Delegate Statement Template

[hachetrade]

Name (organization or individual)
hachetrade

Wallet address or ENS
hectorps.eth

Tally Profile URL

hectorps.eth's DAO Profile

DAO memberships, votes and proposal

What area are you most interested in contributing to? select up to two tags
Public Goods funding
Supporting Infrastructure

Please share your views on the overall goals of the DAO
As per definition the goals of the DAO should be design for the whole communitiy and for it too.

Sample Voting Question 1:

1. against
2. none, well If I could change the weight distribution of the commite I´ll do it
3. I dont see any other solutions than delegations.

Example of voting question 2:
No reimbursement at all. I know it doesnt feel justice but for me its the essence of DAO´s you cant change the rules retroactively. You should, instead, put your resources on solving the problem/s for now on.

Languages I speak and write
English, spanish

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest
no conflict of interest

[ValRo]

Name ValRo (individual)

0x2b189e7B9ED60F9bFb14cb0D3ed7005b17E1A8DF

ValRo's DAO Profile

Area most interested:

Public Goods funding
NFT development on Arbitrum

I do not care about liquidity mining. Bribing people to use X means X is useless. We aggressively build stuff that people NEED instead.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

1. Against
2. No amendments, just cancel it altogether.
3. The solution is reputational avatars, which solves most if not all DAO participation and token-weight voting problems.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
It depends entirely where the reimbursement would come from. If this were a case of introducing a self-executable on-chain transfer block on the hacked amount and reminting into the damaged parties’ accounts, I would vote yes. If the tokenholders and other network participants were to pay for this, no. Socializing losses across a large number of people is not acceptable when it is clear that very small circles of people are responsible for both insecure code and stealing the money.

Languages I speak and write:
Ukrainian, Russian, Polish

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
no conflicts of interest

[jamejung]

**Name JamesXP

**Wallet Address 0x5a5532Ff21251E751a8691CfB87e60AFB31CB284

**Tally Profile URL Tally | 0x5a55...B284

• DeFi development on Arbitrum

ควรทำให้การเร่งการเกิด mass adoption ด้วยการสเกล และการยอมรับ
Prompts to Answer:

1. How would you vote?
   pass for benefit’s commu
2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
   for community
3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
   deverlop for base commu ทุกอย่างควรเป็นไปตามผลโหวต

[Big_Noodle]

Big_Noodle - Co-funder of The Lost Donkeys & Build
** @Big__Noodle - Twiiter **

*Bignoodle.eth

** Tally | bignoodle.eth **

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up tot wo tags:

• Public Goods funding
• Gaming development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
Arbitrum has been the most thriving blockchain regarding blockchain gaming. We’ve seen the entire Treasure ecosystem rise for over a year, and it’s only the beginning…
What’s the role of the DAO in the emergence of gaming on Arbitrum?
The overall gaming market has attracted a lot of attention from various blockchains for over a year. We’ve seen significant investment from other blockchains to attract big web2 gaming companies and names to their chains, thinking they could bring communities through this method.
I believe that Arbitrum could be the real game-changer. Through its DAO, projects can be incubated and supported to guide them to create the best product ever and indirectly lead to massive onboarding of traditional gamers. There are approximately 200 million PS4/PS5 and Xbox consoles sold to date. Imagine onboarding just 1% of those gamers on Arbitrum…

If I have the chance to join the DAO as a delegate, I would make sure to do everything I can to promote massive adoption of Arbitrum by web2 gamers.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

Prompts to Answer:

1. How would you vote?
   For
2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
   None
3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
   In this case, as a DAO, there is not much we can do if this has been voted. However, we can learn from this experience, educate members of the DAO, and ensure that they understand their concerns and how being involved can positively impact their journey through Web3.
   Delegating votes could also be an option as long as a cap is fixed to avoid any kind of majority pool of voting.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

1. Full Reimbursement
A hack is always a sensitive subject because one entity will always lose in the equation.
I believe that all participants in the Web3 space have to take responsibility for their actions. If there were any breach in a contract, it means that the contract was not audited well enough and put its users’ funds at risk.
To prevent that from happening, I would also propose a TIP for auditing every new smart contract deployed from the platform by a trustworthy actor in the ecosystem.

Languages I speak and write: English, French

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
As a user of Arbitrum since day 1 (September 2021), I’ve been involved in many ways in the ecosystem. By being here since the beginning, I’ve been able to follow the rise of Arbitrum and observe every decision made by the leading team. That made me understand the complexity and the importance of making the right decisions to thrive among all the other blockchains.
Being professionally involved in the Arbitrum ecosystem doesn’t mean that my decision would be personally driven. I understand the challenges that a DAO can face and will be able to be impartial with my judgment.

[tiger]

Name (organization or individual)
A. Ali

Wallet Address or ENS

0xe60303D8398B74bc909Aa55a10627c715ad85Ca0

**Tally Profile URL Tally | 0xe603...5Ca0

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

• NFT development on Arbitrum
• Improving Governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

• I do not care about liquidity mining. DAOs must be able to refer their control to other parties.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

1. Against
2. No amendments, just cancel it altogether.
3. The solution is reputational avatars , which solves most if not all DAO participation and token-weight voting problems.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
yes

Languages I speak and write:

• English, dutch

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

*…

[Griff]

Name (organization or individual)

Griff Green

UPDATE

I have been a delegate for over a year now and have a few things I would like to push within the DAO:

• Fight conflicts of interests issues
• Reduce ARB spending (more no votes!)
• Use vesting more in payouts to align interests
• Add token utility to ARB
• Reduce grants and increase good investments.

These will be the issues I will fight for during this next year.

