GMC's Preferred Choices for 7,500 ETH RFP

Summary [Updated on March 14, 2025]

On December 21 2024, the Arbitrum DAO voted in favour of establishing two committees - the Treasury Management Committee (TMC) and the Growth Management Committee (GMC), who were tasked with spearheading treasury management efforts involving 25M ARB and 7,500 ETH, respectively, within the ArbitrumDAO’s treasury.

This proposal presents GMC’s preferred allocation choices with accompanying risk assessments performed by LlamaRisk. After assessing all 45 applications, the GMC is proposing to allocate 5,000 ETH to Lido to be staked for wstETH, and deposit this 5,000 wstETH into Aave V3 on Arbitrum to act as liquidity for LST/LRT looping, and lastly, lend 2,500 ETH on Fluid to support ETH based DEX and lending liquidity.

Objectives

As highlighted in the original Treasury Management V1.2 proposal, the purpose of the Growth Management Committee (GMC) was to provide a path for the Arbitrum Foundation to deploy 7,500 ETH from the DAO’s treasury to achieve 2 things:

  1. Generate low-risk yield on otherwise idle ETH
  2. Spur ecosystem growth

Moreover, given this is the DAO’s first tranche of funds, we really wanted to ensure the DAO starts with a really strong and stable foundation, while securing key partnerships from the very beginning. Thus, we focused on selecting extremely high quality partners with low risk strategies that allowed the DAO’s funds to maximize its reach and impact within the Arbitrum ecosystem.

GMC’s Preferred Allocations

Total Allocation: 7,500 ETH

Number of Allocations: 4

Allocation 1:

Protocol: Lido

Allocation Amount: 5,000 ETH

Basic Strategy Description: Deposit and stake 5,000 ETH with Lido to receive wstETH

Expected Benefit(s):

  • 3.20% ETH/stETH yield (30D Avg.)
  • Highly liquid & composable receipt token that can be extended across other applications (wstETH)
  • 20% “Reward Share” from Lido’s Reward-Share Program, effectively giving the DAO a higher yield on our ETH deposits into Lido

Allocation 2:

Protocol: Aave

Allocation Amount: 4,200 stETH (in wstETH) [Previously 5,000 ETH]

Basic Strategy Description: Supply 4,200 stETH (in wstETH) to Aave V3 on Arbitrum to encourage LRT borrowing against wstETH in collaboration with Lido, Aave, Renzo, and Kelp

Expected Benefit(s):

  • 3.20% ETH/stETH yield (30D Avg.) + est. Aave wstETH supply yield of 0.62% + 0.82% in wstETH deposit incentives
  • Additional incentive programs from Lido, Aave, Renzo, and Kelp, to drive wstETH, ezETH, and rsETH deposits to Aave V3 and more generally Arbitrum. This should also hopefully increase supply rates for wstETH on Aave
  • Allows the DAO to repurpose funds from Allocation 1 (wstETH) to further improve the DeFi ecosystem while accessing a higher yield

Further Details Regarding Incentives:

In cooperation with Lido, an incentive program to grow wstETH deposits on the Aave Arbitrum instance has been designed.

The incentive program consists of three 30-day phases, each with increasing targets and budgets to encourage sustained growth in wstETH deposits on Aave. After 90 days this program will be reassessed and may be renewed. For each phase, the reward mechanism operates in two modes:

  1. When deposits are below the target: Depositors earn a fixed 0.82% APY.
  2. When deposits exceed the target: The daily reward amount is distributed pro-rata among all depositors.

The program features a 15% Month-over-Month growth target with an expanding budget to support continued growth in wstETH deposits on the Arbitrum Aave instance.

Period (Days) Budget (wstETH) Fixed APY Deposit Target Daily Reward
0-30 36.23 0.82% 53,014.48 1.191
31-60 41.66 0.82% 60,956.66 1.389
61-90 47.91 0.82% 70,111.66 1.597

Renzo

Renzo is to provide 0.30% yield in REZ to users who deposit ezETH distributed every 30 days , provided certain conditions are upheld.

Kelp

Kelp is to provide x2 KERNEL points to users who deposit rsETH. These rewards will be claimable during Kernel’s TGE. Whilst the point yield is speculative, it does provide an alternative to Renzo’s governance token derived yield.

Incentives

This strategy benefits directly from the Lido wstETH deposit incentives, and will indirectly benefit from the Renzo and Kelp deposit incentives.

