Non-Constitutional: Amendment to the Delegate Incentives Program

Abstract

This proposal seeks to make 2 amendments under the delegate incentive program:

  1. Increase the minimum voting power requirement to 500k ARB to follow the existing process of joining the delegate incentive program (level 1 delegates)

  2. Delegates between 50k - 500k ARB wishing to become part of the program need an endorsement from a level 1 delegate (level 2 delegates)

67 delegates were eligible in December for payment of between $3000-7000 (only 50 can be approved). Only 21 delegates would meet the threshold under the increased requirements. If each of these delegates then nominated a smaller delegate (web of trust), we would have roughly the same number of delegates as we currently do while improving the economic foundation of the program, be more comparable to other DAOs in minimum eligibility requirements for delegate pay and foster more accountability by having level 1 delegates withdraw their endorsement in case of poor performance by a level 2 delegate.

Motivation

On October 27 2024, Arbitrum DAO approved the Delegate Incentives Program for a total budget of $4.2 million. Its goals are to keep delegated voting power active in Arbitrum DAO and focus on the professionalization of delegates by incentivizing them to stay abreast with developments through attending calls, voting regularly and sharing their rationale. Another goal (which was not how it played) was to allow large delegates to hire staff that could do the research required for a proposal.

The proposal committed to a review process on the parameters at the 3 month mark, also adding in the ability to change any of them via a simple snapshot vote.

After analyzing the delegate payment program, increasing voting power requirement by 10x from 50k to 500k ARB can increase economic foundation of the program, create a better environment for organic participation and bring us more in line with the delegate compensation programs at other DAOs. At the same time, we hear the feedback that smaller delegates between 50k to 500k ARB do as much or even more effort. The pathway is still open for them to join the program if they can secure an endorsement from a level 1 delegate.

Rationale

The amendments to the delegate incentive programs will help Arbitrum DAO in 3 ways;

  1. Improved economic foundation: Currently, the program treats all delegates equally, whether they have 50k ARB or 20 million ARB delegated. This is not reflective of reality. Programs based on equality rarely end well.

Delegates with higher voting power have more responsibility in getting their decision right - this is a fact. At the same time, they have said the engagement from smaller delegates helps them make their decision. Reflecting this reality, allowing smaller delegates between 50k to 500,000 ARB to participate in the program if they have an endorsement from a larger delegate will help preserve the good parts of the program.

There are currently some exploits possible where with 50k ARB (~USD 30,000) of voting power, you can fulfill the checklist of voting, attending calls and commenting to reach breakeven point in 4-10 months while still having your principal. I do trust in the capable SeedLatam team to filter out such delegates, but we should not open up such an attack vector in the first place. Increasing trustless requirements to join the program by 10x to 500,000 ARB makes economic sense and only includes those delegates who can upload snapshot proposals.

  1. Benchmarking with other DAOs : if we look at similar delegate compensation program, Arbitrum stands out in having a much lower barrier to entry and a much higher amount earmarked for paying delegates.
    Aave pays a comparable $5k USDC, but excludes service providers and only includes those with 20k AAVE in voting power (~6 million usd). Similarly, Lido requires 0.1% of voting power delegated to be eligible for payments. The most comparable program is 1inch, which requires a minimum of 500k 1Inch (~ USD 150,000) and pays $4k USDC per month .

We stand alone in keeping a low minimum requirement of only 50,000 ARB. There might be compelling reasons to do so, but we should justify why we are straying so far from industry benchmarks. A happy middle ground is letting such delegates participate if a larger delegate can attest to the value they provide.

  1. Organic Participation: When we financialize the forum for a large proportion of contributors, we crowd out organic participation. We see a high influx of comments from delegates who need to check their tick box, which SeedLatam is on the lookout for, but it nonetheless adds more noise than signal to pay for participation from an average delegate. When level 2 delegates are accountable to level 1 delegates (who may withdraw their endorsement at any time) we will not face this issue as acutely.

Specifications

The original proposal stated that any of the parameters in the delegate incentive program can be changed via a simple snapshot vote.

The delegate incentives program is adding value. Increasing the minimum voting power required for eligibility by 10x, while still allowing smaller delegates to participate if they can secure an endorsement, will bake in a level of accountability beyond the capabilities of the program manager. We also propose capping the limit to 1 endorsement per level 1 delegate in this initial iteration.

Timeline

We will keep this on the forum for at least 10 days before moving to a snapshot vote on 13th February.

