Executive summary
August 2026 counted three governance actions, down from five in July, so the monthly participation threshold dropped back to ≥ 50% (≥ 2/3 votes). Two were on-chain constitutional votes on the Core governor; one was an off-chain Snapshot decision. All three used the 2Q2026 budget schedule with no exceptions. Unlike July, no proposal carried legacy rates.
Across three proposals, 32 enrolled delegates cast votes on 78 delegate-proposal instances (81.25% program participation). 27 delegates received $25,000.00 in total RAD rewards, with full budget utilisation on all three proposal sheets. 48 of 78 voted instances (61.54%) had an on-time public rationale. Delegates who voted without a timely rationale remained eligible where monthly participation and minimum VP rules were met, with a 10% trim on that proposal’s payout.
Compared with July 2026 (five votes, 75% threshold, $23,000 envelope): August had a smaller cohort (32 vs 35), higher aggregate participation (81.25% vs 66.86%), a broadly similar rationale rate (61.54% vs 59.83%), a larger envelope ($25,000 vs $23,000) and more delegates paid (27 vs 21).
What changed vs July
| July 2026 | August 2026 | |
|---|---|---|
| Proposals counted | 5 | 3 |
| Participation threshold | ≥ 75% | ≥ 50% |
| Budget envelope | $23,000 | $25,000 |
| Enrolled delegates | 35 | 32 |
| Delegates paid | 21 | 27 |
| Rationale penalty | 10% | 10% |
Two of those movements are mechanical rather than behavioural, and they are the ones most easily misread.
The threshold moved because the calendar did. The 75% bar applies at five or more proposals; below that it is 50%. August’s three proposals put the month back on the lower bar, so a delegate voting two of three qualifies where two of five would not have. That alone accounts for a large part of the jump from 21 to 27 paid.
The envelope grew on fewer votes. August carried two on-chain constitutional votes at $10,000 each, the most expensive category in the schedule, plus one off-chain decision at $5,000. A three-proposal month weighted toward on-chain constitutional work is worth more than a five-proposal month weighted toward off-chain votes.
Budget schedule applied
| Proposal | Category | Budget / cap |
|---|---|---|
| Constitutional AIP: ArbOS61 Elara Upgrade | On-chain constitutional | $10,000 / $550 |
| [Constitutional] AIP: Security Council Election Process Improvements | On-chain constitutional | $10,000 / $550 |
| Arbitrum Security Program | Off-chain decision-making | $5,000 / $400 |
The Arbitrum Security Program arrived off-chain but is the final decision on the matter: no on-chain vote follows it, it makes no new treasury request, and it sets the program running directly. It was therefore treated as off-chain decision-making rather than a temperature check.
August participants
$25,000.00 distributed across 27 delegates.
| Delegate | Proposals voted | Rewards |
|---|---|---|
| DZack23.eth | 3 | $1,500.00 |
| L2BEAT | 3 | $1,500.00 |
| yoav.eth | 3 | $1,500.00 |
| Griff Green | 3 | $1,466.36 |
| SEED Gov | 3 | $1,374.32 |
| Camelot | 3 | $1,350.00 |
| GFX Labs | 3 | $1,347.48 |
| MUX Protocol | 3 | $1,346.53 |
| GMX | 3 | $1,330.25 |
| Arana Digital | 3 | $1,313.81 |
| Areta | 3 | $1,313.37 |
| olimpio | 3 | $1,294.11 |
| MaxLomu | 3 | $1,208.57 |
| Merlyn Labs | 2 | $1,068.86 |
| Gauntlet | 2 | $990.00 |
| Reverie | 2 | $895.00 |
| JoJoTheCow | 3 | $894.71 |
| Cornell Blockchain | 3 | $849.69 |
| Aave | 2 | $826.45 |
| UniswapDAO | 3 | $471.96 |
| Layer3 | 3 | $390.44 |
| Today in DeFi Research | 3 | $361.84 |
| Zeptimus | 3 | $95.73 |
| Axia Network | 3 | $95.60 |
| cp0x | 3 | $79.26 |
| Lampros DAO | 3 | $68.93 |
| Sov | 3 | $66.73 |
Not paid (August): Whizwang, Limes.eth, Michigan Blockchain, Mihal.eth, Mikael Bondum.
