[RFC] Incentives Detox Proposal

Proposals
1

The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.

TL;DR

  • We agree that incentives are necessary for the continuous growth of individual protocols but also for the ecosystem as a whole.
  • We propose not to rush into creating another incentive program and to agree on a 3-month break once the current incentive distribution periods conclude.
  • During the break, we should focus on analyzing the results of the previous programs and design a new, long-term one based on what we have learned.
  • Various analyses and reviews have already been conducted; we should focus on connecting the dots and designing the operational parameters of a new program.
  • Existing incentives should continue to be distributed as originally planned; this proposal doesn’t seek to stop any of those.
  • There should be a commitment from delegates not to vote for any program that might be proposed before the 3-month period concludes so we can utilize the full extent of that time frame on iterations and improvements.

Abstract

This proposal seeks the consensus of delegates to temporarily pause incentive programs in Arbitrum for 3 months following the conclusion of LTIPP and STIP Bridge distribution timeframes and utilize that time to structure a perpetual incentives program based on the data and the lessons learned from the programs we’ve had so far.

Motivation

Ever since the first program (Short Term Incentives Program aka STIP), the DAO has been jumping from one program to another without effectively reflecting on the data generated by each program. The STIP Backfund proposal was introduced to fund all the STIP applications that were approved but were not funded because the budget ran out. The distribution for STIP and Backfund incentives was extended to March 2024, while the Long Term Incentives Pilot Program (LTIPP) was introduced in December 2023 and was poised to run from January 2024 to April 2024. Lastly, we had the STIP-Bridge proposal that was meant to mitigate the ‘unfair’ advantage that protocols distributing incentives from LTIPP would have over those distributing incentives from STIP & Backfund after the latter programs had expired.

Anyone who followed the discussions around the different proposals and programs is familiar with the fact that time constraints played a significant role in why we didn’t stop to analyze the data collected and iterate based on that. We needed to maintain momentum and remain competitive with other L2s, especially while the market was overall bullish.

Things have changed over the past few months, and the need for an incentive program that accounts for all the data that we have collected through the past programs has become apparent. Our proposal is a social agreement (we will post a temperature check vote on Snapshot but there will be no on-chain proposal) to use the 3 months following the conclusion of LTIPP and STIP Bridge explicitly to reflect on the learnings, to design & refine a program based on them, as well as on the feedback of key stakeholders.

We know incentives are a vital part of protocol and ecosystem growth in crypto, and we want to help create a perpetual program that leverages incentives in the most efficient way to create the biggest positive impact on the protocols receiving them.

Rationale

There are already hundreds of data points to review, analyze, and ultimately distill into actionable insights on what works and what doesn’t in terms of incentives. From professionally carried out analysis to opinion-article style posts in the forums from stakeholders close to the DAO and the incentive programs themselves, here is a non-exhaustive list of information to use (in chronological order):

Before we embark on another incentive program, we should make an effort to incorporate the culmination of all the learnings from the above posts (and others I might have missed) into the design process.

Specifications

The proposal will be submitted to Snapshot a week after this post is published on the forum. If it successfully passes temp-check, the proposed 3-month break from incentive programs will begin on September 17th, given that LTIPP and STIP Bridge incentive distribution timeframe conclude on September 2nd and September 16th respectively.

Within 2 weeks of a successful temp-check, we will facilitate the revival of the incentives working group and invite delegates, researchers who have conducted analysis, protocol builders, and other relevant stakeholders to participate in the working group.

L2BEAT does not wish to lead the working group, and we’d instead prefer to facilitate its creation and then step back and participate in it as delegates by providing our feedback and opinions. We do commit, however, to remaining active in the working group and helping drive the discussion forward.

Once the working group has been formed, it should regularly meet and work towards designing an incentive program that accounts for as many of the insights we’ve gathered as possible without sacrificing operational efficiency and introducing too many complicated and unnecessary structures.