Wallet Address or ENS

griff.eth

Tally Profile URL

Griff Green 🙏🌱🎗💜's DAO Profile

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

1. Public Goods funding
2. Improving Governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

Overall

I believe the best way for Arbitrum to maintain it’s lead in the L2 space is to collaborate with the other L2s as much as possible. This may seem counterintuitive, but this is a network effects game and the real market leaders are not Optimism and Starkware types, but Visa, JPMorgan and the Federal Reserve types. This is the big pie we are fighting for, and to get it we should be working together.

Also, we should be making every effort to be effective in our coordination and learn from the mistakes of other DAOs, and stay at the macro level for DAO wide governance decisions. If I end up with a large voice in this DAO I will be actively reviewing our Governance set up early one to avoid these mistakes.

Liquidity Mining?

In my opinion, aggressively pursuing liquidity mining may not be the best approach, but it’s crucial to bootstrap network effects. I recognized the importance of this early on when xDAI (now Gnosis Chain) and Polygon were the early popular EVM chains. Polygon put a lot of effort into business development and attracted a diverse range of organizations to their network by providing them with grants. On the other hand, xDai didn’t pursue that strategy, and we can see the outcomes.

As for Arbitrum, I believe it’s essential to aggressively engage all sectors of the market. Although Arbitrum has made significant strides in DeFi, other markets such as gaming, NFTs, and DAOs are still relatively underdeveloped on the platform compared to the rest of the industry. We should aggressively pursue these markets by employing token swaps, vested incentive programs, quadratic funding and milestone-based approaches. While I’m not particularly fond of liquidity mining, I believe that we should be open to using that (especially if the rewards are streamed to the user over longer periods of time) and there are also alternative approaches can help us attract strong strategic partners to the chain.

Sample Voting Issue 1: Uniswap & Flipside

How would you vote?

Against

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

If it were up to me, I would suggest starting with a smaller proposal before jumping into a $25 million defi play. It’s a lot of money to commit to a first-time experiment with a new partner, and we don’t want to risk so much so a partner can earn fees on defi and run a bounty program. Honestly the whole plan of putting UNI into Aave and borrowing ETH, while creative, was too risky.

To be honest, my preference is to use Quadratic Funding and Prop House for programs anyway as they are less centralized options. These methods offer a more democratic approach to funding and avoid concentrating power in a few hands.

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

I strongly believe that we shouldn’t have to choose between centralized control and community engagement when it comes to fund distribution. In my opinion, having a product person and centralized control is essential for developing products. However, when it comes to distributing grants, we should be leveraging centralized decision-making powers to design and implement processes that are interactive and engaging for the community while avoiding centralized points of failure.

Tools like Quadratic Funding and Prop House are already available and can help us distribute grants as a community to anyone who wants to participate and make the process more enjoyable. Additionally, emerging tools like Pairwise can further improve our options for community engagement. In my opinion, traditional yes/no voting, as Optimism was doing, is a waste of time. If that’s the alternative, I can understand why someone would opt for centralized grant approaches. However, I believe there are better options available to us.

Sample Voting Issue 2: FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

Split Reimbursement

The situation was quite complicated. Joey and his team at FEI promised a full reimbursement to the users, and for me, it’s crucial that DAOs maintain their integrity above all else. However, I don’t think Joe should have made such a commitment right away, as it’s not his money to give, it’s the DAO’s. Nonetheless, because he made this promise, the DAO should try to fulfill it to the best of our ability.

In this industry, even though we’re creating trustless systems, trust becomes crucial when those systems fail. That’s why organizations like Coinbase reimburse their users after hacks because it’s vital for people to trust the brand and believe that their assets are safe. It may cost a lot of money in the short term, but it will pay off in the long run.

The community would need to understand the impact of a $80 million loss for the DAO and then determine how to support those who have lost their funds. In my opinion, if there’s enough capital in the system, a full reimbursement makes sense. If not, we could split the reimbursement among the affected users, perhaps around 5% to 10% of a hair cut. This would be reasonable, especially considering that some people made a profits from the protocol before the exploit. As the organization responsible for managing smart contract risk, it’s important to be accountable when things go wrong.

Languages I speak and write:

English and a little Spanish

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

I’m the Founder of several companies including Giveth, Dappnode, Common Stack, and General Magic. Additionally, I serve as a Steward on Gitcoin and ENS. One potential conflict is that I have close ties with Jordi Baylina from Polygon Hermez, and their zkEVM, as well as I am an important Steward for Optimism, both could be considered competitors. However, I view these connections as opportunities to strengthen the relationships among leaders in the scaling space. My approach is to bring everyone to the table and work together rather than pitting one against the other. I believe that we are not competing against eachother but cooperating in the fight against traditional financial systems and banks. That’s why Giveth hosted the #ScalingNOW Conference in 2018, and I want to continue that effort to help us recognize that we are all in this together.

As a Steward of Arbitrum, I will of course be committed to prioritizing Arbitrum’s interests over those of any other organizations. If there is a serious conflict of interest (eg Giveth request a grant to deploy on Arbitrum) I will abstain from voting. It’s my responsibility as a Steward, and I will fulfill it to the best of my ability. I’m impressed by what Arbitrum has accomplished. I’m a big fan and a friend of many in the community. I look forward to seeing further advancements and thank you for your delegation.

[Faruqhorlar1234]

Name: faruqhorlar1234 (Individual)

Wallet: 0x5aa5b2dc2b83c4654e31be17e73039a3b89e1fb1

ENS: faruqhorlar1234.eth

Tally: Tally | Tally | 0x5AA5...1fB1
Areas of interest:

Public goods funding
DeFi development on Arbitrum
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
First and foremost, the purpose of a DAO is to allow for the healthy and decentralised development of the rollup. This vision, of course, can entail many different aspects, from the more technical and security focused sections of the rollup (which the DAO should have oversight over) to encouraging the development of a healthy ecosystem and growth with the ARB token. Basically, every decision the DAO makes should return to the question: ’ How does this benefit the long-term sustainability and success of not just the ARB token, but also the broader future of rollups?’ .

