March Participants
A total of 36 participants enrolled.
You can see the full list here.
Votings Breakdown
During the month, there were a total of 1 Snapshot Vote, 1 Tally Vote, and the Security Council Nominee Selection Phase:
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Off-chain decision making (non-constitutional):
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On-chain constitutional quorum:
As a reminder, the budget for this quarter was set at the time of the vote that approved this program:
Additionally, for the Security Council Elections: Nominee Phase, the budget and eligibility rules have been outlined in the following thread: RAD Special Budget for the Security Council Elections
March Results
You can see the sheets with the results here.
Of all the participating delegates, 13 were eligible to receive rewards.
| Delegate | Proposals Voted | Total Rewards ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Areta | 3 | $1,900.00 |
| DZack23 | 3 | $1,900.00 |
| Griff | 3 | $1,900.00 |
| Jojo | 3 | $1,900.00 |
| L2BEAT | 3 | $1,900.00 |
| Uniswap Delegation | 3 | $1,900.00 |
| Zeptimus | 3 | $1,900.00 |
| cp0x | 3 | $1,900.00 |
| MaxLomu | 3 | $1,200.00 |
| GMX | 3 | $1,200.00 |
| Camelot | 3 | $700.00 |
| Arana Digital | 3 | $700.00 |
| Layer3 | 3 | $500.00 |
| TOTAL | $19,500 |
Rewards in USD: $19,500.00
Note: Arana published their rationale for the Security Council Elections: Nominee Phase three hours after the deadline, but we decided to include it as valid.
Metrics
Participation
Participation reached 72.22% across the 36 participating delegates. Of these 36, 20 had a monthly participation rate below 75%, and as a result, these delegates were not eligible for rewards.
Rationales Requirement
In accordance with this requirement, we hereby report the following on behalf of the delegates registered in this program:
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On average, 61.31% of the participants who voted submitted a rationale
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The remaining 38.69% were excluded from rewards despite having voted on the proposal, as required by the guidelines.
Voting Power
Delegates participating in the program contributed the following average voting power (for this analysis, broken down by voting category):
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Off-chain decision making (non-constitutional): 134,397,362 ARB
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On-chain constitutional quorum: 174,700,934 ARB
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Security Council Nominee Selection Phase: 81,537,573 ARB
Incentivized Voting Power
After analyzing the delegates’ voting participation rates, their compliance with the requirement to provide rationales, and the voting power they have contributed to the proposals, we can calculate the incentivized voting power:
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Off-chain decision making (non-constitutional): 54,677,833 ARB - 40.68%
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On-chain constitutional quorum: 57,558,751 ARB - 32.95%
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Security Council Nominee Selection Phase: 43,196,663 ARB - 52.98%
Economics
As previously established, a budget equivalent to USD 7,000 was allocated for off-chain decision-making (non-constitutional) and USD 15,000 for On-chain constitutional quorum and Security Council Nominee Selection Phase votes:
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For Off-chain decision making (non-constitutional) votes, USD 0.0001005892095 was allocated per vote on average (or, viewed differently, 9,941.42 ARB per dollar allocated).
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For On-chain constitutional quorum votes, USD 0.00012161 was allocated per vote on average (or, viewed differently, 8,222.68 ARB per dollar allocated).
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For Security Council Nominee Selection Phase votes, USD 0.00016205 was allocated per vote on average (or, viewed differently, 6,170.95 ARB per dollar allocated).
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Note that this ratio does not match the one used for reward calculations in the shared sheets. This is expected due to the reward cap. The ratio used in the sheets is purely a mathematical construct intended to redistribute the remaining budget among delegates who do not reach the cap, ensuring that 100% of the originally allocated budget is distributed.
Conclusions
March 2026 showed strong engagement across the three incentivized proposals, with material voting power deployed in each category. At the same time, the month underscored how strict participation and rationale rules shape outcomes: while overall program participation was healthy, a meaningful share of enrolled delegates did not meet the 75% monthly participation threshold, and a significant portion of those who voted did not qualify for rewards because they did not publish the required rationales on time.
The incentive design translated into $19,500 distributed across 13 eligible delegates, reflecting both compliance and the redistribution mechanics described in the workbook. Going forward, the program will continue to use these monthly reports to monitor participation and rationale compliance, follow up with delegates who fell short of eligibility, and refine support so more participants can meet the requirements in subsequent periods.
In parallel, we expect to work in coordination with OpCo to review whether any adjustments to how eligibility is applied are warranted, so that the framework remains aligned with the program’s primary aim (rewarding active voting) while preserving clarity around supporting expectations (such as rationales and participation thresholds). The intention is to reduce instances where delegates who vote in good faith miss rewards for secondary or procedural reasons, without lowering the bar for transparency or accountability.