Funding Proposal for LTIPP Protocol Cohort after Council Feedback

Abstract

This proposal seeks to allocate additional funding to a select Cohort of Protocols that, despite not advancing beyond the screening phase of the LTIPP program, have demonstrated:

  • An innovative approach to DeFi with new products and new use cases
  • Sustainable vaults/activities where incentives can be used to accelerate growth
  • Potential to the Arbitrum ecosystem as all protocols are deeply integrated on the L2
  • Flexibility by addressing the feedback provided by the council.

The sum of the proposals requests a total of 942,000 ARB - which is within the unallocated budget of 18.5M ARB from the total 45M ARB designated for the LTIPP program.

This strategic funding initiative aims to integrate these capable Protocols into the LTIPP program, bypassing the need for a comprehensive new proposal and review cycle requiring significant resources and time.

This proposal addresses the absence of a formal mechanism for Protocols to utilize the council’s feedback in the LTIPP program. By funding projects with strong fundamentals that have responded well to the DAO council’s insights, it adheres to the LTIPP’s original specifications and timelines. This ensures efficient resource allocation and enables protocols to contribute to Arbitrum’s advancement through the LTIPP.

For further details on the LTIPP program and application process, please refer to the following link: LTIPP How To Apply FAQ

Joint Effort

This proposal, developed collaboratively by representatives from Connext, D2 Finance, Smilee, and Yearn (hereafter also referred to as “the group”), aims to enhance the Arbitrum ecosystem through participation in the Long-Term Incentive Proposal Program (LTIPP). The LTIPP seeks to address three main issues identified in the Short-Term Incentive Program (STIP):

  1. The excessive burden on delegates.
  2. The lack of substantial feedback for protocols on their proposals.
  3. The stringent restrictions on incentive mechanisms.

While the first issue was effectively mitigated through the diligent (and mighty) efforts of advisors and an initial council screening process, the second issue’s underlying causes were not addressed, merely shifted to the screening phase. Consequently, protocols were disqualified from the voting process without the opportunity to incorporate or respond to feedback from the DAO Council.

The group proposal provides a compelling pathway for including these proposals in the LTIPP voting round.

Protocols Included and Feedbacks addressed

The LITPP Council screening round rationale can be found here: LTIPP Council Feedback - Google Docs

Following the guidance from the LTIPP next steps as noted below

“Should the DAO feel an application that was rejected by the council should be funded, any delegate with sufficient voting power (500K ARB) may post a snapshot requesting to fund said applicant just like they would any other DAO proposal.”

Table 1.

Connext - Request 417,000 ARB (prev. 540, 000)

Summary of Feedback:

  • Incentives should go more towards users
  • Lack of benchmarking with other bridging projects to justify LP requests

Grant Request Size Modification

Connext has already brought more than $250m in LRTs to Arbitrum via our innovative Native Restaking Module. We know we are on the right track and want to further push Arbitrum as a lead in this area.

Our priority remains to attract more users to bridge into Arbitrum and Restake ETH on the L2.

In order to provide the best experience, we can incentivize users by subsidizing part of the bridging fees, and this will further boost the utilization of our pools which will increase our ETH TVL. Higher TVL enables us to provide the best pricing when the Restaking module is used.

Incentivizing users to bridge into Arbitrum has 2 benefits:

  1. We can help more users bridge away from mainnet fees, onboarding them permanently onto Arbitrum
  2. It helps to rebalance the AMM pool, as the restaking activity tends to unbalance the pool in the opposite direction. Having a balanced pool means that users restaking ETH don’t incur a negative price impact.

Following the Council’s feedback, we decided to:

  • Remove the request of liquidity incentivization for our routers and LPs, and shift focus towards our users as requested by the Council.

  • Refund 95% of the fees to the users bridging into Arbitrum, up to 13bps. Fees vary depending on the origin chain (from mainnet it’s 9bps, from other L2s, 13bps) so only the actual fees incurred will be refunded.
    Gas fees will only be subsidized to users who are onboarding to Arbitrum (from any other network), and users exiting Arbitrum will not get subsidized.