If approved, the new parameter will come into effect immediately for the remainder of the delegate incentives program.

Total cost

I don’t expect any prizes for this work but will gladly accept in the future if anyone has found the public sensemaking work valuable.

3 Likes

I agree that the threshold for participating in the incentive program should be raised, but it should be based on the standard of holding ARB rather than increasing the voting power requirement. I believe delegates should hold at least 500K ARB to be eligible for incentives. If a delegate is not a major ARB holder, no matter how much voting power they have, how can they truly consider the interests of ARB holders?

4 Likes

So it seems like you didn’t care at all about the feedback that other delegates also shared in the Arbitrum DAO TG.
Your data is simply derived from your view “threshold too low compared to others, let’s increase x10”.

Yes other DAOs may require more voting power, but that’s based on thresholds that make sense. At Aave we do have this threshold because people are willing to delegate, because you can stake, deposit or simply hold your Aave token and still be able to delegate. So there is an incentive to do so. Also we had several programs running like Merit incentivising people to delegate for extra rewards.

This proposal makes no sense at all at its current stage and may be re considered at a later stage when staking is live and you made a proposal based on feedback an research.

Oh and at Arbitrum you have to write a rationale, make comments etc. Which at most other DAOs isn’t even needed. So there is more work to do here.

Going to vote NO.

6 Likes

Thanks for the early feedback!

This criteria would eliminate @krst and the L2Beat team, which we surely dont want? In general i would say convincing people to hold and delegate their ARB to you is roughly equally as hard as doing it yourself

I don’t think you read the proposal closely enough :grinning: 500k ARB was chosen because;

  1. It is the amount needed for uploading a proposal to snapshot
  2. It reduces the number of eligible delegates to roughly half the size of what the program can accept

When you pay people to write comments, it actually adds more noise than signal (Goodhearts law). So not sure this is a positive

don’t you think you should at least preface your opposition by saying that you are currently being paid under the program and you would be adversely affected were these changes to go into effect?

2 Likes

This is public data, anyone can see I’m being paid. That’s no rocket science.
But this also enables and allows me to do governance work. If not, I wouldn’t be here, many others too and you would have a centralized arbitrum with Gauntlet, Lobbyfi and a few others controlling the DAO.
And tbh I wouldn’t care if I wouldn’t be eligible anymore. So no, it’s not about me, it’s about a bad proposal that had huge backlash yesterday but you decided it’s still the way to go, so here you are, getting the same comments now in public back.

1 Like

I admit that this is difficult, but we also have to acknowledge that a delegate who doesn’t hold any ARB will find it hard to genuinely act in the best interests of ARB holders. I only have 200K voting power, but I hold 100K ARB. If a delegate with 500K voting power holds only 50K ARB or even less, what makes them more qualified than me to participate in the incentive program? I believe it is necessary to set a minimum ARB holding requirement for participants in the incentive program. If they are unwilling to hold 500K ARB, they can simply choose not to participate the incentive program.

4 Likes

Hello,

As an initial reflection, I believe that the process of public outrage on Twitter followed by launching a proposal without much analysis is not ideal.

There are reasons why the program is structured the way it is—each parameter was carefully discussed, and the trade-offs involved were examined in great detail. You could have discussed these details with @SEEDGov -the Program Manager- before submitting this proposal, as they have a dedicated team that studies the program’s outcomes and evaluates potential modifications for improvement.

In fact, more than a year ago, you agreed with the initial design, which has undergone many changes—though not the specific one you are now questioning.

The parameter you are now questioning so emphatically was already in place then:

There is absolutely nothing wrong with changing your mind. In fact, this incentive program is designed to adapt and improve over time. However, based on what you posted on Twitter, it seems like you only just found out about this parameter.

Fortunately, there is an active delegates incentive program that remains experimental in how it evaluates the contributions and values and rewards constructive feedback. So, despite your proposal’s lack of fair logical motivation, I will share my thoughts on it.

The first thing I notice: there is no connection between the identified “problem” and the proposed solution. From what I read, larger delegates should be better rewarded—or the only ones rewarded—because they have greater responsibility than “minor” delegates. On the other hand, reducing the program’s cost to save funds for the DAO is also mentioned.

So I ask you: Will not paying minor delegates make larger delegates feel better rewarded? What is the appropriate amount to compensate for that responsibility?

On the other hand:

That is not the case at all. Properly exercised governance—debating the proposal and understanding the necessary context—takes the same amount of time for a large delegate as it does for a small delegate. It will obviously change the impact of one vote versus another.