Steps to implement

  1. This RFC collects feedback and goes to Snapshot.
  2. The proposal passes Snapshot successfully.
  3. We ‘revive’ the incentives working group and invite all relevant stakeholders to participate.
  4. We collectively start designing and refining a long-term incentives program based on all the data we’ve gathered.
  5. On September 17th, the 3-month incentives break period begins.
  6. Ideally, by the conclusion of the 3-months break, we will be able to transform the design into an actionable program that can be submitted to the DAO as a proposal.
  7. [Optional] If 6 doesn’t happen from the working group itself, then we should at least create an overview of principles any future incentive program must take into account in order to be considered by the DAO.

Timeline

The proposed timeline for the incentives detox is 3 months. If involved parties feel that more time is needed to design an incentive program that is as comprehensive as possible, then the timeline can be extended as needed without an additional vote.

Overall Cost

There is no cost associated with the execution of this AIP.

30 Likes
3

Totally agree. This need for standardized reviews for accountability ACROSS programs is often missed in our pluralist grants proposals. Many see it as an unnecessary expense because running a single program or a centralized program does not require this process. While liquidity incentive programs have been funded from outsode the ThankArb and Questbook ecosystem allocation programs, it is no different in regard to this need.

I believe it is effective to pay the person who organizes and catherds through this process. Facillitation is a skill and finding the best outcomes depends on it being done well.

Perhaps you include a 20k ARB payment for 3 months of facilitation. This could be sent to ThankARB and paid weekly with decentralized validation.

Overall, thanks for this proposal. It isn’t easy to push against the current.

8 Likes
4

Hello @Sinkas

As advisors in LTIPP and STIP Bridge, we support 100% this proposal.

We have seen protocols that have managed to retain users and even grow post-incentives, others that without incentives don’t seem to get traction, and some that have even distributed ARB among a few. The important thing is that as a result of these experiences, we can establish clear guidelines both for assigning incentives and for measuring the performance of a campaign.
Just to mention one thing, during LTIPP priority was given to protocols that distribute incentives directly to users. While this makes sense in most cases, some protocols may well generate benefits to the ecosystem without necessarily distributing ARBs directly to their users. An example of this is the Bridges, most of which ended up being guided to propose to subsidize gas, when in reality there are sometimes slippage or solver costs that are significantly higher for the user.
This is why the next program needs a clear, broad, and flexible framework to avoid force distribution mechanisms with little impact. It is also important to establish appropriate monitoring so that timely action can be taken, without which we are limited to taking action when it is too late.

While it is true that incentives are important for the growth of protocols and the ecosystem, this should not imply that the DAO must continually spend funds without obtaining a conclusion (positive or not) from those expenditures.

Even though significant progress has been made with LTIPP, we not only see this ‘detox’ as an opportunity to regroup and launch a robust program that brings together all the lessons learned so far, but will also allow us to assess the retention of both capital and users in sufficient time so that we can conclude whether a protocol or the ecosystem itself grows organically or not after incentives.

SEEDGov is willing to be part of the working group and urges other interested parties to do the same.

1 Like
5

Thanks @Sinkas for putting together this proposal. We largely agree with the sentiment and substance of the proposal.

Reasons to Support:

  • Data Analysis/Impact: It’s imperative to collect liquidity/retention data for STIP/LTIP grantees both before, during, and without incentives to understand how incentives impact adoption and retention. This is especially true for less dominant protocols where the DAO should measure organic retention before expanding grants.
  • Working Group Continuation: It’s been a year since the initial working group began and revisiting incentives program design is long overdue. It’s concerning that discussions, conversations, and ambitions to improve upon existing programs have either a) been relegated to private Telegram chats or b) been abandoned in favor of extensions with marginal improvements.
  • Quality Assurance: We generally would love to see a higher threshold of quality for DAO operations and programs. We think it’s reasonable for delegates to take a stand against poor program design while still supporting Arbitrum builders. The process of hosting “working groups” and “community calls” should not be mistaken as an indicator of quality.