  • This aligns fully with requests from other players in the space like Across, Hop, deBridge who saw their LTIPP request fully approved.

Our estimate (according to the average of the last 7 days at the time of writing the original proposal) is for users to bridge 137k ETH during the pilot program.

Bridging fee rebate: 137,000 * 3600 (ETH price) * 0.0013 (max fee) * 0.95 = $609,000

Tot: $609,000

ARB (priced @ 1.46): 417,000

The Connext team agrees to return to the Arbitrum DAO any unused ARB funds once the 12 week LTIPP program is concluded


D2 Finance - Request 100,000 ARB (prev. 195,000)

Summary of Feedback:

1. Addressing the “Spike” in Metrics and Achieving Stickiness

Delegate’s Concern: Metrics spikes and concerns over user retention and liquidity stickiness post-incentivization.

D2 Response: The observed ‘spike’ in D2 Finance’s trading metrics during late February was not related at all with GMX grant or lack of organic volume, simply the vaults were not in trading epoch (only small helper vaults like Lyra ++ were trading).

Specifically, the temporary cessation of trading activities for our ETH++ and RODEO++ vaults from February 23rd until March 8th was aligned with broader operational objectives, including refining our application for the Arbitrum DAO grant, enhancing our front-end interface, and bolstering our trading team with experienced hires, such as a new Chief Risk Officer.

It’s noteworthy that during this interlude, we maintained a 100% retention rate for ETH++, underscoring the deep trust our users place in our protocol’s direction and management.

Our trading strategies have generated $11 mil of organic volume through more than 19 protocols in the Arbitrum ecosystem + $12 mil volume in Lyra alone for a total of $23 mil real volume through the Arbitrum ecosystem as of today.

2. Lack of Information on ARB++ Vault Strategy

Delegate’s Concern: Insufficient details were provided on the actual strategy employed by the ARB++ vault.

D2 Response: The ARB++ vault employs a strategy that maintains delta exposure ranging from 20% to 60% of ARB, designed to navigate market conditions efficiently while minimizing downside volatility while keeping ARB upside. ARB++ acts as a natural buyer in “market dumps’ ’ hence if ARB++ achieves reasonable TVL, it can work as a shock absorber for the ARB ecosystem. Example of last week trading in GMX for ARB++:

In our ongoing efforts to maintain transparency and foster understanding of our strategic initiatives, D2 Finance regularly publishes detailed communications about our trading strategies and vault operations.

For example, our Medium article on the launch of the ARB++ vault (which was included in the proposal) shows a detailed breakdown of the strategy.

The medium offers an in-depth look at the underlying mechanics and strategic objectives of this particular financial instrument. This level of detail is a testament to D2 Finance’s commitment to transparency and aligns with our goal to deliver long-term, risk-adjusted performance to our investors.

3. Concerns Over TVL and Reward Distribution

Delegate’s Concern: The grant size exceeds current TVL and concerns over ARB rewards benefiting a small group of users. Current TVL = $350,000, Original Grant Request 195,000 ARB (~$288,600)

D2 Response: The decision to cap TVL in D2 is a deliberate security measure, ensuring the vault’s integrity and performance could be maintained without compromising user assets. This cautious approach reflects D2 Finance’s commitment to security and its strategic plan for controlled growth.

It’s important to note, this TVL is purposefully capped by D2 Finance until our DAO vote to enable deposits via our front end. This is set to happen prior to LTIPP grant streaming and will facilitate exponential growth of D2 Finance TVL based on current demand and commitments for our products

D2 will be reducing our request from 195,000 ARB to 100,000 ARB putting the TVL/Grant ask well in line with those protocols who passed the screening round

That’ said if you compare to claiming ARB concentrations vs OpenBlock Labs we have displayed a decent distribution in comparison

4. Justification for Requested Grant Size and Expected Native Yield

Delegate’s Concern: The requested grant size was ambitious, and the expected native yield of the strategy vault wasn’t considered, which could offset the need for the amount of ARB requested.