From this question we can begin exploring different roles that the DAO could assume in the broader Arbitrum ecosystem, and the careful balancing act that follows for each decision. Some examples include:

Technical protocol and security upgrades: If arbitrum truly wants to be community owned, they need to have an oversight over what the protocol will develop into and all the layers that are part of the Arbitrum ecosystem. However, the average voter will probably not be knowledgeable enough to vote in good faith on whether a development will be fruitful or not. One potential solution that could be explored is a technical subcommittee in charge of overseeing this side of governance, which ultimately might report back to the wider DAO. The DAO is already planning to do this with the Security Council, but this same idea could be implemented in other technical areas.
Liquidity Mining - While this strategy can assist for the short-term growth and user acquisition on the protocols selected for these campaigns, it should not be seen as a permanent fixture of any protocol. Liquidity mining serves as a great opportunity for someone to get acquainted somewhere new in search of the yield, but if subsidised too long by the Arbitrum DAO, it could lead to an unhealthy subsidy of protocols through unsustainable emissions.
Grants - While liquidity mining handles growing users and technical committees handle the rollup itself, grants are the greatest part of the DAO that will target builders. Grants have to be handled carefully, as they have a degree of social trust needed both from the DAO and the builders. Builders have to be able to demonstrate deliverables for the amount and accountability. Despite the complications, grants will allow for the development of tools and dApps that the space might need, but currently might not be as profitable.
These are just some examples of DAO goals, but of course there are endless more possibilities on what might be handled!

Sample Voting Issue 1 - UniSwap/Flipside Bounty

How would you vote?
For
Delegation of voting power is necessary for any DAO to be able to function efficiently in the long term. Even though it brings a degree of centralisation, as long as they do not control an excessive amount of the larger DAO and they have sufficient accountability measures it’s a good initiative.

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

Separate the grants into quarterly distributions: For an allocation as large as 25 Million, I don’t believe that it is wise to simply divide it into Year 1 and Year 2. I understand that half of it was going to employing staff so they would rather have the reserve upfront, but considering that the only upside of delivering such amounts once a year is saving some time on transactions and communications, it feels that dividing the allocations into at least quarterly separations would’ve been wiser.
Introduce checkpoints across the delegation period: In addition to having a committee handling immediate matters related to the grant, it would’ve been preferable to also introduce routine votes to ensure that the DAO was still comfortable with such a large allocation. This would have also encouraged the grantee to increase accountability and deliver accountability reports.
How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

It’s inevitable that effectiveness and decentralisation are inversely proportional. As long as the centralised entities are still ultimately dependent on the DAOs approval, and they operate as transparently as possible, this is a necessary tool for the development of the DAO.

A DAO should consider having centralising points only when specialists are required to act knowledgeable and quickly, something which the Vox Populi of the DAO might struggle with. The entities to do this should be trusted members of the space of course.

Sample Voting Issue 2 - Rari Hack Reinbursement

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.

i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

Split Reimbursement

Hacks and loss of funds are to this day one of the strongest blockers we have from people trusting the space and onboarding onto it. Every time a large draining of protocol contracts occurs, the idea of the Financial Legos gets threatened, as people become less and less willing to risk connecting with other protocols.

For this reason, I believe at least a partial reinbursement is always to be considered when a protocol has decided to cooperate with you. These parties decided to entrust the security of your smart contracts, and their dedication and trust that was placed onto the protocol should be thanked by at least trying to provide some funds back. In the future, this could even be handled with DAO insurance protocols, which are already being developed in the space.

However, I would be hesitant to provide a full reinbursement when the hack has already severely impacted the protocol so badly. If the amount won’t make that much of a difference to the bottom line it makes sense to give a reinbursement, but in this particular case the double impact of the hack was so severe that this lead to one of the first instances of a DAO explicitly closing doors. 10 A full reinbursement , in terms of impact, would be the same as a second equally devastating hack.

TL;DR Provide enough compensation to thank the participants for engaging in the system, but while a full reinbursement might help these stakeholders, the impact of this action could lead to the DAO entering a negative death spiral.

Languages I speak and write: By order of preference - English, Spanish, Italian

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
Currently, I am spending most of my time working on the ParaSwap DAO. This means that I will automatically abstain from any discussion that might involve DEX Aggregation, as my opinion will obviously be biased. The positive side of this participation is that ParaSwap is also deployed in Arbitrum, which means that the success of Arbitrum will also positively impact ParaSwap (through increased liquidity sources and volumes), as well as vice versa (by encouraging efficiency and decentralisation of liquidity in the rollup by aggregating all of these together through a single, simple to access interface).

Additionaly, I’m happy with this

[Faruqhorlar1234]

Name: faruqhorlar1234 (Individual)

Wallet: 0x5aa5b2dc2b83c4654e31be17e73039a3b89e1fb1

ENS: faruqhorlar1234.eth

Tally: Tally | Tally | 0x5AA5...1fB1
Areas of interest:

Public goods funding
DeFi development on Arbitrum
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
First and foremost, the purpose of a DAO is to allow for the healthy and decentralised development of the rollup. This vision, of course, can entail many different aspects, from the more technical and security focused sections of the rollup (which the DAO should have oversight over) to encouraging the development of a healthy ecosystem and growth with the ARB token. Basically, every decision the DAO makes should return to the question: ’ How does this benefit the long-term sustainability and success of not just the ARB token, but also the broader future of rollups?’ .

