@Entropy hasn’t this been the case since the very beginning? Attracting the right lead has always been the key achievement to unlock for the initiative to be successful. What changed now on this front?
I’m voting against OpCo on Tally, my position hasn’t changed much since temp-check:
On Centralization vs. Decentralization:
One of the core strengths of DAOs is their ability to minimize gatekeepers and trusted intermediaries. As envisioned, OpCo could become a gatekeeper, interposing itself between the DAO’s broader community and potential contributors. While the DAO retains nominal authority, OpCo might end up influencing who gets contracts and which initiatives progress. This creates a power structure that’s less open, less trust-minimized, and potentially more susceptible to the sway of a few individuals.Censorship Resistance and Legal Attack Vectors:
Introducing a legal wrapper around DAO operations inherently broadens the attack surface. Under traditional legal pressures, OpCo could be compelled to censor initiatives, freeze funds, or discriminate against certain contributors. One of the great benefits of a permissionless DAO is its built-in resilience against such censorship. By contrast, a legal entity is susceptible to the full force of conventional legal and political pressure, undermining the censorship resistance and sovereignty that define the DAO ethos.Innovation vs. Operational Efficiency:
While supporters might argue that OpCo would bring streamlined operations, attract top talent, and ensure continuity, these benefits come at the cost of layering on a traditional corporate model. Although efficiency may improve in the short term, we risk sacrificing the long-term innovation and permissionless participation that are fundamental to the DAO’s identity. Encouraging everyone to pass through a single operational hub could stifle the very qualities that make DAOs so powerful.Conclusion:
As a lunarpunk and a staunch advocate for trust minimization and decentralization, I see this proposal as introducing considerable centralization risks and censorship vulnerabilities. Although there may be operational advantages, I believe the DAO should pursue solutions rooted in cryptographic guarantees and decentralized frameworks rather than reverting to the familiar (but ultimately restrictive) structures of traditional entities. For these reasons, I will be voting against this proposal on Snapshot.
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gm, voted FOR on Tally as well.
The recent activities and conversations in the DAO convinced me even more that a more structured approach within the DAO can speed up the ecosystem’s progress.
We need people who are fully focused on executing and delivering results for Arbitrum – the OpCo is a great shot at that.
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Voting AGAINST this proposal on Tally
Reasons:
- the reasons we cited before in our snapshot are still valid: cost, scope, lack of clarity, centralization.
- The original proposer Entropy has voted against this proposal, citing that they may be able to take on more of the roles Opco was intended for, and that AF is also getting more involved with Arbitrum DAO, reducing the need for an Opco.
- ARB Price is doing terribly, spending control is clearly needed.
Given these developments, and especially the fact that the original proposer of this - Entropy changed their position to be against this proposal, we are firmly still against this proposal.
We recognize the need for an Opco but it seems that role may be able to handled in a more streamlined way through the participation of Entropy and AF, and this proposal may not be the best way to handle it.
I’m voting AGAINST this proposal. Given the author’s change in stance, I don’t feel confident moving forward with it.
Given that the proposal has not undergone substantial changes since the temperature check, I am maintaining my support and voting in favor on Tally for the same reasons as previously stated (OpCo – A DAO-adjacent Entity for Strategy Execution - #101 by 0x_ultra)
DAOplomats is voting FOR this proposal on Tally.
We initially supported this initiative during the temp check and we are maintaining our support during the onchain vote.
I am voting FOR this proposal in Tally. I respect Entropy’s concerns about overlapping with the Foundation’s evolving role, but I believe the OpCo’s benefits will complement existing initiatives for control.
As I mentioned earlier, I think that the OAT’s oversight is crucial for the OpCo to operate within the boundaries of the DAO’s oversight. The proposal also has strong safeguards in place, if OpCo isn’t working well or becomes unnecessary, the DAO can adjust its role or shut it down completely.
I also consider the safeguards that are in place regarding fund management as an important part of the proposal.
About the budget size, I agree it is a valid concern, but the need for institutionalization and bringing structure to the DAO’s operations justifies this investment in the mid to long term.
I voted FOR this proposal on Tally. I believe the DAO needs a fully-empowered, fully-aligned organization in place to drive forward the (many) initiatives that are difficult to execute via decentralized governance. I’m excited about the Arbitrum Foundation stepping up to take on a larger role, but I believe OpCo is still needed.