A Few Worries:

  • Perception/Image: We recognize the sentiment that Arbitrum is somewhat vulnerable to PR backlash from competitors hyperbolizing this if it becomes a formal proposal. It’s possible a formal proposal is not entirely necessary here.
  • A delay /= A solution: We see a possibility of getting to the end of three months and Arbitrum projects revert to pushing for more bad programs because “the DAO didn’t do its job”. We would prefer to see higher standards for large incentives proposals rather than an arbitrary time period to halt new programs.
  • Execution: Is a party is responsible for collecting, analyzing, and publishing takeaways during this period? Is this something Entropy, the ARDC, or another entity will oversee?

When the Arbitrum Incentives Working Group was paused, there was interest from multiple parties to continue the working group meeting with rotating leadership. However, we also agree with @DisruptionJoe that this role is best serviced by a paid and directly accountable individual.

2 Likes
6

Hey, thanks for putting this proposal together.

Quick clarification, in the context of the detox, do we mean that this proposal includes any additional non-constitutional incentive proposal that may be posted during the period + the renewal of existing ones?

1 Like
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I support reviewing and improving the grant program into a permanent program.

Your motivation, it seems to me, is correct.

However, it is worth considering gathering a team of delegates to discuss now, rather than waiting until September 17th.

  1. This will give us the opportunity to focus on this program now and not take a 3-month break, which will have a bad impact on the competitiveness of Arbitrum. Thus, the break can only be 1-1.5 months
  2. Taking into account the list of information you listed, there is already a large amount of data for analysis. And by the end of September the final result for LTIPP and STIP will come.

I am ready to take an active part in this group of delegates in working on a permanent incentive program.

2 Likes
8

We believe that it’s somewhat overdue that we have some sort of reevaluation period to let all of our findings on incentives sink in before we pursue other ventures. Especially after finding actors that have misused funds. And given the findings, we think that there might be room to give more explicit recommendations for incentive distribution. It also might be time to revisit what we get out of these incentive schemes beyond user acquisition. 3 months seems to be an ideal amount of time where within we can ideate on what greater structures need to be put in place for program accountability, alongside new compliance rules for incentives issuance based on research.

1 Like
9

I appreciate the L2Beat governance team for putting this proposal together. This is a highly controversial topic, and it’s not easy to be the ones to stick your neck out. After all, who doesn’t like incentives?

Even as someone who spends 100% of their working time dedicated to the Arbitrum DAO, I have admittedly not had the chance to read all of the incentive program analysis materials. Setting aside a dedicated period of time (as suggested in this proposal) to evaluate the efficacy of incentives via a working group is an idea I strongly support. I am 100% in favor of a perpetual incentives program, but it is imperative that we throughouly analyze what has and hasn’t worked over the past 3 incentive programs so we implement an optimal design.

I am excited to partake in these working group calls and look forward to what we can collectively come up with. It may hurt a little bit in the short term, but I feel confident we will look back in hindsight and be thankful for the brief pause being proposed here.

4 Likes
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Thanks, Sinkas and the L2Beat team, I totally agree with this idea. We need to stop giving rewards that don’t really help and focus on supporting projects that actually make Arbitrum better. It’s important to collect and look at data before, during, and after giving rewards to see if they really help. We’ve needed to rethink our reward programs for a while, and this is a great chance to make a solid plan for the future. We should have higher standards for what gets approved and make sure everything we do is of high quality. Taking three months to review everything will help us come up with better rules and plans. I think this proposal is a big step toward making Arbitrum grow in a good way.

1 Like
11

Just a few questions:

Is there a current breakdown of all of the incentives programs being provided or that have been provided that have not been reviewed? Where can that be found if there is such a list?

Are there any current review process in place to determine the success/opportunities of the reward programs?

What are the standards for approval that are in place for each program (if they are different)?

What is the measure of success and how does that relate to the disbursement of rewards?

Thanks!

