Rewarding Active Delegates (RAD) Program

[Michigan_Blockchain]

There is certainly a risk of AI slop in any voting rationale. It’s fair to allow for some subjectivity in determining whether a particular rationale is AI-generated. If it’s egregious, delegate rewards should not be given.

The reality is we all have access to GenAI, and use it in our workflows in different ways. To the extent that you cannot tell the difference between a human or AI, we have to accept the fact that the two inform each other.

I believe we should execute on this proposal, and if AI slop drastically increases, then new mechanisms could be put in place to adress the issue. I’m not entirely confident that legitimate delegates will suddenly resort to AI the second this proposal is passed.

[pedrob]

I vote in favor of this proposal.

The design introduces a clear and concrete incentive to vote and to share the rationale behind that vote, so that there is public signaling of the stakeholders vision and alignment with the different proposed paths.

The reduction in amounts aligns with the lower workload required under this system. With the OpCo in place, there is now a full-time team whose responsibilities include facilitating the stakeholders engagement with the DAO, digesting information, and enabling a strong feedback loop to support decision-making, while preventing an excessive burden on those who must dedicate their time to building their products.

Lastly, I consider this proposal to be one of several ongoing initiatives aimed at strengthening Arbitrum’s governance. It should not be treated or evaluated as the sole solution, but rather as part of a broader, comprehensive effort to reinforce our governance processes and stakeholders engagement.

*This vote and opinion are my own and do not represent the OAT nor the views of any of its members

[Zeptimus]

I will be voting FOR this proposal. While I believe there are still areas that can be improved, the alternatives on the table make the direction clear. When choosing between extending DIP 1.7 or adopting this RAD framework, this proposal is the better option and moves in the right direction.

I agree with blockful on the 200k VP threshold. Given the simplified requirements and the removal of subjective assessments, I believe participation could be open to anyone, with rewards calculated in proportion to each ARB of voting power. One could even argue that two delegates with 100k each provide more value than one delegate with 200k. Two rationales, two perspectives, as long as compensation is proportional to VP.

I also agree with paulofonseca on removing the payout caps. Getting rid of caps would avoid unnecessary speculation or conspiracy theories while costing the DAO the same amount overall. If the incentive budget is fixed for each proposal, redistribution through caps does not change the total cost. It simply distorts how the rewards are distributed.

Something I have been vocal about before is vesting. Delegate incentives paid in ARB should promote alignment over the long term and a healthier governance culture. Vesting payouts would encourage delegates to think in terms of multiple years, and one could even justify a higher reward rate for vested payments. This is especially true considering that ARB appreciation over the long term could naturally compensate participants.

[Entropy]

Entropy has voted against the RAD program.

Since the passing of DIP v1.5 a little over a year ago, the conversation surrounding delegate incentives has continuously been a polarizing topic and consumed a large amount of delegate bandwidth. To be clear, this is not to discredit SeedGov as they took on a very challenging task with DIP v1.5-1.7, but with the RAD program requiring rationales we fear that we’re heading back down the same path.

At this point, Entropy views the discussion as having largely devolved into something non-productive, similar to incentives pre-detox period. Additionally, our team is not convinced that incentives for voting are a worthwhile expense, especially with the recent influx of new delegations that has raised the amount of active voting power and the upcoming DVP-Quorum proposal. When considering that the Arbitrum Foundation is continuing to engage in re-delegation efforts with large tokenholders and with this program the DAO would be paying ~$30k a month for voting incentives (based on September and October data), Entropy believes it is more prudent to go without any delegate rewards for several months to observe the impacts and reset the conversation.

[dzack23]

I’ve signaled my vote in favor or this proposal. I’m of the opinion that delegate incentives in some form are necessary for the long term viability of the DAO, for the simple reason that we should not reasonably expect long term active and thoughtful participation from unpaid labor. I think that regarding the growth in delegated votes / continued participation during periods without incentives, “past performance is not indicative of future results”; in fact, given the ongoing proposals of incentive programs — including occasional suggestions of retroactive rewards — it seems plausible that a not-insignificant amount of voting / forum activity has been motivated by the hope/expectation of some such program being put in place eventually.

