Proposal: Adjust AGV Council Compensation to Reflect Role-Based Governance Commitments

Proposals
1

Non-Constitutional

Abstract
This proposal recommends adjusting AGV Council compensation to reflect the sustained time, diligence, and capital accountability required of the role. From inception, the Council was envisioned as a lightweight advisory group. However, in practice — and in response to DAO expectations for oversight — it has functioned more like an embedded governance layer, with active participation in investments, compliance, and program direction.

This update brings Council compensation in line with benchmarks from both DAO and venture ecosystems and is fully covered by AGV’s existing budget. No additional DAO funds are requested.

Motivation
The AGV Council was originally scoped as a high-caliber advisory body with a limited time commitment. In practice, the Council has become a deeply engaged governance partner whose collective expertise in gaming, venture, and decentralized systems has materially strengthened AGV’s operations, strategy, and alignment with DAO values.

As AGV transitions from setup to sustained execution, it’s clear that the initiative is best served by keeping Council members meaningfully involved—not just in oversight, but in shaping capital strategy, navigating ecosystem complexity, and upholding transparent, high-trust processes. This proposal recognizes that the role requires ongoing time, judgment, and context and that attracting and retaining talent at this level requires compensation aligned with the responsibility and value delivered.

Rationale
Since onboarding, Council members have played a core role in AGV’s evolution and operation, including capital approvals, governance and incentive design, strategic alignment, and venture structuring. These are not passive advisory roles; they require sustained judgment and context over months and quarters.

Today, AGV Council members contribute an average of 30 hours/month, participating in investment reviews, organizational and budget planning, DAO engagement, and other governance activities that reinforce long-term program integrity.

In many ways, these contributions resemble advisory board members or investment committee participants in traditional venture contexts, yet unlike in VC or startup roles, AGV Council members receive no equity or carry upside. Compensation must therefore reflect a fair-market equivalent for high-responsibility roles with public accountability and long-term context.

Based on comparable industry benchmarks, we propose a fair annual compensation of $50K/year for Council members, based on:

  • Governance oversight of $100M+ in assets

  • Cross-functional diligence and public accountability

  • Lack of upside compensation (equity/carry)

  • Role-specific benchmarks from VC, startup, and governance consulting sectors

For more detail, see Appendix A : Industry & VC Compensation Benchmarks.

Specifications

  • Adjust total compensation for the current AGV Council from $30,000 to $50,000.00 per annum to reflect the full scope of work delivered from late 2024 through 2025.

  • Adjust total compensation for one Council member who also serves on the Investment Committee from $80,000 to $120,000 per annum, reflecting the significantly higher involvement required of that dual role.

  • Structure compensation as a fixed-term governance payment aligned with DAO and industry norms.

  • The adjustment is retroactive to January 1, 2025.

  • No additional funds will be requested from the DAO. This adjustment will be covered fully within AGV’s existing operational budget.

Overall Cost

Role Type # of Members Current Annual Comp Current Total Annual Cost Proposed Annual Comp Proposed Total Annual Cost
Council Member 4 $30,000 $120,000 $50,000 $200,000
Council Member (IC) 1 $80,000 $80,000 $120,000 $120,000
Total 5 -– $200,000 -– $320,000

Appendix A : Industry & VC Compensation Benchmarks

Benchmark Category Comp Range AGV Council Justification
Startup Advisor (Equity-Based) $15K–$30K/year Similar commitment level, but AGV roles are cash-only and entail broader governance scope
VC Advisory Board / IC Member $25K–$60K/year High AUM oversight with no upside or carry
Strategic/Governance Consultant $30K–$50K/year Reflects hands-on strategy, risk diligence, and recurring operational engagement
2 Likes
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Cross posting from the other thread.

Having had direct experience of the operations from AGV, I do see how council is, today, more aking to a set of employee than a simple oversight body. They do provide expertise each one in their field, and also in specific tasks like job interviews and others. They have also been the closest to the the operations of the fund so far.

I personally do agree that their current salary is not matching the level of responsability and value they bring to the fund.
I also do understand how most delegates are unaware of this, and I think it would be better to start disclosing, in more details and when possible, how the contribute on the day to day operations.

This, for example, is a good start. But can likely pass unnoticed to most since is just a single sentence in a proposal, and would urge AGV on working on better surfacing the amount of work all people in there do because to most of Arbitrum is a black box, and is just fair, for the people that carry the torch on a daily basis, to have their work highlighted.

This also makes a lot of sense.

In support of the proposal.

