Lampros DAO Delegate Communication Thread

[Euphoria]

Snapshot Votes

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1. [Non-Constitutional] - Updates to the DIP, The Complete 1.7 Version
   Voted - FOR
   Reason -

@Euphoria

The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.

We recognize that evolving the DIP is essential as Arbitrum DAO grows, governance processes become more mature, and the role of delegates continues to shift. The move to introduce Tier X for high-voting power delegates, to recalibrate compensation reflecting a lower overall governance workload, and to make feedback assessment more transparent and objective are all clear signals that the DIP aims to adapt to a changing ecosystem.

However, as delegates with less VP, we are especially sensitive to how program changes can influence the inclusiveness and diversity of everyone. Our experience matches the sentiment that insightful questions, research, and onboarding energy frequently emerge from smaller delegates who may not hold large amounts of voting power but have a significant investment in the DAO’s quality and long-term success. We have seen, time and again, that Arbitrum benefits when the tent remains open to these perspectives.

It is for this reason that we particularly echo the concerns raised by other delegates, like @0xDonPepe mentioned, regarding the stringency of the DF scoring and its compounded effect when combined with the voting power multiplier. With only around 12% of delegates presently clearing the DF bar under the current, less strict system, increasing the difficulty and combining it with a high voting power threshold risks closing the door to smaller and independent delegates. At a time when the DIP is one of the last open doors for such participation and recognition, we worry about inadvertently entrenching governance around the largest holders and institutional actors, to the detriment of dynamism and decentralization.

While we recognize the logic for introducing Tier X (appreciate the thinking of the team to focus on increasing voting in DAO) and for focusing incentives and program energy where the most voting power can be activated, we urge caution so that these changes do not inadvertently diminish the existing pipeline for new and diverse delegates. The 40% reduction in compensation is significant and, while the justification is grounded in lower overall proposal workload and increased institutional involvement, we recommend ongoing review to avoid discouraging the participation of contributors whose involvement is critical, especially as new delegates start contributing in Arbitrum DAO. Rewarding voting activity alone for large delegates, while increasing the requirements for smaller ones, should be regularly reassessed to ensure it does not yield a disengaged or lopsided ecosystem.

On the subject of vote-buying platforms, we agree that exclusion from DIP incentives is a sound decision until there is consensus and a robust framework to ensure meaningful alignment. The language that leaves the possibility for future inclusion if proper controls are in place demonstrates an appropriately measured approach.

In summary, we vote FOR DIP v1.7, acknowledging the thoroughness of the process, the clarity of documentation, and the clear need for DIP to remain responsive and sustainable as Arbitrum grows. Our support comes with genuine encouragement to keep inclusiveness and diversity of delegate voices as a core priority, to normalize DF scoring wherever possible to the actual best performer each month rather than an impossible ideal, and to ensure that the program’s gates do not shut out newer and smaller contributors who are essential for a thriving DAO. Our decision today is a vote of confidence in the process, paired with a commitment to ensuring Arbitrum’s governance remains open, legitimate, and robust.

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Tally Votes

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1. Entropy Advisors: Exclusively Working with the Arbitrum DAO, Y2-Y3
   Voted - FOR
   Reason -

@Euphoria

The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

We are voting FOR this proposal in the Tally voting.

The role of long-term contributors in a DAO is evolving, and this proposal is part of that shift. We see Entropy stepping into a more formal, structured role, not just supporting specific proposals, but helping the DAO plan and adapt across multiple workstreams.

What matters to us is that this isn’t a passive renewal. The scope is bigger, expectations are higher, and Entropy will now operate alongside a growing execution layer through OpCo. That raises the bar for coordination, clarity, and delivery, and we think that’s a good thing.

We’ve had a chance to observe Entropy’s approach over the past year, being in touch wherever required, and what stands out is their consistency. Even in areas where outcomes were uncertain, they’ve stayed engaged, taken feedback, and helped push things forward. That level of reliability is rare in decentralized environments.

We’re supporting this proposal with a few expectations in mind. First, we believe it’s important that a clear division of responsibilities between Entropy and OpCo is established early to avoid confusion. Second, the value delivered should be regularly communicated in plain terms so delegates can stay informed. And third, incentive structures should remain tied to meaningful output, rather than just time spent or general presence.