In my opinion, such a comparison is not appropriate. You cannot compare a program in Arbitrum, where what is being governed is a multipurpose chain that contains an ecosystem in itself with a wide diversity of actors., with Maker or AAVE, where governance focuses on a specific product. The considerations, needs, delegate profile, and required skills are all different.

You also say that this could create a better environment for organic participation. Explain to me how stopping compensation without an alternative plan will achieve that. In your text, you mention rewarding participation that adds value, but you don’t specify how to do so.

So basically, your argument is: Let’s stop paying those with less than 500K voting power because the program over-rewards small delegates and is potentially gameable.

Once again, I ask: Is it really necessary to change this parameter to achieve the goals of your proposal? Can’t other parameters be adjusted to double the rewards for those actually contributing to the DAO, regardless of how much VP they have? Is there no other way to recognize the value of larger delegates without excluding smaller ones?

As I understand and recall, the 50K threshold was set as a low parameter to encourage the participation of new delegates joining the DAO. One of the great benefits of DAOs is plurality, but that plurality is meaningless if those participating lack the proper context and proper knowledge of what is going on.

What’s interesting is that, despite the 50K delegation threshold, the first iteration of the program never reached the cap of 50 incentivized delegates:

In fact, participation never exceeded 30 delegates receiving payments. This led to the inclusion of that metric among the KPIs for the current version. One of the program’s objectives is to increase payments, as that would indicate (tbd with results) that delegates are engaged in discussions.

In the last month of the program, in December, 49 delegates qualified for incentives:

So, in the current version, which already rewarded participation for November and December, incentives are still not being distributed at 100% of their potential. In this regard, this data allows me to question the ease of gaming the system. However, that doesn’t mean it’s not possible, and there are certainly parameters that can be adjusted to better reflect and reward the work of delegates who add value.

Regarding the proposed threshold: What was your reasoning for deciding on 500K? The number of delegates above that threshold, the cost—why 500K and not 1M or 5M? I also don’t see the logic behind how modifying this parameter will help achieve the goals of the program that the DAO has agreed upon.

Raising it to 500K—will that allow more delegates to join the DAO? Will it bring in new contributors? Will it ensure that more delegates maintain a high and consistent level of participation?

Another question is: what is the opportunity cost of not incentivizing the delegates who are currently being incentivized and below the proposed 500K threshold?

I do think there’s merit in discussing the results of the DIP and how to make it more cost-efficient (which, I reiterate, is not proposed here).

However, for me to support a modification of parameters, I need at least a justification for why that modification would improve the program, prevent it from being gamed, and bring us closer to achieving the goals that were set. Do we want to incentivize those with a lot of VP, or do we want to incentivize constructive participation that creates value for the DAO? And how can we do this in a cost-efficient way?

One thing you could have done, but didn’t, was engage in the discussion of the program, which was highly debated and received a lot of feedback. The proposal was in the forum for over three months, with back-and-forth discussions until its final approval.

There, you will be able to see feedback from both myself and many delegates who proposed alternative models or ideas on how to reward quality work over routine or potentially spammy contributions. One that I particularly liked was @maxlomu :

To me, one signal that raises alarms is the “consensus” (assuming it exists—though it hasn’t been discussed in depth) to not make the discussion of SOS “mandatory” for qualifying for the incentives program. This was just one of many suggestions from 404DAO, which I supported.

We are incentivizing delegates to participate constructively, but when it comes to the most important discussions, it’s better not to get them involved because of the noise. I understand where this suggestion is coming from, and I even think it makes sense given the current state of the program. However, I believe we should aim for compensated delegates to participate in those types of discussions that are so crucial for the DAO and its future.

That’s why there are many things to improve, and experimentation is needed to understand what works and what doesn’t. But that takes time and experimentation (three months into the current version, and several changes have already been introduced, with more to come).

So before saying that you’re bearish on the Arbitrum DAO, it would be really great to hear your ideas on how to improve the program and make it more cost-efficient, in order to ensure it rewards quality participation over spam.

Finally, I prefer spending money to incentivize quality participation rather than relying on “organic” participation with the expectation that it will be free and of high quality. No, we can’t expect people to donate their time to the DAO “organically” and maintain enough context over a long period. It may work for a while, but it won’t be sustainable or viable.

Just to clarify, I’m not against the discussion of the threshold. However, it should come with a rationale explaining why this modification will improve the program, help it achieve its objectives or how this will benefit the DAO. Other than let’s save money.

