Delegate Statement Template

Governance Delegate Statements
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818

Name: On Chain India (individual)

Wallet address: onchainindia.eth (0xd730439BA51Fb054289811024dC91a4510A227FF)

Tally Profile URL: Tally | onchainindia.eth

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

  • DeFi development on Arbitrum
  • Improving Governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
I believe the DAO should aim to foster a culture of openness, accountability, and fairness by providing transparent governance mechanisms, community-driven proposals and voting systems, and equitable distribution of rewards and resources. Ultimately, the success of a DAO depends on its ability to align the interests and values of its members towards achieving collective goals and promoting the growth and sustainability of the ecosystem.

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Issue Overview

  1. How would you vote?

Against

  1. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

I believe the DAO should aim to foster a culture of openness, accountability, and fairness by providing transparent governance mechanisms, community-driven proposals and voting systems, and equitable distribution of rewards and resources. Ultimately, the success of a DAO depends on its ability to align the interests and values of its members towards achieving collective goals and promoting the growth and sustainability of the ecosystem.

  1. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

I support decentralization and collective decision-making, while also empowering specialized groups for efficient task handling.

Sample Voting Issue 2 - Rari Hack Reinbursement
Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

I am in favor of reimbursing immediately. If the DAO only holds governance tokens, it raises the question of why token holders should be penalized instead of those providing liquidity. Reimbursing in governance tokens could create sell pressure and work against the interests of token holders. However, others argue that the tokens and holders are linked to the protocol, and a hack will inevitably affect the token price.

Languages I speak and write:
English,Hindi and Punjabi

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I have no conflicts of interest to being an Arbitrum delegate.

819

Name:Dafa
ENS:yangfa.eth
Tally Profile UPL:Tally | yangfa.eth
i’m mostinterested in Improving Governance participation
Dao is an institution and a vision of WEB3. I understand that Dao should, is to gather collective wisdom to create value for service projects. Then value can not only be reflected in price but also in direction. However, there is no denying that the Dao’s risk is that if someone with influence uses the Dao to do something that is bad for the service project, then the loss is incalculable, so the Dao must establish a one-vote veto
My view in other communities is the same DAO should be promoted but must be limited
Sample Voting Issue 1:

  1. How would you vote?
    Against
  2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
    First, increase the voting rights of other service providers
    secondly, the voting power in charge of the audit, has a veto
  3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
    The Dao’s ability to work is not limited but the decision-making power is limited, as in the above question can be added one, one veto
    Sample Voting Issue 2:
    i choose Split Reimbursement
    If there’s a hacker attack, then so is the project, and if the victims are reimbursed in full, then that’s not good for the ecology of the project, so the best way to do that is to break up the reimbursement
    Languages I speak and write:
    English、chinese
    Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
  • no conflicts of interest
820

Name: Akintunde (individual)

Wallet address: (0xf6F2778D09eFcCD1f8e6423a22DBee8F9C75DDC5)

Tally Profile URL: Tally | Abjghost

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

DeFi development on Arbitrum
Improving Governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

  1. Increased Transparency: Arbitrum DAO offers a transparent and secure solution for dispute resolution that enables all members to access the same information and understand the decisions made by the group. This increased transparency helps to foster trust and accountability among members.

  2. Improved Efficiency: By utilizing smart contracts, the Arbitrum DAO eliminates the need for manual processes and paperwork. This helps to streamline the dispute resolution process, making it more efficient and cost-effective.

  3. Reduced Risk: The Arbitrum DAO utilizes blockchain technology to ensure that all decisions are secure and immutable. This reduces the risk of tampering or fraud and helps to ensure that all disputes are resolved fairly and quickly.

  4. Improved Reputation: By offering a secure and transparent dispute resolution platform, the Arbitrum DAO helps to protect the reputation of the members of the DAO by ensuring that all disputes are resolved fairly and quickly. This can help to build

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Issue Overview

How would you vote?
Against

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

I believe the DAO should aim to foster a culture of openness, accountability, and fairness by providing transparent governance mechanisms, community-driven proposals and voting systems, and equitable distribution of rewards and resources. Ultimately, the success of a DAO depends on its ability to align the interests and values of its members towards achieving collective goals and promoting the growth and sustainability of the ecosystem.