We maintain our earlier stance and have voted FOR OpCo on Tally
After hearing the last call i decided to keep my stance and vote again “for” in tally. I still belive the OpCo will have a greater benefit than drawbacks.
Voted Against: It took me quite some time to wrap my thoughts around this proposal. In general, I fully agree to set up an entity that would execute for the DAO. I am sure this would result in much more efficient operations. But based on how the proposal is structured, I decided to vote against it. I don’t like that the OpCo proposal is set for such a long period (2+ years).
Since it’s that long, the budget is also significant (30M ARB). The proposal already plans to hire 12 full-time employees (besides OAT members) from the start. This kind of approach reminds me of government-funded agencies or something. A big concern for me is also about the “off switch.” In case things don’t turn out as we expect, will we really terminate this? Will we fire people that we worked alongside for the last 2 years? This could become a mess for all of us.
The argument here is that with a big treasury, we need to make big moves. I disagree. We do have a big treasury, but the DAO space is still very early and inexperienced. We need to experiment, and we do that by staying lean and agile. I support the idea of OpCo, but not at this size.
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This is a real tough one for me. I wanted to vote yes and no several different times.
In general, I like the spirit of this initiative, it aspires to solve real problems. I think it would level up our professionalism for sure.
However, on the other hand this is a lot of extra cost for a lot of redundant effort a $12M initiative probably could be a little more structured. Entropy, ADCP and ARDC fulfill a lot of these needs and if the Foundation is coming in to take a more active role, I could see them filling the rest of the coordination gaps. Will OpCo work to coordinate all these parties…? Maybe. But the scope is broad and vague.
Also, dumping ~25M ARB on the market right now, while i’m sure the markets can handle it, sends a pretty bad signal. Is it worth it?
This is what I ask myself… but in the end, the foundation supports it, and we need a major push right now so:
I am voting “For” this proposal
This is an important moment in Arbitrum history, we need to turn the tide, we used to dominate the L2 space by a wide margin, but no longer. Base is eating our lunch, and there are more rollups coming with some competitive differences. If we have the Foundation, Entropy and OpCo, making a push right now, we can change the momentum, and bring us back into dominance.
It is not a moment to rest on our laurels. LFG.
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After much consideration, I have decided to vote FOR this proposal, as there are clear benefits for its implementation, and it might kickstart a new era of positive and swift movement for Arbitrum.
One of the key elements that made me lean to make this decision has to do with the need to employ people working full time for the DAO, as there are limitations to what we delegates can do and the speed at which we can achieve certain objectives that can be more easily tackled by a more professional and specialized organization.
I believe that the probable benefits of passing this proposal, given the protections that are also part of it regarding the performance and objectives of OpCo, are far more enticing than its potential drawbacks (which do exist).
We vote FOR the proposal on Tally.
Even after acknowledging that the Foundation steps up into a more active role in the DAO operations and Entropy’s updated stance on the OpCo, we still believe the strategy execution is an important function of the DAO and if correctly managed, it will make a significant impact in tandem with Entropy and the Foundation as well as critical service providers and delegates.
The PBC Governance team is voting FOR establishing the OpCo on Tally.
The proposal is just about to hit quorum onchain (with ~8 hours remaining), so we’re throwing our two cents in here to help it along.
There’s been a clear vibe shift in the DAO these past few weeks, and we believe that the OpCo can help keep the fire going. Having an aligned entity staffed by full-time contributors can really help execute where we’ve struggled before. It’s time for the DAO to cook.
We are voting “AGAINST” the proposal, for the following reasons:
- Centralization in the hiring of service providers. We understand that the OpCo will have the commitment to go through the DAO to hire the SPs to achieve the objectives set by the Arbitrum DAO, but it is not clear when the distinction will be made between hiring SPs directly by the OpCo vs hired by the DAO. This lack of clarity may make it simpler to hire via OpCo which, despite being more agile, will not necessarily be more efficient.
- Redundancy with the Arbitrum Foundation. We note that the Arbitrum Foundation supports the proposal, mainly because it reduces the DAO’s dependence on the Foundation. However, there could be a redundancy between the functions of OpCo and the foundation, as well as a conflict between the actions/obligations of DAO and OpCo - since the company can expand its scope if it sees fit and has the resources to do so.