Reward Type Value Rewards to who Benefits treasury funds?
wstETH Deposit Rewards 0.82% APY wstETH depositors Directly
KERNEL Points x2 Points rsETH depositors Indirectly
REZ Tokens 0.3% APY ezETH despositors Indirectly

Expected Returns

Based upon our modelling of the effects of the upcoming incentive programs and some minor Aave parameter adjustments which are planned, we expect wstETH deposits to generate the following returns:

Source Yield (APY)
Lido staking rewards 3.10%
Aave protocol yield 0.62%
wstETH deposit incentives 0.82%
Total yield 4.54%

Allocation 3:

Protocol: Fluid

Allocation Amount: 2,500 ETH

Basic Strategy Description: Lend 2,500 ETH on Fluid’s Arbitrum platform

Expected Benefit(s):

  • 1%-2% native ETH yield
  • Support the growth of Fluid’s highly capital efficient DEX and lending protocol by providing ‘sticky’ ETH liquidity for users to borrow
  • Due to Fluid’s design, every $1 of ETH we lend, the Arbitrum ecosystem can benefit from up to $39 in liquidity
  • Provide necessary liquidity to increase caps and onboard more LSTs and LRTs to Fluid’s Arbitrum instance

[Added as of March 14, 2025] Allocation 4:

Protocol: Camelot - Updated submission can be found here

Allocation Amount: 800 stETH

Basic Strategy Description: Deposit 800 stETH (as wstETH) as single sided liquidity into the wstETH/ETH liquidity pool on Camelot V3.

Expected Benefit(s):

  • Earn 2.56% APY from wstETH yield, trading fees, & xGRAIL (30D Avg.)
  • Allows the DAO to repurpose funds from Allocation 1 (wstETH) to further improve sticky DeFi liquidity

A risk Assessment (LlamaRisk) finds that risks include liquidity concentration risk and smart contract risk.

Note: The decision to provide single-sided wstETH liquidity came from discussions with and detailed analysis by the Camelot team, as they are aware of the difficulties associated with the DAO and the Arbitrum Foundation actively managing a concentrated LP position. Nonetheless, the strategy still successfully improves wstETH liquidity on Camelot and the Arbitrum ecosystem as a whole.

Justification

The GMC was impressed by the quality of inbound applications from protocols across many different verticals (full list can be in a subsequent section of this post). While the GMC wanted to venture further down the risk curve in order to increase yield, help bootstrap up and coming protocols, bolster Arbitrum native/aligned protocols, among other desires, it determined that a strong/conservative foundation for the DAO’s treasury strategy made the most sense until the DAO becomes more capable of actively managing positions.

For example, many proposals included LRT-based strategies. While the GMC did want to encourage the growth of LRTs, we did not think the direct exposure to LRTs was appropriate for the first tranche of fund deployments. Instead, we chose a sector that indirectly benefits LRTs by deepening wstETH liquidity to enable LRT looping strategies. In a different example to help explain the rationale behind our preferred choices, many applications included vote-locked/escrowed tokens as a portion of the yield, but it’s difficult to envision how these reward tokens would be managed in practice. A large number of applicants requested the DAO take on leveraged positions, which would require active management to manage liquidation risk. We also received applications from centralized entities, but felt the allocation would be most beneficial for the Arbitrum ecosystem if given to protocol applications that indirectly benefit a variety of other protocols on Arbitrum.

Lido, Aave, and Fluid represent safe applications that achieve conservative yield and strongly support ecosystem growth. Lido has offered a strong concession in its 20% reward share to the DAO, and has proven to be an essential protocol across a number of DeFi ecosystems. Many protocols on Arbitrum would benefit from a larger supply of wstETH on the network, and by partnering with Lido, we are able to achieve this and form a long-term relationship with a protocol that has made critical contributions to the Ethereum ecosystem. Aave falls in this camp as well, it is a well-established and battle-tested player that is easy to form a treasury management strategy around, and it has exemplified product market fit across a wide variety of DeFi ecosystems. In terms of Fluid, it is one of the fastest growing DeFi protocols, with its marketshare continually trending upwards on Ethereum mainnet thanks to its capital efficient design. Fluid is already seeing strong growth on Arbitrum One, has committed to incentivizing its Arbitrum One deployment, and the GMC believes that this growth can be fueled forward by including them in the DAO’s treasury management program. Fluid’s highest-in-class LTVs will result in maximum ecosystem value add for those users wishing to take advantage of these unique opportunities too.

We want to remind all applicants that this is hopefully the first round of many future allocations. The desire is to continually reinvest ETH and stablecoin revenue into the Arbitrum DeFi ecosystem to increase DAO sustainability as well as supporting Arbitrum’s ecosystem of builders. If you were not selected this round, you will be considered in future allocations assuming the DAO supports it.

