I voted FOR as the editions made between the Snapshot vote and the Tally touched most points I was raising.
I voted AGAINST this proposal on Tally. While I agree with having an OpCo, I think the proposal’s budget is too high and the team size is too big. I see no point in having a full-time, in-house legal counsel, as well as some other employee roles at this point. I’ve seen in other DAOs that they started similar entities with as little as one employee and would scale later on if necessary.
The correct approach is to start lean, with a narrow scope, a short initial (pilot) phase, and then evaluate and scale the budget and the team if necessary. If the proposal was framed like that, I would have supported it.
I have decided to vote against this proposal on Tally for the reasons I mention before:
#1 Complexity of governance:
While the participation of new users in the forum has been increasing, the attendance of new users in the call has also increased by 15% - 20% each month, which tells us about a scenario with a greater number of requests (proposals) that strengthen the DAO. The importance of an entity like OpCo for project management will be necessary but not at this time. Centralizing the entity can lend itself to favoritism regarding who obtains new contracts and which projects are given more focus.
#2 Budgetary transparency:
I understand that the budget mentioned is an approximation of the estimate based on the number of staff who will be supporting this initiative from the start. However, not knowing the authors who are going to carry out the activities raises doubts about whether these people are sufficiently qualified to perform in their area. It is also mentioned that there will be a variation in salaries if there is compliance with indicators, but these indicators have not yet been mentioned or detailed for either OpCo or OAT.
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I voted AGAINST this proposal on Tally. Echoing the sentiment from here, as increasing regulatory concerns (which are not sufficiently clear in the proposal) makes it so that establishing an OpCo and committing to it for a long time frame warrants much greater consideration.
While I recognize there are clear benefits in creating a separate legal entity, this should ideally be given a proper trial run on a smaller scale to increase its chances of passing with a proven track record of efficiency that can off balance most voters apprehensions as of today.
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Voted FOR the OpCO. See my Commenting Rationale.
I decided to vote in favor of this proposal on Tally for the following reasons:
- there were a lot of concerns early on throughout the proposal, but they were articulated a lot in Entropy’s reply comments and in the bi-weekly meetings.
Currently ArbDAOs face inefficiencies and unclear responsibilities when executing complex strategies.OpCo, as a legal entity, can provide a structured execution framework for DAOs to ensure continuity and efficient advancement of strategies.
2、After its establishment, it should be able to solve the problem of resource allocation, attract more high-quality contributors and service providers, and expand the operable scope of DAOs
3, The establishment and operation of OpCo requires financial support of 30M ARB, which may put pressure on DAO’s short-term financial liquidity. In particular, it also adds a very high budget. Although it is not the perfect solution at the moment, OpCo will set up an Oversight Committee (OAT) to ensure transparency in the use of funds and regular reports on implementation, a mechanism that can enhance the DAO’s ability to oversee the implementation of funds and strategies. Therefore it is still hoped that this big step will be taken from the DAO level.
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I’m voting against this proposal on tally because I think the budget is too high, I think we should start with something smaller even thought the idea itself sounds great. I’t looks like it could be over-hiring…
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After thinking about it, vote on tally：AGAINST
Mainly because there are still a lot of concerns against the proposal and because other things may happen in practice as well. The approximate reasons.：
- The funding requirement is too high and lacks transparency, the budget is too broad, and many of the funding streams (executive ，salaries， administration) do not give detailed cost descriptions, and there is a risk of non-transparency. The proposal calls for 30 million ARB, a huge budget for a new experimental organization. DAO funds should not be easily committed, of which $12 million is for cash liquidation, the process lacks clear implementation details, and there is no adequate DAO supervision, which may lead to wasted or misused funds.
- OpCo needs to set up a huge internal operation team involving many departments such as legal, finance, personnel, project management, etc., which may make the DAO more bureaucratic and reduce the efficiency of execution.
- he proposal requires the DAO to immediately allocate 30 million ARB, but the long-term value and contribution of OpCo is not clear, and there is a risk that the DAO’s funds will be locked up for a long time, and the results will not meet expectations. If OpCo’s operation is not good, it may be difficult for the DAO to recover the funds, which will lead to a waste of the DAO’s resources.
It is recommended that the DAO further optimize its proposal, reduce its budget, and enhance transparency and decentralized governance.
