Support the vote at snapshot 
. The direction of this proposal is fine, the details would be more actionable if they were more refined. The proposal mentions quarterly reports as a very important means of transparency, and I think it is possible to add some hard indicators, such as the rate of return on funds, the efficiency of funds deployment, etc., so that the community can more intuitively feel the results of the work of TMC and GMC. From the description of the proposal, the functional distinction between the two has been relatively clear, but it is still recommended that some boundary issues be clarified in the process of implementation, for example, the focus of growth management is on the ETH strategy, so if there is a need for ARB and ETH linkage, which committee will lead the way? If these details can be clarified earlier, it may reduce the friction in the implementation.
I voted FOR on this proposal. It is good to see things moving forward on the treasury management front.
Looking forward to the call with the candidates.
As we communicated to Entropy privately, we are not satisfied with replies in public or private, and do not support Austinâs inclusion on this committee in light of the inconsistencies and inability to provide either documentation or a human being to serve as a reference.
That said, while we are likely to vote against as a result, we do not plan to actively campaign against this proposal. We support the concept, even if we do not support all of the choices.
More broadly, GFX usually votes against proposals that bundle creation of an office and ratification of specific persons to hold that office. See here, here, and here for recent examples; and we generally want to maintain consistency (though we will continue to evaluate on a case-by-case basis for mitigating factors).
This is an excellent example of why the DAO should generally not bundle approval of an initiative with selection of the service provider â there is no easy way to unbundle opposition to a service provider and support for a proposal.
This was a tough decision, but Iâve decided to vote against this proposal on Snapshot. Donât get me wrongâI believe itâs a solid proposal, and effective Treasury Management is critical for overseeing the DAOâs balance sheet. However, as I mentioned in my previous reply, Iâm concerned about the absence of elections. I think appointing TMC members should be handled separately, especially given the concerns @GFXlabs raised about one of the suggested members.
I just voted against the proposal on Snapshot. I believe we started on the wrong foot by involving individuals with questionable track records. This raises concerns and fear about the management of funds being entrusted to them. I feel there exists capable members within the community to handle such an important responsibility. Hope we can discuss this further in the community call to gain greater clarity before this proposal moves to Tally for consideration.
I donât support this proposal, it should be revised with more communication and feedback to protect the interests of the community.
After reading everyoneâs comments and feedbacks, I do find some problem areas. 26M ARB and 7,500 ETH at one time is too risky, so I suggest to pilot the project on a small scale first, and then expand the allocation of funds after verifying the effect. The proposal is not clear enough about the use of funds and the supervision of committee members, and the details of regular reports, which need to be further clarified. the salaries of TMC and GMC compared with the salaries of other members of the DAO may lead to internal conflicts and disputes, and the content of the proposal design is too important. It should be revised with more communication and feedback. Safeguard the interests of the community.
I vote AGAINST this proposal in the temp-check.
I believe treasury management is a key and necessary component for the DAO.
However, I donât see this proposal as true treasury management. Instead, it seems more like an isolated allocation of a specific amount from the treasury aimed at generating returns for the DAO over a short period of six months.
As I mentioned when providing feedback:
This is how I understand treasury management: this proposal is limited to just some aspects of it.
That said, if the proposal gains broad consensus for its execution, I am willing to change my vote on Tally, but with certain considerations aligned with my perspective.
After the TMC delivers the two reports (the second at the six-month mark), I would like to propose including a third report. Considering that by that time the OpCo is expected to begin its operations, this report should cover the state of the treasury, the DAO, expenses, and recommendations for long-term sustainability.
This additional report would serve as a handover document for the OpCo, allowing it to focus on treasury management with a clear vision for long-term success.
On the other hand, I would like to see some strategies outlined regarding what the DAO does or does not want to execute with the ETH before the proposal is approved. According to the DAOs Constitution:
"Arbitrum is part of the Ethereum ecosystem, and the Arbitrum community is part of the Ethereum community. Although the ArbitrumDAO makes its own decisions and pursues its own goals, it is deeply aligned with Ethereum and sees itself as an active and constructive participant in the Ethereum community."