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

The best approach to this tradeoff is to promote a decentralized approach to decision-making and problem-solving. This means that decisions should be made at the lowest possible level, with authority and decision-making power distributed throughout the organization. This allows decisions to be made quickly and allows employees to take ownership of their work and be empowered to make decisions. It also encourages collaboration and creative problem-solving.

Sample Voting Issue 2 - Rari Hack Reinbursement
Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

I am in favor of reimbursing immediately. If the DAO only holds governance tokens, it raises the question of why token holders should be penalized instead of those providing liquidity. Reimbursing in governance tokens could create sell pressure and work against the interests of token holders. However, others argue that the tokens and holders are linked to the protocol, and a hack will inevitably affect the token price.

Languages I speak and write:
English.

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I have no conflicts of interest to being an Arbitrum delegate.

821

Susidharan (Twitter : @DharanR6)
Address: 0x5fd61a1b02f0b2a8c8e01ee36359b234051f295c

  1. Defi development on Arbitrum. Because it builds the foundation of this network. Which is also helps to increase the adoption of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
  2. Tooling and improvement of protocol decentralisation. Because decentralisation is the core concept of the Crypto. So this dao helps to maintain the decentralisation among the Arbitrum ecosystem.
    Sample 1.
    Answers:
  3. For
  4. No amendments.
  5. Certain percentage of centralisation is good for big organisation. But it’s like 30% centralization is good. Did not give up the core agenda of the project. When it comes to decision making it should be decentralized and voting.

Sample 2.
Answers:

  1. Full reimbursement. Because those affected people’s are trusted them. It’s their responsibility to keep it safe. Full reimbursement at any cost. It could give complete trust on them to reinvest in their project.

Languages I speak and Write: Tamil, English

823

Name: r0fman_crypto (twitter)
Wallet: 0x9A837C19E3460905EbfCE299854775734Cb14c4f
Tally Profile URL: Tally | 0x9A83...4c4f
i’m interested in Supporting Infrastructure and NFT development on Arbitrum

Liquidity mining is a popular strategy used by DAOs to incentivize liquidity providers and reward community members for contributing to the platform. The aggressiveness of liquidity mining can depend on a DAO’s goals and risk tolerance. A more aggressive approach to liquidity mining may lead to faster growth, but it may also increase volatility and risk.

Previous issues raised in other communities can vary widely, but some common ones include concerns about transparency, governance, and security. DAOs can address these issues by implementing transparent decision-making processes, strong security protocols, and community-driven governance structures.

Overall, the goals of a DAO and the approach to liquidity mining should be aligned with the needs and priorities of its community. DAOs can benefit from incorporating feedback and input from community members to ensure that their strategies and goals reflect the values and interests of the wider ecosystem

1.For

2.Nothing more

3.The tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done is a common challenge for any organization, including DAOs. On one hand, centralization of authority can provide clear leadership and decision-making, leading to faster execution and more efficient use of resources. On the other hand, too much centralization can stifle innovation, limit participation, and lead to decision-making that does not reflect the needs and priorities of the wider community.

  1. Full Reimbursement
    I speak on English and Russian language
824

Name (organization or individual)

  • Tim

Wallet Address or ENS

  • timton.eth

Tally Profile URL (create a profile here )

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

  • NFT development on Arbitrum

  • Improving Governance participation

  • Helping the community with complex management issues
    Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

  • Liquidity mining, margin cakes - that’s a different story. I think you should create something that will attract people not for profit, but for interest and self-education

Sample Voting Issue 1:

  1. Against
  2. Maybe abolish it completely?
  3. Any dispersion of voices evokes a desire to bring those voices together, for governance and power. No structure can escape the human essence. Therefore, I believe that the primary voice should be in the right hands, not dispersed throughout

