April Participants
A total of 34 participants enrolled.
You can see the full list here.
Votings Breakdown
During the month, there were a total of 3 Snapshot Votes:
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Off-chain decision making (non-constitutional)
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Off-chain temperature check (non-binding)
As a reminder, the budget for this quarter was set at the time of the vote that approved this program:
Incentive Budget per Quarter
| Proposal type | Incentive Budget | Payout Cap | Minimum voting power |
|---|---|---|---|
| On-chain constitutional quorum | 15,000 USD | 700 USD | 200k ARB |
| On-chain non-constitutional quorum | 7,000 USD | 500 USD | 200k ARB |
| Off-chain decision making (non-constitutional) | 7,000 USD | 500 USD | 200k ARB |
| Off-chain election | 7,000 USD | 500 USD | 200k ARB |
| Off-chain temperature check (non-binding) | 5,000 USD | 300 USD | 200k ARB |
Table 1: Incentive Budget 1st quarter
April Results
You can see the sheets with the results here.
Of all the participating delegates, 14 were eligible to receive rewards.
| Delegate | Proposals Voted | Total Rewards ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Arana Digital | 3 | $1,300.00 |
| Areta | 3 | $1,300.00 |
| DZack23 | 3 | $1,300.00 |
| Griff | 3 | $1,300.00 |
| MaxLomu | 3 | $1,300.00 |
| Mihal | 3 | $1,300.00 |
| Reverie | 3 | $1,300.00 |
| Jojo | 3 | $1,225.98 |
| L2BEAT | 3 | $1,000.00 |
| Layer3 | 3 | $927.58 |
| Uniswap Delegation | 3 | $924.11 |
| Zeptimus | 3 | $671.84 |
| cp0x | 3 | $350.49 |
| GMX | 3 | $300.00 |
| TOTAL | $14,500 |
Rewards in USD: $14,500.00
Metrics
Participation
Participation reached 64.71% across the 34 participating delegates. Of these 34, 15 had a monthly participation rate below 75%, and as a result, these delegates were not eligible for rewards.
We will reach out to them privately to better understand the reasons behind the missed votes and offer support going forward, with the goal of enabling them to meet the requirements in future periods.
Rationales Requirement
In accordance with this requirement, we hereby report the following on behalf of the delegates registered in this program:
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On average, 68.18% of the participants who voted submitted a rationale
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The remaining 31.82% were excluded from rewards despite having voted on the proposal, as required by the guidelines.
Voting Power
Delegates participating in the program contributed the following voting power (for this analysis, broken down by voting category):
-
Off-chain decision making (non-constitutional)
- Improvements to the Arbitrum Audit Program: 107,643,549 ARB
-
Off-chain temperature check (non-binding)
-
Transfer 6,000 ETH and Idle Stablecoins from the Treasury to the Treasury Management Portfolio: 107,637,009 ARB
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[Constitutional] AIP: ArbOS 60 Elara: 108,693,295 ARB
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Incentivized Voting Power
After analyzing the delegates’ voting participation rates, their compliance with the requirement to provide rationales, and the voting power they have contributed to the proposals, we can calculate the incentivized voting power:
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Off-chain decision making (non-constitutional)
- Improvements to the Arbitrum Audit Program: 62,746,244 ARB - 58.29%
-
Off-chain temperature check (non-binding)
-
Transfer 6,000 ETH and Idle Stablecoins from the Treasury to the Treasury Management Portfolio: 62,746,244 ARB - 58.29%
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[Constitutional] AIP: ArbOS 60 Elara: 60,638,764 ARB - 55.79%
-
Economics
As previously established, a budget equivalent to USD 7,000 was allocated for off-chain decision-making (non-constitutional) and USD 5,000 for each Off-chain temperature check (non-binding)
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For off-chain decision-making (non-constitutional) votes, USD 0.0001115604625 was allocated per vote on average (or, viewed differently, 8,963.75 ARB per dollar allocated).
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For Off-chain temperature check (non-binding) votes, USD 0.00006081728275 was allocated per vote on average (or, viewed differently, 16,451.33 ARB per dollar allocated).
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Note that this ratio does not match the one used for reward calculations in the shared sheets. This is expected due to the reward cap. The ratio used in the sheets is purely a mathematical construct intended to redistribute the remaining budget among delegates who do not reach the cap, ensuring that 100% of the originally allocated budget is distributed.
Conclusions
April 2026 showed less engagement across the three incentivized proposals (if we compare it with the previous month), with less voting power deployed in each category. At the same time, the month underscored how strict participation and rationale rules shape outcomes: while overall program participation was healthy, a meaningful share of enrolled delegates did not meet the 75% monthly participation threshold, and a significant portion of those who voted did not qualify for rewards because they did not publish the required rationales on time.
The incentive design translated into $14,500 distributed across 14 eligible delegates, reflecting both compliance and the redistribution mechanics described in the workbook. Going forward, the program will continue to use these monthly reports to monitor participation and rationale compliance, follow up with delegates who fell short of eligibility, and refine support so more participants can meet the requirements in subsequent periods.
In parallel, we expect to work on any adjustments to how eligibility is applied that are warranted, so that the framework remains aligned with the program’s primary aim (rewarding active voting) while preserving clarity around supporting expectations (such as rationales and participation thresholds). The intention is to reduce instances where delegates who vote in good faith miss rewards for secondary or procedural reasons, without lowering the bar for transparency or accountability.