If Sybil attacks gaming transactions with STIP incentives are a plausible concern, then Sybil attacks on individual protocol proposal voting should also be considered a concern. The potential for profit is greater with griefing individual protocol proposal voting, as it’s not capped by grant size.
If a protocol token can be short margin traded, there is an opportunity for significantly more profit using the ancient Italian gambit (gambetto, before chess), the act of tripping someone with the leg to make them fall. For example, voting Against & Abstain can be used maliciously against an individual competitor protocol, enabling predictable profitable short margin trades or price drops for profitable spot trades.
The DAO does not conduct Sybil checks. This absence of systems to monitor for Sybil and self-dealing necessitates proposal bundling. When proposals are voted on individually, it creates an opportunity for profitable Sybil attacks and facilitates self-dealing. On the other hand, bundling aligns interests; it becomes highly implausible for many attacks to affect the entire bundle without being obvious and unprofitable.
Preliminary network analysis of STIP round one, shows self-dealing happens. A delegate, not MUX, who openly opposed and voted against a particular protocol, has profited from trading(last day of STIP voting) the token of the protocol they both, openly advocated against & voted against. Individual proposals cater to self-interest when there are no systems to conduct Sybil & self-dealing checks.
Finally, I agree that certain projects ought to be excluded, but on verifiable, testable, objective values regarding security and trust. For instance, hypothetically, if they deploy into production unaudited contracts, omit critical information from incentives proposals or finger prints link to a sybil attack.