*COI disclosure: I am an incentivized delegate under the 500K proposed threshold, and if this were to go to Snapshot, I would normally abstain. However, given my rationale, if this proposal goes to Snapshot under these conditions, I will vote against it because it does not solve any problems. It doesn’t even propose a solution that, even if I disagree with it, could work.

**Writing this response took me over 30 minutes.

11 Likes

I thought about your proposal and feel like there is a happy middle ground.

We divide the delegate incentives program into 2 : one half is the present amendment restricting eligibility to those above 500,000 ARB in delegated voting power.

the second amendment would be for delegates between 50-500k ARB, where some proportion must be owned directly by them

Prima facie, treating both these groups as equivalent does not make sense.

1 Like

Thank you for the detailed response!

I do still stand by my praise of SEEDLATAM and the thought given to designing a proper structure for delegate pay. You get a better idea on improvements after seeing the data come in.

I know I’m alienating a good portion of Arbitrum DAO with this proposal but please do not take any of it as a personal attack on anyone.

This is a straw man argument. My issue is the economic foundation of the program which makes zero sense. More delegation power before being put on full time payroll for the DAO is simply being prudent.

Ideally, we reach a situation for pay of small delegates that is similar to what @stonecoldpat advocated on the twitter thread

And that requires stopping this equality BS where smaller delegates get the same treatment (and pay) as the larger ones.

A very simple way that would be leagues better than what we have for smaller delegates: ask accepted proposal authors the 2-3 most helpful comments and reward those directly. Much more organic than putting 50 people on the payroll whose job it is to comment even if they might have nothing insightful on that particular topic.

The fact that we haven’t reached the cap does not mean its not being gamed or it has a good RoI. We need to see the present delegates and gauge whether they are delivering the equivalent value of a full time employee.

I stand by my prediction that paying $2-3 million for small delegates to comment on every single proposal will not help Arbitrum be competitive in the long run. I really hope to be proven wrong on that front!

My favored approach: similar to the STIP incentives, have a moratorium on delegate pay to those below the 500k ARB. Come up with a better proposal and list than we have now to reward only those giving the equivalent value of full time work. And we then get that passed as a second amendment to DIP.

*Disclosure: I am not receiving any money for calling out issues in the program and am likely going to get ostracised from Arbitrum for it. I would normally keep quiet but if theres even a minor chance of it helping us come back on track its worth doing

**Researching this proposal and responding to comments has taken me over 3 days of completely uncompensated time

So now the smaller ones are those who should own ARB but the bigger ones not?
How does that make sense again? Didn’t you say today that everyone should have ARB and the more they hold the more aligned they are?

So this would mean the small delegates are aligned and bigger ones arent?

2 Likes

The goal of this program is to professionalize delegates, and it has successfully onboarded great contributors who actively engage in the DAO. Raising the ARB requirement to 500K could create an entry barrier for smaller or new delegates, reducing the diversity of perspectives and potentially discouraging small delegates. Also, a high delegation doesn’t equate to greater work or contributions; as Pedro mentioned above, it takes the same amount of time for a large delegate as it does for a small delegate to review proposals and comment on them. Incentives should reward engagement and contributions, not just token holdings.

Regarding your concern expressed on Twitter:


You noted a disincentive to participate in Arbitrum proposal discussions due to the perception that others are compensated while you are not. It’s unclear whether a tenfold increase in the ARB requirement would alleviate your concerns or still leave you feeling marginalized because others are remunerated.

You also mentioned that a 50,000 ARB threshold is excessively low, claiming a delegate could recoup their investment within six months. However, this perspective may not account for the financial realities of many participants, you’re a clear example of this, as you only have a delegation of 22 ARB. Additionally, imagine someone invested in 50,000 ARB tokens to join this program, purchasing them last December at $1.21 each. With ARB now trading at approximately $0.50, that investment would have lost around 60% of its value. In this scenario, it would take months of work within the DAO just to recoup the initial capital.

I also find these comments concerning, as they seem to indicate a misunderstanding of DIP:


You’re framing your comments as if the participants on DIP were dishonest and are grifting money from the DAO. This assertion that DIP participants are exploiting the DAO financially underestimates the extensive efforts many delegates contribute. For instance, this proposal alone required hours of engagement across multiple platforms (X, TG, Forum), dedicated research, and improvement efforts. Your claim regarding the lack of “adequate checks” within the program is inaccurate; all delegate activities are meticulously evaluated using a rigorous rubric, which effectively prevents manipulation. I’ve seen highly regarded delegates sometimes receive “0” scores on their replies/contributions, which shows that the checks in place are strict and effective.

