Thank you to everyone who provided highly valuable feedback. Please find the relevant responses below.
This will be up to the TMC to decide/design (and ultimately the DAO to ratify via Snapshot), but some options include OTC, an Aera or Enzyme-like product that can TWAP out of ARB over a specified time period, periodic CEX spot sells, putting the burden on the Arbitrum Foundation, etc.
The Foundation will serve as the counterparty/custodian for these funds. When researching other treasury management programs, it became apparent that the DAO as the direct counterparty for treasury funds is a legal gray area, and having a foundation with clear jurisdiction and laws to abide by is the proper path forward.
For the TM track, this will again be up to the TMC and ultimately the DAO once it ratifies the path forward. Our personal opinion here is to keep all TM funds onchain with non-custodial infrastructure, but that is just our opinion.
For the GM track, hack or theft is a legitimate concern. Some of the deals that are brought forth to the DAO will inevitably include smart contract risk, require sacrificing the element of non-custodial, among other things. But please note that the DAO must approve these deals on a case-by-case basis and weigh the pros and cons of each offer brought forward by the GMC. Itâs very difficult to define all of the risks given how different every deal could be in nature. But in our opinion, the important point is that the DAO is the ultimate decision-maker on all deals and no funds can be allocated unless it garners support.
For now, Yes. But we believe that itâs possible for OpCo to consolidate the roles of the TMC, GMC, and even the STEP Committee over time once itâs established, creating a unified treasury management function for the DAO (assuming the DAO wants OpCo tasked with doing so, which would of course require a DAO vote). As the OpCo is drafted now, there will be an individual who has extensive expertise in finance on the OpCo team. It is difficult to predict what the DAO will want and how OpCo will evolve, but we do believe it makes sense for OpCo to play a role in budgeting, treasury management, etc.
We agree with you that a DAO budget is sorely needed. However, as mentioned in the proposal, this task seems better suited for OpCo if we truly want it done the right way. Also included in the proposal is the foregone yield on the DAOâs ETH by doing nothing to date, which has led to an opportunity cost of $1M thus far. We feel as though the DAO needs a âchecking accountâ in stables to hedge against lower offchain yields (STEP) that can also cover service provider short falls due to ARB volatility to enhance the service provider experience of working with Arbitrum. Setting up such a structure will take some time, and itâs beneficial to start putting the foundational pieces in place. 15M ARB is a lot of money, but it isnât in relation to the DAOâs historical spending. The remaining 10M ARB is for ARB-only onchain strategies, so even though the yield will be extremely low, itâs good to have the service providers onboarded and the infrastructure in place so that the DAO can have many options at its disposal in the future for treasury allocation.
You are not the only one to call this out. Thank you for doing so. The original rationale was aligning committee members with the Treasury/DAOâs long-term success, hence the ARB-denominated payment terms with a vest. Additionally, the amount was small considering the project returns / small size of the allocation. For example, 7.5M stables earning 10% and 10M ARB earning 2% would ultimately return 750k stables and 200k ARB per annum. If the overhead of the program gets too high, it hardly makes sense to conduct the exercise in the first place. We must also consider the fees of the service providers themselves. Frankly, we would like to increase the TM allotment to 35M ARB, but given the reluctance of community members on this topic, we need to gather more information before making changes to the sizing.
With all that being said, we have changed the compensation structure for the committee members to 10k USDC per member per month, totaling 60k USDC for each member over the course of their term. Additionally, payment to committee members has been amended to ensure deliverables are met.
The monthly expenses were provided solely to give the DAO some added context into how much we spend on general operations (service providers, grants, and council members) given some community membersâ requests for a DAO budget. The goal should, in our opinion, be to cover a significant portion of DAO OpEx through treasury activities over time, but we felt this data point helped justify a 15M ARB conversion to a stablecoin balance to cover service provider shortfalls / other stablecoin needs.
15M ARB being sold over the course of 3 months is, in our opinion, being overstated in terms of market impact. This represents a fraction of the amount of ARB that has been released into the market when compared to incentives programs and other DAO expenditures. With that being said, and in line with our response above, the TMC will be tasked with determining the optimal conversion process, which will ultimately need to be approved by the DAO via Snapshot (thus ensuring the DAO has the final say).
These are 2 excellent callouts. As we mentioned above, we also think it makes more sense to increase the ARB budget for this proposal by 5-10M ARB (bringing the total to 30-35M ARB). However, we need more input from the wider DAO on this topic, as this was a primary point of contention in Karpatkeyâs proposal and the working group calls on treasury management, and we do not want to derail the progress of this proposal.
In regards to the clarification regarding the withdrawal process for stablecoins, the reporting and accounting standards, the process for onboarding new treasury managers, whitelisted strategies/protocols, etc⌠this recommendation will be provided by the TMC and ultimately approved by the DAO via snapshot. We have updated the proposal to include some of the aforementioned points in the TMC deliverables section.
If the staking rewards source working group arrives at the recommendation of subsidizing stARB rewards by spending ETH that had previously accrued to the DAO treasury, that would be considered a failure from our perspective. The rewards source must be sustainable, and not spend more than the DAO can fund into perpetuity. Therefore, no historically accrued yield should fall into the staking rewards group conversation. These two proposals do not overlap.
- This is a great point. We have edited the language of the proposal to include a course of action for committee members who are not performing and need to be removed. Please see the updated proposal.
- Please refer to the above replies.
- The proposal has been updated in the âTMC deliverablesâ section to ensure this point is clear. Thank you for pointing this out alongside Gauntlet.
- The aim of this proposal is to ensure the infrastructure is in place for treasury management so the DAO can move nimbly in the future if a heavier allocation towards onchain strategies is desired. We expect more cohesion across the DAOâs overall treasury strategy (to include things such as STEP) once the OpCo has been established.
- Payment terms have been updated after overwhelming feedback from interested committee members that the pay was not sufficient. We opted for a fixed rate given the problems that arise from performance-based compensation. We do not want to incentivize riskier strategy deployment due to committee payment structures. With all of that being said, we did add some protections for the DAO by anchoring pay to deliverables by only unlocking â of payment for each deliverable that is met (RFP approved via Snapshot, and each quarterly report). Please see the updated terms in the revised proposal above.
We sympathize with this point of view, but given the limited DAO ETH holdings and the significant size in dollar-denominated terms, we feel that it is important for the DAO to remain in full control of how the funds are allocated. For clarification, only a Snapshot vote with 3% of the votable token supply would be required to vote in favor/abstain of the deals on a case-by-case basis, rather than the entire governance process (onchain Tally vote). This is in an effort to reduce unnecessary friction that you have pointed out.
Additionally, we have adjusted the GMC members to include a risk-focused member that can alert the Foundation if funds ever need to be withdrawn from a specific partner protocol due to changing market conditions or other risk-related reasons, and this would not be a decision required to go through Snapshot, but rather would be up to the Foundation to act in the best interest of the DAO.
We went with two committees based on the information gathered from the first two working group calls. Additionally, many community members were against treasury managers charging a performance/AUM fee on ETH strategies given the DAOâs ability to simply stake it. While the DAO could take this approach, and this could end up being the recommendation of the GMC, it makes sense to first see what type of concessions other protocols are willing to make to deepen their alliance with the Arbitrum DAO. This type of work requires risk assessment and BD skills, whereas the TMC requires more traditional financial skills mixed with risk and portfolio construction. The OpCo proposal recently hit the forum, which makes clear there will be an individual in charge of making recommendations on the DAOâs treasury operations with clear objectives and KPIs.