We wish the Entropy team the best as they step into this next phase, and we look forward to seeing the DAO continue to evolve with stronger long-term contributors in place.

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2. [CONSTITUTIONAL] Register $BORING in the Arbitrum generic-custom gateway
   Voted - FOR
   Reason -

@Euphoria

The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

We are voting FOR this proposal in the Tally voting.

We see this vote as a straightforward step to let $BORING integrate with Arbitrum using the generic-custom gateway. This helps Superboring grow and lets users confidently interact with the correct token, reducing confusion or risk of imitations. From a technical perspective, this is simply aligning two contracts for safe bridging, without introducing any new risk to existing systems or the DAO treasury.

As we’ve said before, requiring a formal DAO vote for each technical mapping like this is not the most efficient use of community effort. Projects like Superboring want to ship real adoption and volume; waiting for a governance cycle makes the experience harder for builders and does not make the network safer. We agree with other delegates that technical reviews and audits, not repeated DAO-wide votes, should set the bar for routine gateway actions.

We also appreciate recent steps to address this, like the launch of the Maintenance Upgrades Working Group led by @krst. We hope this initiative results in a smoother and more predictable path for operational upgrades or routine actions like token registration, so that governance is focused on the highest value issues while technical experts keep our infrastructure safe.

This update is positive for the Arbitrum ecosystem, poses low risk, and supports a well-established project.

[Euphoria]

Arbitrum Orbit Chains Revenue Dashboard by Lampros DAO

Arbitrum Orbit Chains Revenue Dashboard by Lampros DAO

Following the launch of our Arbitrum Orbit Chains Activity Dashboard, we’re excited to share the next step in our data tooling journey, a new Dune dashboard focused entirely on tracking revenue contributions from Orbit chains settling on Arbitrum One. Where the first dashboard highlighted usage, gas metrics, and adoption patterns, this one zooms in on the economic layer, helping delegates, chain teams, analysts, and treasury stakeholders understand how and how much value Orbit chains are contri…

[Euphoria]

Lampros DAO Delegate Contributions Update - August 2025

Lampros DAO Delegate Contributions Update

Hi everyone, As part of our monthly series, here’s a look at the contributions we made in August 2025. This month, we kept our focus on data infrastructure and ecosystem research, while also experimenting with more public-facing engagement through X Broadcasts. 1. Orbit Chain Revenue Dashboard We published a new Dune dashboard focused on Arbitrum ecosystem revenue from Orbit chains. The dashboard currently tracks only Orbit chains that are settled on Arbitrum One, offering a way to see how Or…

[Euphoria]

Snapshot Votes

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1. [CONSTITUTIONAL] AIP: ArbOS Version 50 Dia
   Voted - FOR
   Reason -

@Euphoria

The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.

Firstly, thank you to the @offchainlabs team for putting this together and engaging in the thread. We read the post end-to-end and compared the changes against what builders on One and Nova depend on today.

@offchainlabs

Dia adds support for relevant Execution Layer (EL) changes from Ethereum’s upcoming Fusaka upgrade (Q4 2025), enabling EIP-2537, a few bug fixes, and a handful of new features, such as a new feature called Native Mint/Burn.

We agree with the direction. Staying close to Ethereum reduces maintenance risk, and enabling BLS12-381 and CLZ brings real wins for developers. Keeping the pricing work to measurement only is also a prudent choice at this stage.

@offchainlabs

For Arbitrum One & Arbitrum Nova we are proposing a 32 million gas limit (L2 execution gas, not including L1 gas) per transaction, which is the same as the current block gas limit.

Since the per-transaction cap equals the block limit, we kindly ask for a short note with recent chain data to back this choice: P95 and P99 gas used per transaction over the last 90 days, any instances where a single transaction filled most of a block, and a brief check that large single transactions do not impact sequencing fairness. If these numbers show headroom, the 32M setting is easy to support; if they suggest pressure, we can discuss a safer margin now rather than later.