Sample Voting Issue 2:
The solution here is very clear. It is strict and subjective, in some places harsh, but right: everyone is to blame for his own actions. If the community decides to help, it begins to allocate its own donations
No Reimbursement
Languages I speak and write:

  • English, Russian, Turkey

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

  • no conflicts of interest
825

Name: P2P.org

Wallet Address or ENS: 0x4149dfbe618d83c80b0d4d537a7827f3d537b45c

Tally Profile URL: Tally | P2P.org

What area are you most interested in contributing to:

  • Supporting Infrastructure
  • Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization

Please share your stance on the overall goals for the DAO:

The goal of the DAO is to enhance the growth of the Arbitrum ecosystem including applications built on top of Arbitrum and the expansion of its L3 net with its possibilities for specific chains. Decisions should be made while ensuring the long-term sustainability of the DAO and the overall health of the Ethereum ecosystem.

When applying these ideals to the concept of “liquidity mining” we can reasonably conclude that liquidity mining is a good way to attract attention in the short term but should not be seen as a long-term solution.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

  1. How would you vote?

Against.

  1. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

Allocate the grant quarterly or at least biannually with an established SLI/SLO. Given the size of the protocol and the work being done, there is no reason to provide the funds on a yearly basis. While we don’t disagree with part of the bounty being used to pay for Flipside’s operating costs we disagree with the delivery mechanism. Using a yield strategy to fund it brings a lot of unnecessary risks, even if minimal.

Ideally, this should also be done through an open tender procedure.

  1. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

This problem has generally been solved via representative democracy. It is quite understandable that not every single individual can take the time or energy to deliberate on every issue. A delegated committee or council largely solves this issue.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation? i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not?

Full Reimbursement

The only logical path should be to reimburse the affected parties. Whenever an exploit occurs the trust placed in that dAPP/protocol is gone. Reimbursing those affected is a large step in gaining back that trust.

If a DAO has enough capital to continue to operate at the cost of not reimbursing the affected parties their days are numbered and it will not do so for long at which point it’s simply better to reimburse those affected.

Languages I speak and write: English and Portuguese

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

P2P is a validator and participant of the Data Availability committee on Arbitrum.

1 Like
826

@AndriiStroganov - twitter(individual)
0x96add89410d3A231Bf3e434D3Be83462514BEe44

  • NFT development on Arbitrum

  1. For

  2. I don’t have any amendments
    3.Finding the right balance between centralized control and effective operations is a pervasive issue for all types of organizations, including DAOs. On the positive side, centralizing decision-making authority can yield streamlined leadership and more efficient deployment of resources, resulting in speedy execution. However, excessive centralization can impede creativity, restrict engagement, and generate decisions that do not align with the interests and requirements of the broader community.

  3. Full Reimbursement
    I speak Russian and Ukrainian. I can also speak a little bit English and German

827

@Michalwlodarek1 - twitter

0x01Cfd0E842975A9209987dA089f1e0113214B7b5

  • NFT development on Arbitrum
  • Improving Governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

It is a bad reference to the DAOs, the more decentralized the more difficult it is to agree, but I feel that the committees or delegates fulfill that vital function of representing the voice of many in order to optimize the governance processes.

Liquidity mining, ; I think that in the best of many cases the best is to apply to different protocols that kind of incentives, maybe like Optimism that brought diverse uses to its network incentivizing it in an indirect way in usability and ecosystem.

1.How would you vote?
= For
Delegation of voting power is necessary for any DAO to be able to function efficiently in the long term. Even though it brings a degree of centralisation, as long as they do not control an excessive amount of the larger DAO and they have sufficient accountability measures it’s a good initiative.

  1. No proposal more

  2. Much centralization can stifle innovation, limit participation, and lead to decision-making that does not reflect the needs and priorities of the wider community

Sample Voting Issue 2:
It depends entirely where the reimbursement would come from. If this were a case of introducing a self-executable on-chain transfer block on the hacked amount and reminting into the damaged parties’ accounts, I would vote yes. If the tokenholders and other network participants were to pay for this, no. Socializing losses across a large number of people is not acceptable when it is clear that very small circles of people are responsible for both insecure code and stealing the money.

