We have now progressed this proposal to a snapshot vote. Please find the relevant link here: Snapshot
Whilst this will initially be a standalone proposal, we would also like to clarify that Camelot is committed to ensuring that its incentive grant can be aligned and integrated within future frameworks too, as well as supporting other individual team proposals as a governance delegate.
So why feel the need to push this through governance so fast?
The UmamiDAO showâs support for this preliminary proposal with its 900k ARB tokens from the DAO airdrop, although the snapshot only recognises 75k of these tokens due to some technical issues with the delegation process.
Camelot is one of the least deserving candidates for a grant and I say that as someone who has actually used their DEX on numerous occasions.
There is hardly any innovation whatsoever and the attempt to seek a grant is purely to gain a competitive edge against other DEXes, which it so desperately needs since thereâs nothing about it then even comes close to beating other liquidity pools by more established DEXes.
We should not be incentivising DEXes like these as it only attracts mercenary capital and the individuals supporting this likely have a vested interest in seeing this succeed as it will benefit those who hold Camelotâs native token.
I strongly urge the DAO participants to vote against this and not set a bad precedent for other DEXes to swoop in requesting for liquidity incentive grants.
Why do you consider them the least deserving candidate? They have actually done more for the ecosystem than any other DEX on Arbitrum. The evidence is clear and undeniable.
Saying that thereâs hardly any innovation coming from Camelot is simply unfounded. Many projects have taken inspiration from them by forking and copying their ideas. And when you mention more established DEXes, are you referring to those that exist on multiple chains? Camelot is the largest native DEX on Arbitrum, so itâs not difficult to understand their significance as eco centric DEX.
Your argument lacks specific details, making it hard to take it seriously.
Introducing incentives is crucial to attracting more users to the ecosystem at some point, and Camelot has shown they are the best positioned to execute this strategy. Ser read the proposal details again, and if you really disagree, at least provide constructive criticism.
Where do you see the part that the grant will benefit only those who hold Camelotâs native token? There are literally dozens of projects that would benefit from it and most importantly, most of the grant will be allocated to ARB pools.
Count me as a strong supporter of this proposal. I genuinely believe itâs the right move for the entire ecosystem, and Iâm excited to see it get approved!
The evidence? What evidence? In every metric, it is losing to even DEXes like Balancer, which arenât even Arbitrum-native, have no subsidy or grant for incentives and yet are still ahead.
TVL has already shown who the clear winners are - and Camelot is not one of them. Why should the DAO incentivise a project that is already lagging behind?
Your argument lacks specific details, making it hard to take it seriously.
Lastly, I noticed that your account was made on the same day that this proposal was posted. Think that says it all with where your interests lie.
Ahh, a Balancer fan. I should have guessed that.
Balancerâs TVL is higher on Arb than Camelotâs, yes, but that only happened recently. And even then, Balancer isnât an eco-centric DEX, they exist on many chains. TVL isnât everything. E.g. look at the volume and fees:
Balancer 7d = 29.5k
Camelot 7d = 248k
Also, look at the revenue metrics⌠If TVL is the âeveryâ metric for you, then you need to learn much more buddy. Besides, since you mentioned Balancer, personally I think their UI is rather confusing and not very user-friendly hence why I prefer to use Camelot.
Camelot is the biggest native DEX on Arbitrum. They have brought in numerous projects from other chains to build on Arbitrum, constantly pushing innovation on the chain. As I said, look at the proposal details unless youâre one of those that disregard everything that is against your opinion.
Copying what I said to use against me proves that youâre not really in a position to provide constructive feedback.
Regarding my acc being created on the day of the proposal, I had no desire to participate in the discussion on the forum because, up until now, none of the proposals interested me. Read my first message on this postâŚ
Your arguments are still ridiculously weak. Try better.
The bottom line is that every DEX is free to propose similar proposals, and ultimately, the DAO will decide.
The proposal is likely going to pass whether you like it or not.
This twitter thread sums up the whole situation nicely, I strongly urge everyone to check it out: https://twitter.com/boredGenius/status/1680043475126091776
Anyway, the proposal has just been put up for voting, I wouldnât be so sure that it would pass just yet.
In fact, if you are a OG Arbitrum user like youâve claimed and not a shill who conveniently made their account on the same day that this proposal was launched, then you would have already realised that the big Arbitrum whales and delegates have yet to cast their vote.
I donât have to âtry betterâ to convince you. Itâs not my job to convince a shill. Iâll let the DAO voters speak for themselves.