From this question we can begin exploring different roles that the DAO could assume in the broader Arbitrum ecosystem, and the careful balancing act that follows for each decision. Some examples include:

Technical protocol and security upgrades: If arbitrum truly wants to be community owned, they need to have an oversight over what the protocol will develop into and all the layers that are part of the Arbitrum ecosystem. However, the average voter will probably not be knowledgeable enough to vote in good faith on whether a development will be fruitful or not. One potential solution that could be explored is a technical subcommittee in charge of overseeing this side of governance, which ultimately might report back to the wider DAO. The DAO is already planning to do this with the Security Council, but this same idea could be implemented in other technical areas.
Liquidity Mining - While this strategy can assist for the short-term growth and user acquisition on the protocols selected for these campaigns, it should not be seen as a permanent fixture of any protocol. Liquidity mining serves as a great opportunity for someone to get acquainted somewhere new in search of the yield, but if subsidised too long by the Arbitrum DAO, it could lead to an unhealthy subsidy of protocols through unsustainable emissions.
Grants - While liquidity mining handles growing users and technical committees handle the rollup itself, grants are the greatest part of the DAO that will target builders. Grants have to be handled carefully, as they have a degree of social trust needed both from the DAO and the builders. Builders have to be able to demonstrate deliverables for the amount and accountability. Despite the complications, grants will allow for the development of tools and dApps that the space might need, but currently might not be as profitable.
These are just some examples of DAO goals, but of course there are endless more possibilities on what might be handled!

Sample Voting Issue 1 - UniSwap/Flipside Bounty

How would you vote?
For
Delegation of voting power is necessary for any DAO to be able to function efficiently in the long term. Even though it brings a degree of centralisation, as long as they do not control an excessive amount of the larger DAO and they have sufficient accountability measures it’s a good initiative.

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

Separate the grants into quarterly distributions: For an allocation as large as 25 Million, I don’t believe that it is wise to simply divide it into Year 1 and Year 2. I understand that half of it was going to employing staff so they would rather have the reserve upfront, but considering that the only upside of delivering such amounts once a year is saving some time on transactions and communications, it feels that dividing the allocations into at least quarterly separations would’ve been wiser.
Introduce checkpoints across the delegation period: In addition to having a committee handling immediate matters related to the grant, it would’ve been preferable to also introduce routine votes to ensure that the DAO was still comfortable with such a large allocation. This would have also encouraged the grantee to increase accountability and deliver accountability reports.
How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

It’s inevitable that effectiveness and decentralisation are inversely proportional. As long as the centralised entities are still ultimately dependent on the DAOs approval, and they operate as transparently as possible, this is a necessary tool for the development of the DAO.

A DAO should consider having centralising points only when specialists are required to act knowledgeable and quickly, something which the Vox Populi of the DAO might struggle with. The entities to do this should be trusted members of the space of course.

Sample Voting Issue 2 - Rari Hack Reinbursement

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.

i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

Split Reimbursement

Hacks and loss of funds are to this day one of the strongest blockers we have from people trusting the space and onboarding onto it. Every time a large draining of protocol contracts occurs, the idea of the Financial Legos gets threatened, as people become less and less willing to risk connecting with other protocols.

For this reason, I believe at least a partial reinbursement is always to be considered when a protocol has decided to cooperate with you. These parties decided to entrust the security of your smart contracts, and their dedication and trust that was placed onto the protocol should be thanked by at least trying to provide some funds back. In the future, this could even be handled with DAO insurance protocols, which are already being developed in the space.

However, I would be hesitant to provide a full reinbursement when the hack has already severely impacted the protocol so badly. If the amount won’t make that much of a difference to the bottom line it makes sense to give a reinbursement, but in this particular case the double impact of the hack was so severe that this lead to one of the first instances of a DAO explicitly closing doors. 10 A full reinbursement , in terms of impact, would be the same as a second equally devastating hack.

TL;DR Provide enough compensation to thank the participants for engaging in the system, but while a full reinbursement might help these stakeholders, the impact of this action could lead to the DAO entering a negative death spiral.

Languages I speak and write: By order of preference - English, Spanish, Italian

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
Currently, I am spending most of my time working on the ParaSwap DAO. This means that I will automatically abstain from any discussion that might involve DEX Aggregation, as my opinion will obviously be biased. The positive side of this participation is that ParaSwap is also deployed in Arbitrum, which means that the success of Arbitrum will also positively impact ParaSwap (through increased liquidity sources and volumes), as well as vice versa (by encouraging efficiency and decentralisation of liquidity in the rollup by aggregating all of these together through a single, simple to access interface).

Additionaly, I’m happy with this

[Tadeuzrea]

Tadeuzera - Stylezar - twiter

DAO Profile on Tally

**What area are you most interested in contributing to?

• NFT development on Arbitrum
• Gaming development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO

The specific goals of a DAO can vary depending on its purpose and the community it serves. Some DAOs are focused on creating decentralized finance (DeFi) products and services, while others are focused on social impact, gaming, or other areas. Ultimately, the goal of a DAO is to provide a platform for decentralized decision-making that aligns with the interests and values of its members.

In summary, the overall goals of a DAO are to provide a decentralized platform for decision-making and governance, and to serve the interests of its members by aligning with their values and goals.

However, liquidity mining can also be a risky activity as it involves providing liquidity in the form of cryptocurrencies, which can be subject to price volatility and other risks. The level of aggression in liquidity mining should be balanced with the overall risk management strategy of the DAO.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

1. Against
2. No amendments, just cancel it altogether.
3. The solution is reputational avatars , which solves most if not all DAO participation and token-weight voting problems.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
It depends entirely where the reimbursement would come from. If this were a case of introducing a self-executable on-chain transfer block on the hacked amount and reminting into the damaged parties’ accounts, I would vote yes. If the tokenholders and other network participants were to pay for this, no. Socializing losses across a large number of people is not acceptable when it is clear that very small circles of people are responsible for both insecure code and stealing the money.