1 Like
12

We find this proposal to be a well-crafted and strategically important initiative for the Arbitrum ecosystem. It represents a thouhtful approach to how incentive programs are approached, emphasizing the need for analysis and data-driven decision-making.

By devoting more time and resources to analyze past performance and the outcomes garnered, Arbitrum can adopt a more empirical approach to incentive design. This shift towards data-driven strategies is important for the ecosystem’s long-term sustainability and efficiency. The proposed pause and reflection period hence promotes a more sustainable growth model, allowing for the identification of inefficiencies in previous programs and the opportunity to optimize resource allocation in future initiatives.

While the proposed 3-month pause may raise concerns about short-term growth, we believe the long-term benefits of this approach far outweigh any potential temporary slowdown. The insights gained and the improved strategies developed during this period have the potential to catalyze more sustainable and efficient growth in the future.

A more thoughtful approach to incentive design has the potential to improve the retention of both users and liquidity post-incentives, which we deem to be a critical factor for long-term ecosystem health and sustainability, and potentially a meaningful differentiatior.

Overall, we find this proposal to represent a mature, forward-thinking approach to ecosystem development. It effectievely balances the need for continued growth and the importance of strategic planning and efficient resource allocation.

2 Likes
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This is way overdue. Glad to see L2beat initiating this. @Matt_StableLab should defo take part this as the PM or could act as the facilitator since he has a large insight into these programs before we move forward to making the next version of incentives.

1 Like
14

Requires for sure a comment.

Is ok imho to be working on a program, as a collective, that is “better” than previous ones.

I only see one problem which I already stated loud in other communications channels:

  • “better” doesn’t mean anything if we don’t know the specific metric; at the cost of pounding the table, I am really looking for the vision article and temp check from @Entropy; will help us not only in properly sizing future programs and structures, but also to understand how an incentive program can be a facilitator of any vision we decide to have
  • (this comes from the previous experience) whatever design we will choose for the program, we need way more people than the one currently involved working on this, especially on the data analysis side that has to run IN REAL TIME during the program and not only after, and for the “advisors”. Not saying we will have advisors as we had in ltipp and stip.b, but we have seen the benefit of guiding protocols vs leaving them on their own, and I would see renouncing to these figures as a step back and not forward
  • i am strongly convinced we can’t have a one size fit all program; while, likely, bootstrap programs can be subsidized by Questbook, Thrive and Foundation, for incentive program we really need to start making a differentiation. Not all protocols are equal in term of maturity, and that means that protocols with different maturities can drive the ecosystem toward specific kpi(s), or even different ones, in several ways.

Would also like to point out that the LTIPP council, advisors and PM are still working on possible future iterations of the program, even if at a slower pace compared to the initial plan.

Finally, a consideration. This is what was written in the Stip bridge proposal, and was a specific request from delegates who didn’t want to bother on having to do too many discussions at the time of renewal of the program.

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While making a 3 months pause goes in the opposite direction of what was previously stated, even if just as a possibility, I am glad we can take the time to improve the program(s) in a way that make sense for both the DAO, the Protocols and the Users. Our goal is to understand what each of these stakeholders want, and find a common ground.
Let’s make Arbitrum Grant Programs something that other DAOs have never even dreamt of.

1 Like
15

After examining the conversation further, we would like to question the notion of creating a new working group for the DAO to conclude new incentive design/approaches. Our ARDC work has extensively discussed this, and we would like to ask all to review the work already published (we have an included TLDR section for those that are busy). In light of this, we think that it may be somewhat excessive to create a new working group rather than simply taking a break for 3 months, pushing for new treasury management initiatives, and discussing to new incentive compliance rules, etc. Given the work that the ARDC has already done, this might be best left as an ARDC deliverable rather than spawning a new working group.

There is definitely a noticeable uptick in L2 traction from other competitors that we have seen in the past year, with incentive programs being launched as we speak (Linea with its points program, etc). There are also ecosystem players elsewhere that are focusing on other verticals to onboard users (account abstraction, etc) that may be worth incentivizing in some way as well.

