While we fundamentally agree that quorum thresholds are an important friction in democratic processes, ensuring proposals only pass with genuine and substantial support, we also recognize the pragmatic need for adaptability, given Arbitrum’s current governance landscape. Lowering quorum thresholds carries inherent risks, including increasing vulnerability to governance attacks or allowing insufficiently supported proposals to pass. We analyzed the potential risk of lowering quorum in the perspective of unintended DAO treasury leakage, and for constitutional proposals, we believe we should take more conservative approach as some protocol vulerbility or malicous upgrade could cost Arbitrum’s TVL.
However, considering Arbitrum’s current developmental phase as an evolving project rather than a matured governance system, maintaining a high quorum threshold could impede progress. Temporarily adjusting the threshold is acceptable as an interim measure to mitigate immediate governance gridlock, particularly when factoring in the safety net provided by the Security Council.
Nonetheless, this approach should be seen explicitly as a temporary solution. Moving forward, we strongly encourage the DAO to address the root issues, such as low voter participation and engagement, rather than repeatedly adjusting quorum thresholds. Alternative approaches like treasury delegation and targeted incentives to boost voter participation should be explored in greater depth to ensure the long-term integrity and effectiveness of Arbitrum’s governance structure.
I will be voting “For” at the temp check stage, however I will not vote “Yes” at the constitutional stage unless there is more effort put into what the ‘next steps’ are. I agree with a few other comments that ‘temporary fixes become permanent solutions’ and fear that the 4.5% is just going to be the permanent number moving forward. While I think there will be discussions on long term fixes in general, without further steps we risk having this same vote in a year but to go from 4.5% to 4%.
All said, I do want to vote “For” in the end as this is an inherent issue with all DAOs and should be addressed.
Edit: To save forum space, I will be voting “For” on Tally. AF has indicated the issue of quorum will be addressed in other proposals, which leads me to believe this isn’t going to be just a recurring issue where we vote to lower the threshold every year. Thank you!
I have decided to vote in favor of this proposal. As I already expressed during the discussions over the past weeks ([Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction - #34 by 0x_ultra), I believe it is crucial that the governance process doesn’t get stuck and that we maintain the flexibility to adapt to current conditions.
That said, as I mentioned before, I hope this vote can also serve as an opportunity to reflect on more long-term, structural solutions. I’m glad some ideas have already been discussed, but I sincerely hope they won’t be forgotten after this vote. I really think addressing these challenges is essential for the ecosystem.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We are voting FOR the proposal.
As per our previous comment, we’re generally in favor of straight-up reducing quorum to mitigate the difficulty in meeting it as a short-term fix. Ideally, and for the long run, we need to organically increase participation from token holders, either in the form of delegation or direct governance participation.
Also, it’s important to highlight that, as also suggested by the Arbitrum Foundation, if we are to assume a stable rate of unlocks, the amount of ARB required for quorum will be roughly the same as it was in April, given the time it takes for the proposal to go through the entire governance process.
I have voted in favour of this proposal because it’s a reasonable step to make sure good proposals don’t get stuck simply because not enough ARB is showing up to vote. I also see that it does not fully solve the deeper problem of low delegated ARB across the ecosystem, but I believe this opens the door to exploring different ideas, for instance delegating some of the DAO treasury’s own ARB to active delegates / other trusted parties. Details about how that would work, who would receive it, and for how long, etc- would still need to be figured out, but it’s an important conversation to have. And lastly, it’s also worth noting that imo this will likely become a recurring problem unless other long term oriented measures are taken, for example the idea mentioned above.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation decided to vote “FOR” on this proposal at theSnapshot Vote.
Rationale
We agree with L2B and other delegates: considering the unlock rate, despite this modification in a short time, we will reach the actual required quorum levels, so a long-term solution is necessary.
We would like to know AF’s opinion (@arbitrum) about potential alternatives for solving the lack of participation (both from delegated and undelegated ARB ), and especially the lack of incentives to delegate VP to active delegates in the long term.
From our POV, staking aligned with involvement in governance for obtaining rewards is still the most viable alternative, even though we are unaware of the source of resources to be used to fund it
Now, we are invoking the AF because we understand that nowadays this process needs an entity/contributor that owns it. Right now, we all agree that a long-term solution is necessary, but this proposal never establishes an action plan to follow, or at least, to start to work on a permanent fix.