I believe this alignment should be considered when selecting the strategy.
At first thanks @Entropy for this proposal.
I do not support this proposal because it introduces unnecessary complexity with two separate committees and overlapping responsibilities, which could lead to inefficiency and confusion. I am also agree with @kuiclub, that before allocating this significant funds:
that creates uncertainty and risks mismanagement, it would be better make at first a small one to avoid risks
Thats why I am voting against.
I am voting against this proposal. We should rethink the process of selecting GMC members, and this proposal did not take the time to address all the delegatesâ questions.
Interesting set of feedbacks so far on the votes. Let me first anticipate the vote: in favour.
The issue addressed here, to me, is broad: is about weaponizing some assets that we have in the treasury (eth) + have an environement with less friction in the dao to pay SP in stables (conversion of arb in stables), something that we failed a couple of times already. Plus at the same time find yield strategies for these assets idling, which are the stables and up to some degree the arb.
I can kinda agree here. This is not necessarily treasury management at full scope, but is a management of a subpart of assets, with just a certain consciousness of DAO spending (regen reports) and no DAO budget yet. It tries to address some needs that we have, plus create yield on some assets doing, effectively, nothing for now.
So again: is it treasury management satisfying all the needs we have in term of spending, risk, yield etc? No. But we donât have these info, and to me is a very good way to start.
It tried to go for low hanging fruits such as eth staking, stable convertion and some yield. Already with this, in the environment (our dao) that we have, historically quite resilient to these initiative, we see a decent opposition.
I think instead is good that we start exactly here, and evolve into what we need: in 6 months we might have the opco, likely another more aggressive type of market regime, we will have hopefully some insight into timeboost revenue, and other iniative laid down that will tell us if we will have to increase/decrease size, risk, type of assets, etc.
Now letâs go on doubt, margin of improvements and others.
I donât have an opinion as strong as this one but can understand the rationality. At the same time, I can understand the rationality like entropy said of the two buckets being run with different skillset in mind.
I think the effective answer is a mix of both: there could be different people in the operation of both buckets, but there should be a single overview to always have a tab on what is effectively happening from a risk standpoint. I think, for now, the current setup is good enough, and hope that in 6 months, at renewal or under opco, it will be instead made more cohesive.
Another big improvement part in future will be STEP: it necessarily has to converge in these initiative. While it also add a somehow very specific growth nature, even more so on a BD and advertisement level since it was also about attracting institution in our DAO, we donât have to forget how in the end the goal of that initiative was to have stables deployed in RWA to produce yield for the DAO. In 6 months it should converge into whatever we will have here, and any phase 2 for step, if started in the meantime, should be setup with this merging goal in mind.
On a final note on the people involved and the process so far proposed.
I can honestly say that this makes a lot of sense as a general approach, but not always. As usual, devil is in the details, and we are a DAO in which we tend to try and have a say in everything, always.
In this very instance we have a topic that is both extremely complex (treasury management), requires a lot of expertise and so specific figures, and a history of the DAO not finding right away the path (remember the karp/gauntlet proposal was on discussion i think in july, almost 5 months ago). The fact that we need to move toward some sort of treasury management, the fact that in 6 months this will likely be revised, and the fact that Entropy made the DD on all candidates, to me is more than enough to support this initiative. And I hope others will see, more than the imperfections of it, the important step forward that it will be for the DAO, knowing that we will be able to adjust it along the road.
cp0x voted FOR this proposal
The rationale can be read in the thread
We support the idea of improving treasury management, as outlined in this proposal, as it aims to enhance how the DAO allocates and manages its assets. However, we believe the process could be further strengthened by allowing other parties to participate in the treasury and growth management processes. Introducing competition among service providers could result in better deals and more effective strategies for the DAO. Additionally, we suggest incorporating performance-based incentives for the Treasury and Growth Management Committees to keep them motivated, ensure they maximize returns while managing risks, and align their efforts with the DAOâs long-term goals.
I voted âForâ on Snapshot because I believe Treasury and Grow management tracks will help Arbitrum build a stronger financial system with flexible investment options - make sure for long-term development and stability.