@offchainlabs

A Constraint-Based Pricing Change: STF instrumentation to track multi-gas

Measuring first is the right approach. To help everyone review before any later activation, it would be helpful to expose a minimal telemetry surface for the new counters (compute, storage access, storage growth, history growth), either via JSON-RPC or a Prometheus endpoint, and to share a short outline of the activation playbook when you return: which parameters can change, how changes would roll out, what checks define “go / no-go,” and how a revert would work if needed. This keeps the next step predictable for node operators and the DAO.

@offchainlabs

Native Token Mint/Burn is proposed to be included in ArbOS 50 Dia for the benefit of Arbitrum Orbit chains

We support including it in the codebase while keeping One and Nova unchanged. For completeness, please confirm there is no configuration path that could enable Mint/Burn on One or Nova in this release, and share the audit artifacts for the Dia diff when ready. For Orbit chains that opt in, a short operator checklist and the clean migration path if a bridge provider changes would be useful. A concise “assumptions matrix” that maps token/bridge choices to added trust would also help teams make informed decisions.

@offchainlabs

A few bug fixes

These fixes are welcome. A brief regression summary noting the test coverage and any expected effect on batch posting costs or node resource usage would make planning easier for infra teams. If there is no material impact, stating that clearly is helpful.

We understand activation could land after Fusaka due to constitutional timings. That is fine if the audit report, the RC metrics snapshot, and the upgrade notes are public before Tally.

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Tally Votes

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1. [CONSTITUTIONAL] Remove Cost Cap, Update Executors, Disable Legacy USDT Bridge
   Voted - FOR
   Reason -

@Euphoria

The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

We are voting FOR this proposal in the Tally voting.

The current on-chain proposal makes three sensible changes that improve sustainability, operations, and user safety. Removing the amortized cost cap on Arbitrum Nova aligns fees with real L1 posting costs after EIP-4844, ends a recurring subsidy, and fits Nova’s current role as Orbit adoption grows. Updating the DAO’s Upgrade Executors to include executeCall() reduces overhead for future upgrades while keeping execute() available, and the published Trail of Bits review on the new path gives comfort on security intent. Disabling the legacy USDT bridge and consolidating on USDT0 removes a source of confusion and edge-case risk for contracts that cannot handle the legacy auto-withdraw behavior.

We also want to acknowledge L2BEAT’s rationale and thank them for their technical review of the executable payload. Their team confirmed that the targets and params match the stated intent, that the DAO addresses and ProxyAdmin references match the deployment list, that the correct Inbox contracts are used for Arbitrum One and Nova, and that the constitutional L1 timelock and delay align with the execution timeline. We value this kind of independent payload verification. We also note their point about the tradeoffs of bundling. In principle, we prefer single-topic on-chain votes when feasible. In this case, we believe the net effect of the bundle is clearly positive and supports the DAO’s long-term interests, so we are comfortable voting FOR while recognizing that some delegates have reservations about the USDT0 trust assumptions separate from this execution.

The Nova change reduces deficits, the executor upgrade streamlines governance work, and the bridge change improves user safety. Taken together, the proposal strengthens the network’s sustainability and operational clarity. Hence, we will vote FOR.

[Euphoria]

Lampros DAO Delegate Contributions Update - September 2025

Lampros DAO Delegate Contributions Update

Hi everyone, Here’s our September update. This month we continued to expand our data work, ran more live sessions to walk through the dashboards, and kept our weekly analytics series running. Below are the main items. 1. Revenue dashboard - expanded coverage (89 chains) We updated our Arbitrum Orbit Chains Revenue Dashboard to cover 89 Orbit chains that settle on Arbitrum One. This gives a wider view of which chains are contributing to ETH revenue and how that revenue flows change over time. E…

[Euphoria]

Snapshot Votes

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1. Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies
   Voted - AGAINST
   Reason -

@Euphoria

The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

We are voting AGAINST this proposal in the Snapshot voting.

We support the idea of putting idle ETH to work, but we cannot approve a large transfer now because the ATMC’s recent ETH allocations have underperformed simple staking, and there is no clear implementation plan for how the 8,500 ETH will be used.

The proposal mentions a blended 30-day APY near 2.4% and roughly 43.4 ETH generated since May. For a transfer of this size, those headline numbers are not enough; we need a side-by-side comparison of net APY after fees and costs against passive staking options (wstETH / Lido / Rocket Pool) and against high-quality DVT/validator options.

