[SOS Submission] SEEDGov – Strategic Objectives
Summary
This strategic objectives matrix was designed by SEEDGov to professionalize Arbitrum DAO’s governance, reduce friction for new participants, and establish a solid foundation for its institutional evolution.
We propose a structure that organizes the ecosystem around (not inside) OpCo, addressing existing gaps in coordination, specialization, and accountability.
Our objectives focus on six key areas:
- Effective governance and an achievable quorum
- Vertical specialization in critical areas
- Operational frameworks for workstreams
- Standardization of business units with OpCo as the Strategic Control Panel
- Innovative decision-making and funding mechanisms
- Development of a DAO-custom reputation system
Rationale
Arbitrum DAO has managed to establish itself as one of the most relevant and decentralized in the ecosystem, but it still faces challenges related to day-to-day governance, the high entry barrier for new contributors, and a lack of structured processes for specialization and optimization of decision-making, as well as accountability for both processes and the actors involved.
Governance, Participation, and Reputation Systems
When it comes to day-to-day governance, participation in votes and anti-capture mechanisms have both been widely discussed and are pressing matters for protecting the DAO’s interests. With increasing quorum requirements and the emergence of financial incentives for delegating voting power, it’s clear that establishing mechanisms to strengthen the participation of delegated voting power—as well as initiatives aimed at safeguarding the DAO from external attacks—should be a top priority.
One promising initiative in this regard was ARB staking, but it has yet to reach consensus on several parameters, such as the source of revenue, the strategy for redelegating the voting power of stARB used in DeFi, and even the criteria for defining what constitutes an active delegate or which delegates should be promoted for delegation.
We believe that establishing a reputation system tailored to Arbitrum DAO could help clarify these aspects and also recognize key contributors who have long supported the DAO’s mission but have not gained representation through delegated voting power.
Professionalization, Workstreams, and Standardization of Business Units
With OpCo just around the corner and the new approach proposed by the AF in “A Vision for the Future of Arbitrum”, it’s clear that the way we interact with the DAO will change significantly, bringing greater clarity around Arbitrum’s objectives. The DAO is evolving—and so must its delegates and contributors—by specializing in the verticals aligned with the goals outlined in the SOS or by offering their services as providers/contributors in various initiatives.
The high entry barrier for new contributors reflects the same issue mentioned by the AF in the quoted post: today, getting involved in Arbitrum from scratch entails an extremely steep learning curve due to the sheer volume and diversity of discussions taking place. A more structured DAO, with clear objectives and well-defined verticals as priorities, will not only streamline the participation of existing members but also make it easier for new members to join the community. However, it is up to us to design mechanisms to define the target audience and then attract and retain that talent. While it’s true that delegates and contributors should experience less overload, we must focus on ensuring the DAO has a strong pool of talent available to make high-level decisions, approve protocol upgrades, execute proposals under the oversight of the OpCo and Arbitrum-Aligned Entities, and allocate treasury funds.
That’s why we aim to propose a series of structured processes to ensure the specialization and professionalization of community members (a topic already being worked on through the DIP) and also to establish methods for identifying contributions beyond this forum—such as recurring DAO calls, the delegates’ Telegram chat, and other contributions like private feedback.
Contributor specialization will allow us to design frameworks for SOS-aligned workstreams in which these community members can participate under the oversight of OpCo. Each business unit within the DAO must operate under the same standards—sharing a strategic vision and aligned reporting cadence, KPIs, etc.—instead of functioning as isolated silos as they currently do.
Decision-Making and Funding Mechanisms
Regarding decision-making and funding mechanisms, we’ve seen time and again that when proposals like the Arbitrum D.A.O. Grants Program reach the end of their cycles, the DAO receives a flood of small proposals on the forum due to the lack of mechanisms to fill that gap. It’s clear that today the DAO depends on these types of structures to fund smaller initiatives, and without them, the decision-making process becomes unviable, as delegates must devote time to evaluating these initiatives at the expense of more significant decisions.