Finally, while it is constructive to seek continuous improvement, the approach taken in your public discourse, particularly the dissemination of incorrect information and undue criticism on social media, does not foster a productive environment. I acknowledge that DIP can definitely be improved, and several community members are already working on enhancements. The DIP 1.5, like most we do in this DAO, is experimental, evolving based on collective insights and feedback. It would be more beneficial to engage directly with program managers, bring this topic on governance calls or bounce your concerns with other delegates already working on this, before resorting to making public rants.

5 Likes

The greater the ability, the greater the responsibility. The more the voting power, the more ARB one should hold—this is common sense.

2 Likes

I want to be a little careful. My tweet is mostly focused on acknowledging that the Delegate Incentive Program could be improved with an end-goal of onboarding full time contributors who dedicate their time to Arbitrum. I do not want the tweet to be taken as an explicit endorsement for this specific proposal :slight_smile:

3 Likes

Thank you for your comments and proposals for the construction of DAO.
1, the proposal compares Aave, Lido, and 1inch, but these DAOs don’t have exactly the same governance model as Arbitrum, does it make sense to compare them directly? I think Arbitrum, as an L2 ecosystem, should consider a more open governance model, rather than a direct comparison with DeFi project?

2、DAO needs more people to participate in the governance, raising the threshold may make the representatives with small positions lose motivation and even reduce the community activity, will the proposal content make it more difficult for new and potential representatives to get started? The bar is already lower than many DAOs now, but wouldn’t raising it by a factor of 10 make it harder for new reps to enter the DAO ecosystem? Will fewer DAO reps in the long run affect turnout and make it harder to push for governance?
Totally agree with @pedrob’s comment here, which clearly sets out the incentive rules that were derived from months of feedback as far back as last year. So I think keeping the DAO open ensures that new entrants are still incentivized to participate in governance, rather than making governance only for large holders.
3, the current proposal assumes that the quality of voting and participation is lower for smaller delegates, but that’s just an assumption, has there been any assessment of whether the quality of voting is actually lower for smaller delegates than for larger ones? If the threshold is raised to 500k ARB, there will only be 21 eligible delegates left, which means 68% of delegates will be excluded. I think DAO needs a diversity of voices, would reducing the number of delegates make governance too centralized? Will it make it harder for smaller delegates to gain influence, and will the DAO end up being dominated by just a few large delegates? If we really want to optimize, I think we could consider keeping a portion of the rewards dedicated to high quality discussions and votes, rather than just deciding by position size?
The price of ARB is very volatile, today it dropped below $0.4, if the position is more than 500,000, have you considered the mindset of the delegates to hold the position?

2 Likes

Thanks @Larva , @pedrob , @EzR3aL , @0xDonPepe , @kuiclub for the valuable feedback. I’ve redone the initial proposal to account for your concerns with a second amendment: delegates with 50k to 500k ARB can still be part of the program, provided they secure an endorsement from a delegate with 500k ARB. That would decentralize accountability from the program manager to the level 1 delegate who can withdraw their endorsement at any time in case of poor performance.

I know my public sensemaking style can be alienating, but I hope you see it comes from a good place. If you don’t think this process valuable, I’m happy to lock this thread and disengage.

  • Delete yourself
  • Continue onward
0 voters
1 Like

As we don’t like to read long posts, I will present my comment as short as possible:

TL;DR: We need to do a better job gathering data, and present the actual values to foster a proper discussion.

There is a difference between being “eligible” and an “active participant”. “Eligible” means that the candidate has met all the criteria. For the current version, v1.5, “active participants”, meaning who received payment, in November were 41, and in December 49.

So, from a pool of 67 eligible participants, we still didn’t fill the 50 slots.

And why that happens? For a series of reasons: There is a minimal threshold of work that needs to be done, some delegates move to other places, etc, etc. Not my point here.

About the cost of the program: Despite this being removed from the original post, that was one of the key aspects moving this forward, so I want to touch it briefly as well.

This value was set assuming all 50 delegates would receive the max amount in the program (And extensively discussed when the proposal was up). And was one of the key criticisms of it presented in the original post.

Now, If we get the actual numbers so far, In November the value spent was 224,659.40 USD, and December was $260,867.73 USD. What gives you an average of 242,763.56 USD. Even assuming the higher value (more close to 50 slots, at reflects the payment of 49 delegates), the one-year projection is 3,130,412.76 USD.