As a person that has been using arbitrum and also building in the space, I find the partners that this is being distributed to highly concerning, Camelot has a history of favoritism which is evident by who they bring upon on to their launchpad, this proposal has a risk for them to enrich their âRound Tableâ members, which has no clear membership criteria other than who they feel like being a part off. Either open up and clarify the guidelines for joining the round table or make this liquidity grant available for anyone on Camelot trustlessly that can meet certain clear criteria.
Whatâs the benefit in having one protocol receive so much money, with absolutely no oversight on who gets it, other than âecosystem partnersâ which they handpick themselves, when they are unwilling to touch their $1M+ airdrop.
That too to push liquidity mining something that everyone knows only attracts mercenary capital and benefits only those who are farming it and taking a cut of fees, and that has no tangible long term benefits.
Itâs obvious that you are a direct beneficiary as you are not entertaining any of the counter arguments against this, and flaming anyone that tries to argue against it.
I have decided to vote against the proposal.
Here are the reasons why:
A framework for protocols to request grants has still not been deployed and instrumented.
What is a framework? A process that establishes guidelines that protocols/organizations must follow when requesting a grant.
Examples of policies that could be established by a framework:
i. Protocols need to explain what they will do with the grant
ii. They report progress every X month
iii. Can grants be self-delegated?
iv. Can ARB tokens be sold in every grant category?
v. Is there any lock-up?
Guidelines for protocols to request grants are on their way to being approved. I think itâs prudent to wait until there is a clear ruleset and that all grant-request organizations should be evaluated the same.
As a general idea, I like LM. They clearly attract TVL, which of course leaves the chain when LM ends â but some people do stick.
Also, other chains are doing incentives, so not considering it is a disadvantage.
As there is no clear ruleset created by the Foundation, there are gray areas which (in my opinion) can be improved.
At the time of writing, top 2 voters are:
⢠Address 0x2e3B: (FOR) 9M $ARB
⢠Address 0x5396: (FOR) 2.4M $ARB
0x2e3B (9M) is from Camelot.
They are voting to give themselves the grant. I donât think this should be prohibited, since the voting power comes directly from their community.
Shouldnât their own community have a vote? I think of course they do. Otherwise, itâd be censoring.
0x5396 (2.4M) is 0x_ultra, from Jones DAO.
2.3M of 2.4M voting power is a yesterday self-delegation from their multi-signature.
2M ARB is from the ARB airdrop.
Jones is getting ARB incentives on their pool.
Is this considered a conflict of interest?
https://twitter.com/JonesDAO_io/status/1638267939177615366
With Pluralistic Labs and QuestBookâs proposals having passed temp-check, there will probably be a grantâs framework soon.
These 2 proposals set the foundations for analyzing and approving grants.
Optimism invests millions of $OP for LM/grants. Itâs important to keep this context in mind to be able to focus on growth.
Also, Camelot is NOT proposing incentives to $GRAIL, which eliminates the direct conflict of interest price element.
They do, however, already own 2.1M ARB that they received on the initial airdrop.
This could potentially be used for LM incentives until thereâs time to better evaluate.
https://debank.com/profile/0x03ff2d78afb69e0859ec6beb4cf107d3741e97ab
They have worked hard to advance the Arbitrum ecosystem. They are the top 3 DEX by TVL.
I think they should receive a grant for LM incentives down the road.
Blocking well-thought-out and rational proposals is capping growth.
This was a very good way to improve the proposal.
The Arbitrum DAO does not have enough clarity, rules, or frameworks -just yet- to be distributing millions of dollars in the situation as-is.
We should first focus on enabling a process that will ultimately be better for all participants involved.
The final reflection is:Camelot will probably end up receiving a grant, and I will most likely be voting FOR.
The reason I decided against it (atm) is to allow the DAO to have better processes to analyze Grants. There is a time-sensitive element, but we donât have to rush.
Voting themselves⌠ewww, thatâs ugly.
Although voting themselves isnât against the rules, it isnât ETHICALLY good looking, especially using given powerâŚ
⌠Imagine a politician using his given power to benefit himself⌠ouch, that wasnât a good example. ^^!
I mean I saw the authors of the other 2 grants program proposals voting âabstainâ. This is how I think it should be: If someone gets DIRECTLY BENEFITED from their OWN PROPOSAL, shouldnât take part on the final decision.
Following the same procedure a group of ARB whales or protocols amassing most of the voting power could agree to ask for funding themselves with community assets âcartelizingâ and taking over the chain. Similar to a 51% attack over the concensus.
There are lines we shouldnât cross if we aim for decentralization and Camelot behavior, according to what we are seeing, is not the most appropriate in this aspect.
Camelot is clearly trying to be the king in this kingdom. There are 2 kind of kings in the history, the ones that crown themselves and the ones that get crowned by the people. The question is: Which one does Camelot want to be?
I think they should change their vote to abstain.
