Proposal: Accelerating Arbitrum - leveraging Camelot as an ecosystem hub to support native builders

Proposals
239

is just me or everyone keeps talking about this incentives framework, but no one seems to know who is making it? Seems like a great excuse to sit on hands and do nothing

If delegates aren’t voting because of a lack of framework, then it is their responsibility to be helping set it up in first place @olimpio. People have delegates millions of ARB and you just take the path of least resistance? You need to be doing more. You need to contribute. A single comment is not enough

No one is magically going to come out with a framework that ticks every single box……….

Simple - if you’re voting against because of no framework, then actually contribute for once instead of being armchair critic @Woo_woo

If I was a competitor of Arb I would 110% be opposed to this. The best way to slow down the ecosystem would be to “wait for framework. oh there is one? Sorry that isn’t good enough, too risky”. Nothing will ever happen and projects will move to other chains.

If I was a competitor to Camelot I would support this. If Camelot doesn’t get it then is gonna take years for this magical framework to come, and even then nothing will change and the same excsuses will be present.

Contribute to the framework - or admit that it’s an idealistic excuse at best and a great way to slow down the ecosystem at worst.

Choose wisely. Arbitrum can become even stronger, or it can send a signal to all other chains that it would rather spend months doing nothing.

3 Likes
240

There are even prominent community figures running around telling people that this proposal was “Arbitrum Foundation approved” simply because they stated its a valid governance proposal.

Let me clarify that the Arbitrum Foundation does not endorse proposals. Our job is to be Switzerland and maintain a neutral position to help the Arbitrum DAO with the decisions it makes. Projects may, or may not, approach us before submitting a proposal, that is up to their own discretion. If a project does approach us, then we endeavour to answer their questions as much as we can so they feel prepared to submit their proposal to the Arbitrum DAO.

In this case, we told Camelot that their proposal was suitable for submission to the Arbitrum DAO, and it will be up to the community to discuss and decide whether to approve/reject it.

10 Likes
241

This proposal represents a significant challenge for the DAO, marking a pivotal moment. Let me begin by expressing my deep disappointment, and I approach this matter from a ‘neutral’ standpoint.

It is unacceptable to witness the lack of engagement from the prominent delegates in this domain. This failure extends to the DAO, the delegates themselves, and the entire ecosystem. Rather than fostering genuine debates, what I have observed is an abundance of trolls, hate, and Twitter squabbles.

All delegates must rise to the occasion. Arbitrum’s reputation is at stake, regardless of whether the DAO controls tokens worth $4 billion. Engaging in a constructive discussion is paramount.

To the delegates, most of you have not even taken the time to respond or publicly share your thoughts on this matter. So far, the only individual to have done so is @olimpio , and their argument is feeble and was only shared AFTER they made an influencer style thread about their vote. The prevailing narrative seems to be 'this proposal is commendable, but we need a framework’.

Allow me to inquire, who will take charge of creating this framework or establishing DAO guidelines? YOU ARE THE DAO. By inviting thousands of users to delegate to you, you accepted the responsibility of being the DAO. Do you genuinely believe that you are fulfilling this duty by passively standing by and merely offering a single comment?

Your contributions are needed now more than ever. Frankly, I am not concerned about specific Arbitrum protocols such as Camelot; I am concerned about the DAO’s image. This proposal has made it abundantly clear that control lies in the hands of idle participants who would rather delegate work to others, than be a delegate themselves.

If you desire a framework, build it. If you seek guidelines, create them. If you want structured KPIs and milestones, then actively engage. The DAO is not a mysterious entity that will hold your hand and do everything for you. YOU are the DAO.

Perhaps there have been extensive discussions behind closed doors, but at this point, I find it highly doubtful given the clear lack of coordination across delegates, the foundation, and any protocol.

This failure reflects poorly on the Arbitrum community. As an early supporter I expect better. I am yet to witness any constructive posts from significant delegates, and this is truly disheartening, regardless of the outcome.

3 Likes
242

I have the same doubts.

243

All right, that’s how monopolies are formed.

244

Would love to hear the delegates thoughts on this? A lack of response would be telling.

L2 beat, treasure, Eric Wall, Plutus, Blockworks, Griff Green, Mihal… where are you?

Disappointing

245

@litocoen voted and couldnt even be bothered to write a single comment.

Do you not care about your delegates?

247

This has not been estipulated by the Foundation. However, it is of my opinon that Protocols should not use ARB they got in their airdrop to vote for themselves or for proposals that directly benefits them. They should Abstain.