Equally important, the proposal does not lay out a concrete allocation plan. Moving 8,500 ETH without clear per-protocol allocations, caps, or documented selection rationale is premature. As other delegates mentioned, it is “premature to transfer ETH before a concrete and approved plan exists,” and we agree that funds should not be transferred first and decided upon later.

If part of the goal is ecosystem support, the proposal should also include measurable KPIs for those growth allocations and a timeline to reassess impact.

For these reasons, we are voting against it at this moment.

[Euphoria]

Snapshot Proposal

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1. [Constitutional] AIP: DVP Quorum
   Voted - FOR - DVP Quorum
   Reason -

@Euphoria

The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

We are voting “FOR- DVP Quorum” for this proposal in the Snapshot voting.

The rising quorum issue has been visible for a while now. Since the quorum reduction in May, the constitutional quorum has continued to climb past ~209M ARB, while total delegated voting power has stayed largely flat between 320M and 350M ARB. That gap is exactly what’s making governance fragile, not because participation is dropping, but because quorum has become increasingly dependent on a handful of large delegates showing up.

@Arbitrum

It should be set as a percentage of the total delegated voting power (DVP).

DVP is a new concept. We see this shift as a practical response to a structural issue, not a silver bullet. Aligning quorum with DVP makes it more reflective of real participation and lowers the risk of gridlock as quorum keeps rising with token unlocks.

The baseline makes sense in principle, but it will need careful monitoring and a check for the governance risks for the same. We’d like to see more clarity later on how this floor could be adjusted with an analysis back.

@Arbitrum

• Non-constitutional proposals. Set at 40 - 50% of total delegated voting power and a minimum fixed voting power of 100m ARB.
• Constitutional proposals. Set at 40% - 50% of total delegated voting power and a minimum fixed voting power of 150m ARB.

We think these values are a reasonable starting point. But what matters more is how the spread between constitutional and non-constitutional quorum is preserved over time. If it collapses, upgrade security weakens. This is something to watch closely, not set once and forget.

We also believe participation efforts should run in parallel. A re-delegation week, similar to what we saw in 2024, could help boost active delegation. That would strengthen the DVP quorum model rather than just adjusting the parameters around a static base.

And finally, since this vote is only to gauge community sentiment, we’re supporting the DVP quorum direction because it’s a step that can prevent gridlock in the near future and open up more structured discussion on the exact configuration. We are in favour, but also looking forward to seeing how the final proposal evolves.

[Euphoria]

Security Council Elections (September 2025)

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The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

Thank you to everyone who applied for the Security Council position. We truly appreciate the time and effort each candidate put into their applications.

As we have limited voting power, we believe it’s important to make our vote as impactful as possible. By focusing our support on two candidates, we aim to increase the chances of electing individuals whose expertise and experience we consider essential for the Security Council.

We are splitting our votes between Daniel Goldman and Emiliano Bonassi.

• @dzack23 brings direct protocol expertise as the author of core Arbitrum contracts and governance infrastructure. His deep familiarity with the system makes him well-positioned to contribute during high-stakes technical decisions.
• @emilianobonassi brings strong rollup experience, a whitehat security background, and proven incident response capability from his prior time on the Council.

Together, they combine core protocol insight and battle-tested security leadership, ensuring strong technical coverage, quick response capability, and credible representation on behalf of the community.

We believe this pairing strengthens the Council’s ability to act decisively and responsibly during critical moments while preserving the trust and resilience of the Arbitrum ecosystem.

[Euphoria]

Snapshot Votes

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1. AGV Council Compensation Calibration: Benchmark for Future Council Terms
   Voted - FOR
   Reason -

@Euphoria

The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.

We view this proposal as more than a compensation update. It sets a clear direction for how the DAO values strategic oversight roles tied to large capital programs. AGV Council manages a 200M ARB program, which requires serious time, responsibility, and accountability. Aligning compensation with market benchmarks is a rational step if we want experienced contributors to commit meaningfully. Undercompensating governance roles of this scale would create long-term operational and accountability risks for the DAO.