Risk Assessment (Llama Risk)

LlamaRisk has reviewed these different strategies and finds the risk inherent to each is satisfactorily mitigated to warrant the allocation. In summary, LlamaRisk have identified the following key asset risks and strategy risks:

Incremental wstETH asset risks include:

  • Liquidity for the asset is low on Arbitrum, meaning the ETH allocation will have to be staked on mainnet then bridged over using Arbitrum’s canonical bridge.

Incremental Aave wstETH strategy risks include:

  • Arbitrum DAO may not be able to withdraw its entire position at all times due to volatility reducing market liquidity. This risk is managed by Aave’s interest rate model, with successful effects demonstrated with the level of withdrawal liquidity of Aave V3’s Arbitrum wstETH market being over 40,000 on February 4th.
  • The yield may be lower than anticipated as liquid restaking yield is lower than was expected 6 months ago, meaning limited profit for traders leveraged longing liquid restaking tokens and shorting liquid staking tokens. This is the primary use case for those looking to short wstETH, which is demonstrated by low deposit rates for wstETH on this market.

Fluid strategy risks include:

  • Fluid DAO change management processes (e.g. LTV modifications) are not clearly structured and outlined. This could lead to changes to market critical settings going into effect without all participants knowing, which may have unintended consequences.
  • A high degree of trust is placed in the core team, with access controls resting in their hands over important functions such as freezing the protocol, users and market modifications. A 7/13 multisig controls these functions, which is owned by the core team. Given that many of these signers are based in India, some degree of operational risk is introduced from frequently arbitrary regulatory rulings in this jurisdiction potentially preventing their continued compliance with the protocol’s best interest. Uncertainty remains, introducing risk.
  • As with Aave, pool liquidity risk may prevent the DAO’s entire position being withdrawn in a single transaction during periods of high volatility. Also as with Aave, Fluid competently restores market liquidity quickly through its interest rate model.

Full risk analyses, with guiding processes, are available:

Next Steps

If approved by the DAO, which per the original proposal that passed on Tally requires a Snapshot vote with a simple majority of votes signaling For/Abstain with the quorum equal to 3% of the votable token supply at the time of the proposal going live, the Arbitrum Foundation can begin deploying the 7,500 ETH in accordance with the processes defined in the original applications. This proposal will move to Snapshot on Thursday, March 20, 2025.

If the DAO rejects the choice of the GMC, it will take into account the feedback from the community and alter its choices and proceed to another forum post/Snapshot vote over the coming weeks.

Full list of applications

The entire list of submitted applications can be found here. We encourage voters to evaluate this list relative to the GMC’s preferred choices and vote accordingly.

Disclaimer

The information provided within this forum post is for educational and informational purposes only and does not constitute financial, legal, or tax advice. Nothing within this post should be interpreted as an endorsement, recommendation, or advice to engage in any specific transaction, strategy, or investment. This decision is entirely for the DAO to make, and for the Arbitrum Foundation to subsequently put into action. The information is presented “as is” without any warranties of accuracy or completeness, and each delegate is encouraged to conduct their own due diligence and vote accordingly. DAO members should consult with professional advisors for specific guidance before making any financial, legal, or tax-related decisions. Use of this document is entirely at your own risk.

4 Likes

This thread was posted less than 7 days before the beginning of the proposed offchain vote on February 27th. It has been our tradition and it is in the Arbitrum DAO constitution as well, that proposals should go to a vote only after at least 1 week of discussion in this forum.

7 Likes

Finally we see the DAOs assets being put to work to get to a point of a sustainable treasury. The selection of protocols like Aave, Lido and Fluid is as well very great. Using the security and great liquidity of these.
Im in favor and as well do think that the distribution seems solid.

1 Like

ACI are pleased to see Aave being used to help Arbitrum grow the DAO treasury we would also like to congratulate our friends at Lido and Fluid who have built great products that we believe deeply benefit DeFi on Arbitrum. We hope this will be the start of a long collaboration between Arbitrum, Aave, and the broader DeFi ecosystem and we stand by to provide advice and assistance to the DAO as required.

1 Like

what a big disappointment

my view (and the one of many other builders):

6 Likes

This proposed allocation does not feel right to me.

First of all, I agree with the first comment from Paulo - why are we cutting the vote short?

From my readings I understand Arbitrum inherits its security from Ethereum. By allocating the treasury ETH to Lido you are actively choosing to lower the decentralization and security of Ethereum’s validator set, which hurts Arbitrum in the end too. I’m aware Lido claims to be decentralizing but the fact is >95% of the ETH staked in Lido is still managed by a small set of entities.