For example, of Camelot’s 9M ARB, 7M is from the community, which I strongly think should have a voice. In Jones’ case, 2.3M of 2.4M is ARB inside of the Multisignature that was a self delegation.

It seems we will encounter this situation with several Roundtable members, I am bringing this to discussion because the impact on proposals is not negligible. It does not present a conflict of interest that protocols use ARB airdropped to them to vote for themselves in Snapshot?

I believe the Foundation could be more involved in guidance on these matters, for example creating a Code of Conduct? @stonecoldpat

I encourage you to take a look at the last two Snapshot proposals to find the path for a Framework(s) in the works:

11 Likes
248

Structure follows Precedent:

I see that a lot of folks are being influenced by Olimpio in proposing to vote against this resolution. I believe it is important to create fair structures for all potential future grantees to ensure the smooth growth of the ecosystem. These rules do not exist yet. However, I also believe that Camelot has demonstrated a great effort in moving the ecosystem forward. As so often in DAOs: structure follows precedent. Why deny Camelot the grant, when it can be a pioneer in helping to set the rules for projects to come?

I am not in favor of aggressive LM strategies in general. However, I do think that the neglection of LM incentives, as i.e. @MattOnChain proposes will place Arbitrum at a disadvantage to competitors who make use of this instrument partly excessively.

This is why I vote “For” this resolution and hope fellow delegates will do the same

1 Like
249

The DAO is a self-governing, you or any of it’s members need to create that framework then vote on it. Same for code of conduct, this is why DAO’s need more structure than a bunch of randoms coming together and voting on things. There needs to be members of the DAO that spearhead initiatives, gauge the community and put forth proposals to create the base framework for something like this.

Minus the general tribalism in this conversation, the better question is why has it been 4 months since the airdrop and none of this has been put forth. The airdrop was to enact governance, not gate-keeping. In my opinion, Camelot has been a cornerstone to the ecosystem, has done more for the ecosystem than any other project in terms of grassroots development and has discussed with the foundation about their request and given the green light. We can’t sit around idle until there’s all these “prerequisites”. At this pace, nothing will be done in terms of grants until 2024 or beyond. What incentives do people have to keep building on Arbitrum? It’s better to lead, taking calculated risks than start to fall back in the pack and try to catch up.

2 Likes
250

This has not been estipulated by the Foundation. However, it is of my opinon that Protocols should not use ARB they got in their airdrop to vote for themselves or for proposals that directly benefits them. They should Abstain.

For example, of Camelot’s 9M ARB, 7M is from the community, which I strongly think should have a voice. In Jones’ case, 2.3M of 2.4M is ARB inside of the Multisignature that was a self delegation.

It seems we will encounter this situation with several Roundtable members, I am bringing this to discussion because the impact on proposals is not negligible. It does not present a conflict of interest that protocols use ARB airdropped to them to vote for themselves in Snapshot?

Thanks for your answer. We appreciate that you reflect that the majority of the delegation by Camelot is without question as it reflects support of our community members.

Regarding other protocols, grants will mostly be directed to builders on the chain, so it becomes difficult in reality to try and separate these builders from the governance process, and I think it can have adverse effects.

In Camelot’s case, to remove all partners that also have voting power would be excluding most Arbitrum builders. I appreciate the intent, but I struggle to see how this has positive effects in practice, considering that protocols received their ARB airdrop based on their contribution to the ecosystem, and their voice should therefore be heard in governance too.

You also didn’t address the last part of my question, ie where would you suggest to draw the line for conflicts of interest? Some examples:

  • should protocols be allowed to vote against a proposal that would benefit a competitor?
  • should a protocol building on top of the one requesting a grant be considered as well in this scope?
  • should a DEX be excluded from a liquidity incentives program proposal if the protocol asking it has liquidity on its AMM?
  • etc…

We could extend those questions to multiple other cases in reality, for instance to a delegate’s holdings, advisory roles, commitments to projects or other chains etc… While I agree with you that it should not be unaddressed, I think it can very quickly turn into a purity test that would not be profitable to anyone, and would just end up hindering the voting process as a whole.

4 Likes
251

You have raised valid concerns about the potential ambiguity and varying interpretations when drawing the line for conflicts of interest. To address this, it is crucial to establish clear and specific guidelines for identifying and managing conflicts of interest in governance processes.

