Delegate to a public access, public good citizen enfranchisement pool through Event Horizon

We appreciate the questions, as it draws attention to some areas needing further explanation:

a. Can you help us understand the rationale behind the 5M ARB ask?

5M $ARB would make us the 23rd largest delegate. We initially requested 2m, but some delegates expressed concerns that if the delegation was too small to move the needle, there would be no point. Just recently @cp0x asked us to raise it again. Some delegates expressed interest in placing us as the 15th largest delegate (7.3m $ARB) as a sweet spot. We’ll await further feedback before moving up from 5m.

b. Do you have any suggestions on how the technical implementation for delegating ARB would look like?

in a similar vain @cp0x asks:

[Function: delegate(address delegate) has only 1 parameter, so it’s impossible to distribute votes to more than 1 address.

the DAO would only have to delegate to one address, the EH address so that won’t be an issue.

To answer @jengajojo’s question (b) about the technical details: Fractional delegation isn’t possible, and is one of the reasons why in Uniswap’s successful retroactive delegation proposal they spun up a Franchiser contract. So mirroring our GovHack Arbitrum hackathon proposal we will amend this proposal with the technical details as follows:

Technical Implementation

In order to implement this proposal, it is required that we create a DAO-controlled Franchiser contract. The contract owner would be the DAO timelock and it would allow the DAO the power to delegate and undelegate tokens that it sends from the treasury to the Franchiser. We suggest that the Foundation aids in the creation of this contract in order to create an official and safe implementation, though we can likely fork the Trail of Bits audited Uniswap Labs implementation [github] of the same concept. If this proposal passes Snapshot, we request that the Foundation take the time to fork the contract and hire an auditor to check the implementation.

The contract has simple functions:

-Fund: allows the DAO to send tokens to contract and delegate to a single address

-FundMany: allows the DAO to send tokens to contract and delegate any amount to multiple addresses

-Recall: allows DAO to pull back funds from Franchiser effectively undelegating and returning tokens to treasury from a single delegate.

-RecallMany: allows DAO to pull back funds from franchiser effectively undelegating and returning tokens to treasury from multiple delegates.

It is worth noting that all tokens sent to the Franchiser will remain a part of the DAO’s balance sheet as it has full-control over the contract. The delegated tokens never leave the DAO’s ownership.

Forking and auditing this franchiser contract would be useful for Arbitrum’s version of retroactive delegation (updated version to be posted shortly). Crucially, we view both this proposal (delegating to EH’s retail enfranchisement pool) and the above retroactive delegation proposal (boosting active delegates in the 50k-1m ARB range) as two sides of the same coin of the community’s call for creative ways to boost retail participation and governance decision making processes.

c. Would the community be starting a delegation thread and communicating rationale for its votes?

Given that the community is not 1 individual, this wouldn’t be clear cut. Conversations would be public in our discord (we just yesterday spun up the infrastructure to have each meta-governance proposal get its own forum post in our Discord). We could explore in the future having a community representative aim to summarize these debates as the community grows.

d. Would you apply for the delegate incentive program?

We don’t have any plans to, no.

A final point I want to add is how we view this proposal as fitting into the broader Arbitrum DAO strategy:

A good framing for this proposal is, EH serves as a sort of “delegate bootcamp” whereby small retail participants, enticed by a vote multiple, will finally come out of the woodwork to not only start voting, but to start debating these proposals to make their decision-making process more legible (h/t to @krst for this connection). Once reputation and a moderate delegation is built up, these delegates can get fed through the pipeline into the retroactive delegation program (50k-1m ARB). So both proposals aim to improve the leaky pipeline that is delegate onboarding. I hope this expansion of the overarching vision helps.

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