We also agree with the one-time startup-phase bonus for the inaugural Council. The scope of work during AGV’s setup went far beyond the original plan. Acknowledging that extra effort is fair and also sets a useful precedent for other verticals that may go through similar early-stage build-out phases. This is not about rewarding past work casually, but about recognizing the foundational role these early contributions play in getting such programs operational.

At the same time, this proposal highlights the need for a more structured approach to compensation in the DAO. Instead of treating each vertical’s compensation individually, the DAO should work toward a standardized framework for council and oversight roles. Startup-phase responsibilities should ideally be scoped and approved upfront, and compensation calibration should be reviewed periodically based on both benchmarks and actual responsibilities.

Supporting this proposal reflects our belief that strong governance requires fair and transparent incentive structures. It sets a practical baseline for how we can structure future councils and verticals more predictably.

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2. [Temperature Check] Should we try a Delegate Incentive Program like the Arbitrum Triple Dip?
   Voted - ABSTAIN
   Reason -

@Euphoria

The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

We are voting ABSTAIN for this proposal in the Snapshot voting.

Thank you, @paulofonseca, we recognise the work and thought that has gone into this proposal. Over the past several cycles, DIP has gone through multiple iterations, each trying to address specific challenges. This proposal builds on that history by splitting incentives across three layers: voting, forum engagement, and quarterly contributions. That is a logical and needed progression.

Our decision to vote abstain is not a rejection of the direction. It is a reflection that some core components of this framework are not yet mature enough to be implemented at the scale and importance that this program carries.

The introduction of the Peer Recognition Score (PRS) adds a new layer to delegate incentives. Forum engagement has always been part of the ecosystem, but turning peer recognition into a direct reward mechanism will shape delegate behaviour in ways that are not entirely predictable. Peer-weighted models can be powerful, but they can also lead to concentration of influence and feedback loops that reward popularity over value. This is not an abstract concern. It is a pattern we have observed in other systems and even in softer forms within earlier versions of the DIP. Calibrating PRS correctly is essential, and the current draft does not fully answer how this will be managed over time.

The move to quarterly contribution voting is a meaningful improvement because it reduces frequency and offers delegates a more structured moment to evaluate impact. However, it still depends heavily on subjective interpretation. Across DIP 1.5, 1.6, and 1.7, contribution evaluation was consistently the point where disagreements and disputes originated. Changing the timeline alone does not fix this. Without clear boundaries on what counts as an impactful contribution and how different kinds of work should be weighed against each other, the program risks reintroducing the same problems in a slightly different format. The friction would simply reappear later in the cycle.

Several operational questions also remain open, and these are not minor details. The proposal has not yet clearly outlined how gaming in the PRS system will be identified or handled, what minimum evidence standards will be required for contribution claims, or how collusive behaviour and tie situations will be addressed. In past DIPs, lack of clarity at this level directly led to disputes, delays, and shifting expectations among delegates. These issues tend to surface only when payouts are on the line, which is why they need to be resolved before the program is implemented.

@krst

We find this to be a complete failure of the DAO governance process and us, as people behind it.

As @krst rightly pointed out, there’s a deeper issue beyond the design itself. We now have two separate proposals addressing the same problem, moving forward in parallel instead of converging on a shared solution. This reflects a gap in how we collaborate as a DAO. Differences are natural in a decentralized system, but failing to set them aside and align on common ground is a missed opportunity to build something stronger together.

This could have been a moment to bring ideas together into a single, robust framework rather than asking delegates to choose between competing visions. The DAO’s strength has always come from constructive debate followed by collective action. That spirit feels absent here, and we fully align with this point. A coordinated approach would have served the DAO better than fragmented efforts.

[Euphoria]

Snapshot Vote

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1. The DAO Incentive Program (DIP 2.0)
   Voted - AGAINST
   Reason -

@Euphoria

The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

We are voting AGAINST this proposal in the Snapshot voting.

We want to begin by acknowledging the effort and thought behind this proposal. The team included lessons from the Delegate Incentive Program and attempted to create a clearer distinction between delegates and contributors through a more structured framework. The intent to improve accountability, encourage transparency, and expand recognition to contributors is nice and directionally positive for the DAO.