- High operating costs. As brought up by other delegates, the high remuneration assigned to C-level positions (above that practiced in the market) and lack of clarity on the allocation of remuneration for future OpCo employees. The operating cost of similar entities at Lido and dYdX had a much lower initial cost. We think it’s important to bring in a competitive remuneration to attract talent to OpCo, but balanced with what is already practiced in the market (perhaps a lower fixed remuneration and a higher bonus with clearer KPIs).
We know that Arbitrum needs to improve its efficiency and there are frictions in doing this in a DAO. However, if the option is to increase centralization in order to gradually decentralize, this proposal could lead to more risks for the DAO, consuming its resources (U$15M) in a risky experiment for the organization.
For those who are curious, we’ve studied models to better understand how the structure of the entities/companies that DAOs have works:
• The dYdX - About dYdX Ops subDAO | Shaping Decentralized Finance
• Lido - Organize the Lido Alliance Program as a Lido-DAO-Adjacent BORG - Proposals - Lido Governance
I see that they are necessary and can really help. But I found the cost of the proposal very high. Despite this, we understand why the proposal was generally well received by the delegates.
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Voting FOR this proposal
For not because this proposal is perfect, if anything the fact that Entropy was tasked with stewarding this proposal and then basically ran chicken away from it shows it was far from perfect. It had a bloated budget and created as sense that this would simply superseed all DAO activity, which I think is far from the truth.
The DAO though doesn’t have the option of ignoring the challenges in front of it. We need to ensure that now and in the future the ability to marshal resources to to meet our growth in terms of product, strategy, investment, delivery and oversight.
Setting up OpCo is at this stage only a shell. How far and what we want it to do will be fully subject to oversight electing a council to oversee its activity and especially its setup. The mandates may or may not have been fully established but programs like LTIPP, GCP, STEP show that as a DAO one thing we are capable of is electing and putting in place the oversight needed.
With OpCo we have options, and that alone can help ensure that contributors, vendors, administrators of programs have to work with the DAO that is not helpless to do anything itself and stop contracting with us as if we are in a position of weakness.
If OpCo doesn’t pass is the DAO fatally damaged? Nope, it just means that not today but in the future when we want to move quickly we will have to take more time and may not have had time to work out the hiccups that will delay us at that stage. We will continue to establish programs, and be reliant on external parties, life will go on but we just won’t be as geared up.
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Just my 2cents since I am ex-Lido and know the dYdX sub-DAO very well (my husband has been with it since inception & and is the current GM):
- Lido Alliance: the scope is very narrow, the goal of Alliance is only to work together with/support and eventually incubate (still tbd) protocols that have synergies with Lido. The rest of the DAO (with ~200 full time contributors) is not part of this
- dYdX Ops subDAO: also very narrow scope, owning and operating the community owned infrastructure: frontend and some backend services with the necessary contributors and service providers (last mandate proposal asking for 20M for 3 years)
Just wanted to give this clarification in case other delegates read this and still need to vote.
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We are maintaining our “Abstain” vote on the on-chain proposal. Although the DAO clearly needs an operational scaffolding, this proposal relies heavily on the OAT election and a single hire without a clear process or an identified candidate versed in Arbitrum DAO operations. That dependence creates too much uncertainty to support blindly.
We also remain concerned about the proposal’s broad scope. We understand the tradeoff in flexibility, but the final version remains purposefully vague despite our concerns that it lacks specific KPIs and a defined roadmap. Compounding matters, several entities—including the Arbitrum Foundation, Offchain Labs, and even the proposal’s original authors—are now publicly positioning themselves to fulfill or redefine the roles OpCo intended to occupy. If the operational scope were clearer, it would be easier to support OpCo.
We acknowledge the DAO’s need for sovereign operational infrastructure. However, in light of these evolving dynamics, it is difficult to see how OpCo, as currently proposed, can confidently serve that function. Consequently, we will maintain our Abstain vote.
Should the proposal pass, Gauntlet will fully support the setup and aims to be heavily involved as a delegate to support the success of OpCo. It will be critical to the DAO’s success that this entity is staffed with capable and committed people.