Thank you for putting this up, @NathanVDH.
We stated our disagreement with funding this initiative a couple of times in the past [1] [2]. However, this does not naturally translate to us supporting a proposal to claw back GCP funds.
This RFC proposes a promising approach to GCP, but it lacks clarity on whether other alternatives have been considered and a proper assessment of the program’s current state.
This needs more thought around it. Let’s take setting up the legal entity as an instance. Have you considered the fact that setting up an entity for GCP of this kind requires as much time as it took? The legal structure outlined in the GCP’s M&A document involves multiple layers of compliance, detailed due diligence, and iterative legal reviews that span across various jurisdictions and regulatory bodies. If other specific key milestones were persistently delayed, it would be great if you could mention/list them.
Did you also consider meeting with the interim transparency committee on this subject? Yes, the council is already set up, but we believe meeting them would have painted a clearer picture, as they have a good understanding of things.
The suggestion to claw back funds negates this comment here. You are not suggesting that funds should be deployed based only on measurable progress but all remaining unallocated funds should be returned and the program wound down.
@Jojo also asked a question along the lines of impact assessment. What are the potential consequences of terminating the GCP on Arbitrum’s ecosystem, particularly in the gaming sector? Understanding these impacts can help in evaluating whether the benefits of clawing back funds outweigh the possible setbacks.
While the proposal raises valid concerns about the GCP’s performance and accountability, a more comprehensive assessment of the program’s current state and potential alternatives could provide a balanced approach that safeguards the DAO’s interests while considering the broader implications for the Arbitrum ecosystem and delegates.