Even with greater involvement of AAEs in decision making and proposal execution, it is likely that analyzing 400 submissions would be overkill for any of these entities. This is why we believe alternative mechanisms should be explored to provide continuity and efficiency.
Risks and Challenges
Although the objectives outlined here are achievable and aligned with Arbitrum’s MVP, there are structural, technical, and political risks that could hinder their implementation:
- Operational fragmentation: Without an effective coordination layer (OpCo, workstreams, frameworks), the DAO may fall into isolated efforts with no synergistic impact.
- Lack of social adoption: Even with good ideas, the lack of conviction from delegates and contributors can block implementation. This is particularly relevant for objectives like reputation systems, alternative funding, and DAO-owned business units.
- Institutional inertia and resistance to change: Many actors are used to grant-based models and structures with low accountability. Introducing corporate-style structures with KPIs and performance tracking may generate friction.
- Technical complexity and incomplete measurement: Tracking invisible contributions (calls, mentoring, off-forum advising) requires sophisticated tools and criteria that have yet to be developed.
- Shortage of senior human resources: Some objectives—like vertical professionalization or governance of business units—require specialized profiles that are difficult to attract without sufficient reputation or incentives.
Non-Capital Resources Required
To achieve the proposed objectives, resources will be needed that don’t necessarily involve direct spending, but do require strategic commitment, coordination, and technical or organizational expertise. The main non-capital resources needed include:
- Specialized technical talent in the design of DAO-native reputation systems, contribution tracking tools, and user-friendly interfaces for new voting/funding mechanisms.
- Operational facilitators and project managers to monitor workstream implementation, coordinate updates across business units, and ensure accountability.
- Active and sustained participation of delegates and contributors, especially during experimental phases like pilots for decision-making mechanisms or reputation system validation.
- Direct support from OpCo as a coordination and oversight center, from generating standardized documentation to appointing and auditing leads of each work unit.
- Commitment from the builder ecosystem (from Orbit chains to programs like GCP or STEP) to integrate their own metrics and practices within the SOS matrix framework.
- Low-cost or community-driven technological tools (i.e. Karma) adapted to Arbitrum DAO’s needs for prototype testing and evaluation.
1-Year Strategic Objectives & Key Results
Objective 1: Increase Effective Governance and Participation
Facilitate quorum attainment and strengthen active participation from delegates—especially those who are underrepresented—through the implementation of reputation and anti-capture mechanisms. Strengthening participation and quorum reinforces the DAO’s sovereign character, enabling effective self-governance and the responsible management of Arbitrum’s immense economic potential.
- KR 1.1: Increase the current average participation from X% to Y% of delegated tokens. This can be achieved through ARB staking or other mechanisms.
- KR 1.2: Implement a proof of concept for a delegate reputation system, with at least 50 participants.
- KR 1.3: Design and test an anti-capture mechanism.
Objective 2: Professionalize the DAO with Vertical Specialists
Create a distributed knowledge environment where each vertical (legal, research, product, etc.) has validated experts, enabling more informed decision-making. By embedding domain experts into DAO operations, Arbitrum can build high-functioning business units that replicate the efficiency and vision of traditional enterprises — but owned and operated by the DAO itself.
- KR 2.1: Onboard at least 5 specialists per identified strategic vertical.
- KR 2.2: Launch a public and auditable directory of DAO specialists.
- KR 2.3: Release an MVP of a specialist pool, enabling workgroup or bounty-based calls for participation.
- KR 2.4: Double the number of active independent contributors in the ecosystem within one year.
Objective 3: Design and Test a Workstreams Framework
Develop and implement a formalized framework for Workstreams that enables the DAO to scale operational execution under a decentralized yet structured model. Each Workstream should be organized by strategic vertical (legal, governance, DeFi, gaming, education, etc.), with defined leadership, clear roles, and transparent reporting and accountability mechanisms.
The goal is not only to facilitate the creation of working groups but to establish a replicable organizational architecture that transforms these groups into productive units capable of executing key initiatives aligned with the SOS, and coordinated by OpCo as the central articulator. This will lay the foundation for a DAO that operates like a functional economy, with teams working under corporate governance principles but collectively owned.