While I think much of the feedback and criticism has been valuable, I don’t see any of it as decisive and believe that blocking the proposal would be a case of letting perfect be the enemy of the good (presuming one believes having an some form of incentive program is worthwhile to begin with). E.g.,

- Concerns about spam / AI-slop forum posts are valid, but this is ultimately unpreventable. Given that this requirement likely won’t make a major difference in either direction (as discussed, we’d expect to see active forum participation regardless), I believe that all things equal this requirement is a positive one to nudge things in the direction of transparency. I would trust OpCo with the authority to judge cases of obvious, egregious abuse and withhold rewards accordingly.

- Questions around the cadences of snapshots can be fairly easily clarified, and AFAICT, no option should impose any significant administrative overhead.

Etc.

Some suggested modifications that were brought up (namely by @blockful / @Zeptimus / @cp0x ) that I would support:

• 200K seems like an unnecessarily high minimum voting power, and could even perversely incentivize consolidation where we’d rather encourage more independent voters; I’d support including a lower tier either in this program or a separate one.
• Vesting schedule for rewards (as per @Zeptimus ).

Overall, I believe that this proposal is a good starting point and improvement over prior incentive programs with its emphasis on simplicity and objective criteria. Affirming my support.

[Mehdi_eth]

Voted in favor, although I couldn’t be part of the program due to having less than the required 200K $ARB VP.

After reading the discussions, what really surprised me is that some of the DAO’s service providers—who charge millions of dollars a year and generate controversy every year around their budget—are complaining that spending time and resources on this initiative isn’t worth it. Why? Maybe because they are already safe and the rest doesn’t matter as much.

When the DAO’s own research shows that there are pure voters who consistently participate without any incentives, a proposal like this makes a lot of sense. These voters have already proven their commitment, and this program encourages them to participate even more and formalizes them within the DAO.

Especially for Arbitrum DAO—one of the leaders in DAO experimentation and new initiatives—we’ve had several failed experiments that cost a lot. So calling this program, which helps formalize potential governance voters into active governance participants and future experts, a “waste of resources” feels completely backwards.

I’ve personally been one of these “potential voters” who eventually became a delegate. Even though I haven’t been very active on the forum lately—mainly because of the new threshold criteria and relatively low incentives compared to the time and effort required—I still maintain a relatively high voting participation rate.

So I appreciate @Arbitrum for proposing this program. I’m sure that, in the future, the market will reward us with a significant premium for having such diverse voters and delegates.

[cp0x]

Can you explain the logic behind your vote?

You voted for the highly controversial adoption of DIP version 1.7, which contained many subjective points.
And in this version, after the Foundation has truly considered all the comments and removed all subjective parameters, you’re voting against it?

This is doubly strange, since you’re essentially a superdelegate with a huge budget.
That said, I think you should have participated in the discussion of this proposal, rather than just writing about the vote itself.

[Curia]

We are voting in favor of this proposal.

The program sets up a straightforward incentive for delegates to vote and share their rationales publicly. That alone helps improve transparency and gives the community a clearer picture of how different stakeholders view each proposal. It also makes it easier for proposers to understand feedback and refine future work.

We do have one concern around the current minimum voting power requirement. It feels a bit high for where the DAO is right now, and it leaves out many active delegates. That said, this is something that can be revisited as the program runs and as more data comes in. We do not see it as a blocker to getting started.

Since Curia previously received an Arbitrum grant to build governance analytics (Arbitrum Dashboard), we are also happy to support the @OpCo by providing data on voting activity, rationale participation, and other governance signals. If our work can help the OpCo review proposals or monitor the health of the system more easily, we are glad to contribute.

Overall, this proposal moves governance in a constructive direction, and we support giving it a chance to run while continuing to refine the details as the DAO learns more.

[maxlomu]

gm, voted FOR.

This feels like a reasonable starting point for delegates. I’d still like to see more value brought by delegates beyond just voting, but I see RAD as the first step toward that, with room for contributors to add value in new ways in the future.