Voting breakdown
Three proposals counted toward August RAD participation and rewards:
1. Constitutional AIP: ArbOS61 Elara Upgrade
- Type: On-chain, Core governor (constitutional)
- Budget / cap: $10,000 · $550 / delegate
- Vote end (UTC): 2026-08-01 11:31
- Links: Vote · Forum
- RAD voters: 27 / 32 (84.4% of enrolled)
- On-time rationales (among voters): 16 (59.3%)
2. [Constitutional] AIP: Security Council Election Process Improvements
- Type: On-chain, Core governor (constitutional)
- Budget / cap: $10,000 · $550 / delegate
- Vote end (UTC): 2026-08-14 09:36
- Links: Vote · Forum
- RAD voters: 27 / 32 (84.4% of enrolled)
- On-time rationales (among voters): 15 (55.6%)
3. Arbitrum Security Program
Participation
| July 2026 | August 2026 | |
|---|---|---|
| Enrolled delegates | 35 | 32 |
| Proposals | 5 | 3 |
| Aggregate participation | 66.86% | 81.25% |
| Delegates with 100% | 18 | 23 |
| Delegates with 60% to 80% | 6 | 4 |
| Delegates with 20% to 40% | 6 | 1 |
| Delegates with 0% | 5 | 4 |
| Met monthly threshold | 21 | 27 |
The four delegates at 67% cleared August’s 50% bar comfortably. Whizwang at 33% did not.
Zero participation. August’s four delegates at 0% were limes.eth, Michigan Blockchain, mihal.eth and Mikael Bondum. Looking across the last three months:
| Delegate | June | July | August |
|---|---|---|---|
| limes.eth | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| Michigan Blockchain | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| Mikael Bondum | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| mihal.eth | n/a | active | 0% |
Three delegates (limes.eth, Michigan Blockchain and Mikael Bondum) have now recorded 0% for three consecutive months.
Rationale requirement
| July 2026 | August 2026 | |
|---|---|---|
| Vote instances cast | 117 | 78 |
| With an on-time rationale | 70 (59.83%) | 48 (61.54%) |
| Without | 47 | 30 |
The Arbitrum Security Program drew the strongest rationale rate among voters at 70.8%; the Security Council election process vote was weakest at 55.6%. The Security Program was the month’s only off-chain vote and the only one with an active discussion thread running alongside the vote, which is the most plausible explanation for the gap.
Five of the 30 missing rationales were late rather than absent: written, but outside the five-day window. Late and missing carry the same 10% trim, though they are different behaviours. The five were SEED Gov, GMX and Reverie on the Elara upgrade, and Sov and GMX on the Security Council vote.
Seven delegates voted on every proposal available to them and wrote no rationale for any of them: Aave, Camelot, GFX Labs, MUX Protocol, olimpio, Layer3 and Lampros DAO. Rationale coverage remains the single largest source of forgone rewards in the program.
Voting power and incentivized VP
| Proposal | Total VP | Incentivized VP | Incentivized % |
|---|---|---|---|
| ArbOS61 Elara Upgrade | 155,601,094 | 155,601,094 | 100.0% |
| SC Election Process Improvements | 148,448,091 | 145,751,900 | 98.2% |
| Arbitrum Security Program | 133,529,534 | 133,529,534 | 100.0% |
Incentivized VP was effectively total this month. The only shortfall is @whizwang’s 2.70M on the Security Council vote, zeroed by the monthly participation gate rather than by the VP floor. This is a change from July, where delegates were also excluded for sitting below the 200,000 VP minimum.
Conclusions and observations
August returned to a three-proposal calendar and a 50% threshold after two consecutive five-proposal months, while running the 2Q2026 budget schedule uniformly for the first time.
1. The paid cohort grew because the bar moved, not because delegates voted more. Twenty-seven delegates were paid against July’s 21. The threshold falling from 75% to 50% is most of that. There is a real improvement underneath it, since among delegates who voted at all 92.9% of possible votes were cast, but the headline number overstates it.
2. Participation concentrated rather than broadened. Twenty-three of 32 delegates voted on all three proposals, the highest full-participation share the program has recorded. At the same time four delegates voted on nothing at all, three of them for the third consecutive month. The middle of the distribution has thinned out.
3. Rationale coverage barely moved and remains the main leak. 61.54% against July’s 59.83%. Seven delegates who voted on everything available to them wrote nothing, and a further five wrote late. Between them, missing and late rationales trimmed a meaningful share of the envelope away from the delegates who earned it and toward those who documented their reasoning.
4. The cap bound harder than usual. With only three proposals and two carrying $550 caps, three delegates (DZack23.eth, L2BEAT and yoav.eth) reached the per-proposal ceiling on every vote and took the maximum $1,500. In a month with more proposals the same voting power spreads across more sheets and binds less often.
Payments
August rewards were distributed on 3 September 2026 in a single transfer from the RAD multisig. Rewards are denominated in USD and paid in ARB, converted at a 7-day TWAP of $0.09480180 per ARB, measured 26 August to 2 September over hourly closes and cross-checked across three venues.
You can find the payment transaction here.