Languages I speak and write:

  • English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

  • no interest
1 Like
828

Name: TonyStark

ENS: okhai.eth

Tally Profile URL: Tally | okhai.eth

Areas of interests:

  • Public Goods funding
  • Supporting Infrastructure

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
My overall goal for the DAO is for it to remain aligned to the development of core blockchain infrastructures and to provide support to contributors ( e.g. builders, community members, e.t.c. ) on the Arbitrum and ultimately Ethereum ecosystem.

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Issue Overview

  • Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
  • For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
  • This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

Prompts to Answer:

  1. How would you vote?
    Against

  2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
    Since the issue with this proposal is regarding the centralization of power, I would propose we engage more third parties to get involved in this redistribution hereby making it more objective. My rationale is that if there are ways to make it better we should, especially on a case like this.

  3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
    There is a time where centralization of authority is important since it impacts ability to get things done, especially in a case of emergency when time of response is critical. This is why I love the idea of Arbitrum security councel.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
Issue Overview: link removed because I am a new user and cannot add more than two links - see info above ( original question post )

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
3. Split Reimbursement

I believe there shouldn’t be a blanket check where parties are always reimbursed for hacks. Participants also need to hold themselves accountable and learn how to follow best practices against hacks. I understand there are circumstances beyond people’s capacity sometimes so after through investigations, we can determine who is eligible for re imbursement or not.

We should also learn to asses who we put in critical positions to ensure security of DAO treasuries, multisig and infrastructures.

Languages I speak and write: English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
No conflict of interest.

829

xenos (individual)

millisoft.eth

Tally | millisoft.eth

Areas I am most interested in contributing to:

  • Public Goods funding
  • NFT development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

I believe that the Arbitrum DAO should focus on increasing decentralization and ecosystem growth both in terms of the community outreach and the number of projects.
The proposals and decisions within the DAO governance should benefit the ecosystem and provide ideas for a long-term and sustainable development.

There should also be incentives in the form of grants for the builders and community in order to increase the competitiveness of the rollup and attract more users and developers amidst the growing number of potential competitors.

One more goal could be becoming a common infrastructure for other chains (the Internet of Rollups) that are fast, secure, and low-gas.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

  1. My vote would be: Against

  2. I would increased decentralization by inviting other qualified members to the Allocation and Oversight Committees. After that I would support the proposal.

  3. My view is that people in most cases can eventually come to a compromise after some discussions. Although this approach might be not so efficient in terms of time, but I strongly believe that this is the only way forward to the true decentralization. Any concentration of power or authority can, and most likely, will be abused.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

I would consider several factors first before making any choice:

  1. How significant the hack was for the project and the ecosystem. If the amount was too big then it could damage the reputation and liquidity of the whole ecosystem. Even if the affected users receive full reimbursement, it is unlikely that many of them will trust the project again. This can lead to significant liquidity outflow and possible ecosystem downfall (depending on the size). Conversely, if the amount was relatively small then it makes full sense to even fully reimburse the losses (maybe with some vesting period) improving the ecosystem reputation and keeping some affected users in.

  2. Source of reimbursement. We should carefully consider where the liquidity for the reimbursement comes from. Will any other project be affected by the decreased liquidity or treasury funds?

  3. Can we explore other means to recovering the hacked funds such as an offer of a share of funds and no prosecution to the hacker in exchange for a return, or a bounty for the information that can help recover the theft?

Hacks happen regularly, and became even more frequent recently. This is an unavoidable reality of the digital world. That said, responsible projects and communities should be involved and help to resolve these critical accidents in order to maintain the trust and reputation of the ecosystem.

To summarize, In an average case I would be more inclined to support a partial reimbursement, but my choice will fully depend on an individual case details.

Languages I speak and write:
English, Russian, Spanish

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
No conflict of interest.

