Double-Down on STIP Successes (STIP-Bridge)

It’s rather disappointing that you miss that the much bigger problem here is that this proposal only goes through because of the vote of people who will financially directly benefit from it. It’s frankly baffling that people seem to be ok with this. For anyone caring about arbitrum, it should be the top concern

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Thinking quickly, one approach to avoid overburdening the delegates could involve using the LTIPP process, but with faster iterations where advisors can assist in refining proposals and filtering those that met the previous STIP criteria. Then, the council could have a selection phase, similar to the current one but with shorter timelines. In this scenario, protocols wouldn’t need to submit a new proposal; they could use their previous submission and collaborate with advisors on the incentive distribution. The process should be short-lived.

This would be to merge the STIP with the LTIPP and avoid having 2 separate processes.


They voted their proposal in favor :smiley: Maybe good signaling is not tolerated here who knows


First of all thanks to SavvyDAO for the proposal. As ITU blockchain delegation committee we do not support this proposal. The reason for this is simply the same with @tnorm and @pedrob.
The monitoring report of STIP has not been served yet. Also, LTIPP has not started. So this funding method’s success is not proved yet. We also think SavvyDAO failed to adequately defend the proposal since not being responsive enough to previous discussions.

Because of these reasons, we propose an update on this proposal that would also include the other necessary additions based on the outcomes of the previous grant programs in the most optimum way possible. Until then, we are voting against this proposal.


giphy (1)


I’m casting my vote against this proposal, expressing concern over the ongoing trend of DAO dependency. It’s crucial for projects within our ecosystem to evolve organically and foster innovation independently. While moderate support is beneficial, the current model raises questions about sustainability and the over-reliance on grants. I encourage all independent delegates to consider the broader implications of such consistent, significant grants on both the ecosystem’s growth and the ARB token’s stability. It’s essential to explore diverse growth strategies beyond grant dependency.


The Princeton Blockchain Club will be abstaining from the STIP-Bridge vote at this time.

We’ve been mulling over this proposal for a while, and are split over the current implementation details.

The L2 environment continues to get more competitive by the day, so we’ve been voting in favor of funding previous grant and incentive programs. Supporting strong Arbitrum-native teams and incentivizing users to use top protocols on the chain is key.

However, we would like to see more analysis of STIP results before the onchain vote. We might be overspending significantly on ineffective uses of ARB, and would like to make informed decisions in the optimistic voting process.


Michigan blockchain voted against the proposal. We thought that the only major difference between this and the LTIPP was that the LTIPP would not be available to those who participated in the original STIP. The LTIPP does what this program intends to do, and it covers what we did poorly in the STIP. It sounds like we are throwing unnecessary money to keep the funded protocols afloat. Large spending isn’t justifiable only as a way to compete with other L2 protocols and move people to ARB.


Seeing that the Snapshot vote is passing with success, we can refine the next steps for the STIP-Bridge.

I believe this is a good idea, and it will allow to reduce the burden for delegates and add clarity to projects.

First thoughts on what I would like to see in the template:

  • Impact of the STIP: most reports I have seen focus on the outcome of the distribution “1000 $ARB distributed to 100 wallets”. We should focus on a second layer: what were the consequences? What
    value was created? How much was retained after the incentives ran out?

  • Lessons learned: how would you run the program again? What would you change? How can you make it more efficient?

  • Sustainability: will you always need ARB incentives? At what point does your activity become self sustainable


Our delegation voted AGAINST this proposal because, same as others, we’re concerned about how rushed this was and the fact that it feels like taking one step back instead of building on what we could get from the LTIP. Personally, I think that by rushing an incentives program, we risk giving incentives to protocols that might not be used efficiently - this could end up harming innovation throughout the ecosystem, similar to what happens in nations that subsidize certain sectors heavily.

Also, on this:

I simply think it’s always going to be the case - the market is clearly heated and other chains will start launching their tokens; so I don’t think that simply injecting more tokens won’t change this, nor will it really give us much of a competitive advantage vs other ecosystems, since many will be doing the same. What I think we should do is double down on protocols that, through their innovation, will help us compete, and not based on whether they qualified for other incentive rounds.


Thank you for highlighting the pressing need to address the unprecedented competitive pressures facing the Arbitrum ecosystem. The introduction of significant incentive programs by Layer 2 network competitors poses a real threat to our existing protocols.

To maintain our edge, it’s crucial that we leverage operational data to inform targeted funding strategies. Allocating resources where they’re most needed, based on specific user metrics and consumption patterns, will ensure that our projects remain committed to Arbitrum. This proactive approach is essential for sustaining network growth, user engagement, and overall ecosystem stability in such a dynamic market environment.

Moreover, while STIP Bridge is instrumental in retaining these integral projects, it’s essential to emphasize that the true value of Arbitrum isn’t solely reflected in operational metrics or fund allocation. We must also focus on empowering the arb token and enhancing its utility to reinforce the network’s position in the market.

Let’s continue to monitor operational data closely and align funding initiatives with our strategic goals to ensure the continued success of the Arbitrum ecosystem.

UPDATES FOR TALLY PROPOSAL (notes on updates made April 10th):

Feedback from successful Snapshot vote and how it was addressed in the updated proposal.

Concern 1)

We don’t yet have an understanding of which protocols were and were not successful in STIP

Updated Solution

To address this, performance audits have been integrated into the proposal. These audits, conducted by OpenBlock Labs, will provide transparent insights into how effectively protocols utilized their STIP grants.

Concern 2)

The proposed format is too passive and may lead to indiscriminate fund distribution. We need more infrastructure and quality checks.

Updated Solution

We have updated the proposal to include a much more robust infrastructure. First OBL will be providing audits. Second, the advisors from the LTIPP program will be available to work with protocols to improve their incentive mechanisms and determine appropriate amounts of ARB to request from the DAO. Finally, a PM role has been created to help facilitate the program and provide a point of connection between the delegates, advisors, protocol, foundation, and data providers.

Concern 3)

This is the same as STIP we didn’t use what we learned the first time.

Updated solution

This proposal has a few notable differences compared to STIP.

First, this pool of protocols has already been somewhat vetted by the community as they were selected initially. However, they now have had the opportunity to showcase how effectively they can use incentives. The OBL audits along with the data the community will provide will give us more insights into which protocols can successfully use incentives making it easier for delegates to choose which protocols to extend.

Second, STIP was the first time protocols applied for funding and there were strict rules for what they could use the ARB for. This led to many applicants having poor incentive mechanisms as they were unsure how to apply to one of these programs. Now, they will have the opportunity to work with the advisors who helped the LTIPP come up with exciting new incentive ideas. This will help the STIP protocols put forward better applications.

Finally, this program trials optimistic funding. Even with the council in LTIPP, there are still 77 snapshot votes. This is not sustainable for the DAO. This bridge allows us to test an optimistic approach in a more controlled environment to see if it is something we should explore using in the full long-term program

All Updates to the Proposal

  1. Performance audits have been included to give the community a better understanding of how protocols utilized their STIP grants.
  2. The advisors from LTIPP will be assisting Bridge protocols to help answer questions and improve their applications
  3. A program manager has been added.
  4. A small operational budget has been included to onboard the advisors and pm as well as cover any unforeseen costs such as additional audits. As this budget was not included in the original Bridge Snapshot vote, we will not use any of these funds until an additional snapshot is passed that determines how these funds should be used.
  5. More clarity has been added regarding the posting of Addendums
  6. More clarity has been provided on the challenge process and optimistic process
  7. The timeline has been updated
  8. The possibility of extension in case of a delay to the full long-term program

Are all applications expected to be submitted in ARB and not in USD?