Concrete examples and suggestions can help provide clarity in navigating conflicts of interest. For instance, protocols should be discouraged from voting against proposals solely to benefit their competitors, as this could undermine the overall health of the ecosystem. Encouraging collaboration and cooperation among protocols can foster long-term growth and mutual benefits.
Implementing transparency, disclosure requirements, and clear guidelines may present challenges, requiring additional resources and efforts.
However, these measures are necessary to mitigate conflicts of interest effectively. Protocols should disclose their relationships, holdings, and advisory roles to ensure transparency and allow the community to assess potential biases.
Not adequately addressing conflicts of interest can lead to risks such as biases and unfair decision-making. It is essential to create a level playing field, where proposals are evaluated based on their merits and the best interests of the ecosystem as a whole. By actively managing conflicts of interest, the governance process can maintain its integrity and ensure fairness.

We can draw lessons from successful governance models that have effectively dealt with conflicts of interest. For example, some protocols have established independent committees or councils responsible for evaluating proposals and managing conflicts of interest.
These entities consist of representatives from diverse backgrounds and are empowered to make impartial decisions in the ecosystem’s best interest.
By incorporating specific guidance, providing examples, addressing challenges, and highlighting potential risks, we can enhance the effectiveness of governance processes in managing conflicts of interest and fostering a fair and thriving ecosystem.

252

You have raised valid concerns about the potential ambiguity and varying interpretations when drawing the line for conflicts of interest. To address this, it is crucial to establish clear and specific guidelines for identifying and managing conflicts of interest in governance processes.

Concrete examples and suggestions can help provide clarity in navigating conflicts of interest. For instance, protocols should be discouraged from voting against proposals solely to benefit their competitors, as this could undermine the overall health of the ecosystem. Encouraging collaboration and cooperation among protocols can foster long-term growth and mutual benefits.

Implementing transparency, disclosure requirements, and clear guidelines may present challenges, requiring additional resources and efforts. However, these measures are necessary to mitigate conflicts of interest effectively. Protocols should disclose their relationships, holdings, and advisory roles to ensure transparency and allow the community to assess potential biases.

Not adequately addressing conflicts of interest can lead to risks such as biases and unfair decision-making. It is essential to create a level playing field, where proposals are evaluated based on their merits and the best interests of the ecosystem as a whole. By actively managing conflicts of interest, the governance process can maintain its integrity and ensure fairness.

We can draw lessons from successful governance models that have effectively dealt with conflicts of interest. For example, some protocols have established independent committees or councils responsible for evaluating proposals and managing conflicts of interest. These entities consist of representatives from diverse backgrounds and are empowered to make impartial decisions in the ecosystem’s best interest.

By incorporating specific guidance, providing examples, addressing challenges, and highlighting potential risks, we can enhance the effectiveness of governance processes in managing conflicts of interest and fostering a fair and thriving ecosystem.

3 Likes
253

Ok that’s great but who do you want to implement those?

The proposal highlights the clear lack of leadership and guidance from the Foundation.

It is not enough to be Switzerland… the DAO is in its infancy and every delegate and protocol is now in a position where they have no idea what is needed. Delegates are talking about the foundations framework, others are saying that doesn’t exist… quite frankly this is a mess. As a user I have no idea what is going on, it looks like a clear failure from everyone.

If the Foundation does not step in at this point, then I struggle to see how the DAO moves forward in general. You will end up in a position where you give tiny 100k grants for the next year, wondering why the ecosystem has stalled and the best projects have been poached for other chains.

This vote will now likely fail:

  • what signal does that send to newer builders that were wanting to move to Arbitrum? Additional incentives would have sealed the deal. Now they question the DAOs support of the largest projects.
  • what signal does this send to other Arb builders? Camelot set the bar very high and I see no one else that could follow it up, aside from GMX perhaps
  • what signal does this send to other Arb projects that wanted to do their own incentives?

This is a failure on the delegates and the foundation.

The DAO is controlled by a handful of delegates that lack the experience to control an entire DAOs treasury, whilst lacking the necessary guidance and leadership from the Foundation - this is now EVIDENTLY clear.

254

TreasureDAO abstains from this proposal.

As one of the most significant delegates in Arbitrum DAO as well as one of the largest ecosystems building on the Arbitrum network, we wish to exert our influence on issues most germane to our DAO’s user base. Treasure will maintain its primary focus on Constitutional matters such as process, software updates, chain ownership, and new chain approval, as well as non-Constitutional proposals that sit within Treasure’s orbit of gaming, NFTs, and related matters.

