Name (organization or individual): Disruption Joe
Wallet Address or ENS: disruptionjoe.eth
Tally Profile URL: Tally | disruptionjoe.eth
What area are you most interested in contributing to?
- Public Goods funding
- Improving Governance participation
- Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
My goal is to create legitimacy, credible neutrality, and sustainability in DAOs. We need DAOs to execute on their promise of allocating resources better than their web 2 counterparts - corporations. By leading the industry in pluralistic allocation mechanisms, Arbitrum can be more decentralized while enjoying faster ecosystem growth. Most importantly, I bring lessons from Gitcoin as a former Grants Operations lead with the Gitcoin Holdings company before serving 6 seasons as the Fraud Detection & Defense workstream lead.
Sample Voting Issue 1:
1. How would you vote? Against
2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any? I would suggest that they instead use a combination of more pluralistic mechansims including quadratic funding and retroactive funding. It would be better for them to identify success criteria and start with a smaller amount. My issue isn’t with Flipside’s number of seats, it is the amount they are requesting without clarity of output. The amounts are relative requiring a unique evaluation in context of the DAO and it’s overall funding goals.
3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done? I would identify the types of outcomes they are looking for. Is this program intended to give the community voice? Is it intended to efficiently allocated capitol to existential development needs? Is it meant to spur innovation or community growth? Most communities have multiple needs. An excellent exercise for thinking through this is to use Blockscience Social-Technical Frequency Mapping method of identifying task latency vs technical expertise. Then we can determine what success looks like for each quadrant. I’d love to help Arbitrum utilize tools & methodology like this.
Sample Voting Issue 2:
Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
Split Reimbursement
I believe that the DAO can change its mind anytime before the action has been taken on-chain. This recently happened to me with Gitcoin DAO choosing to revote on my workstream’s final budget. The important thing is that the DAO finds a way to maintain legitimacy. In my workstream situation, I advocated for an appeal process to be made so that in the future the DAO would have a fair way to deal with the situation. Similarly, I think the Rari situation calls for similar options. Ideally, the governance mechanism comes up with the best solution. Rather than proving one side or the other to be correct, it should pull out the best parts of both arguments and create a new solution. In this Rari case, I could see remuneration as a percentage of protocol profits over a certain amount of time being a reasonable solution.
Languages I speak and write: English
Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I don’t have any clear conflicts of interest… maybe that I have some $OP tokens! (Never sold)