We are all aware that Arbitrum has a quorum problem.
In fact, as referenced by @paulofonseca, this was researched by ourselves and @Nethermind and presented to the DAO in these two reports:
- Exploring the Viability of Governance Attacks - Part 1: Arbitrum Governance and its Challenges
- Part 2: Arbitrum Governance Risks Analysis
We understand the desire to tie quorum to delegated voting power rather than the circulating supply of ARB and the benefits this brings. However, there are several concerns we have around the implications of such a change, which we believe need to be appropriately assessed.
Firstly, it does not recognise the growing issue of voter apathy or seek to address the stagnation in the DAO’s delegated voting power - something we know there is a clear need for and should focus on before discussing altering quorum calculations. We have seen informal delegation events happen in the past, and encourage the DAO, the Foundation and OCL to do more in this regard.
Secondly, the proposed solution is entirely novel and untested, and therefore likely has not had various edge cases hypothesised and tested for attack surfaces. In addition to various ‘edge cases’, we expect models to be created and simulations run on simple price action and tokenholder changes. If we were to experience a major black swan event or a prolonged bear market, which led to a mass exit of ARB tokenholders, each quorum calculation would impact the DAO in vastly different ways.
Thirdly, market research on other available and tested methods should be fully assessed, analysed, and critiqued in the context of Arbitrum to fully inform both the Foundation and delegates of their benefits and risks as valid alternatives. For example, @krst references:
Lastly, we will just highlight the valid point @krst made about the breadth of the undertaking to upgrade key contracts, with the potential to introduce new vulnerabilities, but also that this may be an opportunity to discuss what else should be upgraded more widely.
Whilst we understand the motivation behind the proposal, we encourage a broader research and discussion framework that can lead to a unified approach to solving quorum, voter apathy, and delegation issues once and for all. In light of this, the DAO should be able to fully understand the benefits, risks, and alternatives to such an implementation.
As such, we will be voting AGAINST this proposal.