Languages I speak and write:

• English, Portuguese

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

• no conflicts of interest

[Joey_sama]

Name: Joseph

Wallet Address: 0xbcd56d7ae8ca4b5de4d22a8af9a6720b3c3692e7

Tally Profile URL: Tally | Joey_Sama

What area are you most interested in contributing to?:
I’m interested in

*NFT development on Arbitrum

*Gaming development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
How aggressive should we be in liquidity mining, what is the goal of the DAO?
A: I think there should be a balance on Liquidity Mining. Whatever is the safest for the ARB community. The goals of the DAO should be discussed and decided by the community. Main goals would be to further the development and refinement of the Arbitrum network and community.

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Issue Overview 827

Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.

For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.

This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

Prompts to Answer:

How would you vote?
A: I would vote “Against” the proposal.

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
A: I would want to make sure that Flipside didn’t have so much control over the decision making and distribution of the UNI.

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
A: While I agree that Flipside should have some control there should be a decentralized consensus among the community on how much power they have. This should be discussed and negotiated regularly on a fixed schedule.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

A: I think that the situation depends on what was the cause of the hack and what is being done to resolve the hack. I feel like the community should be fair with its decision and everyone should take some responsibility. I think that would be the best decentralized answer.

I would choose: *Split Reimbursement

Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.
A:If the cause of the hack was something that could have been avoided if the community had made the proper decisions in advance then they should take some of the responsibility and not be fully reimbursed or everyone in the community should take their share of the responsibility. Receiving no reimbursement because of inaction will cause the community to finally take action. If the cause of the hack was not the fault of the community then I would agree with reimbursement but I do not understand the specifics of how or where the funds would come from to do something like that. Morally that would be my answer.

Languages I speak and write: English

[Micro]

Dyar ( individual)
0xb905201390b80FAff2165F207A6f75023dE646c1

DAO Profile on Tally

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up tot wo tags:

• Public Goods funding
• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• Improving Governance participation
• Supporting Infrastructure
• Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization
• IRL Arbitrum community gatherings

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

how aggressive should we be in liquidity mining, what is the goal of the DAO?

I am not the biggest fan of liquidity mining, at least not directly from a DAO; I think that in the best of many cases the best is to apply to different protocols that kind of incentives, maybe like Optimism that brought diverse uses to its network incentivizing it in an indirect way in usability and ecosystem.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

1. How would you vote?

Against

2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

Diversity of opinions and participants should be the main objective of a DAO, if a small group centralizes power, the name DAO is only an aggregate.

Something that can help is to predefine in the beginning the creation of committees and delimit the members it should have at the expense of increasing diversity against personal interests.

3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

It is a bad reference to the DAOs, the more decentralized the more difficult it is to agree, but I feel that the committees or delegates fulfill that vital function of representing the voice of many in order to optimize the governance processes.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

3. Split Reimbursementt

A DAO must ensure the best environment for its members and also take into account their survival, therefore it will depend a lot on the cases and the type of hack, by literally draining their funds I do not think they can pay.

That’s why I think the best thing to do, and depending on the case like FEI, is to return money to those affected and it’s better , maybe under a vesting system or the DAO can get down to work to look after the interests of its users.

**Languages I speak and write arabic , kurdish, english

**Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest

I am confident that I have no conflicts of interest that would not allow me to perform my role in the best possible way.

[jackinabinet]

Name: Jack Inabinet

Wallet: 0xf2c40738416a2C0f257273B6090EcB08Ffb565dB

Tally: Tally | @JackInabinet

Areas Interested in Contributing To:

1. Public Goods Funding
2. DeFi Development on Arbitrum

Overall Goals for the DAO:

An $ARB HODLer myself, I will aim to maximize the value of our collective bags.

Having a position on governance is akin to sitting on the board of a publicly traded company. Any decision that I make will be in line with what I believe to be the best path forward for Arbitrum and provide the greatest chance of success for the chain.

Arbitrum is a long-term project: governance must align with this. An emphasis on decentralization and a bulletproof product must come above short-cuts and easy profits.

Personally, I was disappointed by the $ARB airdrop. The safe route chose by the Arbitrum Foundation failed to capitalize on the potential of the airdrop.

Fortunately, there is still room to correct these shortcomings!

The DAO treasury will receive 42.8% of the $ARB distribution

Simply yeeting these tokens into liquidity mining or gas fee reimbursements is a poor usage of the treasury.

Much like Optimism and Blur’s announcements of a second airdrop, there is room for governance to carefully craft an airdrop that places $ARB into the hands of long-term holders, while boosting chain usage and retaining users, as seen with Blur’s approach of announcing the airdrop prior to snapshot.

The goal of future $ARB airdrops should maximize the incentives to come to Arbitrum and aim place coins in the hands of Arbinaughts!

Sample Voting Issue 1:

My Vote: Against (Amendments Required)
Proposed Amendments: Flipside receives no seats on the oversight committee
Centralization Tradeoffs: Centralization is required for operational efficiency. Running every decision by the DAO is inefficient and would put Arbitrum behind the competition (not trying to recreate the Maker governance process here). Frameworks should explicitly outline where DAO consent is necessary. Regarding Flipside, I believe the allocation of 3 seats on the Allocation Committee makes sense: Flipside is being consulted as the expert and is trusted to distribute bounties. Oversight of any DAO program, however, should not be in the hands of those with direct monetary incentives to see the renewal of the program or may be more inclined to adopt lax oversight frameworks.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Best Solution: Full Reimbursement
Rationale: Protocols owe a fiduciary responsibility to their users. If a protocol is able to make its users whole after an exploit, it should. Failure to do anything less is selfish and completely undermines crypto values. $ARB holders have an equity-like stake in the network and should be the bottom dollar of the capital stack. Making users whole comes above all else, end of story.

Languages I speak and write: English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest: Hold some $OP

[Jiurn]

Jiurn

Jiurn.eth

[Tally | @Jiurn]

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

DeFi development on Arbitrum
Supporting Infrastructure

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
I think simplicity is key - the power of the person on the DAO should be corresponding with the numbers of $ARBI tokens.