I think in general delegate incentives make sense: yes, most of us would probably do this for free, but RAD recognizes the actual time spent and pushes for better quality work. Clear rules also help large holders and structured groups model potential earnings and decide how they want to engage in governance.

That said, as Entropy pointed out, this topic has dominated the DAO’s attention. Hopefully passing it lets us move on and focus on what actually matters for the DAO’s future (strategy? revenue? attracting builders?). We can always iterate once we have more data.

[Griff]

I voted YES, but I want to mention that I agree with a lot of what @Entropy is saying, a voting reward detox could be healthy. But also the work has been done and this is a great foundation to build off… so why wait. I like that this vote is close and I think we win whether it succeeds or fails.

I also agree that we’ve spent way too much time talking about delegate incentives and I don’t want us getting stuck but I believe passing this through with clear rules and expectations should allow the DAO to focus. If this proposal fails, I hope we can shelf it for at least 2 months.

ALSO I want to reiterate that I would have loved to see a design that creates long term incentive alignment. Things like rewarding with locked tokens or even increased delegation. That’s the biggest thing missing in the current proposal.. but i think it could be added in later.

I think the DAO needs closure on this topic so we can focus on more meaningful work. RAD sets a baseline and lets us move on. The way I look at it is Arbitrum got this massive advisory board (delegates) to receive advice from.

Side note: It’s very interesting to know how much every vote will cost and how this will affect our proposal backlog and how the DAO will use delegates’ time. This system shows clearly how expensive it is to make a vote in the DAO and I think that is pretty cool.

[stonecoldpat]

Hi all,

I just wanted to drop a quick comment on the vesting. This is something that can be added after the vote. I think main bottleneck right now is finding a reasonable solution for creating a batch of vesting contracts per month via safe.

[Euphoria]

The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.

For the sake of maintaining quorum and ensuring that important proposals do not get stuck in gridlock, we see this program as a necessary step. Incentivizing active participation will help keep the DAO functioning smoothly and reduce voter apathy over time.

On the aspect of posting rationales, we are definitely in favour. It is a basic principle every delegate should follow. Sharing rationales not only adds transparency but also helps delegators clearly see how and why their delegate voted. Many delegates, including several with less than 200k voting power, already follow this practice, and formalizing it through a structured program will only strengthen governance standards.

We hope that future iterations will review the 200k ARB minimum threshold so more active mid-size delegates can take part, and that clear reporting standards are maintained to track cost-effectiveness and participation impact.

[CastleCapital]

We’re voting FOR. After months of back-and-forth, RAD feels like a practical baseline: clear mechanics, simple ops, and rationales back in the mix to get large delegates voting and explaining their points of view.

Separately (outside RAD), we’d like to see a stakeholder/participant incentive track that rewards impact and is anchored to explicit DAO goals. This would be unrelated to VP and the piece that will align day-to-day contributions with where the DAO is trying to go.

[blockful]

We voted FOR the proposal.

There are some changes that should be made to make the RAD more open to smaller delegates, and we do not fully agree with the per-proposal payment logic.

However, with the OpCo and the PM in place, we believe that adjustments can be made throughout the program to make RAD more efficient and inclusive.

[gi0rgos]

Thank you for the proposal.

Since this “war” continues, and I’m using the same word I use in my delegate thread, I will express myself very openly.

I believe that this entire issue is a clash of conflicting individuals or entities within the DAO. The only thing we have achieved so far is division. The numbers in this proposal show it clearly: Polarization!

I see the repeated argument that we are trying to reduce costs. However, the DAO gives (or gave) far larger amounts of money to teams or programs that in no way justify receiving such levels of funding. Either because they produce no revenue, or because they fail to produce the expected revenue. So why such hostility toward the delegates, who are supposed to be the foundation of the DAO?

The chart below was created using data I pulled today, December 10th, from Karmaq.

Below 500,000 total voting power sits 40% of the top 20 delegates, with only one delegate (5%) in the 200,000–500,000 range.