However, after reviewing the proposal and reflecting on our experience across all previous DIPs, we believe that this version of DIP, while well-intentioned, would benefit from deeper alignment with the DAO’s long-term direction before being implemented. Our vote against is not a rejection of the idea itself, but a call to refine and unify approaches for the benefit of the entire ecosystem.

The separation between delegates and contributors is a natural and much-needed evolution, as it acknowledges that meaningful governance participation takes different forms. However, the current structure may benefit from a better balance between operational efficiency and community autonomy. For incentive programs to scale sustainably, decision-making authority should ideally be distributed across transparent, peer-validated processes rather than concentrated in administrative functions.

The introduction of the Peer Assembly and vouching system raises further questions about accessibility and fairness. By design, it creates a permissioned layer around participation, one that relies on social consensus rather than open criteria. Over time, such systems tend to consolidate influence around a smaller inner circle, reducing the openness that has defined Arbitrum’s governance to date. While accountability is essential, we must ensure that inclusion and decentralization remain foundational to any incentive framework adopted by the DAO.

It’s also important to recognize the broader context of where the DAO stands today. Arbitrum has reached a stage where governance experimentation has multiplied, from various incentive programs to multiple DIP revisions. This experimentation is healthy, but at this point, the DAO would benefit from more convergence rather than fragmentation. Currently, there are two active proposals: DIP 2.0 and the Triple Dip, both addressing the same fundamental challenge of delegate incentives.

This parallel effort represents more than just creative diversity; it reflects a coordination gap. Instead of working together toward a unified system, we now have two competing frameworks, both of which have strong ideas but separate execution paths. This is not the DAO at its best. The real strength of Arbitrum’s governance has always come from open debate followed by collective alignment, even among differing perspectives. A joint framework, one that combines the operational clarity of DIP 2.0 with the decentralized logic and automation of the Triple Dip, would deliver far more value than either in isolation.

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Tally Vote

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1. Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies
   Voted - AGAINST
   Reason -

@Euphoria

The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

We are voting AGAINST this proposal in the Tally voting.

We appreciate that the team published an Investment Policy Statement. The IPS adds structure and explains how the ATMC will think about benchmarks, opportunity cost, and growth versus yield decisions. Still, the IPS does not resolve the two core reasons we opposed the proposal on Snapshot: underperformance and no clear implementation plan.

The current and historic allocations have not shown that they beat simple staking once fees and costs are included. We need a clear, side-by-side net yield comparison that shows expected returns after custody fees, management fees, gas, bridge costs, and any other expenses. Without that net comparison, we cannot judge the true opportunity cost of moving 8,500 ETH.

The proposal still lacks a concrete allocation plan. We expect a detailed list of target protocols or a phased tranche plan with checkpoints and OAT sign-offs. We will not support transferring a material sum first and deciding specific allocations later.

[Euphoria]

Lampros DAO Delegate Contributions Update - October 2025

Lampros DAO Delegate Contributions Update

TL;DR Revenue dashboard expanded to 95 Orbit chains, with 2 chain names mapped and new coverage for Orbit chains settling on Ethereum. Orbit Chains Activity dashboard now includes TVS (Total Value Secured) views, live and broken down by externally bridged, natively minted, and canonical value. Hosted two Twitter Spaces in October on fees, chains, and AEP flows; ran weekly data posts and monthly summaries. Submitted several Spellbook PRs (protocol trades and Limitbreak updates) and a new Arbitru…

[Euphoria]

Snapshot Votes

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1. AGV Council Compensation Calibration: Startup-Phase Bonus for Current Council Members
   Voted - FOR
   Reason -

@Euphoria

The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

We are voting FOR Proposal B in the Snapshot voting.

Building a venture vehicle like AGV within a DAO structure is demanding work. The inaugural Council went beyond advisory duties; it shaped AGV’s governance, compliance, and operational systems from the ground up. That level of commitment and ownership deserves fair recognition, especially given how much of AGV’s foundation now relies on those early efforts.

We believe the proposed startup-phase bonus is a fair and measured way to acknowledge that work. It reflects the time, responsibility, and strategic input required to bring AGV from idea to execution. Since it’s funded fully within AGV’s existing budget, it also demonstrates a disciplined approach to compensation and resource management.