I understand you want to allocate to a low-risk strategy for ETH and Lido is the kind of ETH version of “nobody gets fired for buying IBM”. But you received similar proposals from Rocketpool and StakeWise, both solid and well-known low-risk options which are much better and more decentralized alternatives to Lido, and other DAOs have already allocated to those protocols. Choosing Lido is not very aligned with Ethereum especially if you have these better options available.

and by partnering with Lido, we are able to achieve this and form a long-term relationship with a protocol that has made critical contributions to the Ethereum ecosystem

Lido helped concentrate staked ETH and has explicitly voted against self-limiting their LST protocol. Are those the critical contributions?


That’s just my two cents. I don’t know if this will change anything but I hope you at least consider this impact of your choice next time. Lido is not the best choice available here.

3 Likes

This is total bullshit. You are going to invest eth earned on arbitrum one. Not a single project is native. Native projects like gmx and camelot made arbitrum what it is today . This is a total disappointment. total failure …

seems like a very odd signal to send to the ecosystem and perhaps an indication that the ‘governance moat’ that exists around the Arbitrum DAO needs to be reviewed

2 Likes

seems shady when wintermute has heavy financial interests tied to Lido, aave and fluid. Is wintermute really tunnelling arbitrum treasury ?

I am gonna jump the gun to move the convo from the current twitter drama and delegate chat hell into the forum.

I have experienced mixed feeling since the publication of these results. I will start by saying is impossible for me and for anybody else to read all the applications so far posted by the protocols, especially because some are gathed as docs so, likely, any end take I or others will have will be currently mostly

  • gut related
  • tied to higher level goals.

At first, I was honestly disappointed by the 3 protocols selected. Don’t get me wrong, I was well aware that lido staked eth would have been an important part of this first tranche, as well as aave. We are talking about battletested protocols, backbone of defi. Thinking arbitrum can succed for example without these 2 would be naive at best, malicious at worst.
I won’t comment on fluid that, as a protocol, I don’t know well enough. I will trust the committee in saying it provides risk adjusted yields that are good enough for our DAO.

All this premised, it seems rather strange that there is not a single eth allocated to arbitrum native protocols.
This is bad because we are on an almost 2 months streak in which the highest autorithy of our chains (OCL through Steven/AJ, Foundation through Patrick, DAO through Entropy, and I am surely missing several here so no offense) talk about how the DAO and the ecosystem should change pace, should push for alignment of participants etc. The one time we had the capacity to take actions matching our collective words, we have a very strict choice of protocols, all from ethereum mainnet.




I am not here to say that these protocols should excluded or others should be plugged in. Nor I am here to say that the committe didn’t do a proper risk adjusted analysis, because I am pretty sure that are well equipped in this sense, likely more than most particpants here. But the decisions here have been extremely short-sighted.

Our DAO is at an inflection point. I personally expect all participants of the DAO, especially the ones in active roles, in knowing how bad the perception of Arbitrum is out there. For this reason, is quite strange that out of 7500 ETH, we couldn’t even allocate 10% spread in other protocols, even to just give outside a signal that “the dao is here to support you, builder that decides to come to arbitrum instead of going to base to enjoy the support of coinbase or to solana to be part of the biggest casino in the world”.

I am going to also try and put myself in the shoes of the committee. The program, as was structured, was mostly a one-way program. Meaning that while there is mentioning of “having a counterparty negotiating”, this is mostly related to numbers. At least, this has been my direct experience having crafted the jones/camelot joint proposal. But, the committee didn’t engage with protocols saying “of X, Y and Z that you proposed, we can do X, we can do 30% of Y and Z doesn’t fall in the risk parameters”. Curious to know if this happened to others.

Let’s also do a practical example.

This point was in the end unclear in the details. As stated above, only staked lido direct strategies have been pursued with no direct exposure to LRT; likely more than one protocol has submitted strategies involving lido eth, rocketpool eth, renzo eth, etherfi eth etcetera. The committee could have, for example, only onboarded the staked lido part and maybe exclude the others.
Note that I am not suggesting this course of action, but merely stating an example in which there could have been alignment.

Note that taking on actively all proposals, reshaping that on behalf of the DAO, would make this program more akin to what we have had through STIP.b and LTIPP in which advisors indeed had this painful role. We don’t want to go down that route again, but we can find compromise that are driven by the overarching goals of

  • reach the financial independence of the DAO
  • give a signal to builders that we, indeed, want to support them in several ways
  • start to change the perception of the general public of the Arbitrum ecosystem, the DAO, the Foundation, that are all seen in a downward spiral.