Therefore, this proposal at the moment is, in my opinion, punitive toward smaller delegates (<200000 tokens).

It would be perfectly reasonable to include a clause that delegates with less than 200,000 voting power count as (for example) two delegates collectively, even if more individuals qualify (as is the case now), and the amount that would normally correspond to two delegates could be distributed among them proportionally to their Karmaq score. Such an approach would increase the sense of equality within the ecosystem and make people feel that the time they invest actually matters.

Personally, although I am among those who will feel the consequences, I am not concerned. I will continue to be part of the community as much as I can.

But why do I disagree with what is happening?

If we add up all the tokens held by delegates with less than 200,000, it amounts to more than 3 million tokens and over 70 delegates. Yesterday, December 9th, I once again saw one of our most highly funded organizations, OpCo, request brainstorming ideas for increasing revenue, either from existing programs or new ones. Yet by cutting the incentive for so many people to participate actively, you reduce the chances that someone will bring you such an idea.
Yes…in the name of cost reduction…reduce the amount they receive, but don’t push them away by offering zero.

I say all of this with full respect.
Of course, my vote will be AGAINST, based on everything stated above.

[krst]

The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and is based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.

We voted FOR.

From our perspective, RAD is a simple and direct program. While it does not address all the issues we had with previous programs, it is at least narrowly scoped and has a clear goal.

However, we share some of the reservations mentioned in this thread. It is important to keep in mind that this program incentivizes (and therefore expects) only voting with rationale, nothing more. A “vote + rationale” rule naturally invites template-style posts, and in our opinion, it is perfectly acceptable to have them. If someone doesn’t have many thoughts on a given proposal, we would prefer them to publish a short, template-based rationale rather than try to produce a multi-page explanation of what ChatGPT thinks about the matter. We trust that delegates who want to express their voice on decisions made in the DAO and present extensively their point of view will continue doing so, with or without incentives. After all, we believe that the impact that a thoughtful, reasonable, and mindfully presented voice in the DAO has on the future of the Arbitrum ecosystem is itself a reward and an incentive.

That said, we are not sure if the budgets are set correctly for the given scope. In our opinion, for this scope, they could have been set lower, especially since they put a certain pricetag for each vote - setting that expectation now can lead to voting apathy in the future if we lower the rewards or cancel them altogether.

Furthermore, OpCo’s discretion to adjust or pause rewards is useful, but it should be exercised transparently to avoid unpredictability and any potential abuse of power.

Finally, we understand that OpCo is still deciding whether to appoint a Program Manager. Whatever the decision, we would welcome a short public note explaining the choice, who will be accountable (OpCo itself, the Arbitrum Foundation, or a PM), and the scope, KPIs, reporting cadence, and expected cost. If a PM is appointed, please clarify the selection criteria and SLAs; if not, outline how operations will run without one and who the main point of contact will be.

[ITUblockchain]

We voted abstain for this proposal. We appreciate the intention behind this program and the broader effort to encourage more consistent delegate participation. Having delegates actively vote and share their reasoning adds transparency and provides valuable insight for proposers who rely on genuine feedback to improve their work.

But, we share the concern regarding the current minimum voting power requirement. The threshold is quite high and excludes a significant number of delegates who are active, who participate in votes, and who take the time to explain their positions. These contributors strengthen the governance process, yet under the current structure they are unable to benefit from the incentives.

Because of this, we are not in favor at this stage

[paulofonseca]

voting Abstain on this offchain vote because I will receive rewards from this program if this proposal passes.

[Codeknight]

@paulofonseca

the requirement for there to be a vote rationale posted for each vote, so delegates get paid, will incentivize delegates to post slop AI vote rationales and polluting the forum, just to get the reward.

That has been my experience. Rationales are often generic and not challenged because its so subjective.

If it is required, please don’t have people post them to the forum in their own threads. Then all the top threads are delegate threads.

[0xDonPepe]

I voted abstain, acknowledging the need for a delegate incentive program, but not fully convinced by the current implementation.