Prompts to Answer:

1. How would you vote?

Against

Although simplicty is key, some rules must be applied and one entity cannot control too much power in any sphere or we wouldn’t be better than them.

2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

A rule to never exceed 10% of the power in any term possible.

3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

Balance and perspective. Those are the key elements to take into consideration. Most people will be scared to see the protocol having too much power because of bad experiences they had with web2 companies, for instance. So, you need to understand their point of view. The same goes for them, it will never go exactly the way they want too and despite the fact that this way is the best way to handle things. It is still not perfect. From time to time, you will have to take the bull by the horns and for an important and quick decision, satisfy the most people possible, whatever that means and it will piss off people. Just gotta remind them that the best scenario for them isn’t the best for everyone. As a protocol, don’t be greedy, try to satisfy as many people as possible, don’t be egoistic and at ultimately, everything will be fine.

Sample Voting Issue 2 - Rari Hack Reimbursement

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

1. Full Reimbursement

I think users should feel safe and have faith in their project. The project should avoid those types of incident throught the help of white hats and bounties.

Languages I speak and write: French, spanish and english

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest :
I am creating a project and will use a L2, which is going to be Arbitrum. I genuinely like Arbitrum and would be honored to be chosen as a delegate. I use other L2 and would would also work on other blockchains. I see protocols as friends, even if Ethereum is my best friend is Ethereum and you’re his younger brother and genuinely appreciate you, we aren’t exclusive, this isn’t a relationship. I can work on Eth, Bitcoin, ZkSync and love your project anyways. I decide to work On Arbitrum because of scalabilities issues on Eth, but I don’t wanna be limited for the good of my future users.

[elon]

Name: Yeh

Wallet Address:0x497363ba8DBF92263E7440Dc9B681C003b61aC6c

Tally Profile URL: https://www.tally.xyz/profile/0x497363ba8dbf92263e7440dc9b681c003b61ac6c

What area are you most interested in contributing to?
A: DeFi development on Arbitrum, Improving Governance

The overall goals of the DAO should be to set a clear vision and purpose, make a governance structure that is open and includes everyone, find a balance between liquidity mining and stability to attract new users, create a tokenomics model with aligned incentives for all stakeholders, and encourage long-term growth and scalability.

1. For
2. Restructure the allocation and oversight committees. Change the members of the allocation and oversight committees so that they are more representative of a wide range of people. This could include contributing members from the Arbitrum builder and the Users.
3. 60% Ability to get things done 40% for centralization of authority. We need to find a balance between these two, also we can have a voting process under the governance structure and committees to let users and builders decide the committee members. I would say the composition will be committee(30%) > builders(15%) >users(35%)> Third party overwatch Council(20%)

Q2

1. Support and encourage all the projects on Arbitrum for audit, if the project got hacked we need to find out the amount first and how many victims. For me, the best way is that the project keeps running, for the profit that they earn after they need to pay back to the victims, meanwhile the committee need to give the project support and guidance.
2. Split Reimbursement. After the project gets hacked the team of it needs to show their effort and proof of work so that they can get resources from the committee. But the most important thing is how they appease the users and don’t let them lose faith in this.
3. we can offer a bonus for the hackers or white hackers for finding the bug out of the contracts. And the treasury money will come from the project on the Arbitrum.
4. Languages I speak and write: Mandarin and English
5. Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest: I’m Building at Nitro Cartel as a Chinese MOD

[Bhau]

Name (Organization or Individual)

Bhau

Wallet Address or ENS

Bhau.eth

Tally Profile URL

bhau.eth's DAO Profile

What area are you most interested in contributing to? Choose up to two tags:

• Public Goods funding
• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• NFT development on Arbitrum
• Gaming development on Arbitrum
• Improving Governance participation
• Supporting infrastructure
• Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization
• IRL Arbitrum community gatherings

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

The overarching goals of Arbitrum DAO should direct Decentralized Governance (via $ARB) towards harnessing Network Effects – increasing the N.

EIP-4337 Account Abstraction facilitates the process.

The aim of Liquidity Mining should be defined before it is initiated; if not specifically, then at least generally. DeFi Summer 2020 and the ensuing bull market taught us many lessons about governance token issuance. An important insight that should be integrated and applied is this:

Majority of farmed governance tokens were dumped for ETH, WBTC, and Stable-coins. The market behavior essentially signaled an absence of governance utility for these tokens; consequently, the governance tokens did not retain or store value. I.e., Gresham’s Law manifested in real time as Liquidity Pools were drained of “good” money, driven out by “bad” money. The systematic dismantling of Curve Liquidity Pools that precipitated UST’s de-peg and, then, the ensuing LUNA fiasco is likely the most resounding manifestation of this monetary principle in recent history.

The goal of Distributed Ledger Technology is to decentralize emergent innovations to the masses. To quote Steve Jobs,

“We have to start with the customer experience and work backwards to the technology.”

Arbitrum DAO’s greatest priority should be to create value and deliver it to the end users – We, the People.

Through Decentralized Governance, we should direct the DAO to onboard as many people as possible. Policies of Action must be chained with Consequences of Outcomes. This is how we harness Network Effects and hold ourselves accountable; this is how we decentralize the Ethereum Network. Nobody should even mistakenly refer to our Infinite Garden as a Centralized Network, nor ETH as a Security.

If elected as a Delegate, I will gladly share these ideas in further detail.

Decentralized Finance will be prioritized because we have yet to optimize it and leverage Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) to its full potential. When parametrized appropriately, combination of DeFi with Public Goods can facilitate a Regenerative environment. We can say this with minimized uncertainty because the Great John Nash has already mathematically solved the Cooperative Bargaining problem; the satisfaction of these 4 axioms creates a Non-Zero Game, and generates Collective Non-Zero Sum Outcomes (Public Goods):

• Scale Invariance
• Pareto Efficiency
• Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
• Symmetry

As a natural consequence of Pareto Efficiency optimization, Positive Externalities are likely to benefit some, many, and essentially all tags.