An approach like this would have the benefit, for example, to allow utilizing instead of 5000 eth in AAVE, of using 4800 ETH in AAVE and 200 in Dolomite, only in the ETH lending, having what accordingly to defillama is an average yield that is double on only 4% of the initial capital, in a protocol that natively started in Arbitrum, has participated to our incentive programs, and now expanded succesfully in berachain where thanks to the work of the foundation and ecosystem now manages there half a billion in assets. This not a shill for dolo, to which I am not affiliated nor I am an investor, but is a prime example of a protocol that, for the good or the bad, has found better opportunities and more success outside of Arbitrum, and that we should try to retain and keep closer to our ecosystem.




I totally understand that, whatever the choice the commission would have made, it would have made someone unhappy. But the current choice feels is going against what we have been seen preaching by the ecosystem leaders.

I will wait for the proper explanations from the committee. The goal will be, in the end, to have working capital for the dao in a risk adjusted way: if we find ways to do it while signalling support for a broader cohort of Arbitrum protocols, we will have a net positive outcome outpacing value wise both the work needed for it to come to fruition and any yield difference.



disclosure: cow has wrote the applications for jones and camelot, has partially advised winr, and has helped more protocols than he really wants to admit in the end. While biased, cow likes to think he cares about the ecosystem as a whole regardless single protocol preferences

5 Likes

Pretty disappointed.

Arbitrum has safe, higher yielding products like this that the dao can support and use to increase adoption through providing liquidity (maybe even on arbitrum in a native dex), or increasing borrow capacity for eth on arbitrum , etc.

There are so many safe opportunities to keep TVL on arbitrum while also supporting the ecosystem.

Please reconsider - I would love arbitrum to win back some mindshare but stuff like this won’t help at all.

1 Like

I’m really really looking into the choice the (GMC) has made in the sense of growing the Arb ecosystem,which is the reason lido,aave and fluid protocols was chosen because of the 20% yield return———————-

but not involving any arb protocols that has been supporting the development of Arb growth worth considering, since protocols like Camelot has been in support for the growth of Arb and more protocols…………

but when it come for progress of Arb no protocols should be looked into but all we should be considering about is the growth of Arb and 20% yield return is good and I think this is the reason the (GMC) made their decision on Lido, Avve and fluid protocols because they promised good yield return. But Camelot protocol or any arb ecosystem if also has made the same promise of %20 yield return, not including anyone of the protocols from arb ecosystem is not really fair to me.

No Ecosystem → No Growth.
No Growth → No GMC.

The drama here isn’t clear because the mandate are at odds with each other: You want max safety to grow the treasury and risk is something that you don’t compromise.

Yet, the other part of the mandate calls for ecosystem growth which implies younger, fast growing, experiment heavy protocols.

So which way arbitrum man?

Some existential question:

  • In the pursuit of low risk returns, does arbitrum native protocols matter?
  • What are the factors where people will be ok, for a given set of (low) risks, to chase returns?
  • Do we go for large protocols to strength marquee apps as their integrations may be more widespread leading to more network effects? (e.g fluid lending helps DEX volumes etc)?
2 Likes

It seems GMC is trying to replace TMC, and unable to perform their own duties.

While I do get the concerns people have one should not forget that this isn’t the everything the DAO has. This is simply a good start to use idle assets and generate revenue. And they simply go the EF way. Making sure that yield is high but risk very low. And no one can argue that Lido & Aave aren’t safe.
You cannot say it for Fluid maybe, but for now they are doing an outstanding job and I understand why they got chosen, additionally they offer good yield.
And this yield can be used in the future to boost arbitrum native protocols as well.
Most lack the understanding that you need to start somewhere and you usually choose the safest place instead of high risk. And no TVL will be gone. It will still be on the Arbitrum chain, offering protocols like Contango or other ones on Arbitrum more and deeper liquidity which helps them as well.
In the future there could be a vote to reserve 10% of those assets for Arbitrum native protocols but in the end I would always go the safe way with the majority. That’s what most of you probably do as well with their private portfolios.

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You are really right💯this isn’t the everything the DAO has. This is simply a good start to use idle assets and generate revenue. And they simply go the EF way. Making sure that yield is high but risk very low. And no one can argue that Lido & Aave aren’t safe.
You cannot say it for Fluid maybe, but for now they are doing an outstanding job and I understand why they got chosen, additionally they offer good yield.
And this yield can be used in the future to boost arbitrum native protocols as well.

@Arb_Junior why did you just post a comment, coping part of the @EzR3aL comment above?
Liking their comment was not enough?

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@SEEDGov this seems like a bot or AI thing. Look at my previous post and then this post. Simply copying mine with other words.

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Was trying to make it more understandable that @EzR3aL made good points about all this.