Im going to support this proposal at Snapshot stage. It is important to use idle asset and let them generate yield. Either by staking them like the Aave DAO does, taking out loans against ARB to fund initiatives and at the same time earn yield or any other good opportunity.
We are voting against this proposal in its current form. While we support the main overarching goals: utilizing idle ETH to generate yield and using stablecoins for operating expenses, we have identified two critical shortcomings:
- Excessive Council Structure: The inclusion of two separate councils is unnecessary and creates operational inefficiencies. Although this structure was informed by feedback during the working group calls, we strongly recommend consolidating into a single council. This council should oversee all assets (ARB, ETH, and USD) and establish a standardized Request for Proposal (RFP) process along with a unified reporting framework. The proposed bifurcation into ARB/USD and ETH subcommittees is redundant, as qualified council members should be capable of managing all asset classes without requiring additional segmentation.
- Council Selection Process: We do not support the inclusion of a preselected council and believe that the DAO should have the opportunity to elect its representatives. We propose that a standard election is held to fill two council seats, which would then form a three-member committee alongside Entropy. To account for the increased workload, we also suggest a 50% pay increase for council members.
By implementing these changes, the proposal would streamline operations, improve accountability, and reduce the council budget by approximately 30%. We are confident these adjustments would better serve the interests of the DAO while achieving the proposalâs objectives. If these changes are included by Tally, we would be willing to change our vote in favor of the proposal.
Overall, I was in favor of this proposal. We need a more defined strategy for our treasury, and I believe in Entropy as a great team to do that. However, for a few reasons, I decided to vote Against this proposal.
Before moving forward to Tally, I would love to see:
- A clear plan for how converting ARB to stables will be handled (e.g., OTC, etc.) to avoid impacting the ARB price.
- DAOs are a great way to decide on committee members. Letâs vote on them instead of simply appointing a group.
- A more concrete plan for KPIs. What key metrics will we follow, and how will these reports be presented to the DAO?
As ChamaDAO, we believe in using our resources wisely to ensure our financial decisions promote long-term sustainability. This proposal outlines strategies to reduce risk from idle assets, diversify our treasury, and drive growth, all while maintaining transparency and accountability. By adopting a structured, DAO-led approach to treasury management, this proposal aligns with our goal of responsible fund allocation and making every dollar work efficiently.
Therefore, we will be supporting this proposal on Snapshot.
I am generally in favour of the idea of the proposal, but I agree with @Tekr0x.eth that we should see a more precise plan (or guardrails) for selling ARB for stablecoins.
One idea is to have a daily limit (as percentage of ARB volume) on ARBs sold. Another is to perhaps also sell part of ETH, not just ARB. And also to extend the timeline of selling ARB (3 months may be too short if we donât want to impact the price too much).
I also echo @404DAOâs suggestion of having only one committee instead of two.
That said, Iâm voting FOR the proposal in the Snapshot voting. But Iâd need the changes I mentioned (especially the guardrails for selling ARB) to be implemented in the proposal before supporting it in the Tally vote.
I initially voted FOR the proposal but changed it to AGAINST after seeing the last response from one of the nominated council members
Surely there is no NDA involved in giving references of people who can attest to your claims? I donât like his patronizing tone one bit here
Right now, it seems like there are still a few major areas to discuss and confirm questions about.
Firstly, the proposal notes the absence of a formal budget but defers its creation to OpCo. Without a concrete interim budget, managing cash-like reserves might become ad hoc or misaligned with long-term goals.
It would also be interesting in determining what stablecoins and what the selection criteria for stablecoins (e.g., risk levels, protocol choices) are. Maybe including a whitelist of stablecoins or criteria for selecting them would add clarity and mitigate risks associated with stablecoin volatility or depegging.
Additionally, while payments for TMC and GMC members are milestone-based, the $300K USDC cost could be considered high for a pilot initiative. Also, the GMCâs potential reliance on NDAs may conflict with DAO principles of transparency. This comment and concern is also valid, we are not a fan of this tone and itâs not productive during this time.