Speaking as someone currently serving on the Security Council since the March 2025 election and having served as OpenZeppelin’s Council representative prior, I want to share my perspective on this AIP.
Longer Cohorts
I’m strongly in favor of moving to two-year cohorts. The six-month cycle can be exhausting for candidates, delegates, and members alike. Too much energy goes into campaigning and turnover prep that changes the makeup of the Council. Longer terms would provide continuity and reduce election fatigue. In my experience on other Security Councils, longer-serving members work more effectively with one another.
Key Rotation
I also strongly support adding key rotation mechanisms. There are often perfectly reasonably reasons for a Council member to rotate keys for security measures or because of personnel changes for organizations. A clear process with timelocks and monitoring ensures this does not become a significant irsk
The risk of abuse is already low — every rotation is subject to the 18-day timelock with Foundation oversight. Still, this could be improved by requiring other Council members (e.g., 7 of 12) to co-sign a rotation after checking that the new key is controlled by the same person or entity.
Thresholds & Incumbents
On the lower threshold and incumbent auto-progression, I’m neutral. Lowering the bar could help some candidates, but the real challenge is quality. Likewise, skipping the nomination phase eases delegate work, but competition is also healthy. I’m comfortable following delegate consensus here.
Candidate Qualifications
Where I do agree with many comments is on candidate qualifications and vetting. It’s one thing to have the numbers, but the DAO also needs confidence that members have the technical skills and integrity the role requires. The OpenZeppelin report laid out good recommendations, and I’d like to see those explored. That said, I don’t think this AIP needs to be blocked on that front. Improving qualifications will inevitably depend on the Foundation to design and enforce stronger checks during compliance, and I hope that conversation continues in parallel.
In summary
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I am strongly in favor of the longer cohort duration and key rotation changes.
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I support key rotation and believe its security could be further strengthened by requiring a threshold of the current Security Council members (e.g., 7 of 12) to co-sign a rotation, validating that the new key is controlled by the member without creating the friction of involving governance.
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I am neutral on lowering nomination thresholds and incumbent progression.
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I agree that technical qualification standards is lacking in this proposal and deserves attention, although not necessarily a blocker to the AIP if the AF could commit to making improvements on this front.
This proposal addresses several real pain points we’ve felt inside the Council, and I believe it’s a step in the right direction.
As a current member elected in the March 2025 cohort, I would personally be comfortable with — and supportive of — an extension of my term under these changes.