Additionally, in reference to a possible perpetual incentive program, it may be better to allocate the feasibility/operational analysis of that to the ARDC and then examine preexisting incentive mechanisms and then issue a new compliance ruleset accordingly. Some other things that we may need to consider is whether there should be some incentive program allocation matching. If a protocol applies for STIP, maybe they should be required to put up some of their capital as well so that the risk is not entirely on the DAO. It might not be best practice for the DAO to completely subsidize activity. Finally, if we are to discuss a perpetual incentive program, it may be time to open a greater conversation on what ArbitrumDAO and Arbitrum receive beyond acquired users.

We have a greater deliverable on our findings with STIP/revenue coming soon, and we will revisit this forum discussion once published. Here’s what we can say right now: there is some evidence that revenue was attributable to STIP, though there should be an operational overhaul regardless.

Here are some of the incentive designs we witnessed and their percentage of STIP allocation:

  • standard liquidity incentives (30% of total allocation)
  • fee rebates (25% of total allocation)
  • points/usage-based programs (12% of total allocation)
  • native token liquidity incentives (8% of total allocaiton)
  • liquidity incentives with long-term locking (8% of total allocation)

STIP Operational Report
Retroactive STIP Analysis

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Arbitrum is a good project and I find that the teams working on this project manage aspects of this type well. This project remains one of the best for creating and establishing a community. For me technically it surpasses many others. The Arbitrum teams manage loyalty very well through token distribution and decentralization programs. This project remains one of my 3 favorites!

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An Update From the LTIPP Workstream

The LTIPP workstream, which consists of the 5 Council members @404DAO, @coinflip (GMX), @GFXlabs, @karelvuong, @WintermuteGovernance, 3 Advisors @CastleCapital, @SEEDGov, @JoJo, and the PM @Matt_StableLab has been meeting and will continue to meet bi-weekly to discuss lessons learned from the ongoing incentives plans and develop a plan for a long-term incentive framework, as per our mandate in the LTIPP proposal.

We acknowledge the change in conditions in the DAO regarding what delegates would like to see concerning the scope and timing of future incentive programs. This post will serve to update the community on where we currently stand and what we believe needs to happen in the DAO before future incentive programs can commence.

Changes We Would Like to See in a Future Program

Creation of a Modular System

While we believe that general incentives are important, a one-size-fits-all incentive program has proven limited in flexibility, duration, and effectiveness. For this reason, we believe the focus of future programs should shift towards multiple smaller objective-based incentive programs running concurrently within the larger incentive infrastructure.

We believe this will bring the following benefits:

  • Allows program rules tailored to a specific protocol type instead of trying to fit everyone into one box.
  • Sub-councils with expertise in a specific objective will lead to more informed decisions about which protocols to fund and will not require a DAO vote for each protocol individually, making the whole process much smoother for protocols and delegates.
  • Allows sub-councils to recommend best practices for protocols to achieve the specified goal and enforce certain restrictions to prevent a race to zero between similar protocols
  • If we have sub-incentive programs that are specifically marketed to a particular audience, marketing becomes more manageable and targeted.
  • It makes the program more adaptable, both in terms of quickly adding new sub-incentive programs for emerging market trends and also allowing us to eliminate incentive strategies that are not working without stopping the entire program.

This modularity might also translate into different incentive programs and further internal differentiations of rules and mechanisms based, for example, on the protocol’s maturity, past achieved results, and other metrics.

Clear Objectives with Clear KPIs

The DAO has never decided what specific goals we are trying to achieve with incentives other than generally growing the Arbitrum Ecosystem. This has made it hard to measure the program’s success and for the council to decide what kind of applicants they should accept. For an overarching incentives framework, we believe it is imperative to have clear objectives so that we can integrate KPIs throughout the program to measure whether we are achieving our goals. This ties in with the definition of Vision, Mission, and Strategy that @Entropy is working on and that we are eager to assess in the optic of having incentive programs as a powerful driver of the above.