Supporting this proposal aligns with our broader view that meaningful DAO programs demand real commitment, and recognizing those who deliver helps strengthen accountability and trust across the ecosystem.

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2. AIP: Raise the gas target, min L2 base fee, & implement improvements to the pricing algorithm
   Voted - FOR
   Reason -

@Euphoria

The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.

@offchainlabs

This AIP proposes to reduce the severity, frequency, and duration of high L2 gas prices during periods when demand exceeds the gas target by introducing a new set of gas targets and new, accompanying adjustment windows for Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova.

We support this direction. Frequent gas spikes have been one of the few remaining pain points for both users and developers on Arbitrum. The introduction of multiple gas targets and longer adjustment windows feels like a well-reasoned and data-backed step to make network fees more predictable without compromising stability.

@offchainlabs

this AIP is accompanied by an increase in the minimum L2 base fee from 0.01 gwei/gas to 0.02 gwei/gas to help reduce spam and offset any potential decline in the portion of L2 surplus fee-derived transaction fees (during periods of peak demand) to the ArbitrumDAO.

We agree with this adjustment. The increase is minimal for users but meaningful in reducing spam-driven transactions and balancing the DAO’s revenue model. It shifts the fee dynamics slightly toward a more stable and predictable income stream, which is healthy for long-term sustainability.

@offchainlabs

this proposal requests the ArbitrumDAO grant Offchain Labs permission, for 2 years from the mainnet activation of this proposal, to adjust the gas targets and adjustment windows in Table 1, in addition to the right to add up to 10 more gas targets and adjustment values.

We find this reasonable. OCL has the technical competence, and granting limited, transparent flexibility for parameter adjustments allows the network to evolve dynamically. Still, we expect visibility into every change; public logs, clear reasoning, and metrics showing network impact, to maintain accountability during this delegated period.

We also acknowledge the updated node hardware requirements. They are realistic for today’s operators, but maintaining transparency around decentralization metrics will remain important as throughput increases.

Overall, this proposal aligns with DAO’s long-term goals: improving user experience, keeping the system scalable, and preserving stability. It is a technically sound and forward-looking change, and we are confident in its positive impact on both the ecosystem and DAO revenue health.

[Euphoria]

Snapshot Votes

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1. John Kennedy reconfirmation for AGV council
   Voted - Abstain.
   Reason -

   The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

   We are voting ABSTAIN for this proposal in the Snapshot voting.

   We hold great respect for John Kennedy’s contributions to the Arbitrum ecosystem and the AGV Council. His professional background in game development, product leadership, and go-to-market strategy is impressive, and his work helping shape AGV’s investment thesis has clearly added value to the DAO.

   That said, we believe positions of this nature should ideally go through an open and transparent election process. While we understand the intention behind the continuity model, preserving institutional memory and ensuring operational stability, it’s equally important that all council seats are filled through a process that reflects the DAO’s core principle of open participation.

   Our decision to abstain is not a reflection on John’s capability or commitment, but on the process itself. Had this nomination been part of the open election, we would have been glad to support his candidacy based on merit and past contributions.

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2. Tim Chang reconfirmation for AGV council
   Voted - Abstain.
   Reason -

   The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

   We are voting ABSTAIN for this proposal in the Snapshot voting.

   We appreciate Tim Chang’s contributions to the AGV Council and his strong background in venture capital, early-stage investing, and ecosystem building. His experience guiding AGV’s investment thesis and setting up the operational framework has clearly helped shape the program in its early phase.

   As mentioned in our comment on John Kennedy’s reconfirmation, we believe that all council seats, including those nominated for continuity, should ideally be subject to an open election process. This ensures transparency, equal opportunity, and full alignment with the DAO’s principle of open participation.

   Our decision to abstain is based on this process consideration, not on Tim’s qualifications or performance. We hold respect for his work and the value he brings, but we think that open elections strengthen long-term trust and accountability between AGV and the broader DAO community. Had this nomination been part of the open election process, we would have been glad to support Tim’s candidacy based on his track record and contributions.