1 Like
830

Name (organization or individual: Cornelius Agu

Wallet Address or ENS: 0x5ba9A8FB45F35ddFA6cf0817B6F2f25DAa6343CF

Tally : https://www.tally.xyz/profile/0x5ba9a8fb45f35ddfa6cf0817b6f2f25daa6343cf

Areas of interest:

  • Public goods funding
  • DeFi development on Arbitrum
  • Improving Governance participation
  • Supporting Infrastructure

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
As a prospective delegate for the DAO Arbitrum blockchain, my overall goal is to promote the growth and development of the community while ensuring that the interests of all members are represented. To achieve this, I believe that the DAO should prioritize initiatives that foster liquidity and encourage participation from a diverse range of stakeholders.

While liquidity mining can be a powerful tool for incentivizing participation and building momentum, I believe that it should be approached cautiously and with a long-term perspective. In my view, the primary goal of the DAO should be to create a sustainable and resilient ecosystem that can weather market fluctuations and adapt to changing conditions.

Regarding the issues that have been raised in other communities, I believe that it’s important to take a proactive and collaborative approach to addressing concerns and building trust. By engaging with members of other communities in a respectful and constructive manner, we can cultivate a culture of cooperation and mutual benefit that benefits everyone involved.

Ultimately, my stance on these issues is guided by a commitment to transparency, inclusivity, and responsible stewardship of the resources and assets entrusted to the DAO. As a delegate, I would work tirelessly to ensure that the community’s interests are represented and that the DAO continues to thrive and grow over the long term.

Sample Voting Issue 1:
As a delegate, I would vote against the Uniswap proposal as it currently stands. While I believe that bounties can be an effective way to attract new users to Uniswap, the proposal gives Flipside crypto too much control over the allocation of UNI and oversight of the program. In my view, this could lead to centralization of power and create an unfair advantage for Flipside.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
As a delegate, I believe that the Rari hack reimbursement situation is a complex issue that requires careful consideration and a nuanced approach. While I sympathize with those who were affected by the hack, I believe that it’s important to weigh the potential benefits and drawbacks of reimbursement carefully.

In my view, the decision of whether or not to reimburse parties affected by an exploit should be based on a number of factors, including the severity of the exploit, the impact on the community, and the feasibility of reimbursement. In some cases, full reimbursement may be appropriate if the exploit was particularly damaging or if it was the result of a systemic issue within the platform. However, in other cases, it may not be feasible or appropriate to provide full reimbursement.

Ultimately, I believe that the decision of whether or not to reimburse parties affected by an exploit should be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the unique circumstances of each situation. As a delegate, I would work to ensure that the interests of all members of the community are represented fairly and that decisions are made in a transparent and responsible manner.

Languages I speak and write:

  • English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

I am confident that I have no conflicts of interest that would not allow me to perform my role in the best possible way.

831

Instructions:

Please respond to the submission template below by replying with your answers.

Name (glitchc individual)

Wallet Address or ENS 0x8DF4E055AbcD4668C40c34d03548d2d5AE8DC0e5

Tally Profile URL ( Tally | 0x8DF4...C0e5**)**

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

Improving Governance participation

Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
Overall, the goals of a DAO should be aligned with the values of the broader blockchain community, including decentralization, transparency, autonomy, innovation, and social impact. By prioritizing these values, a DAO can create a truly decentralized and autonomous organization that serves the needs of its members and the broader community. When deciding how aggressive to be in liquidity mining, it is important to consider the potential risks and rewards, as well as the current market conditions. In volatile market conditions, it may be prudent to be less aggressive in liquidity mining to minimize risk of impermanent loss, therefore a less aggressive approach to liquidity mining is what I would convey for the long term benefit of Arbitrum especially as TVL and daily transactions are very high due to the utility and value provided by the Arbitrum ecosystem in comparison to other layer 2 solutions.

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Issue Overview 868

Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.

For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.

This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favour of one service provider.

Prompts to Answer:

How would you vote?

I would vote against because the proposal to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties was contentious due to concerns about Flipside having too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program. The proposal also seemed to favour one service provider over others, which raised further concerns. It’s important for any proposal to consider all stakeholders’ perspectives and avoid centralization of power to ensure transparency and fairness.