Stronger Reporting and Accountability

Since previous incentive programs lacked clear objectives, it can be hard to identify ineffective or malicious actors. In addition to implementing clear KPIs, we envision the establishment of an oversight mechanism to continually evaluate the program’s progress and identify which parts are failing to meet their milestones so adjustments can be made. To accomplish this, we must have live dashboards from the beginning of the incentives and a clear mandate for how we will use this data to alter the incentives framework.

Additionally, a watchdog, on-chain sleuth role is needed to identify any misuse of funds in real-time and present any findings to an oversight council so we can stop these streams as issues arise.

More Emphasis on Marketing

Marketing has never been a part of the program. This led to reduced visibility and awareness of the program from both users and protocols and has stifled our ability to attract new users. The recent addition of the “Rewards” page on the official Arbitrum Portal is a good step towards driving greater awareness. However, we can surely do better to bring more attention to users and protocols. The marketing aspect has to be baked into the proposal to guarantee we have a legitimate marketing strategy bringing users to these incentives.

What Must Happen in the DAO Before the Next Program

A Clear DAO Vision

As a DAO, we need to decide what our goals for the future are. Are we trying to attract the most users, the largest users, new protocols, or existing protocols on other chains? The DAO must reach a consensus on what we are trying to accomplish. This can be achieved either by a team like Entropy or via the DAO as a whole. However, we must have a concrete vision to design a program that works toward this vision accurately. If the DAO cannot produce a complete vision in time for the next program, we must at least have clear objectives the DAO would like to accomplish via incentives so that those overseeing the creation of programs and distribution can properly focus efforts. This will also help us establish clear KPIs and milestones to measure success and hold the incentives program accountable more effectively.

Clarity on How we Can Plug in existing DAO infrastructure into Incentives Programs

Since the last program, the DAO has added the ARDC and is discussing other infrastructure, such as the OpCo. We must figure out how these new additions can best support an incentives program so we can leverage this already-funded talent to support the incentives program with research, analytics, and accountability.

More Data and Analysis Showing What is Working

The LTIPP allowed protocols to experiment more with incentive designs and included the advisor role to help protocols implement exciting new incentive plans. Research into the success of these new designs will be published shortly by OpenBlock and the LTIPP bounties. Additionally, qualitative surveys regarding protocols’ experiences were a part of the STIP.B application. Analyzing this data will be crucial for designing a future program so we can provide recommendations for protocols regarding which mechanisms have been effective in the past.

LTIPP Workstream Plan of Action

We are open to the idea of a detox as we recognize several things must happen before the next program is ready. However, we are unsure if a hard cap on when the following incentive program can start is necessary.

The LTIPP workstream plans to continue designing the basis of a framework for the next incentives program. We want to create the basic structure in the short term so that when additional data and clarity on the topics we mentioned earlier come in, we can easily integrate the findings into the new modular framework.

In the spirit of transparency, we would be happy to start hosting more public calls and encourage feedback from delegates interested in helping with incentives. However, our workstream should continue to drive the design of the next incentives program. Our workstream was elected by the DAO to focus on incentives and is made up of some of the most active members of the community. Working closely with the 100+ active incentives plans has taught us firsthand all the struggles and intricacies required to tackle a large-scale incentives program. Due to this intimate knowledge, we are in the best position to provide the DAO with a clear plan for the future of incentives on Arbitrum.

The end mission for this workstream is to present the DAO with a robust long-term incentive framework that it can implement and benefit from for the foreseeable future.

11 Likes
19

The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.

First of all, we want to thank everyone who has taken the time to read our proposal and provide feedback or express their opinion. To us, an important aspect of the proposal itself is to drive constructive discussion and get as many stakeholders as possible involved in creating a perpetual incentive program.

While we understand the narrative that could emerge should such a proposal go to Snapshot and become ‘formal’, we do not think that the perception will be as negative. If anything, the narrative could be that ‘Arbitrum is working on a perpetual incentives program based on the lessons learned from incentives programs so far’.

