initiatives, incl. grants to initiatives like ARB Staking and others, to identify any implementation gaps and provide targeted support.

Quorum thresholds serve as critical safeguards in decentralized governance. Adjustments to core parameters like quorum deserve thorough justification. In our view, such adjustments should generally lean towards making parameters more stringent and secure, rather than weakening standards for convenience.

To address this issue, we encourage exploring quorum models that balance flexibility with stability, such as:

• A two-tier quorum model:
  • Fixed minimum threshold (e.g., 3.5%);
  • An additional variable component based on historical participation averages over a rolling period.

This approach would provide quorum flexibility while avoiding successive threshold adjustments.