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

It is important to have a more decentralized allocation and oversight committee. One way to achieve this could be to increase the number of seats on the committee and to have a more diverse group of members. Flipside should provide regular reports on the distribution of tokens to bounties and the performance of those bounties. This will ensure that the community has visibility into how the program is functioning and how tokens are being allocated. The allocation and oversight committee should be independent from Flipside. This could be achieved by having the committee appointed by a neutral third-party, such as a decentralized autonomous organization (DAO). To promote innovation and creativity in the bounties program, it is important to allow for the participation of other analytics service providers. This will encourage competition and drive innovation, ultimately benefiting the Uniswap ecosystem as a whole. To ensure that the bounties program has a positive social impact, it could be tied to social and environmental causes. For example, bounties could be offered for projects that promote sustainability or contribute to social causes. This will help to align the program with Uniswap’s values and mission.

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

In the case of Uniswap’s proposal to use Flipside to attract new users through bounties, the concerns about centralization of power and favouritism towards one service provider are valid. Giving Flipside too much control over the allocation of UNI to bounties and oversight of the program could create a situation where decisions are made based on the interests of Flipside rather than the interests of the Uniswap community. I would therefore suggest establishing clear guidelines for decision-making which are transparent and fair to ensure that decisions are made based on the interests of the Uniswap community rather than the interests of a single service provider. The community could then ensure that the proposal aligns with the community’s interests. This would also help to identify potential issues before they become contentious. Consideration of the long-term implications of the proposal and how it will affect the decentralization of the platform should be taken into account, for instance, If the proposal undermines the decentralization of Uniswap, it could harm the platform’s long-term prospects.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
Issue Overview:
Overview Link 1 2.6k
Overview Link 2 336

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

Full Reimbursement

No Reimbursement

Split Reimbursement
Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.

The decision to reimburse or not reimburse the affected parties in the Rari hack is a complex one. It depends on the severity of the exploit, the responsibility of the platform, and the platform’s reputation and trustworthiness. I would favour split reimbursement whereby the platform could choose to reimburse some of the affected parties and not others. For example, they could reimburse users who had their funds stolen due to platform negligence but not reimburse those who lost funds due to their own actions, such as sharing their private keys. This option would try to balance the responsibility between the platform and the users.

Languages I speak and write:

English (Native) German (Intermediate)

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
Diversity of opinions is critical to making progress and determining the future direction of the Arbitrum ecosystem. We recognize and celebrate the fact that delegates will have diverse views and we both encourage and anticipate good-faith debates in the governance process. That being said, it’s critical that all featured delegates are operating with Arbitrum’s best interest in mind, so please affirm that you don’t have any conflicts of interest that would prevent you from using your best judgement to operate in the best interests of advancing the Arbitrum ecosystem.

I can confirm that I do not have any conflicts of interest that would prevent me from using my best judgment to operate in the best interests of advancing the Arbitrum ecosystem

1 Like
832

Mykola - individual

0x4A7E2229539ea73bf35D62acE63f40430912dE5D

[Tally] Tally | @Mdgddfhdfhdf

DAO memberships, votes and proposal

  • Public Goods funding
    1.For
    2.Nothing more

Languages I speak and write:
English and Ukrainian

I am PhD, Associate Professor*)

1 Like
833

**Name: Leighton Cusack // Arrakis Labs

Wallet Address or ENS: 0x067b9Bbbbc42d2AB9b9Ab6bB62646dAF7F344A76

Tally Profile URL: Tally | lay2000lbs

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up two tags:

  • Public Goods funding
  • DeFi development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
Protocol governance should strive to minimize human decision making and inputs. They should be striving to work themselves out of a job. The best governance is no governance.

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Issue Overview

  • Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
  • For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
  • This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

Prompts to Answer:

  1. How would you vote?
    Against

  2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

I would not allocate funds to parties that have inherent conflicts of interest.