Furthermore, the reason we want this to be a Snapshot proposal and not just a type of verbal agreement is that we want it to act as a commitment from delegates and other contributors to participate in the discussion and relevant working group.

The timeline is indeed arbitrary and doesn’t guarantee anything other than that we’ll have a predetermined window of time to focus on moving the needle toward creating a perpetual incentives program. Given that the whole proposal is mostly a social agreement, the timeline can be shorter or longer as needed. The reason we proposed 3 months is that it takes approximately that much to realistically move something in a meaningful way through the governance process.

As noted in the original post, there have already been multiple efforts to collect, analyze, and publish takeaways from the different incentive programs so far. Our opinion of what the working group should do now is to focus on discussing those takeaways and distilling the insights into an actionable program.

Correct, the detox is about any and all incentive programs/proposals, be it new ones, or the renewal of existing ones.

The goal, as stated in the proposal, is to put together the working group if and when this proposal passes. We’re planning on going to Snapshot on Thursday 1st of August, which means that if the proposal garners the necessary support, we’ll start gathering the working group on August 8th - more than a month before LTIPP/STIP-Bridge end.

The proposed break from incentives will give us an opportunity to take things like that into account when creating a future perpetual program. With quantitative data now in hand, we can shift our discussion on interpretation of that data from a qualitative standpoint.

We’d be happy for the existing incentives working group to lead this discussion, but it seems that it has become inactive after the last incentive programs (LTIPP/STIP-Bridge) were introduced. A testament to that is that they didn’t engage with our post sharing our thoughts on a perpetual incentives program. Furthermore, even if they are active, they do not seem to interface as much as we feel is needed with the DAO. Instead, if the group is indeed active, they operate behind closed doors.

As far as the ARDC is concerned, there’s simply not enough time to undertake leading the conversation around the creation of a perpetual incentives program, given that the ARDC’s mandate concludes at the start of October (if not sooner because of the situation around funding). The ARDC has carried out a lot of research that the working group can refer to, and perhaps it can remain involved until it concludes.

Our idea for reviving the working group was that we’d facilitate its kickstart, and then someone else would take the lead while we remain involved in our capacity as delegates. Our main concern is making the working group open & transparent, and enabling more people to get involved in different relevant areas.

L2BEAT Office Hours

We’re more than happy to discuss this proposal further during our Arbitrum Office Hours this Thursday 1st of August at 3pm UTC in this link.

2 Likes
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Hello, my cents:

This is a really needed time to reflect about the previous programs and dive into the data. However, I see some comments questioning the detox duration.

IWould be possible to create the snapshot with different options, so we can gauge which one is preferred? These are also arbitrary numbers, but bearing in mind that one month would be too short, I suggest having:

2 months
3 months
4 months
No Detox

That way, there is an option for those wanting a shorter or a longer period. And make it sure that after this period, there is a proposal, even if it is: No changes in the current setup (steps 6 and 7 of your proposal). Not really a fan of extending it without an additional vote.

1 Like
21

Blockworks Research is voting FOR this proposal on Snapshot.

We deeply agree with the sentiment found in this proposal which is that we need to overhaul our incentives and review over prior material and results found over the last few months. Additionally, we would like to say our door is open for teamwork to explore possible designs and compliance methods. As stated by other delegates in discussions elsewhere, it might be best to do a presentation on the results found in prior work with ARDC materials, STIP, and LTIP so that the greater delegate-base has an understanding of what is occurring.

Furthermore, we would like to bring a general question to all delegates which is what should we be looking at acquiring from these incentive programs beyond users (short term and long term) and we would like to open a question of whether there’s room for involvement with Arbitrum Orbit chains.

2 Likes
22

I fully support this proposal. The rationale behind it is solid—taking a deliberate pause to analyze and optimize future incentive programs based on comprehensive data and stakeholder feedback ensures that resources are used effectively. This approach aligns with long-term ecosystem growth and sustainability.