Thank you for paying attention!
Hello! We believe that removing “Abstain” votes from the quorum calculation may not be the best approach. Delegates often use the “Abstain” option when they have a conflict of interest or simply cannot confidently vote “For” or “Against”, allowing their participation to still contribute to quorum without forcing them to pick a side.
If someone truly wants to avoid influencing quorum, they can just opt out of voting altogether. Excluding “Abstain” votes from quorum could also lead to more proposals failing when a significant amount of voting power has to abstain for legitimate reasons, such as conflicts of interest.
We understand the concern about bribe markets and automated voting systems, but removing “Abstain” from the quorum count might eliminate its entire purpose. It could be more effective to explore other protections, like raising quorum requirements for especially sensitive proposals or adopting a voting differential model, similar to DAOs like Aave.
A voting differential ensures that “For” votes must exceed “Against” by a certain margin for a proposal to pass, which can provide a more balanced security measure than excluding “Abstain” votes. For example, by introducing a 5% voting differential, a proposal can only pass if there are 5% more "For” votes than “Against” votes, even if “For” votes account for more than 50% of voting participation.
I agree that we should have a vote differential of 5% or even more. It doesn’t make sense that huge changes to the Arbitrum network (like upgrades) can be decided by a contentious vote where For wins vs. Against by a 0.000000000000000001 ARB difference.
We are aligned with @cupojoseph’s work to improve the DAO governance process and have been eagerly following the number of proposals he has put forward. While we don’t agree with all of them, it is encouraging to have a number of delegate voices who are clearly focused on making Arbitrum great again.
The intent of this proposal seems to us to be focused on improving the governance process, but we worry that taking away the legitimate ABSTAIN option removes some ability for delegates and voters to express their stance on important governance topics.
That said, the DAO needs more stringent controls on large spending initatives like the Op-Co proposal (which we were against because of the obscene budget).
We agree with @Chris_Areta’s suggestion that higher quorum thresholds should be implemented for proposals that require budget approvals. We would even add that budget approvals over a certain dollar amount should require very high voting numbers both in total votes and in the percent of yes votes needed to pass. For example, proposals that spend more than $1 million should require over 70% yes votes and high participation. One approach could be to review the votes for the past year and require participation some percent above the one year average participation. Over time, participation should increase, making it harder to pass proposals with large budgets.
We think the direction of this kind of work is necessary, because it is clear that the DAO currently spends far too much money for far too little benefit. While this proposal could use some refinement, we are happy to continue working and providing feedback on proposals that will ultimately limit the excessive spending of the DAO.
Thanks @cupojoseph for this proposal!
I took some time and carefully read the proposal itself and all the comments underneath. I would like to point out some interesting ideas from the comments above (maybe may help with the problem) that are interesting to me, and also express my point of view.
- First of all, I want to remind that this proposal does not take away the legitimate ABSTAIN option to vote. Maybe it will be usefull for people which will leave their comments under this proposal in the future

It still remains and each delegate will have the opportunity to select this option. The only thing suggested in the topic is not to add them to the Quorum.
So, you won’t have to worry about this if the proposal is accepted. You can always choose the option ABSTAIN ![]()
- After reading the proposal, I began to think that it was generally dishonest to count the votes ABSTAIN to achieve a quorum. They decided to abstain, they do not vote either for or against. But then I came across this delegate @Zeptimus and his comment
Based on this logic, it turns out that if we have 4 friends and 2 vote against, 1 for and 1 abstain, then the vote that abstain will be counted as a quorum against and the proposal will be rejected? If this works both ways in our votes, then everything is fair and I don’t see the point in not counting these votes towards the quorum, since they help reach a decision when we have a constant lack of quorum. I thought that it works only in one way.
- Why else should votes be taken into account? As @0xTALVO.ETH_MTY said,
So, those who vote are not always on topic and sometimes they do not have time to study the proposal. They are ready to vote the way the majority decides. And that’s fair. Therefore, their votes must be taken into account in the Quorum. It’s logical.
- And one more argument in favor of the fact that the votes of those who abstain should be taken into quorum.