D2 Finance Response: D2 Finance’s approach to generating native yield is deeply rooted in sophisticated active trading strategies, similar to those utilized by market makers and asset management firms. These strategies are inherently subject to market volatility and are designed to capitalize on this volatility to achieve a positive expected value (EV) over the long term. Thus we do not provide estimates on base yield at the start of an epoch; instead, our yield is dynamically generated based on the performance of our active trading strategies.

The request for a sizable grant from the Arbitrum DAO is timed with the release of the new FE, ensuring that the grant distribution process will be streamlined and accessible to a wider range of users, moving beyond the current limitations of depositing solely through Arbiscan for compliance reasons which required limited TVL up to now. With that friction removed we believe we can have exponential growth, in part facilitated through the grant.

Such strategic foresight is vital for a growing operation like D2 Finance. The initial phases of our strategy’s implementation play a pivotal role in shaping market perception and bolstering user confidence.

Grant Request Size Modification

D2 Finance is committed to growth and sustainability within the ecosystem and open to feedback from the council. As such we would amend our grant ask as follows:

  • Current TVL = $350,000 (DeBank | The Web3 Messenger & Best Web3 Portfolio Tracker)
  • Its important to note, this TVL is purposefully capped by D2 Finance until our DAO vote to enable deposits via our front end. This is set to happen prior to LTIPP grant streaming and will facilitate exponential growth of D2 Finance TVL based on current demand and commitments for our products
  • Therefore we are reducing our request from 195,000 ARB to 100,000 ARB putting the TVL/Grant ask in line with those protocols who passed the screening round

Outside the periods when the vaults were closed, we observed an organic and accelerating trend in volumes even spread out in different weights between different protocols, which correlates with the available market opportunities.

Based on a simple regression analysis of historical data, our milestones are not only achievable but also conservative, especially when considering Lyra’s trading volumes, which are not reflected in Dune data.

Therefore, D2 Finance update our request to 100,000 ARB


Smilee Finance - Request 125,000 ARB (prev. 150,000)

Summary of feedback received (excluding who voted yes):

  • GMX: Expresses reservations regarding the proposal due project maturity, performance metrics, and grant size relative to current status.
  • KAREL: Suggests resubmitting the proposal in a later grants window with a reduced ask after demonstrating greater traction.
  • GFX: Argues against financing fee subsidies to a grantee, citing the finite nature of grants funding.

Smilee Protocol launched shortly before the LTIPP application program but lacked a proper tracking tool to demonstrate performance and traction. As of today, Smilee has been live for less than a month (with one week of trading paused for redeploying new smart contracts) and has achieved the following performances:

  • Total Value Locked (TVL): $2M (increased cap from $2M to $3M on April 11, 2024)
  • Trading Volumes: $10M
  • Premium: Approximately $40K for Liquidity Providers (LPs)
  • Unique users: 154

Detailed performance metrics can be viewed at:

In response to feedback from the Council and recent performance trends, we propose resubmitting the application with a reduced grant amount. This adjustment will fully offset all incentives for the trading fee rebate. Setting the new grant request at 125K ARB, we will implement the following incentive scheme:

  • Grow Smilee TVL from $2M to $5M.
    • Incentives APR = ~16%
    • USD Equivalent of Earn Incentives = 185K USD (Assuming ARB Price of 1.46$)
    • ARB Equivalent of Earn Incentives = 125K ARB
  • Trading boost incentives = 0 ARB

Therefore, Smilee Finance update our request to 125,000 ARB


Yearn - Request 300,000 $ARB

Summary of feedback from votes against:

  • Very little activity and TVL on Arbitrum today
  • No milestones over the 12 weeks
  • Lack of net-new in-flows to Arbitrum