3 Likes
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Thanks for this proposal!

I have several questions and concerns, mainly related to the attempt to extend the term durations:

  1. Why is participation in the upside (profit share) not considered?
    The motivation emphasizes that Council members do not receive equity or carry, presenting this as a problem. However, the proposal itself does not attempt to address this directly, for example, through a profit-based reward mechanism, KPIs, or performance fees.
    Why wasn’t an option for upside participation proposed? This could serve as a stronger motivator and be more equitable for the DAO, effectively addressing both compensation and incentive issues.

  2. Violation of the conditions under which the current Council was elected.
    Raising compensation by 66% without a new vote or mandate revision seems questionable, as voters supported the current Council based on the original $30K per year terms.
    Don’t you think it would be more appropriate to implement such changes in the next cycle or after a new vote? Alternatively, vote now but apply these new conditions only to the next Council composition.

  3. Where are the performance metrics for such a significant salary increase?
    Given the substantial compensation increase, it is reasonable to expect clear KPIs or reports on each member’s contributions.
    Is there a plan to introduce KPI for each of Council members?

4 Likes
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Good points, which echo much of what came to mind for me while reading this proposal.

1 Like
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Thanks @JoJo, we appreciate you raising this. We’ll continue to work on making the responsibilities of the Council more visible going forward. It’s possible that terms familiar to AGV might carry different connotations to the broader DAO and we recognize the importance of continuously surfacing those differences more clearly so expectations are aligned.

Thanks as well @cp0x for the thoughtful feedback. We’ll respond to each point in turn:

1. On the lack of performance-based compensation (carry/profit-share)

This is a valid observation. In traditional venture setups, carry or profit-share is common. However, AGV’s structure and governance model, where Council members are reelected annually, make this difficult to implement. There is no guarantee that the same individuals who approve deals today will still be serving when returns materialize years later. This disconnect creates challenges in aligning performance incentives across election cycles.

So while the lack of long-term upside is a known gap, it’s more of a structural limitation rather than an oversight. It also reinforces the case for fair fixed compensation, particularly when Council members take on operational roles typically compensated with both salary and carry in private funds.

2. On increasing compensation mid-term

We understand the concern. To clarify, this proposal is being posted precisely so the DAO can weigh in before any changes are made, including voting to approve or reject the adjustment.

While the original compensation mirrored other DAO council structures (like STIP or LTIPP), the role of the AGV Council is fundamentally different. AGV’s Council is not just about oversight; it is operational. Council members lead due diligence, evaluate all proposals, conduct interviews with founders, and approve every investment or grant made. They are also involved in hiring, including our current GM search, and are embedded in every major operational decision.

After benchmarking compensation across similar roles in the ecosystem and factoring in the lack of profit participation, it became clear that AGV’s Council was significantly under-compensated for the scope of work required. The proposed adjustment brings compensation closer to an upper bound aligned with industry standards and reflects the level of responsibility Council members carry.

3. On performance metrics and KPIs

This is a fair question, and one we’ve considered closely.

The challenge is that most meaningful KPIs for a fund like AGV (e.g., realized returns, portfolio company success) are multi-year outcomes, well beyond the tenure of any single Council. Short-term KPIs, such as “number of deals approved” or “grants disbursed,” risk incentivizing quantity over quality, which is counterproductive to AGV’s investment mandate.

In a traditional fund structure, performance metrics would apply more naturally to a stable, long-term team with carry. In our case, with rotating Council membership, no carry, and DAO-driven oversight, we’ve focused on ensuring transparency and accountability through public reporting, forum updates, and community engagement, rather than artificial quantitative KPIs.

That said, we’re open to suggestions on how we might improve performance transparency without misaligning incentives, and appreciate the push for clearer and more transparent accountability.

We’ll continue iterating based on all the feedback received and welcome any additional thoughts as we move toward a vote. Thanks again to all who’ve taken the time to engage here.

6

Thanks for your reply, however I’ll continue

I still believe that simply increasing the fixed salary does not address the underlying issue. My suggestion is:

  • Keep the base salary at the current level
  • Introduce performance-based bonuses, such as:
    • а success fee for each deal that is approved and closed by the foundation
    • а bonus based on the growth in valuation of AGV’s portfolio
  • Introduce a profit-sharing mechanism tied to long-term performance
    Even if a contributor is not re-elected the following year, they should still be eligible for a retroactive bonus if a deal or project they worked on becomes successful - provided the KPIs they were individually responsible for were met at the time of their contribution

This would align incentives more effectively and ensure compensation reflects real impact

I have a few suggestions regarding short-term KPIs:

  • Number of projects reviewed – for example, reviewing at least 10 projects per quarter
  • Number of projects passed to due diligence – e.g. 3 qualified leads per quarter
  • Number of investments approved – tracking how many sourced deals successfully passed through the full process
  • Number of personal publications or detailed reports on work done – encourages accountability and visibility within the DAO.