@mfer 7M+ of Camelotâs voting power is coming from the community, are they supposed to be excluded from governance?
@olimpio Regarding Jones and a potential conflict of interest, yes they would be getting ARB incentives on their pool and I understand your point, but in this case where would you draw the line?
Does it mean protocols should not vote for their self interest?
Should all of Camelotâs partners, which represent a large part of the ecosystem builders, not be allowed to participate since they would all benefit from this grant?
Would that also apply to a grant proposal authorâs competitors that might vote against, as it could also be considered as a conflict of interest?
All delegated power is fair enough. Is not the ideal scenario where everyone vote individually without any intervention of Camelotâs team (authors of proposal) in the process, but it is what it is when dealing with governance systems with delegated power allowed (which makes it so centralized btw, but this is another topic).
The power that comes from tokens custodied by Camelotâs multisig with Camelot team (proposal authors) as signers, those are the ones that should abstain imo.
Same applies for partner protocols, unless they custody the voting power under a real DAO, in which case would be absolutely legit.
*By real DAO I mean actually already autonomous and decentralized with no human signers.
Thereâs conflict of interest in most of the things in life, all the time, and thatâs not bad perse.
⌠BUTâŚ
Big part of the voting power owned by partner protocols still comes from assets managed by individuals who have close personal/business relationship with the authors and direct beneficiaries of the proposal. Hereâs where âthe badâ conflict of interest applies. I guess is what Olimpio refers to, or at least is what I understand. Correct me if Iâm wrong @olimpio .
What a great proposal, seems like everyone benefits from this, look at the number of protocols that are on the list, gets my vote!
What a great proposal, seems like everyone benefits from this, look at the number of protocols that are on the list, gets my vote!
So robbery being official after this time. Closely 10m usd like??? Are we going to build a brand new chain?
First of all, I want to express my sadness regarding the rudeness. After all, this is my opinion, and you donât have to agree, but direct insults are not pleasant. Nevertheless, I still want to respond to you. The complaint I raised was merely a reflection of similar ideas expressed by others above. However, if youâre curious, I believe that the project could be accomplished with a lower budget. Considering that there are other projects in the ecosystem achieving great results with significantly less funding, I find it unhealthy for such a large amount of money to be disbursed from the treasury over a period of 6 months. (Taking into account that Camelot has received a grant before.) I acknowledge that chains have sufficient funds, but I am not satisfied enough with this project, which is why I find the requested budget excessive. I hope you find my response agreeable and that you wonât direct this rudeness towards others. I am just a simple user expressing my thoughts. Take care of yourself. Best regards. 
What other chain other than arguably OP has ecosystem funds of hundreds of millions dollars? I donât know of any who would give out this level of funds to such a small project, but feel free to correct me. I think the days of these crazy ecosystem funds are over for the time being.
The argument for why itâs too much is a nuanced topic that revolves around similar situations in the past, the size of Camelot right now (this grant being their entire marketcap), and the state of Arbitrum DAO governance. Imagine if uniswap came and asked for 200m Arb and then brushed away concerns about the amount much like you are doing now. Just because the pot is big doesnât mean itâs a good idea to waste in ways that causes more negative externalities for the ecosystem.
You are easily the most angry person Iâve seen in this thread. I suggest relaxing a bit.
Itâs pretty clear what everyone wants at this point, a framework that gives all projects equal process of applying for and analyzing grants instead of some projects getting the first movers advantage by exploiting the nascent stage of Arbitrum governance. There are even prominent community figures running around telling people that this proposal was âArbitrum Foundation approvedâ simply because they stated its a valid governance proposal. It just all feels wrong, and I think thatâs clear in the current sentiment of the general ecosystem and why so many people are voting no.
The argument for why itâs too much is a nuanced topic that revolves around similar situations in the past, the size of Camelot right now (this grant being their entire marketcap), and the state of Arbitrum DAO governance.
Camelotâs marketcap is 40M.
There are even prominent community figures running around telling people that this proposal was âArbitrum Foundation approvedâ simply because they stated its a valid governance proposal.
I think we expressed very clearly what the Foundation said, ie that it was 1) valid from a legal standpoint and 2) appropriate to be submitted now to the DAO.
Itâs pretty clear what everyone wants at this point, a framework that gives all projects equal process of applying for and analyzing grants instead of some projects getting the first movers advantage by exploiting the nascent stage of Arbitrum governance.
Afaik there is currently no known incoming grant framework for liquidity incentives. Iâm supportive of the idea, and Camelot will gladly contribute to its setup, and apply to it once live, but I donât think it would justify to completely freeze grants for months in the meantime. Thatâs a pure waste of momentum and drawing power for the chain.