There is certainly a risk of AI slop in any voting rationale. It’s fair to allow for some subjectivity in determining whether a particular rationale is AI-generated. If it’s egregious, delegate rewards should not be given.
The reality is we all have access to GenAI, and use it in our workflows in different ways. To the extent that you cannot tell the difference between a human or AI, we have to accept the fact that the two inform each other.
I believe we should execute on this proposal, and if AI slop drastically increases, then new mechanisms could be put in place to adress the issue. I’m not entirely confident that legitimate delegates will suddenly resort to AI the second this proposal is passed.
The design introduces a clear and concrete incentive to vote and to share the rationale behind that vote, so that there is public signaling of the stakeholders vision and alignment with the different proposed paths.
The reduction in amounts aligns with the lower workload required under this system. With the OpCo in place, there is now a full-time team whose responsibilities include facilitating the stakeholders engagement with the DAO, digesting information, and enabling a strong feedback loop to support decision-making, while preventing an excessive burden on those who must dedicate their time to building their products.
Lastly, I consider this proposal to be one of several ongoing initiatives aimed at strengthening Arbitrum’s governance. It should not be treated or evaluated as the sole solution, but rather as part of a broader, comprehensive effort to reinforce our governance processes and stakeholders engagement.
*This vote and opinion are my own and do not represent the OAT nor the views of any of its members
I will be voting FOR this proposal. While I believe there are still areas that can be improved, the alternatives on the table make the direction clear. When choosing between extending DIP 1.7 or adopting this RAD framework, this proposal is the better option and moves in the right direction.
I agree with blockful on the 200k VP threshold. Given the simplified requirements and the removal of subjective assessments, I believe participation could be open to anyone, with rewards calculated in proportion to each ARB of voting power. One could even argue that two delegates with 100k each provide more value than one delegate with 200k. Two rationales, two perspectives, as long as compensation is proportional to VP.
I also agree with paulofonseca on removing the payout caps. Getting rid of caps would avoid unnecessary speculation or conspiracy theories while costing the DAO the same amount overall. If the incentive budget is fixed for each proposal, redistribution through caps does not change the total cost. It simply distorts how the rewards are distributed.
Something I have been vocal about before is vesting. Delegate incentives paid in ARB should promote alignment over the long term and a healthier governance culture. Vesting payouts would encourage delegates to think in terms of multiple years, and one could even justify a higher reward rate for vested payments. This is especially true considering that ARB appreciation over the long term could naturally compensate participants.
Since the passing of DIP v1.5 a little over a year ago, the conversation surrounding delegate incentives has continuously been a polarizing topic and consumed a large amount of delegate bandwidth. To be clear, this is not to discredit SeedGov as they took on a very challenging task with DIP v1.5-1.7, but with the RAD program requiring rationales we fear that we’re heading back down the same path.
At this point, Entropy views the discussion as having largely devolved into something non-productive, similar to incentives pre-detox period. Additionally, our team is not convinced that incentives for voting are a worthwhile expense, especially with the recent influx of new delegations that has raised the amount of active voting power and the upcoming DVP-Quorum proposal. When considering that the Arbitrum Foundation is continuing to engage in re-delegation efforts with large tokenholders and with this program the DAO would be paying ~$30k a month for voting incentives (based on September and October data), Entropy believes it is more prudent to go without any delegate rewards for several months to observe the impacts and reset the conversation.
I’ve signaled my vote in favor or this proposal. I’m of the opinion that delegate incentives in some form are necessary for the long term viability of the DAO, for the simple reason that we should not reasonably expect long term active and thoughtful participation from unpaid labor. I think that regarding the growth in delegated votes / continued participation during periods without incentives, “past performance is not indicative of future results”; in fact, given the ongoing proposals of incentive programs — including occasional suggestions of retroactive rewards — it seems plausible that a not-insignificant amount of voting / forum activity has been motivated by the hope/expectation of some such program being put in place eventually.
While I think much of the feedback and criticism has been valuable, I don’t see any of it as decisive and believe that blocking the proposal would be a case of letting perfect be the enemy of the good (presuming one believes having an some form of incentive program is worthwhile to begin with). E.g.,
- Concerns about spam / AI-slop forum posts are valid, but this is ultimately unpreventable. Given that this requirement likely won’t make a major difference in either direction (as discussed, we’d expect to see active forum participation regardless), I believe that all things equal this requirement is a positive one to nudge things in the direction of transparency. I would trust OpCo with the authority to judge cases of obvious, egregious abuse and withhold rewards accordingly.
- Questions around the cadences of snapshots can be fairly easily clarified, and AFAICT, no option should impose any significant administrative overhead.
Etc.
Some suggested modifications that were brought up (namely by @blockful / @Zeptimus / @cp0x ) that I would support:
200K seems like an unnecessarily high minimum voting power, and could even perversely incentivize consolidation where we’d rather encourage more independent voters; I’d support including a lower tier either in this program or a separate one.
Overall, I believe that this proposal is a good starting point and improvement over prior incentive programs with its emphasis on simplicity and objective criteria. Affirming my support.