In short: The costs are way lower than 4.2m and the proposed (now deprecated) action would not have the impact advertised.

And why that happens? Not my point again, but there is an extensive framework to judge the delegate’s contribution, helping to steer their energy towards things that enhance ArbitrumDAO governance (and processes, etc, etc).

Final note:

Discussions help to improve things overall, and I’m glad it does that. And, IMO, it is with a larger set of delegates that we will be able to achieve better results. For example, it is good to have delegates, part of the mentioned incentive program, helping to correct things that are wrong and improving proposals in general.

If we are worried about noise, there are tools in place to filter it, and @SEEDGov is doing an amazing job there, together with the Arbitrum Foundation (for the forum in general).

Sources: [DIP v1.5]Delegate Incentive Program Results (November 2024)

5 Likes

I’ve frozen the poll – it is not really maximum politeness / good vibes to delete yourself :slight_smile: goal is to foster discussion on this topic

5 Likes

I disagree with the proposal.

The problem with DAOs is concentration of power in a few wallets which leads to voting apathy by everyone else.

So the end result becomes DAO as a board of directors like current TradFi corporations.

The goal of any DAO should be to make it as welcoming and easy for new members to join and grow within the ranks of DAO delegates.

This brings new ideas, fresh blood to Arbitrum, and increasing threshold will end up alienating not just voters but all smaller token holders and even users.

Thus, Arbitrum DAO having the lowest threshold is not a disadvantage but a huge advantage here. The proposal mentions other DAOs with higher thresholds, but as a Delegate of those DAOs, I can say that the cost is apathy and decline of new ideas.

Just check the recent attack on Compound DAO where voting apathy almost led to millions of USD lost to a hacker… Just because voters didn’t care to vote.

The total budget of $4.2 million and being different from other DAOs is worth the cost.

6 Likes

Thanks for bringing up this discussion. We understand the rationale behind increasing the voting power requirement as a means of creating a reasonable barrier to entry and aligning Arbitrum DIP more closely with comparable programs.

Can you please clarify the reasoning behind the approach of requiring endorsements from bigger delegates as a participation requirement for smaller delegates? What makes delegates with higher voting power uniquely qualified to “endorse” other delegates?

Our concern is that we don’t necessarily see how possessing significant voting power by itself places a delegate in a position to determine whether another delegate’s contributions are valuable enough to deserve compensation. Additionally, it is not clear why one set of delegates should be accountable to another set of delegates when all delegates derive their legitimacy from and are thus in fact accountable to token holders / delegators / the DAO itself.

Ideally, we should aim to create a program that both allocates incentives efficiently while also remaining as objective as possible in choosing which delegates are incentivized. Whether that’s by simply increasing the voting threshold requirements across board or introducing tiered compensation (for different voting power tiers like in 1inch), or similar adjustments. Whichever it is, we believe delegate compensation should be uniform and determined by the DAO for all delegates.

1 Like

Thanks @jameskbh for the comments! We all agree that the delegate incentives program can be improved, what we differ in is how to go about it. One approach is internal consensus among stakeholders, which is happening. The other is opening it wide to involve many outside our ecosystem in pathfinding the best version of this program. I honestly believe that Arbitrum wins with at least some people taking the second path as that brings in fresh blood and perspective.

The feedback was overwhelming that rather than reduce costs we should improve value per dollar. So I did change the budgetary implications such that if all 21 delegates over 500k ARB nominate another delegate between 50-500k ARB to be in the program, we would land up with a similar number of paid delegates as we currently do with a (hopefully) better accountability structure than relying on the capable SEEDLATAM team to do the heavy lifting by themselves for the entire cohort. Curious to know if you think this approach is at least better than what we currently have.

Sorry for my over-reaction. My goal is to lend my axe to this cause, not to become a Boromir :laughing:

Do you still think this is valid even with the second amendment added to the proposal? Even if there is new blood in the DAO, surely they can find at least one delegate willing to attest to them before we bring them on at full pay for the DAO?

So the status quo is relying on the program manager to make this decision (along with metrics). We have heard a desire to be more opinionated in who gets to join the program and receive full time pay, and surely the answer is to not vest that power in one entity however capable they might be?

The good part is it is NOT a popularity contest, since it requires only one large delegate to see your value and make an endorsement for you to join the program. You do also agree that with greater power comes greater responsibility, right? Or is everyone equally accountable to token holders and the DAO?

1 Like