Proposal: Return funds to arb users who sent their airdrop tokens to the contract address

[DisruptionJoe]

I think this is correct. Additionally, the DAO doesn’t hold responsibility for those who received and then sent their airdrops to the contract address (or any other address). This entire thread reeks of illegitimacy. Any account or address I’ve followed has been quite questionable, though I haven’t done a thorough investigation so that is anecdotal.

My experience with this is two years as the workstream lead for Gitcoin’s Fraud Detection & Defense workstream.

There are simply too many red flags for me to believe this is worth the time of the DAO.

I would be voting no to this proposal as it stands.

1. I don’t believe the DAO should set a precedent of taking responsibility for mistakes of users.
2. If there was a known incident of a hack in the Arbitrum official discord, we could do a proposal specific to addresses affected, but only AFTER applying fraud detection to the addresses involved as the owner of the hack could be the owner of most affected! This is a zero cost attack and I know from experience the sybils are crafty.
3. The process would need to be clearly scoped with milestones including a formal process for collecting addresses affected where they must include certain other identifiers, then the fraud detection, then the ratification of a final list.
4. The process would need a champion willing to do the work. I would be more than willing to vote to reimburse someone for their time IF it turned out there was a legitimate claim. Unfortunately, I wouldn’t vote to fund this in advance at this point.

Side Note on Sybils

I’m very interested in minimizing the impact of sybil voters. There are transparent and auditable tools to do this along with better mechanism design we could use for our grant program governance (which is what sybils would want access too)

Sybil Detection Solutions

We can work with the Open Data Community to crowdsource detection using open-source code and data extracted from the source. There is also the option of using a service provider like TrustaLabs. While their approach is more blackbox, their expertise would show in the final reporting.

Mechanism Design Solutions

I’ve already suggested one such design before.

@DisruptionJoe

I’d love to see this. I’m a big fan of Quadratic Weighted Staking.

To utilize governance tokens, $ARB holders would have to stake their $ARB to “charge up” (yes, like turbo in NBA Jam!). Let’s say that staking for 3 months gives your 80% of your governance weight. 1 year would give you 90%. A logarithmic curve.

Flexible Voting would allow people to LP and earn yeild while staking for governance.

It is called “Quadratic” because the voting power is the square root of $ARB tokens held times the “charge up” coefficient. This makes the preferences of many more important than the few.

Additionally, by forcing staking commitments to vote, it creates a natural sybil resistance because bad actors are forced to play into positive sum game theory.

I’d love to propose this to governance sooner than later.

Another option would be to partner with an org like the Token Engineering Academy to find other potential system designs.