As @Euphoria said, the fact that we will not take into account the votes ABSTAIN in the quorum will not be able to influence
For this we need other methods. Maybe, in fact, gradually increase the quorum threshold over time, as one of the options that many delegates have already mentioned here. But not removing Abstain votes from the quorum.
In that case, you would have 50% quorum, with 33% voting for and 66% voting against and the proposal would not pass. The role of abstaining is to signal that you want others to decide while still contributing to the quorum, ensuring it is not a blocker. If the majority votes against, the proposal won’t pass. Quorum is only relevant for yes votes.
I don’t see a compelling reason for this initiative to move forward. The quorum is already fulfilling its purpose by accurately counting the people who have participated in the vote but have chosen not to take a stance, whether for or abstain. The primary goal of ensuring that enough voters are aware and engaged is being met.
By excluding abstentions from quorum calculations, we would essentially be forcing participants who are active in governance and well-informed about the proposals to take a definitive position on every issue, even when they might prefer to remain neutral. This could undermine the value of abstention as a valid form of participation and could pressure voters into making decisions that they may not fully support.
I believe security is always a crucial topic, and we should continuously seek ways to enhance it, but in my opinion, removing abstentions from the quorum calculation is not the right approach.
Also I fully agree with these comments. How is everyone making comments without even reading the proposal first?
Gauntlet does not believe that removing Abstain from quorum is an effective solution to the issue of outside attackers. In the case of LobbyFi, if an attacker was attacking the protocol, they would presumably buy votes, and if not, a good actor could likewise buy the votes against, and have LobbyFi not count toward quorum.
It’s not clear this a problem that needs a solution, nor that removing abstain is a benefit to the governance model.
I don’t see a good reason to remove ‘Abstain’ votes from quorum. The sole purpose is to count participation without forcing a stance, as many in the thread have pointed out. Abstaining is like delegating to your peers and I think it is better to keep it as part of quorum. Quorum should reflect engagement.
The current design is such that if you don’t want your vote to count towards quorum, you vote against, if you want it to vote towards quorum but don’t want to support directly, you vote abstain. That’s better.
Also, changing cost is a thing.
if you want your vote to count towards quorum but don’t want to support you should vote against. That’s better.
I fundamentally disagree with this assumption. If you’ve chosen to not take a stand, that choice should never be used to push a proposal from Failing into Passing.
- There’s an unpopular proposal which is failing
- Bob is not paying attention and chooses not to take a stand.
- The proposal is now passing.
^ We want to avoid this scenario BEFORE is happens.
That’s not how it works. When you vote against, you don’t contribute to the quorum. Only “yes” and “abstain” votes count toward the quorum.
Abstaining = I don’t have a strong opinion on this, but I will not block the decision the community makes.
If a proposal is failing, abstaining will not make it pass. Abstaining does not add weight to “yes” votes.
Factually inaccurate. If you don’t understand how quorum works please do not waste everyone’s time by commenting.
Here’s another example, with unrealistic numbers to demonstrate the point:
- A proposal with 1 million yes votes, and 500,000 no votes is failing because of lack of quorum. It is unpopular
- Bob is not paying attention and chooses not to take a stand. Bob votes abstain with 120M votes
- The previously failing proposal is now passing despite being unpopular. The DAO is completely rekt forever.
These numbers are unlikely, but as participation goes down and the number of active delegates actually reading proposals continues to dwindle, the risk is increasing. We want to avoid these type of scenarios BEFORE they happen.
Sorry @cupojoseph, but you are misunderstanding quorum. Quorum is not the passing or failing mechanism for proposals. It is actually a second check designed to ensure that a significant portion of the group is aware of the proposal, preventing a small minority from making decisions on behalf of the entire DAO.
A “no” vote will never turn into a passing vote because of quorum.
There are significant design issues we should be discussing around quorum, but this is not one of them.
Sorry, but this is fundamentally wrong and I don’t have time to explain to each person. Test it yourself if you don’t believe me.