[Euphoria]

Lampros DAO Delegate Contributions Update - November 2025

Lampros DAO Delegate Contributions Update

TL;DR Revenue dashboard expanded to 96 Orbit chains, with one new chain added and one name mapped on Arbitrum One; four new chains added and three names mapped for those settling on Ethereum. Released a new Arbitrum Trader Segmentation & Activity Overview dashboard on Dune to analyze trading behaviour, liquidity, and fee patterns across Arbitrum. Hosted a Space titled “Arbitrum Trader Segments Explained: Liquidity, Volume, and Behaviour” on 25 Nov 2025. Continued our weekly and monthly data ser…

[Euphoria]

Snapshot Vote

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1. AGV - 2026 Council Elections
   Voted - 50% for JoJo and 50% for Chris.
   Reason -

   The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

   We want to start by thanking all candidates for their thoughtful applications and contributions. The AGV has evolved into a key part of Arbitrum’s ecosystem, and the election reflects the depth of talent helping shape its next phase.

   Given our limited voting power, we’re focusing our votes where we believe they’ll have the most meaningful impact. After reviewing all pitches and discussions, we’re splitting our votes equally between @JoJo and Chris Cameron (@GFXlabs), two candidates who bring complementary strengths in governance, transparency, and strategic alignment.

   • We have seen first hand JoJo has been closely involved in Arbitrum’s governance for a very long time, like from evaluating incentive programs to managing the D.A.O. Grant Program. His hands-on experience with AGV since its inception and his focus on improving communication across AAEs make him a valuable bridge between AGV, the DAO, and builders.

   • Chris brings extensive multi-DAO governance and financial oversight experience. His proposal to deliver a clear financial and structural report on AGV within 60 days shows a strong commitment to transparency and accountability, values that will help delegates better understand AGV’s operations and impact. We look forward to seeing that report if he’s elected, as it would be a valuable contribution for the DAO and the delegates.

   Together, they combine Arbitrum-native insight with independent governance rigor, a balance that will strengthen AGV’s ability to scale responsibly while staying fully aligned with the DAO’s long-term mission.

[Euphoria]

Tally Vote

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1. [Constitutional] AIP: Activate ArbOS 51 (Dia) and Gas Pricing Updates
   Voted - FOR
   Reason -

   The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

   We are voting FOR the combined proposal in the Tally voting.

   ArbOS 50 Dia keeps Arbitrum in sync with Ethereum’s upcoming Fusaka upgrade, enabling EIP-2537, EIP-7939, and important bug fixes while introducing the groundwork for multi-resource gas tracking. These changes improve system efficiency and prepare the network for future scalability. We also support including the Native Mint/Burn feature for Orbit chains while keeping it disabled on One and Nova, which is a practical and safe approach.

   The proposal on gas targets and pricing adjustments is a well-reasoned step to make L2 gas fees more stable and predictable during high-demand periods. The move from a single 7 Mgas/s target to multiple overlapping targets and longer adjustment windows is data-driven and should help smooth volatility. The small increase in the minimum L2 base fee from 0.01 gwei to 0.02 gwei is reasonable to reduce spam and maintain network health. Granting Offchain Labs limited flexibility to adjust parameters within set ranges for two years is also acceptable, as it allows responsive tuning while keeping the DAO in control.

   Overall, both proposals are balanced, technically sound, and aligned with the DAO’s broader goals of scalability and operational stability.

[Euphoria]

Snapshot Vote

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1. Rewarding Active Delegates (RAD) Program
   Voted - FOR
   Reason -

@Euphoria

The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.

For the sake of maintaining quorum and ensuring that important proposals do not get stuck in gridlock, we see this program as a necessary step. Incentivizing active participation will help keep the DAO functioning smoothly and reduce voter apathy over time.

On the aspect of posting rationales, we are definitely in favour. It is a basic principle every delegate should follow. Sharing rationales not only adds transparency but also helps delegators clearly see how and why their delegate voted. Many delegates, including several with less than 200k voting power, already follow this practice, and formalizing it through a structured program will only strengthen governance standards.

We hope that future iterations will review the 200k ARB minimum threshold so more active mid-size delegates can take part, and that clear reporting standards are maintained to track cost-effectiveness and participation impact.