Responses:

  • Very little activity and TVL on Arbitrum today
    • Back when the $ARB token went live, the pool of up-only Yearn strategy possibilities was very small on Arbitrum. We were only able to make strategies that had no exposure to IL, could take large deposits with little slippage, and were essentially lossless. DeFi activity on Arbitrum was booming, but did not align with these prerequisites.
    • Today we’re in a much better position. We’ve released Vaults V3 that allows us to open up Yearn strategies to a new spectrum of risk. In the past 30 days we’ve released 21 new vaults and strategies, with most of those coming out in the past 7 days. The next stage is for us is to kick start adoption through our social and partner channels.
  • No milestones over the 12 weeks
    • We’ll divide incentives equally over 12 weeks and stream rewards for APY boosting immediately along with a push in socials to drive adoption.
    • We propose the following milestones with the understanding that we may not receive the next stage of incentives if we do not cross the goal TVL:
      • Weeks 1-4
        • Goal: $10 million
      • Weeks 5-8
        • Goal: $20 million
      • Weeks 9-12
        • Goal: $30 million
  • Lack of net-new in-flows to Arbitrum
    • This is a valid concern as there are two farms we have in common with another existing Arbitrum project. We will omit Stargate, Curve, and Compound strategies from boosting.
    • We will focus on net-new strategies to Arbitrum that will grow:
      • Pendle Penpie strategies
      • Silo lending liquidity
        • Since the submission of this original proposal, we’ve engaged Silo to onboard to Juiced Vaults with the goal of net-new in flows to Arbitrum.
      • Ajna lending liquidity
      • Gamma LP strategies
      • wstETH leveraged strategy using Aave and WETH as debt

Overall Cost

The total cost to implement the AIP Proposal

942,000 ARB

A change from 26,414,599 ARB to 27,356,5599 ARB, still well within the overall allocation of 45,000,000 ARB designated for the LTIPP program.

Given the innovative approach, sustainability, and contributions to the Arbitrum ecosystem demonstrated by the Cohort of Protocols, additional funding is not just an investment but a strategic decision. These protocols have showcased not only the capacity to create novel DeFi products and use cases but also the flexibility to adapt and evolve based on feedback. By accelerating their growth through targeted funding, we can significantly enhance the net benefits to the entire Arbitrum landscape, driving broader adoption and long term value. Thus, supporting this cohort is an opportunity to fuel pivotal developments at a stage that is set to benefit all Arbitrum stakeholders.

**** These comments are my own and are not on behalf of the GMX Grants Committee or LTIPP Council that it is a member of ****

While i respect the proposal, 12 hours after posting it and with zero feedback pushing it to a snapshot vote I think was rash and not helpful.

https://snapshot.org/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xb35eccd2bdf5ba7a542f5bfa51569778bca7ff3127e0e5e7694b195a204e5488

While i want to vote for many of these proposals especially with the thoughtful amendments, being forced to vote for them all or none is personally a non-starter and i’ll be voting against this proposal. Both in LTIPP and STIP.b each protocol and each proposal stands on its own individual merit, why should these four protocols be different?

Also multiple protocols on this list are aware work is ongoing to provide the DAO delegates with an orderly process to be able to review proposals that did not secure the support of the council, making the decision to rush this to snapshot all the more puzzling.

Do hope you reconsider the rush to snapshot, but respect your right to push forward the choice is yours.

Thanks for the feedback @coinflip

We were working on (incorrect) understanding this was the pathway to proceed

We have removed the snapshop and will seek guidance from the program administrator direct for next steps in the LTIPP process

Thanks for your inputs

This opinion reflects the one of @SEEDGov as a participant in the DAO and should not be considered part of its role as an Advisor for the LTIPP. Additionally, for what it’s worth we were not Advisors for any of these applications during the feedback period.