First and foremost, we’d like to sincerely thank the Arbitrum team for putting forward this proposal.
The recommendation to lower the quorum threshold from 5% to 4.5% is clearly laid out and backed by a solid risk analysis. The core insight — that while the token supply continues to grow, voter participation has stayed relatively flat — points to a real governance challenge that needs to be addressed for the long-term health of the ecosystem.
We see this 0.5% reduction not as a permanent fix, but as a practical step to prevent potential governance deadlock while more robust, long-term solutions are in the works. It’s a measured and responsible approach.
Given that the proposal comes directly from the Arbitrum team, we trust both the intent and the execution. With that in mind, we have voted ‘For’ this proposal.
We think the answer to your question is community consensus since this is a DAO. Any future adjustment, whether up or down, would require another constitutional proposal, a temperature check, and majority support from delegates and token holders. Thus it’s not a slippery slope, but rather a step that holds the same standards as any other constitutional change.
We agree that increasing participation and delegation is crucial, and we see this quorum reduction not as a replacement for those goals, but as a short-term unblock while the DAO works towards them. We have an upcoming proposal on flexible quorum that will hopefully fix the quorum issue in the long term. More details will be posted soon, but it will likely revolve around using active voting power to set the quorum threshold.
Thanks for the thoughtful and passionate write-up, and for being a committed contributor. We hear your concerns.
We agree that this proposal alone won’t solve participation. It’s a targeted, short-term response to recent data showing that even well-supported constitutional proposals are struggling to meet quorum. The aim is to prevent governance gridlock while we actively work on more durable solutions. We have an upcoming proposal on flexible quorum that will hopefully fix the quorum issue in the long term. More details will be posted soon, but it will likely revolve around using active voting power to set the quorum threshold.
Thanks for your continued engagement. Your voice matters and we value your perspective.
We understand the hesitation around changing core governance parameters without simultaneously addressing broader participation. We view this proposal as a short-term tactical measure to avoid immediate governance deadlock, especially as the number of constitutional proposals grows.
We have an upcoming proposal on flexible quorum that will hopefully fix the quorum issue in the long term. More details will be posted soon, but it will likely revolve around using active voting power to set the quorum threshold.
Thank you for the nuanced position and conditional support. This is exactly the kind of thoughtful input that makes the DAO better.
We share your concern: temporary fixes can become de facto standards if not followed up. Our intent is for this reduction to provide immediate relief while more long-term solutions are being scoped out.
We have an upcoming proposal on flexible quorum that will hopefully fix the quorum issue in the long term. More details will be posted soon, but it will likely revolve around using active voting power to set the quorum threshold.
Thank you for sharing your rationale and for acknowledging the importance of the issue. We deeply respect your concerns and your principled stance.
We agree that lowering quorum is not a long-term fix. It’s a tactical step, designed to avoid near-term gridlock while giving the DAO breathing room to pursue longer-term improvements.
We have an upcoming proposal on flexible quorum that will hopefully fix the quorum issue in the long term. More details will be posted soon, but it will likely revolve around using active voting power to set the quorum threshold.
We support the proposal to reduce the quorum for approving a proposal by 0.5%. We know the importance of quorum to prevent governance attacks and, with Arbitrum’s diversification strategies, an attack can become profitable.
It is essential that lowering the 0.5% is not the only measure taken by the Arbitrum Foundation for the DAO. We recommend debating a way to increase the number of votes participating in proposals, either with (1) incentives to attract new delegates, (2) committees like the ACC in Optimism/Scroll or (3) delegation from the Foundation to delegates.
Increasing participation is important, but maintaining the security of the DAO is also fundamental.
in Favour as per previous comments. Quorum is a mechanism to prevent proposals sneaking through. It should not be taken as a mechanism to vote down on proposals, as for this later usecase we already have the voting itself
Voting FOR. We recognize this is a temporary solution to low voter turnout. There is some interesting discussion of dynamic quorum in the thread, but for now this is an adequate fix. In the future there needs to be a more robust solution to incentivizing government participation to address the root of the problem.