[DIP v1.6] Delegate Incentive Program Results (July 2025)

[SEEDGov]

Hi @curia

Regarding the feedback provided in the thread, we’d like to point out the following:

1. Echoing Previously Stated Opinions

In your first point, you echo a suggestion that had already been raised by James, and in fact, your comment uses nearly identical wording:

@jameskbh

That said, I’d like to propose a middle-ground approach specifically for the Events Budget:

Instead of dissolving it, I suggest moving the funds under the ATMC balance to generate yield, while earmarking it for future event opportunities.

@Curia

First, we echo the suggestions from @cp0x and @jameskbh regarding the Events Budget. While we understand the challenges with its current structure, we suggest earmarking these funds within the ATMC rather than fully dissolving them

This also happened, in one of the last paragraphs, where you also echoed an opinion already expressed by another delegate:

@Curia

Finally, we support the point raised by @maxlomu regarding the need for a clearer breakdown of responsibilities between the ATMC, AAEs, and the Foundation. As operational roles expand, publishing a simple responsibility map would help DAO contributors and proposers understand where to engage and who to coordinate with across different verticals.

This isn’t necessarily a negative thing, as you’re expressing alignment with points raised by other delegates. However, it doesn’t bring anything new to the discussion.

2. Overlooking an Approved Framework

Your second point seems to overlook the recent approval of the ATMC and its associated framework:

@Curia

Second, as more capital is entrusted to the ATMC, we suggest increased transparency around how these funds will be allocated. While the proposal outlines the general stablecoin strategy, it would be beneficial to explore publishing a lightweight investment framework that includes expected yield ranges, preferred protocol characteristics, and risk parameters. This would help delegates better understand the trade-offs involved and improve overall oversight.

As outlined in the Arbitrum Treasury Management Council - Consolidating Efforts proposal, the DAO has already approved a process where:

If the Council identifies opportunities to generate yield on treasury assets, they will submit a high-level proposal for DAO approval. Once approved, Entropy will be responsible for presenting a more formal and detailed plan to the OAT for final approval.

Expecting a pre-published framework with detailed yield expectations, protocol preferences, and risk parameters contradicts the process that the DAO already ratified.

3. Asking for Clarifications That Were Already Given

@Curia

Third, while we recognize that the OAT plays a key role in oversight, we recommend clarifying how governance and reporting processes will apply to the newly allocated funds. This includes confirming that all fund deployments will be publicly disclosed in the ATMC’s forum thread and that quarterly reporting will be provided with performance data and strategy updates. These practices would support the DAO’s broader push for transparency and operational accountability.

In your third point, you request clarification on something that had already been addressed both in the forum and in the Snapshot proposal:

Entropy is clearly tasked with communicating any new allocations and deployments and is also responsible for providing quarterly reports. These responsibilities are explicitly mentioned both in the forum and in the Snapshot proposal.

4. Repeating Existing Concerns

@Curia

Regarding the unused ADPC Security Subsidies, we suggest exploring whether any unallocated funds could be coordinated with the Arbitrum Foundation’s upcoming security or audit initiatives. If these initiatives are well-defined and mission-aligned, they may represent a more targeted use of capital than passive yield alone.

Your fourth point repeats a concern already raised by MaxLomu, which Entropy later addressed by clarifying that the Arbitrum Foundation has enough funding to carry out the Arbitrum Audit Program initiative.

Conclusion

Despite the length of the feedback and considering the context outlined above, we don’t believe this comment added meaningful value or brought anything new to the discussion, nor did it influence the outcome of the proposal.

As stated in our public report:

‘Curia has built a tool that can help them make an in-depth exploration of data-driven analysis that can help the DAO have a great impact on decision-making. We find this comment as the perfect example of it and will definitely encourage following this path in order to keep achieving the necessary Total Participation to receive compensation.’ What we mean by this is that the right approach for Curia might be to identify a vertical where they truly have the context and expertise required to add value.

That being said, regarding feedback contributions specifically, our suggestion would be to provide feedback when you genuinely feel you can add something new to the conversation. To be frank, this particular comment felt somewhat forced.

One thing that might be helpful is to revisit which of your comments have previously received scoring in the DIP reports. That could give you a better sense of which verticals or discussions you’ve been able to contribute to most effectively.

We hope this feedback proves helpful moving forward.
Best regards,
SEEDGov