Connext - Request 417,000 ARB (prev. 540, 000)

Context: The Council voted with 2 “yes” and 3 “no” responses.

Positive aspects highlighted by the Council:

  • Benefits of supporting LST/LRTs on Arbitrum.
  • Strong team with a solid background.
  • KPIs and Milestones are adequate for the grant required.

Negative aspects highlighted by Council members:

  • Grant size justification.
  • Distribution mechanism: It was recommended to incentivize end users (bridging costs) rather than LPs.

Interestingly, the 6 months lock-up was fine for a Council member, but not fine for another.

What Connext is proposing is to modify the distribution mechanism by focusing incentives on covering the gas costs for bridging, specifically targeting 100% of users coming from other networks to Arbitrum. Moreover, it estimates this cost based on user activity seven days before submitting the original proposal.

Here are some suggestions that we think could strengthen the proposal:

1- Include a dashboard showing the bridging costs to Arbitrum for the past 30 days to justify the volume and thus the estimated amount. The data from the seven days prior to the application provides a valid sample, but expanding this period could offer more comprehensive data.

2- Estimate the required amount in ARB not based on its USD value (which has proven to be very volatile), but rather on its value in ETH. Since the cost of bridging gas is in ETH, it would be more stable to estimate the ARB cost in ETH (over the last year, the cost of ARB has fluctuated between 0.034 and 0.038 ETH, which is much less volatile than its cost in USD).

3- Adjust your milestones in a separate publication to align with the newly requested amount in order to be possible for a delegate to move the proposal to Snapshot.

D2 Finance - Request 100,000 ARB (prev. 195,000)

Context: The Council voted with 2 “yes” and 3 “no” responses.

Positive aspects highlighted by the Council:

  • Clear in its KPIs, milestones, and goals.
  • Composability
  • Arbitrum alignment

Negative aspects highlighted by Council members:

  • Justification of the grant size
  • Grant size > TVL
  • Distribution mechanism
  • Uncertainty of the potential results considering the low history of the protocol
  • Considering what happened after GMX grant ended (activity drop), lack of users stickiness.

D2 Finance has provided explanations about the operations of their ETH++, RODEO++, and ARB++ vaults, stating that the decision to maintain a capped TVL is for security reasons, and proposes nearly a 50% reduction in size.

D2 Finance is a native protocol on Arbitrum, notable for its degree of composability with innovative trading and yield strategies that add value to Arbitrum.

Here are two comments that could strengthen the proposal:

  • Include new charts on the performance of the ++ vaults since they stopped receiving incentives (from the GMX grant) to date, to bolster the explanation in point 4.
  • Move the publication to a separate document and adjust the milestones according to the new requested amount.

Smilee Finance - Request 125,000 ARB (prev. 150,000)

Context: The Council voted with 1 “yes” and 3 “no” responses.

Positive aspects highlighted by the Council Members:

  • Innovation / uniqueness

Negative aspects highlighted by Council members:

  • Grant size / TVL + project lifetime

  • Lack of KPIs and sufficient data

  • Distribution mechanism

Echoing the Council’s feedback, Smilee Finance includes a dashboard with metrics showing a TVL of nearly $2M as of this post, although this amount is similar to that evaluated by the Council when considering the high ask. Additionally, they have decided to remove the section of the proposal dedicated to fee rebates and focus their request on APR incentives for liquidity providers (LPs):

I believe that with the explanations provided and the adjustment in the amount, it is possible to address some of the Council’s concerns, although others still remain:

1- Despite increasing the TVL cap to $3M on April 11th, the current TVL remains the same.

2- The traction of unique users is quite limited, raising doubts about the effectiveness of distributing incentives to a few users.

3- Given the young age of your protocol, it is likely that the liquidity of the pools you wish to incentivize is provided by your team. I would like to see a disclosure of this situation and a plan to prevent yourselves from farming the rewards.

4- I recommend publishing the proposal in an independent publication and setting new milestones according to the new amount requested.