This objective builds on successful structures like STEP, aiming to ensure that Workstreams do not operate as isolated silos, but as synchronized components of a broader strategic plan.
- KR 3.1: Formalize and launch 3 SOS-aligned workstreams with defined leads, scopes, and reporting lines by the end of the year.
- KR 3.2: Publish a public and replicable playbook on how to form, operate, and dissolve a Workstream within Arbitrum DAO.
- KR 3.3: Publish quarterly performance reports for Workstreams.
2-Year Strategic Objectives & Key Results
Objective 4: Consolidate OpCo as the Strategic Control Panel of a DAO-Owned Economy
Transform OpCo into a scalable coordination and oversight layer that enables DAO-funded programs, business units, and workstreams to operate with professional governance standards, a shared strategic vision, and measurable accountability. By doing so, Arbitrum DAO can evolve from a grants-based ecosystem into an interconnected, DAO-owned operational economy capable of funding, executing, and sustaining long-term initiatives.
- KR 4.1: Design and deploy a standardized framework for DAO-owned business units with OpCo as the oversight entity, including charter, scope, and performance requirements.
- KR 4.2: Host quarterly strategic planning sessions with leads from all DAO-funded programs to synchronize goals, budgets, and execution timelines.
- KR 4.3: Ensure that 100% of DAO-funded units adopt a minimum corporate governance structure (milestone tracking, reporting cadence, KPIs) by the end of year 2.
Objective 5: Innovate in Decision-Making and Funding Mechanisms
Explore, test, and institutionalize new governance and capital allocation mechanisms that allow Arbitrum to evolve beyond traditional token-based voting and unilateral grants. This objective aims to lay the foundation for an adaptive decision-making infrastructure, with tools designed to enhance legitimacy, scale participation, and promote efficient allocation of public resources.
Inspired by models like Futarchy, Quadratic Voting, and Quadratic Funding, the focus will be on practical experiments that allow the DAO to validate outcomes based on preferences expressed by value and conviction—not just token holdings. Additionally, the creation of specialized community funds managed by mechanisms that prioritize collective impact over individual or political interests will be encouraged.
- KR 5.1: Launch two pilot programs for alternative mechanisms (e.g., Futarchy, QF).
- KR 5.2: Establish at least one community fund managed through Quadratic Funding.
- KR 5.3: Publish impact and adoption metrics for each governance experiment.
Objective 6: Create a DAO-Aware Reputation System
Design and implement a custom-built reputation system tailored to Arbitrum DAO. This system should go beyond surface-level metrics like voting records or forum activity, capturing and valuing both visible and invisible contributions—such as participation in calls, mentoring, proposal reviews, leadership in workstreams, and other efforts outside traditional public channels.
This system should not function as an isolated tool, but as a transversal layer that informs key processes such as resource allocation, decision-making participation, workstream composition, delegate incentives, and onboarding workflows.
Inspired by tools like Karma, Coordinape, SourceCred, and other DAO-native models, the goal is for reputation to become a non-transferable but accumulable asset that reflects trajectory, impact, and reliability within the ecosystem. Additionally, the system should be compatible with staking mechanisms or other forms of symbolic commitment to the DAO, aligning long-term incentives.
This system will enhance accountability, reduce over-reliance on token ownership as the sole power source, and foster the emergence of distributed leadership—legitimized by contributions rather than visibility alone.
- KR 6.1: Co-create a functional prototype with the community in under 12 months.
- KR 6.2: Map and track at least 80% of non-visible contributions (calls, mentoring, reviews, etc.).
- KR 6.3: Integrate the reputation system into at least two governance decisions.
Further Details
- This matrix is designed to complement the operations of OpCo.
- The SEEDGov team commits to participating in pilot implementations, workstreams coordination, and progress monitoring.
- A structural review of the matrix is proposed 12 months after its adoption, including clear success indicators and open feedback tools.
