The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting AGAINST this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
We want to begin by acknowledging the effort and thought behind this proposal. The team included lessons from the Delegate Incentive Program and attempted to create a clearer distinction between delegates and contributors through a more structured framework. The intent to improve accountability, encourage transparency, and expand recognition to contributors is nice and directionally positive for the DAO.
However, after reviewing the proposal and reflecting on our experience across all previous DIPs, we believe that this version of DIP, while well-intentioned, would benefit from deeper alignment with the DAO’s long-term direction before being implemented. Our vote against is not a rejection of the idea itself, but a call to refine and unify approaches for the benefit of the entire ecosystem.
The separation between delegates and contributors is a natural and much-needed evolution, as it acknowledges that meaningful governance participation takes different forms. However, the current structure may benefit from a better balance between operational efficiency and community autonomy. For incentive programs to scale sustainably, decision-making authority should ideally be distributed across transparent, peer-validated processes rather than concentrated in administrative functions.
The introduction of the Peer Assembly and vouching system raises further questions about accessibility and fairness. By design, it creates a permissioned layer around participation, one that relies on social consensus rather than open criteria. Over time, such systems tend to consolidate influence around a smaller inner circle, reducing the openness that has defined Arbitrum’s governance to date. While accountability is essential, we must ensure that inclusion and decentralization remain foundational to any incentive framework adopted by the DAO.
It’s also important to recognize the broader context of where the DAO stands today. Arbitrum has reached a stage where governance experimentation has multiplied, from various incentive programs to multiple DIP revisions. This experimentation is healthy, but at this point, the DAO would benefit from more convergence rather than fragmentation. Currently, there are two active proposals: DIP 2.0 and the Triple Dip, both addressing the same fundamental challenge of delegate incentives.
This parallel effort represents more than just creative diversity; it reflects a coordination gap. Instead of working together toward a unified system, we now have two competing frameworks, both of which have strong ideas but separate execution paths. This is not the DAO at its best. The real strength of Arbitrum’s governance has always come from open debate followed by collective alignment, even among differing perspectives. A joint framework, one that combines the operational clarity of DIP 2.0 with the decentralized logic and automation of the Triple Dip, would deliver far more value than either in isolation.