5- Regarding point 4, I recommend setting an APR cap (15% is mentioned in the form) and fixing the distribution of incentives with conditions for milestone compliance.

Yearn - Request 300,000 ARB

Context: The Council voted with 2 “yes” and 3 “no” responses.

Positive aspects highlighted by the Council Members:

  • Strong team and great usage on other chains.
  • Clear milestones and execution plan.
  • Grant matching with the ARB airdrop they received.

Negative aspects highlighted by the Council Members::

  • Lack of users / TVL in Arbitrum
  • Distribution mechanism
  • Justification of the grant size
  • Concerns over what type of users they are attracting (Arbitrum already existing users rather than other chain ones).

Given Yearn’s reputation and its performance on other chains, there have been no questions regarding the amount requested, but there were concerns about execution given the limited activity they currently have on Arbitrum.

They provided valid responses about the new vaults and investment strategies that were recently launched, which offer attractive options for both Arbitrum users and users from other chains looking to move their liquidity to this network. I believe the explanations provided and the new milestones set address some of the Council’s concerns, although I leave my recommendations to strengthen the proposal should it advance to Snapshot:

1- Provide details (including the contract address) of the pools/vaults you wish to incentivize, and how much of the ARB you will allocate to each. If flexibility is needed due to market fluctuations, detail the objective parameters for their selection.

2- Considering your low TVL at this moment, commit to a cap on the APR percentage for each of those pools/vaults to ensure that ARB is not distributed excessively among a few users / TVL if milestones are not met. In this regard, commit to release more ARB conditioned to meeting the milestones.

3- Share in an independent publication the pools to be incentivized and the commitment on the APR percentage conditioned on meeting the milestones.

Final comments

I hope all comments serve as feedback to improve your applications. Of course, if you feel your applications are good as they are, there’s no need to do anything. This is an opinion, and adhering to it does not guarantee the support of the delegates.

I suggest all applicants to move their proposals to a unique and individual post to allow any delegate who supports it to move that proposal to Snapshot within the defined time frame. The explanation of how was provided by the Program Manager:

Finally, check the deadline:

1 Like

hi @pedrob, please find here below some clarifications on your feedback.

1-Despite increasing the TVL cap to $3M on April 11th, the current TVL remains the same.

Please note that market performances influenced negatively our TVL. Even though we haven’t yet disclosed future incentives, our TVL increased by 18% in a period of market crash (data as of 21st of April). Below a detail:

source: https://defillama.com/protocol/smilee-finance#tvl-charts

It’s also worth noting that in the same period, Arbitrum TVL moved from $3.07bn+ to $2.69bn ( i.e. -12%).

2-The traction of unique users is quite limited, raising doubts about the effectiveness of distributing incentives to a few users.

We have done $13M+ in notional volumes with 164 unique traders, (excluding LPs). This has been achieved in less than one month, considering a week of paused trading due to contract migrations. Would you mind quantify what is considered “few” to help me to better understand your targets and benchmarks?

3-Given the young age of your protocol, it is likely that the liquidity of the pools you wish to incentivize is provided by your team. I would like to see a disclosure of this situation and a plan to prevent yourselves from farming the rewards.

The team has deployed ~$10K of liquidity, just to track TVL performances and PnL, and as agreed it will be excluded from the grant program scheme since it’s done via the disclosed wallets.

That said, as we stated multiple times in both the proposal and the public conversations with our advisor in the LTIPP Discord, all the TVL comes from our partners and community members that joined the Genesis Pool program. All this is verifiable on-chain:

4- I recommend publishing the proposal in an independent publication and setting new milestones according to the new amount requested.
Noted, thanks.

5- Regarding point 4, I recommend setting an APR cap (15% is mentioned in the form) and fixing the distribution of incentives with conditions for milestone compliance.
Noted. Setting the 15% APR implies changing the proposal with an ask amount to 143,800 ARB (arb price at 1.2$).