Initially, I’d like for us to focus on the following causes in order to ensure we help those people first who need it the most. Money makes the world go round.

This is of particular relevance in the midst of our ongoing banking crisis. Residency DAO is special to me.

More context below pertaining to Optimism & Base

Once we optimize the system to achieve these goals, perhaps we can consider onboarding each United State as a Decentralized Autonomous Organization.

Sample Voting Issue 1

Vote for or against?

For.

Hindsight is 20/20, so it’s easy to act as the armchair governor and state what could have been done differently. Importantly, we have to take risks lest we stifle innovation and progress altogether through paralysis by analysis.

What amendments would you make to the proposal, if any?

None, though moving forward I’d recommend adopting innovative primitives from Elastic Decentralized Finance. Inversion of Price Elastic Digital Assets into Supply Elastic Digital Assets unlocks the value proposition of Double-Token Debts.

How would you approach the trade-off between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

Here, my approach is straightforward – let’s avoid reinventing the wheel. We can model the system(s) that have already optimized this. A prime example is the Nervous System. Within the Active Inference & Free Energy Principle framework, Information Entropy (Free Energy) is actively minimized by the Nervous System to accurately infer the future (minimize Prediction Errors).

Mechanistically, information (entropy) is perpetually entering the Nervous System and it is processed via distributed computing in parallel at the level of individual neurons, collectively at the level of function specific regions, and then integrally at the level of dynamic functional brain networks. This maps on to individual user wallets, DAOs, and a global web3 layer on Ethereum.

Therefore, I’d like to simultaneously have delegate power on Optimism, Base, and/or other Layer 2s/3s built on Ethereum. This need not necessarily entail a Conflict of Interest; rather, it can promote Checks & Balances.

More clarity here can be shared through media, but at this time my account is restricted in this regard.

Sample Voting Issue 2

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation? Elaborate

1. Full Reimbursement
2. No Reimbursement
3. Split Reimbursement

Full Reimbursement. Debtors should be made whole, as they are the ones who delegated Trust in this case.

In such scenarios, a conceptual application of the Learned Hand Rule (Calculus of Negligence) can offer valuable pragmatic insights.

Roughly – if the Probability of Loss (P) x Gravity of the Loss (L) is greater than the Cost of Burden for the entrusted party (B; smart contract engineers, auditors, and associated entities):

P x B > L → then, full reimbursement should proceed.
Edit: P x L > B → then, full reimbursement should proceed.

Measure thrice; cut once.

Languages I speak and write:

English, Hindi, Marathi, Medicine, Psychiatry, Symbolese (Language of the Soul vis-à-vis Collective Unconscious), Mentalese (Language of the Mind)

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

I partake in Decentralized Governance at Forth DAO. Instead of a Conflict, I believe this would be a Focus of Interest for Arbitrum DAO. I retain Optimism Governance Tokens as well. Of note, intrinsically I have no Conflicts of Interest as the overarching goal is oriented towards effecting Collective Non-Zero Sum Outcomes.

[Pxt]

Name (organization or individual)
•Pxt

Wallet Address or ENS
•0x6e074612Ae417AB80A574Fa5Fc78D21765Fe2F30

Tally Profile URL
•Tally | 0x6e07...2F30

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

•Gaming development on Arbitrum
•Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization
•NFT development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

•Ultimately, the goals of a DAO will be determined by its members, who may have a variety of motivations for participating, such as profit-seeking, social impact, or a desire to build a community around a shared interest or goal.

It’s worth noting that DAOs are still a relatively new phenomenon, and their potential applications and impacts are still being explored. As such, it’s possible that the overall goals of DAOs may evolve and change over time as the technology and its possibilities develop.

Prompts to Answer:

1. How would you vote?
   •For

2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
   •No amendments

3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

•The tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done is a complex issue that requires balancing competing concerns. On the one hand, a centralized authority structure can make decision-making more efficient and streamlined, enabling faster action and potentially reducing the potential for conflict or disagreement. On the other hand, centralization can also lead to a concentration of power and decision-making authority in the hands of a few individuals or groups, potentially limiting the input and participation of other stakeholders.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

1.Full Reimbursement

•When a hack occurs in a DAO, it is important to first take steps to mitigate the immediate damage and prevent further losses. This could involve identifying and fixing any vulnerabilities in the system, securing remaining assets, and investigating the extent of the hack.

Once the immediate situation has been addressed, it is important to assess the impact of the hack on members of the DAO and any potential repercussions for the organization as a whole. In the case of the FEI RARI hack, it seems that a significant number of members were affected.

It is important to ensure that the process is transparent and fair. This could involve establishing clear criteria for eligibility, setting a reasonable timeframe for claims, and providing a clear and accessible process for submitting and verifying claims.

Languages I speak and write:

-English, Polish

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

I don’t have any conflicts of interest.

[DiamondProtocol]

Name (organization or individual)
Diamond Protocol /Diamond Unibot

Wallet Address or ENS
Protocol Contract address: 0x9Cf11F95FfB3F122be512f73918e63187a18A71d

**Tally Profile URL **
Tally | 0x9Cf11F95FfB3F122be512f73918e63187a18A71d

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up tot wo tags:

• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• Supporting Infrastructure
• Public Goods funding

---

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
eg — how aggressive should we be in liquidity mining, what is the goal of the DAO?

