Name (organization or individual): @cattin | SEEDLatam (Cattin0x on twitter)
Wallet Address or ENS: 0xAbAbE91A907fAdff921720C43ABe4098e7245E99
Tally Profile URL: Tally | 0xAbAb...5E99
What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:
- Public Goods funding
- Improving Governance Participation
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
eg — how aggressive should we be in liquidity mining, what is the goal of the DAO?
SEEDLatam will focus all its efforts on the following points:
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Decentralization: SEEDLatam will oppose initiatives and proposals that tend to centralize decision-making in Arbitrum DAO. In conjunction with this stance, and as Arbitrum technology continues to mature, SEEDLatam will collaborate in creating, modifying, and improving governance processes to ensure broad participation and that the system remains secure.
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Growth: SEEDLatam will promote and support all initiatives that enable the growth and adoption of Arbitrum One, Arbitrum Nova, and their respective ecosystems. Emphasis will be placed on ensuring that all growth initiatives are reliable, secure, and sustainable over time.
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Ethics and Support in Latam: SEEDLatam will actively contribute to the governance of Arbitrum DAO and disseminating Arbitrum One, Arbitrum Nova, and Arbitrum technologies throughout Latin America, as it has already been doing in its communities (through L2 en Español). We look forwards to working with other delegates interested in furthering Arbitrum’s mission in our region and encouraging others to actively participate in the DAO’s governance.
SEEDLatam is a non-profit organization dedicated promotes and supports web3 communities in Latin America. We bring together educators, developers, researchers, artists, entrepreneurs, students, and enthusiasts who build and promote knowledge about Ethereum.
SEEDLatam’s goal is to raise the level of understanding about web3 in Latin America and empower future leaders.
SEEDLatam + L2 en Español
Together with L2 en Español, a community dedicated to the study of scalability solutions in Ethereum (born out of DeFi para Principiantes and SEEDLatam), we have decided to carry out this delegate platform to actively participate in the governance of Arbitrum DAO. We’re truly committed to the future of Ethereum and Web3.
While Latin American developers and builders have always been key players in the crypto scene, our regional community’s participation in formal instances has not been as prominent as we would like. In SEEDLatam, we want to change that by being part of the governance to collaborate on the expansion and growth of the ecosystem.
As a delegate platform, SeedLatam wants to work with its communities to coordinate a credible representation of all those truly interested in the future of Web3 and Arbitrum from the perspective of our region. We understand and value Arbitrum’s stage of development, being one of the most mature EMV-compatible Layer 2s, as an opportunity to showcase its advantages as an example to follow compared to other L2s, and in contrast to the L1 release scheme pretending to fix the current challenges of the Ethereum ecosystem.
Scaling Ethereum should be our priority in our path toward mass adoption, and we are willing to do our part in removing any barriers that might prevent this from happening in our region
Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:
Sample Voting Issue 1:
Prompts to Answer:
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How would you vote?
Against
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What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
SEEDLatam would have voted against this proposal - here are some points to consider:
- There was no contest for applicant providers to compete with Flipside Crypto and propose a counterproposal for DAO members to choose from multiple options.
- Uniswap’s DAO was not structured so that different organizations (delegate platforms, communities, student groups, etc.) could fulfill a specific/administrative role within the DAO, such as the Core Units of MakerDAO.
- Flipside Crypto abused the governance process mechanism to get the proposal approved.
As SEEDLatam, we would have proposed the creation of a council for the DAO to vote on its members and have them manage the treasury grants, with a renewal of their position after a certain amount of time.
- How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
The dilemma between decentralization and efficiency will always be contentious, but it doesn’t mean you can’t have centralized structures within a decentralized entity. A DAO can have decentralized governance while still having centralized working groups/subDAOs/committees that report to the DAO to optimize decision-making. Centralization is naturally efficient, so it makes sense for a group that must make quick decisions on specific issues to opt for a centralized structure. In summary, centralization makes sense when facing a convex disposition and decentralization when facing a concave one.
Sample Voting Issue 2:
Issue Overview:
FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.
Prompts to Answer:
Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)
- Full Reimbursement
- No Reimbursement
- Split Reimbursement
Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.
We would opt for a split reimbursement - When addressing this issue we have to ponder between two key actors in a DAO, those supporting it materially (through their effort) and those supporting it financially (through their ivnestments/contributions). We believe that a split reimbursement would be the best way to satisfy both parties.
This might be subject to different factors, such as the severity of the exploit, ideally, a solution should prioritize affected members first, but shouldn’t go as far as liquidating the DAO’s funds - since this would not only damage the DAO itself but also risk other members trust in the protocol.
Therefore, in cases like FEI RARI, there should be adequate compensation to those affected - preferably through vesting - but at the same time ensure that the protocol remains sustainable. Something to consider with vesting is that it should be sufficiently balanced, in order to ensure that the team remains incentivized to carry on with their work and that it’s scheduled in a way that it doesn’t get too diluted/loses it’s value.
Apart from this and beyond what happened with Tribe, DAOs should have a predefined policy on how to proceed in the event of an exploit. This wouldn’t only add more predictability regarding what the next steps should be for victims, but it also ensures that in the event of an exploit, victims won’t really have to go through DAO bureaucracy to receive some sort of compensation (assuming they were entitled to it). If not, DAOs could also opt for a Code Deference clause on their charters/constitutions - but these could create friction with their communities.
Languages I speak and write: English and Spanish
Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I, Cattin, and other members of SEEDLatam’s delegate platform collaborate with various protocols and projects, but we don’t see any conflicts of interest. We will disclose any that may arise in the future. SEEDLatam is currently participating as a delegate in the governance of Optimism and plans to expand it to other protocols. Therefore, we will do our best to ensure that the work done by these delegations does not conflict with the interests of Arbitrum DAO, ultimately prioritizing the well-being of the entire ecosystem.