  1. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

Anyone receiving tokens needs to be highly empowered to use it however they see fit. Delegated centralization.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
Issue Overview:
FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

  1. Full Reimbursement
    2. No Reimbursement
  2. Split Reimbursement

Each situation is so unique that I can’t give a blanket answer. My understanding of this situation is it originally stemmed from the fact that the first vote was not an on-chain action… so that is the first problem here. Don’t even have votes on things that are not effecting on-chain actions.

Overall, I don’t see Arbitrum governance backstopping losses happening on protocols deployed to Arbitrum.

Languages I speak and write:

English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I am actively involved in the DeFi ecosystem but my only salary or compensation comes from PoolTogether Inc. I am small angel investor in Optimism Labs. I do not believe any of these things will compromise my ability to serve the Arbitrum community!

834

Name Mantra

Wallet Address or ENS 0xc446a8819f18badfea219d759460b5445e2d52de

Tally Profile URL Tally | @ddos040

What area are you most interested in contributing to?
Public Goods funding, DeFi development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
eg — how aggressive should we be in liquidity mining, what is the goal of the DAO?
A DAO can foster innovation by enabling experimentation and risk-taking, without being beholden to traditional corporate structures.

Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:

Sample Voting Issue 1:
[Issue Overview ]

  • Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
  • For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
  • This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

Prompts to Answer:

  1. How would you vote?
    For
  2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
    None
  3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
    Create sub-DAOs: One approach to balancing centralization and decentralization is to create sub-DAOs within the larger DAO. Each sub-DAO can have its own governance structure and decision-making process, allowing for more efficient decision-making on specific issues or projects.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

Split Reimbursement

Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.
Split reimbursement as there is always a risk you take when operating with a contract.
Languages I speak and write:
Swedish, English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
Diversity of opinions is critical to making progress and determining the future direction of the
Arbitrum ecosystem. We recognize and celebrate the fact that delegates will have diverse views and we both encourage and anticipate good-faith debates in the governance process. That being said, it’s critical that all featured delegates are operating with Arbitrum’s best interest in mind, so please affirm that you don’t have any conflicts of interest that would prevent you from using your best judgement to operate in the best interests of advancing the Arbitrum ecosystem.

1 Like
836

Name limes

ENS limes.eth

Tally Profile URL Tally | EnlightenedLime

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up tot wo tags:

  • Public Goods funding
  • IRL Arbitrum community gatherings

Goals for Arbitrum DAO:

  1. Security: Remove all “training wheels” from the Arbitrum sequencer and all protocol functions. It’s important that now with the inception of the DAO that there is little permissioned access to the protocol but functions on top of it remain editable.

  2. Increase adoption: Ethereum scales through optimistic rollups and Arbitrum being the most secure and functional rollup today remains the priority after security.

  3. Cater to builders who use Arbitrum as their home. The best way to foster a community is to support the people who build the infrastructure for everyone. We need to ensure Arbitrum remains an attractive place for innovators to explore.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

  • Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
  • For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
  • This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

Prompts to Answer:

  1. How would you vote?
    Against

  2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
    I would propose to reduce the number of seats to 1/7 and request comment from the other service providers

  3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
    By design, DAOs are large, slow, and inefficient. Because of this, Arbitrum DAO should have a limited scope of influence, but have it govern the most important parts of the protocol (sequencer, multisig, etc.) Centraliztion for the purpose of accomplishing goals with defined budgets and time horizons are how I would vote to spend resources.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Full Reimbursement

In the event of losing another individuals funds, measures should be taken to fullest extent to refund those who lost funds. When not enough treasury funds are available. Funds should be reserved for wind up fees (open-sourcing work, final payments, etc.) and a partial reimbursement issued.

Languages I speak and write:
English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
Currently I operate as a Delegate and Steward of ENS DAO.