We think the No. 1 goal about the DAO should be growing the ecosystem, and having quality members that can sustain the growth of the DAO over any market conditions. As such, the DAO need both froth (publicity, general interest, eyeball) and anchor (great tech, math & finance flair, down to earth building). An atmosphere of solidarity is also important, where fellow members help each other and protect each other. This requires a basic level of trust, to maintain this trust, a committee should be elected to periodically review the up and coming members of the community, seed out bad players that plans to exploit the ecosystem for short term gain and connect the good members who can help each other out.
What is more important I feel is for the community members to build on top of each other rather than against each other. If the fellow members can build on top of each other, it’s like the leveraged effect, the ecosystem will grow exponentially, but building against each other will just result in stampede. There could be a DAO theater, where new comers will present themselves in front of the DAO members, if their product is 1. novel 2. high-quality 3. bring in fresh liquidity to Arbitrum, the DAO members can tilt resources (eyeball, tvl, community) help to the new comer.

---

Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:

Sample Voting Issue 1:

Against. We think too much decentralization will result in indecisiveness, but in this case, there is only one service provider here, which seems unfair. The allocation committee should have less concentration, and for any allocation initiatives, there should be at least 2 if not 3 contenders. There also should be a backtrack/amendment mechanism built in, as market changes very fast these days. In the case of unfit, or un-performance or members exploiting the allocations, the allocation committee should be able to revoke the allocation and be able to give it to someone else, following a pre-designed process.

---

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Split Reimbursement, and members should all contribute to a community insurance, if they would like to be reimbursed. furthermore, all participating members should have some threshold security requirement fulfilled, i.e. audit report by top auditor, well publicized bounty program, good development practice. The reimbursement from the insurance fund should be a time weighted, contribution weighted number.

Languages I speak and write:

Within our team, we have native speakers for English, Chinese, Bahasa Indonesia.

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

None

---

[Alphalima]

**Name Alphalima (individual) **

Wallet Address or ENS 0xfaFAf3224366019357C1e3A1B1d8D50E0FcD914c

Tally Profile URL (create a profile here )

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up tot wo tags:

• Public Goods funding
  ( bahasa ) saya telah mendapat tahu berkenaan ekosistem arbitrum ini sejak jun 2022. ramai orang memperkatakannya bahawa ini adalah projek yang harus diberikan perhatian.

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
( bahasa ) impian setiap orang adalah ingin mendapat manfaat dari teknologi yang dibangunkan oleh ekosistem arbitrum ini.

Sample Voting Issue 1:
none

Sample Voting Issue 2:
none

Languages I speak and write:
bahasa

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
seperti kebanyakan orang ramai, saya juga ingin memperolehi manfaat dari ekosistem ini, bukan hanya dari segi fund, tetapi juga terhadap teknologi yang dibangunkan.

Love from Asia

[yoavw]

Name (organization or individual)

Yoav Weiss

Wallet Address or ENS

yoav.eth

Tally Profile URL

yoav.eth's DAO Profile

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up tot wo tags:

• Public Goods funding
• Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

The DAO should serve the long term health and security of the rollups, and should favor long term sustainability over short term gains. It should promote values like censorship resistance, decentralization, and security. The DAO should support Ethereum and other core infrastructure projects that Arbitrum depends on.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

1. Against
2. The proposal gave too much centralized power to a small number of individuals. I’d amend it to something like I describe in 3.
3. I’d start with a version that errs on the side of decentralization and give it a few months. If it proves too hard to get things done, have the DAO elect committees, compensate committee members to ensure proper attention, and hold them accountable to it through the constitution. The DAO would occasionally reelect these committees.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

My vote would depend on the source of funds for the reimbursement, and in any case I would only vote for partial reimbursement.

I would vote against any reimbursement paid by the public in any way. The protocol wasn’t sufficiently battle-tested, users knew this going in, since the protocol was moving faster than some other more conservative projects. Their losses shouldn’t be socialized.

I would vote for a partial reimbursement if it is paid by the protocol’s treasury or founders. It makes sense for the protocol stakeholders to show accountability and share the burden since they were in a position to secure it.

I would vote against reimbursement of anything over 80%, no matter who pays for it. We should not condition users to expect a bailout because it promotes carelessness. Users should learn to do their due diligence and prefer protocols that invest in security.

Languages I speak and write:

English, Hebrew

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

Full disclosures:

• I’m a member of the Arbitrum security council.
• I’m also a delegate in the governance of other L2 chains but do not hold a stake there.

I do not see these as a conflict of interest but disclosing them in case anyone else does.

[Orca]

Name (organization or individual)
Kai Orca

Wallet Address or ENS
0x1A83Ea288C490A4Ac03191a7451312C621294911

Tally Profile URL
tally profile

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up tot wo tags:

• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• Supporting Infrastructure

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
The overall goals for the DAO should be “efficient system”.
Regarding infrastructure, the powerful incentives drive operators to contribute to a stable system. Making a well-organized incentive structure is one of the most important role of the DAO.
However, purging really matters. Indolence, moral hazards, and negligence hamper the growth of ecosystem. DAO must take a holistic approach; use greed and punishment appropriately.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

1. How would you vote?
   Against
2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
   This proposal tends to think of token allocation as a light thing. Respecting the ecosystem participants, allocating new tokens should be done cautiously. They could make one or more steps other than the proposed committee, such as a DAO vote.
3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
   I have watched a few blockchains in which the foundation grabs a powerful authority on the excuse of executive ability. This eventually led to corruption of the governance and betrayal of the ecosystem. Wrong things have been done by governance of few people: using bounties stealthily, giving authority to incapable parties as a personal favor, and selling tokens behind using a mixer.
   As long as the DAO takes the principles of decentralization, we shouldn’t prioritize the ability to get things faster.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

3. Split Reimbursement
   DAO has a responsibility to protect the ecosystem from an attack from outside. I think it is necessary to reimburse to protect the interests of ecosystem members. However, there should be pain and it must be shared.

Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.

I believe the role-back should be done when it is a situation of system fault. Mistakes made by a single party are not applicable.

Languages I speak and write:
Korean, English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I have no conflict of interest.