These KPIs are designed to motivate individual participation, making it clear that bonuses and potential reappointment will directly depend on personal contributions.
If someone clearly delivers more than others, their chances of being re-elected for the next term will naturally increase

7

Strong yes from me on this.

It’s time we stop treating governance like a side hustle when the work clearly isn’t. The AGV Council has gone waybeyond “advisory”, they’ve been doing the heavy lifting: managing oversight on $100M+ in assets, leading investment diligence, shaping strategy, and keeping the program aligned with DAO values.

Compensating them fairly isn’t a bonus, it’s a necessity.

This proposal simply acknowledges reality: high-responsibility, high-context roles deserve market-aligned compensation, especially when there’s no equity or upside involved. The $50K/year adjustment (and $120K for the dual-role member) is not only reasonable, it’s overdue.

No new DAO funds are being requested, and we retain top-tier contributors without compromising integrity or budget. That’s a win-win for everyone.

Let’s keep raising the bar for what accountable, long-term governance looks like.

8

Hi @cp0x, thanks for the thoughtful suggestions. We really appreciate you taking the time to engage so deeply with the proposal.

AGV, like much of what the DAO is building, is still early and evolving. We’re approaching this with a startup mindset: moving quickly, learning from what works and what doesn’t, and adjusting along the way. One of our key learnings early on was that in order to deliver real oversight and operational momentum, the Council had to be far more hands-on than originally envisioned, not just reviewers, but active participants in the build.

On Performance-Based Bonuses & Profit-Sharing

We’ve explored this idea, but there are several challenges that make performance-based bonuses difficult to implement at this stage:

  • Attribution is a moving target. Success in venture-style investing is the result of many interlocking factors, including timing, team execution, and market shifts. It’s difficult to draw a clear line from outcome to individual contribution, especially when Council composition may change years down the line.

  • Timing is misaligned. AGV investments are long-term. It can take years before meaningful results materialize. Structuring retroactive bonuses would require a complex tracking and claims system, which doesn’t fit our current operating model and introduces friction for a lean, fast-moving operation.

  • Misaligned incentives. We’re wary of introducing task-based KPIs or bonus systems that push quantity over quality. Counting projects reviewed or deals closed risks shifting focus away from thoughtful diligence toward hitting a quota, which goes against AGV’s mission to fund only the most compelling opportunities.

On Proposed KPI Metrics

We’ve intentionally avoided tying compensation or evaluation to volume-based metrics. The quality of AGV’s investments, not how many are processed, is the north star. Forcing numerical targets might generate activity, but not necessarily outcomes. Given how early we are, staying flexible and allowing the Council to apply judgment is more valuable than rigid KPI targets.

We agree visibility is important, and this is already built into our process. AGV produces a biannual transparency report that’s reviewed and approved by the Council before publishing. While the core AGV team drafts the report, the Council is responsible for ensuring it reflects an accurate and complete view of operations and decision-making.

We’ll continue evolving AGV’s structure and accountability mechanisms as the program matures, including revisiting compensation models if/when a longer-term fund structure supports it. In the meantime, we’re committed to being transparent, responsive to feedback, and iterative in approach. Thanks again for helping us improve.

9

The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.

We are voting FOR the proposal.

Having followed the work that the AGV council is doing and the responsibilities they are carrying, we understand where the request for adjustment to their compensation comes from, and we’re supportive of it.

We internally debated whether the retroactive aspect of the adjustment makes sense, and we would have been more comfortable supporting the proposal if it weren’t for that part. However, after deliberation, we concluded that we’re essentially voting to adjust the compensation in recognition of the work that the Council has been doing, not as a path for them to do more in the future. With that line of thinking, the retroactive adjustment makes more sense.

However, we would like to clarify that one thing we expect from the Council going forward, especially with the adjusted compensation, is improved communication with the DAO and increased transparency. Castle Labs is doing good work as the communications party of the AGV, but we also expect the Council itself to be more communicative. Similar to how the OAT from the OpCo attends calls and makes itself available to the DAO, we expect the same of the AGV.

2 Likes
10

Having had no direct exposure to the AGV I (and most likely a range of other delegates) find it hard to understand the role that was previously envisioned vs what it actually turned out to be.

I had asked about a simple detailed breakdown in a previous comment GCP Council Salary Updates, Ops Improvements, and Transparency Cadence - #23 by tamara without getting a clear answer, hence here it is again:

Clear breakdown as follows:
- Initial responsibilities (aka what we thought the Council has to work on)
- Actual responsibilities (aka what they are actually doing on a monthly basis)
- Additional responsibilities (aka what they will be doing on top if this proposal passes)

The above neatly formatted in an Excel (or table as has been done with the comp overview) would be a nice visual

4 Likes
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Concur with Tamara’s request here.