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For the reasons outlined during the temp-check vote, I vote FOR this proposal on Tally
I voted NO because I believe DAOs should operate with the minimum structure necessary. We need to stay as decentralized as possible, allowing initiatives to grow organically and enabling the community to swarm toward the ultimate goal of increasing ARB’s value by showing growth within our ecosystem.
Additionally, while not the sole reason for my vote, I’d like to point out that the proposal lacks clear execution details, such as how OpCo will be structured, how leadership will be chosen, and what mechanisms will ensure alignment with DAO governance.
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Voting in FAVOUR
I have multiple concerns with this proposal that I have shared multiple times and don’t feel they’ve been addressed properly. However, the DAO is in bad need of execution capacity and so I’m supporting this, begrudgingly
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I still see the value in setting up OpCo for Arbitrum. It could help streamline management, finances, and strategy, while bringing more professionalism and transparency to the DAO.
Although I do have some concerns about the 30-month timeline and the 30M ARB budget, I’m willing to give it a shot and see how it impacts the DAO.
Hopefully with OpCo, we’ll have a healthier, stronger, and more decentralized DAO with expert contributions.
Voted For on Tally!
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The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas. It’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We’re voting FOR the proposal, following our support during the temp-check. We didn’t post our rationale back during the Snapshot vote, so we’ll explain our train of thought and decision-making process for both votes in this reply.
Ever since the idea of an OpCo was first discussed following DK’s post (linked in the original proposal), we saw and understood the need for the entity described. To outside participants, Arbitrum DAO might seem like a hive buzzing with energy, with contributors carrying out different initiatives. However, To insiders, the operational gaps are apparent and have been for months.
As things are right now, and if we want to be objective, the DAO isn’t a great partner to work with. Even the smallest proposal must overcome many hurdles to pass, and that’s a deterrent for many projects wishing to collaborate with or work for the DAO.
While the OpCo won’t necessarily be the solution to all the operational problems, it definitely has the potential to be. But with that potential comes risk: failure, centralization, overspending, etc.
Internally, we discussed and assessed the proposal based on our understanding and vision of what the OpCo can be, and, given we’re no seers, not of how it will actually work. That’s important to clarify, as the practical implementation of how the OpCo operates within a DAO is somewhat subjective and not necessarily analogous to operational companies as understood in more traditional industries.
The team behind the OpCo, from the Chief Chaos Officer down to the last employee, will play a central role in how the entity operates. Unless those individuals are fully aligned with the DAO and Arbitrum, we probably won’t see OpCo having the desired impact. Working for the DAO’s OpCo should expand beyond the scope of the job description in terms of responsibility for carrying out the tasks. In essence, and akin to a startup, the premise of success lies with the people rather than with the structure of the entity itself.
Given that, the two questions that we asked ourselves were:
- Do we currently have people within the DAO who could staff the OpCo who already have the relevant skills, experience, and context?
- If yes, then we should focus our efforts on figuring out the structure and specifics to enable those people to work.
- If not, then:
- Do we have the means of hiring and ‘onboarding’ the right talent to the OpCo without making the entity’s success a long shot?
For the second question, we expect Entropy and the Arbitrum Foundation to step in and help source the right people. Since the newly formed and DAO-elected OAT will hire for the executive-level positions, we want to ensure that they will have access to a solid pipeline of candidates.
Overall, we expect that attracting and hiring the right talent will be one of the biggest challenges we’ll need to overcome to make OpCo work effectively. The OpCo and its employees need to make the whole thing work in a DAO setting and not have the entity work as a hub of the top delegates.
The OAT, specifically the people who compose it, will be pivotal in the success or failure of the whole endeavor. They need to ensure that they hire the right people and that the OpCo is executing for the benefit of the DAO and not for the benefit of its own existence.
To summarize, we believe that the OpCo will be a proving ground for the DAO. The structure itself is something that can be tweaked, but the whole initiative will, at least at first, heavily rely on the people who make up the OAT and the OpCo itself. We cannot stress enough how important it is for the DAO to figure out how to make this whole thing work.
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I am also voting FOR this proposal, given that Entropy has shown value with first the AF grant received, then their DAO proposal and all of this would now get merged into OpCo. I hope my concerns about overhiring and employees trying to create work to appear engaged don’t come to pass.