2 Likes
837

Jerome Gideon
0x767ab0B384f45Ec327150f65DDd4D414aA343690

Supporting infrastructure
NFT development on Arbitrum

Liquidity mining shouldn’t be really aggressive because agressive mining increases volatility and risk
We need more project founders to built more nft, play to earn,defi projects in the Arbitrum ecosystem

1.For
2.No amendments
3.The ability to get things done is the most common thing with all DAOs and all organization

Full reimbursement

I speak and write only english

1 Like
840

Name - Snappy
Wallet - 0x19491c83Adbed54100d13a6287452619F54C74D5
Tally - Tally | snappychaff.eth

Areas of Interest

  • Improving Governance Participation
  • NFT Development on Arbitrum

    • Overall Goals for the DAO

        The ultimate goal of the DAO is to align with the principles
of decentralization and also community-driven decision-making. The
aggressiveness in liquidity mining should reflect this in a way that
balance incentive to participate with long-term value and sustainability.

    Sample Voting Issue 1:
    1. How would I vote?
    I would vote against this because it centralizes too much power to one service provider.

    2. What amendments would I make to the proposal if any?
    I would propose an amendment to reduce Flipsides control and involve other service providers in the exchange to diversify and decentralize power.

    3. How would I approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

        I don't believe this question is as simple as; How much
centralization should we have? I believe that centralization should 
be evaluated differently given the complexity of the situation and 
the DAOs principles and ultimate goals. In this scenario with Flipside, 
I believe there should be much more decentralization. Even though this 
would mean reaching new users slower, giving Flipside 3/7 seats on the 
allocation committee and a third of the seats on the Oversight committee 
goes directly against the goals of the DAO. Ultimately, when alligning
with the principles of the DAO, decentralization should be the priority.
Efficiency should be sacrificed for decentralization, never the other way
around. This is why I believe centralization should fluctuate from 
situation to situation, if possible.

    Sample Voting Issue 2:
    How would I choose to handle this situation

        I would make an effort to provide as much of a refund as possible.
Specifically if the individuals affected had no control over what happened
I believe a full reimbursement is not only right, but necessary. It is
unfair to users if they had no control over the situation and still lost
their money. If the users are at fault, I don't believe any reimbursement
is required nor should it be provided at the expense of the project.
In any case where the project itself is at fault in any way, I believe at
the very least, a split reimbursement is important, to show that the users
are a priority, and their well-being is taken into account. I believe this
aligns with the principles of the DAO, where even though there is some
centralization, ultimately they are not in it for their own gain.

    Languages I speak and write: English
    Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest: I am currently a student, and very young. I have been involved in the web3 space for around a year and a half and as anyone else in this space knows; I am learning more everyday. While I don’t believe I have any conflicts of interest that would prevent me from using my best judgement to advance the Arbitrum ecosystem, I do believe that I have a lot to learn. I’d love to help contribute to Arbitrum in any way I can as well as learn a lot along with everyone else involved!

    841

    Name:
    @Koozvkk (Twitter)

    Wallet Adress:
    0x6E864E4D78A87d8e043f7574CDC0e0c3E2F5afA7

    Tally Profile:

    Areas of contribution:
    DeFi development on Arbitrum, NFT development on Arbitrum.

    Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
    For me the most important goal of the DAO is to stimulate the healthy and decentralized (!) growth of the protocol. Decisions made by the members should be in the best interest of the DAO as a whole, taking into account the long term perspective and best interests of further development.
    In case of liquidity minining I would prefere golden mean as too agressive approach increase risk significantly. Agressive approach is awesome in short term.

    Sample Voting Issue 1:
    I would vote FOR.

    What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
    I would recommend to introduce regular control votings for DAO members. They would be conducted in order to assure if members are still okay with the centralization of voting power.

    How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
    Centralization of authority may be good way to improve DAO efficiency in long run. The compromise here should be based on mutual trust - rest of DAO members should have still ability to approve or disapprove the decisions.

    Sample Voting Issue 2 - Rari Hack Reinbursement

    Split Reimbursement
    Hacks are the nightmare for cryptospace. They devastate the trust and confidence of the wider audience of users. Having that in mind I would choose to make a partial Reimbursement. I think that ‘full’ option could be too difficult to implement in that case, as it would be devastating for the DAO.
    I think that assuring members that in case of hacks they will not be leaved alone is valuable for the whole DAO.

    Languages I speak and write:
    Polish - native
    English - fluent
    German - fluent

    Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
    No conflicts of interest