Proposal - Delegate Incentive Program (DIP)

[SEEDGov]

@maxlomu

We should explicitly incentivize delegates to add value to the DAO and measure their impact, instead of purely evaluating their output. All a delegate needs to do today is vote and justify that vote, and bring home a considerable amount of money.

• We should strengthen the incentives for proactivity

• We should reduce the rewards for basic activities.

• Example 1: If a delegate is demonstrably reviewing on-chain code that will be executed during a Tally vote, they should be rewarded.

• Example 2: the program should formalize and reward delegates that push forward new initiatives

We agree on this. Today the program incentivizes proactivity or the generation of new initiatives through bonus points, although we are open to suggestions on how to work better on this point.

As for reducing rewards for basic activities, we believe that the proposed change in weighting to CR and PF is a measure that considers this scenario.

Additionally, it is worth mentioning, as we already stated in our mid-term report:

@SEEDGov

Quorum

It’s really important to start paying attention to the quorum. Since a large number of tokens have been put into circulation since the DAO began, the required quorum has been increasing significantly. However, the growth of ARBs in voting has not increased at the same rate.

Compensate on-chain activity is necessary, as there has been a decrease in the amount of VP voting while the quorum needed is becoming larger and larger. Compensating on-chain activity can help mitigate possible governance attacks.

@maxlomu

Delegate compensation should be a mix of dollar value and ARB tokens.

• Reason: Delegates should be incentivized to drive value into the ecosystem, which should be reflected in ARB’s value. If there is no connection between compensation and the value of ARB, this focus will be lost.

• I suggest starting with an 80/20 split (80% fixed USD value, 20% in ARB).

We believe that there is an alignment between the interests of the DAO and those of the delegates when applying an ARB Cap to each Tier.

@maxlomu

Exclusivity: Similar to Entropy’s proposal, a delegate or organization should receive a bonus if it is not working with competing DAOs.

This motivated in part the introduction of the tiers, since a delegate who wishes to reach the highest tier will probably have to dedicate a greater amount of time to the DAO. In this way, we are not directly demanding or incentivizing exclusivity but giving a fair compensation for the dedication of those delegates who obtain the highest tier.

@Mehdi_eth

However, I would like to express my concern that the duration of the program should be reduced to six months instead of one year. This change would allow us to evaluate the program’s effectiveness and seek further improvements. I agree with @maxlomu’s statement on this matter; we should assess and compensate for the effectiveness and impact of the delegates.

We believe that maintaining the duration for six months, when the program is no longer experimental, would undermine the stability and planning of the delegates in the DAO. On the other hand, there is a clause that allows the DAO to make changes in the Scoring methodology during the program, so after the mid-term report, the DAO could easily review the program’s performance and push for changes.

@Mehdi_eth

Regarding this, how long does it usually take for MSS to pay the delegates?

This will depend exclusively on how long it takes the MSS to create the transaction and get the signatures for it to be executed. Considering that it is a brand new organism, we do not have estimates of how long this could take, however there is an “expectation” already expressed in the MSS proposal:

@Entropy

Expectations of MSS members

Transactions are expected to be promptly (within 24 hours) reviewed by all signers, and if approved through the process outlined above, signed. While we realise that there will be times when a signer may not have internet access or some other deterrent to signing, these are expected to be few and far between. If there are more than 3 lapses in expectations over the course of a 2 month period, chairs are expected to communicate that to the DAO and potentially remove the signer.

@Mehdi_eth

As some delegates may not be able to communicate effectively and may remain quiet during the calls, will this still count towards their bonus points? Or must they actively participate in the discussions?

In the beginning, it will reach the mere attendance, although as it is a new parameter, we will be watching the evolution of the same during the program.

@Tane

We agree with @Englandzz_Curia and @KlausBrave that it’s important not to discourage participation from diverse delegates. We believe that some kind of asynchronous participation should be considered for those delegates who can’t attend the calls. An idea is to consider proactive comments and discussions on the call notes as “participations”.

We agree, although we have seen that in most occasions the call notes are not a commonly published file in the forum. Anyway, we support the idea of having calls in multiple timezones as a solution to this situation. @cliffton.eth @raam Is it possible to add an extra time slot to the calls?

@PennBlockchain

Mirroring the comments brought by @PGov, we prefer the current methodology for tracking commenting on proposals is better than the one presented in this v1.1 program. Reducing the weight of comments after the Snapshot is live will likely lead to increased spam comments. Often, important questions and concerns are discussed while the Snapshot vote is live, especially on topics where one party has the responsibility/knowledge to respond or require members to gather data.

Considering that several delegates have expressed concerns with this scoring methodology, we have proposed alternatives in the following post, we invite you to review it.