I can maybe shed some light here as one of those that made a proposal to the DAO, with 3 points that OpCo can make the process easier for folks like me
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My biggest hurdle (in terms of time) was actually figuring out the program manager selection for STEP and its monitoring, not doing the actual work with the committee in selecting products. With OpCo, my wish would be that proposal writers can execute what they need within a fixed timeframe, with details of implementation and monitoring thereafter taken care of by the OpCo.
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For those elephants here with long memories, another issue with STEP 1 was the controversy around committee pay. Having OpCo negotiate and approve the pay would make things significantly easier.
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The third is around program evaluation. If i state that STEP was a success, it is naturally met with skepticism since reputation blowback wouldn’t let me say otherwise. Entropy doing analysis on RWA growth of the chain since STEP led to it being easier to propose STEP 2. Having OpCo as an impartial but opinionated arbitrator stating whether DAO programs are worth renewing is another avenue I hope they take under their wing.
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After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “FOR” on this proposal at the Tally Vote.
Rationale
Considering that the proposal has not undergone significant changes other than the adjustment of the amount to be requested based on the current state of the market, we maintain our position, previously justified in this comment.
As in @web3citizenxyz representation. Voting FOR, without retroactive in this proposal. Below the rationale:
This proposal has some good ideas, but there are important concerns. I am agree that this plan could make the DAO stronger, but also the creation of OpCo also adds many layers of management, which may slow down decision-making instead of making it more efficient.
There is no clear way for the DAO to recover its funds if OpCo does not work as expected.
30 million ARB is a big amount, and most of it goes to operational costs instead of investments that can bring value back to the DAO. It is important to focus more on investments rather than just covering salaries, administration, and other expenses. Also, there is no clear explanation of how the DAO can earn back the 30M ARB. Will OpCo generate revenue, or will it just spend funds without returning value?
To be ohnest I think it would be better if the budget of proposal will be reduced.
Against. Arbitrum DAO is the most active DAO, with a large number of innovations, including many grant requests. Do you really need a three-year plan to build a highly efficient Arbitrum DAO? In reality, this just creates inefficiency.
Your plan involves a huge budget, but I don’t see a more effective approach. This is a waste.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in Tally voting.
Moving from Snapshot to Tally, and noting the budget adjustment based on the current state of the market, we maintain our position, trusting in OpCo’s ability to effectively manage the outlined responsibilities.
As @krst mentioned:
The selection of the team, especially the OAT members, is critical. We agree with the suggestion that Entropy and the Arbitrum Foundation can actively help find the right people for these roles.
It’s important that the team formed for 30 months as mentioned in the proposal should be capable, disciplined, and determined enough to support the growth of Arbitrum until that time and not to drop in between.
We believe OpCo’s strategic management and operational capabilities could greatly enhance our ability to prioritize and deploy new projects, making our ecosystem stronger and more dynamic. We trust this initiative will keep power decentralized, protecting the future of Arbitrum.
Entropy has voted AGAINST on OpCo.
To start, some context might be helpful. OpCo was an idea that started at ETH Denver last year. In short, it was a solution to the problem that was the DAO not having full-time contributors. DK followed up by proposing a high-level vision for OpCo that got many excited about its value for the DAO, a second and more active Foundation. Following DK’s proposal, and Entropy’s funding, Entropy was asked by many delegates to drive the initiative forward in an executable and optimal way. We believe we have done this and fulfilled our original mandate as a facilitator for the initiative and a tool that drives forward the items that the DAO prioritizes. That said, it is our opinion the need for the OpCo is now overstated and likely to even lead to operational friction and unnecessary costs. With the Arbitrum Foundation committing to taking an active role in governance and Entropy Advisors doing the same, the landscape has completely changed from this time last year. Our main concerns with OpCo, outside of the aforementioned, surround being weary of its potential to attract the right talent that will lead it to being an impactful initiative instead of another competing foundation with bloat, lacking executors who drive the DAO in the right direction. We believe with the structure as proposed, OpCo is a safe experiment (although with some sunk cost), given if the 3 members elected to the OAT cannot find a talented lead, the entity can be stopped even after its funding.
We think it is important to mention that Entropy does have a COI. We believe that in tandem with a now more hands-on Foundation, Entropy can achieve many of the values and purposes of OpCo in a leaner manner, without the DAO having to take on additional risk in the form of, e.g., finding leaders for the entity. Over the coming weeks, we will start to synergize more heavily with Arbitrum-aligned teams, using our role as a more opinionated leader in the DAO rather than solely as a tool for delegates.
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