Name: PlutusDAO
Wallet Address or ENS: 0xBbE98D590d7eB99F4a236587f2441826396053d3
Tally Profile URL: Working with Tally to manually connect our multi-sig. Edited soon with appropriate details.
What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:
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DeFi development on Arbitrum
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Improving Governance participation
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
We believe that the high-level goal of the Arbitrum DAO is simple: to support the growth of Arbitrum and its projects in a decentralized, sustainable and fair manner. This should be done through active governance participation by entities that are intimately familiar with the Arbitrum ecosystem and its participants. It is integral to ensure that there’s a collaborative spirit between delegates to advance and drive Arbitrum’s adoption and technological development forward.
In practice, this means supporting projects in a manner which makes Arbitrum an attractive place for builders to build. This should be the basis of any liquidity mining, grants and upgrades - in other words using those tools to attract talent, projects and capital that are aligned with Arbitrum and it’s future direction.
PlutusDAO is in a truly unique position to be a key delegate in driving forward the goals listed above. We have a rare combination that predicts success in this role - Plutus has been a part of the Arbitrum ecosystem for over a year now and our core products revolve around governance aggregation.
We’re extremely interwoven into the Arbitrum ecosystem, deeply understand the needs of projects building on it and have actual cross-team governance collaboration experience. It’s for this reason that we believe Plutus to be an extremely strong delegate candidate that has Arbitrum’s best interests in mind. Arbitrum’s success is close to our heart and we want to play a key role in steering its future! 
Sample Voting Issue 1:
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Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
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For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
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This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.
Prompts to Answer:
1. How would you vote?
Against
2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
To ensure fairness and alignment of incentives, the allocation committee and oversight committee should be more decentralized. It’s key to have Flipside on the allocation committee for key updates and insights, but not necessary on the oversight committee. Yearly funding should be reduced to quarterly periods with added KPIs to ensure that the project is moving in the right direction. Often the issue with grants are lack of accountability and incorrect sizing - with this solution, both could have been avoided!
3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
As long as key goals and objectives are clearly defined before starting a project and governance participants are aligned towards a common high-level goal, the tradeoff between centralization of authority and ability to get things done is actually not as polarizing as it may otherwise be.
As a backdrop to all DAO decision-making, it’s crucial to ensure there’s a clear constitution, performance indicators and common objectives to measure actions against. Ideally decision-making should smoothly move from a birds-eye view to more granular topics, and for this an abundantly clear and rigorous governance process is required.
Sample Voting Issue 2:
FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.
Prompts to Answer:
Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)
1. Full Reimbursement
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No Reimbursement
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Split Reimbursement
The reimbursement topic in case of hacks is an extremely sensitive and nuanced topic. It undoubtedly brings ethics into the scope of decision-making in a large way and requires weighing out the facts of what has actually taken place carefully before making any decisions. While users bear the risk of using DeFi applications, we believe the DeFi space currently suffers from a distinct air of safety when using especially experimental and cutting-edge (at the time) DeFi apps such as Rari.
We believe that in case of hacks where a user is clearly not at fault, protocols should reimburse users in full as long as it is economically feasible and does not lead to the protocol going under. If the damage is too large to fully cover without bankrupting the protocol, a split reimbursement should be considered while planning and executing a path forward where users will eventually be repaid in full. Again, the topic is extremely nuanced but in the spirit of advancing the space and encouraging innovation, we heavily encourage protocols to take responsibility in the unfortunate event of an exploit.
Languages we speak and write: English, Finnish
Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
PlutusDAO is an Arbitrum-native governance aggregator that works with many of the best teams on Arbitrum. We have a vested interest in affecting the future of Arbitrum in a positive way!