A vote that is failing because it does not reach quorum, like in the above example, will pass if abstain votes bring it above quorum. This has already happened in the past and I anticipate it become more extreme over time. There is no check in the code to make sure there is any significant amount of YES votes, only that there are more YES than NO votes. A proposal with 1 YES vote and 121M abstain votes will pass. Should it? Obviously not.
I 100% disagree! This was learned very clearly in the Early days of Aragon. Weird dynamics happen if Against counts towards quorum.
If a voter want to vote against, that voter doesn’t want to support the proposal in passing in anyway.
So if a vote against adds to quorum, then voting against CAN support the proposal in passing in that way so it breeds weird strategic voting behavior if a voter is voting against the proposal!
If “Against” adds to quorum, and I want a proposal to fail, I should strategically wait to vote Against because it might fail just due to quorum.
Then, with real time voting… if I am holding back my Against vote, and so are others, then more people are voting “For” than really believe it… so it looks like EVERYONE believes in the proposal… so the people on the fence might actually vote “For”.
This is not good, this was learned in early DAOs… It is not better.
Against can not count as quorum, so Abstain does instead. With a DAO that shows real time vote results, its the right way.
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Those are easy words to say behind a screen
respect. We are here helping each other.
Here is where you could had misunderstood my words. I wouldn’t call this proposal failing; I would call it winning but not passing.
That’s a winning proposal without enough people looking into it. The moment other folks look into it and abstain, they are communicating that they don’t have the expertise/time to look into it in the detail it deserves and are trusting the people who are voting to decide. If the majority of voters vote no, that proposal will not pass.
And what you are proposing is to remove quorum from abstain votes, which honestly makes no sense. There are technical decisions where I personally do not want to participate, but I don’t want to block the decision from happening via quorum.
This is exactly what happens in practice: many delegates who don’t want to support a proposal opt to simply abstain. By not voting at all, they prevent quorum from being met, thereby stopping the proposal from being approved.
Based on this, removing the “abstain” option from the quorum count wouldn’t provide a significant improvement. If a malicious proposal were to be posted, delegates still have the option to either abstain or vote against—both actions effectively prevent the proposal’s approval. Even if an attacker were to buy votes on LobbyFi, the proposal would fail as long as the majority of delegates act in the DAO’s best interests.
Instead, I’d propose considering a higher quorum threshold for proposals that aren’t explicitly malicious but could be controversial. For instance, the Gaming Catalyst funding approved last year serves as a good example where a higher quorum might have been more appropriate.
On behalf of the UADP, it’s interesting this proposal is around due to automated bribe markets like LobbyFi having large impact these days. By not counting ‘Abstain’ votes towards quorum, the DAO can ensure that only active ‘For’ or ‘Against’ votes influence the decision-making process, potentially making it more challenging for contentious or malicious proposals to pass.
We don’t think this is a particularly highest priority but, some considerations:
- Delegate Participation: Delegates often use the ‘Abstain’ option when they have conflicts of interest or lack sufficient information on a proposal. Removing ‘Abstain’ from quorum calculations might discourage participation from those who prefer neutrality, potentially leading to lower overall engagement
- Quorum Dynamics: Adjusting quorum requirements itself could be an alternative approach. For instance, implementing higher quorum thresholds for proposals involving significant treasury allocations or requiring a specific percentage of ‘Yes’ votes for certain proposals might enhance governance security without altering the role of ‘Abstain’ votes.
- Voting Differential Models: Adopting a voting differential model is an idea tossed around that we like, albeit much more annoying and nuanced in practice to set up. ‘For’ votes must exceed ‘Against’ votes by a certain margin for a proposal to pass, could provide a balanced security measure.
Overall, it’s nice to see this pretty in depth discussion and debate of this nuanced topic.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
We agree that quorum is an issue that needs to be investigated, however, we do not believe including Abstain votes is a solution.
The ARDC Risk Member is investigating this and already had an AMA with delegates before beginning the research.
We look forward to the output of Nethermind’s work and their recommendations.
Notion Repo for ARDC Tasks: Explore the viability of a governance attack at the current quorum and analyze the risks involved in reducing quorum.
ARDC Communication Thread: ARDC Communication Thread - #14 by Juanrah