While many members of the Treasure council and community have meaningful experience or exposure to decentralized finance and have their own opinions on proposals such as these, we believe that using Treasure’s considerable influence to impact every vote could result in the formation of ‘voting cartels’ that endanger Arbitrum DAO’s long-term success in building a healthy governance system.

–

To comment on one of the major themes highlighted by other delegates and the community: Although this proposal was initiated before Arbitrum DAO has been able to fully establish its grant framework(s), we do see the need for individual grant proposals to be put forth and assessed on a case-by-case basis as part of a pluralistic system. In the absence of a fully formed grants program, it can be prudent for Arbitrum DAO to fund and place informed ‘bets’ with proven, long-term aligned partners who are believed to be able to drive significant value back to the Arbitrum ecosystem. Arbitrum DAO should aim to support initiatives that enable greater competition, innovation, and development in the ecosystem. Without commenting on this particular proposal, TreasureDAO will continue to evaluate grant requests on the basis of their impact on competition in the ecosystem and degree to which they strengthen overall development on top of Arbitrum while remaining focused on our core verticals.

—
Posted by Karel Vuong (Co-Founder) on behalf of the TreasureDAO community.
EDIT (Aug 9, 2023 at 4:37pm EST): @TreasureDAO will be used as the official account for the broader TreasureDAO community moving forward.

10 Likes
255

Exult, odyssey to effect change within the intricate tapestry of a decentralized construct unfolds as a rare for this vote.

It demands the perpetuity of an unceasing symphony, a harmonious interplay of boundless intellectual deliberation that traverses the infinitude of thought itself.

As we embark on this enigmatic Vote.

Shall we transcend the conventional confines, ascending beyond the mere roles of architects to emerge as architects of architects.

With each step, shall we witness the crystallization of a manifestation so exquisitely distinct, edifice.

This ethereal erection, born from the profound alchemy of our endeavor, shall rise , steadfast in its resolve to ascend. An emblem of our boundless imagination.

1 Like
257

Truly, I stand in awe of the unparalleled selflessness emanating from this proposal. It is a masterpiece of magnanimity, as the entirety of the ARB request gracefully flows into the hands of authentic Arbitrum users. This marks the genesis of a virtuous cycle, propelling the entire Arbitrum ecosystem into a realm of explosive growth in usage and TVL.

Unlike other platforms, Camelot stands unrivaled for a myriad of reasons:

• Nitro Pools technology and vested rewards repel mercenary capital, fostering growth in TVL that far surpasses other L2 incentive programs. Camelot’s design ensures a profound stickiness in the ecosystem, fostering enduring engagement.

• Camelot’s impact on Arbitrum surpasses that of any other DEX. Round table partners, the most prolific protocols on Arbitrum, have harnessed GRAIL and xGRAIL to incentivize their liquidity, forging bullish and sustainable tokenomics. For instance, JonesDAO eliminated LP emissions, and over 25 protocols reaped substantial savings.

• As the native DEX, Camelot embodies an unwavering commitment to Arbitrum. The users themselves chose Camelot, solidifying their alignment with the essence of Arbitrum. This makes Camelot the most deserving protocol for the first ARB grant, with incentives flowing directly to the deserving Arbitrum users.

Now, let us elevate this proposal even further:

• A direct kickback to ARB holders shall reward their participation, amplifying TVL, volumes, and overall Arbitrum usage. By channeling a portion of fees earned by Camelot during the incentive campaign to the ARB-ETH LP, ARB holders shall reap the dual benefits of grant incentives and Camelot’s generated fees.

• Augment rewards for LPs with ARB or projects that pair their tokens with the Arbitrum DAO’s token. Such a boost shall enhance participation and fortify engagement within the esteemed Arbitrum ecosystem.

• Envision an xARB token akin to the successful xGRAIL model, vesting the underlying ARB over six months or expediting the process with a calculated reduction. This measured approach shall ensure smoothness in the ARB supply curve, fostering long-term growth and enduring usage of Arbitrum and Camelot. Forfeited tokens can be repurposed, perpetuating the cycle of innovation.

Comment on the meticulousness of this proposal, underscored by the Camelot team’s honesty in setting milestones and pledging their own ARB tokens in a separate grant multisig. Such dedication sets them apart, speaking volumes about the resplendence of Camelot within possibilities .

258

Let us bask in the brilliance of this proposal, a testament to meticulousness that leaves no room for disposal. The Camelot team’s integrity shines through, milestones and pledges that few dare to pursue, impacting and elevating all others protocols as team.

260
7 Likes
261

This topic is temporarily closed for at least 4 hours due to a large number of community flags.