The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting ABSTAIN for this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
Thank you, @paulofonseca, we recognise the work and thought that has gone into this proposal. Over the past several cycles, DIP has gone through multiple iterations, each trying to address specific challenges. This proposal builds on that history by splitting incentives across three layers: voting, forum engagement, and quarterly contributions. That is a logical and needed progression.
Our decision to vote abstain is not a rejection of the direction. It is a reflection that some core components of this framework are not yet mature enough to be implemented at the scale and importance that this program carries.
The introduction of the Peer Recognition Score (PRS) adds a new layer to delegate incentives. Forum engagement has always been part of the ecosystem, but turning peer recognition into a direct reward mechanism will shape delegate behaviour in ways that are not entirely predictable. Peer-weighted models can be powerful, but they can also lead to concentration of influence and feedback loops that reward popularity over value. This is not an abstract concern. It is a pattern we have observed in other systems and even in softer forms within earlier versions of the DIP. Calibrating PRS correctly is essential, and the current draft does not fully answer how this will be managed over time.
The move to quarterly contribution voting is a meaningful improvement because it reduces frequency and offers delegates a more structured moment to evaluate impact. However, it still depends heavily on subjective interpretation. Across DIP 1.5, 1.6, and 1.7, contribution evaluation was consistently the point where disagreements and disputes originated. Changing the timeline alone does not fix this. Without clear boundaries on what counts as an impactful contribution and how different kinds of work should be weighed against each other, the program risks reintroducing the same problems in a slightly different format. The friction would simply reappear later in the cycle.
Several operational questions also remain open, and these are not minor details. The proposal has not yet clearly outlined how gaming in the PRS system will be identified or handled, what minimum evidence standards will be required for contribution claims, or how collusive behaviour and tie situations will be addressed. In past DIPs, lack of clarity at this level directly led to disputes, delays, and shifting expectations among delegates. These issues tend to surface only when payouts are on the line, which is why they need to be resolved before the program is implemented.
As @krst rightly pointed out, there’s a deeper issue beyond the design itself. We now have two separate proposals addressing the same problem, moving forward in parallel instead of converging on a shared solution. This reflects a gap in how we collaborate as a DAO. Differences are natural in a decentralized system, but failing to set them aside and align on common ground is a missed opportunity to build something stronger together.
This could have been a moment to bring ideas together into a single, robust framework rather than asking delegates to choose between competing visions. The DAO’s strength has always come from constructive debate followed by collective action. That spirit feels absent here, and we fully align with this point. A coordinated approach would have served the DAO better than fragmented efforts.